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Thesis Abstract
This PhD thesis was motivated by the simple observation that the
objectives of distinct supply chain managers are often conflicting. This
problem is usually addressed via supply chain contracts that are designed
to align the incentives of the different supply chain partners to the overall
benefit of the entire supply chain, when seen as a whole. In this way, the
long-term prosperity and viability of all the firms that participate in the
supply chain can be ensured. In order to study the efficiency of different
supply chain contracts in attaining the theoretical optimum performance,
there exist a number of standard normative models that predict the
decisions of perfectly rational decision makers. But supply chain partners
might in reality not make the perfectly rational decisions that these
theoretical models predict. This may be because they may lack the required
information, or experience cognitive limitations and individual preferences
or have only a finite amount of time available. For this reason, they might
have to settle at satisficing choices. The result of these ‘boundedly rational’
decisions is a real world of different than expected interactions.
Since in this world the standard normative models retain limited predictive
power, this PhD thesis aims to explore the true efficiency of the simplest
supply chain contract that can exist, namely, the wholesale price contract.
In addition, this PhD thesis provides some useful recommendations that
aim to help supply chain managers make price and order quantity decisions
that would be better aligned with the interests of the overall supply chain.
To this end, this study applies an original approach that supplements
experiments with human subjects with Agent Based Simulation
experiments. In greater detail, informal pilot sessions with volunteers were
first conducted, during which knowledge of the underlying decision
making processes was elicited. Appropriate Agent Based Simulation
models were subsequently built based on this understanding. Later on
human subjects were asked to interact with specially designed versions of
these Agent Based Simulation models in the laboratory, so that their
consecutive decisions over time could be recorded. Statistical models were
then fitted to these data sets of decisions. The last stage of this approach
was to simulate in the corresponding Agent Based Simulation models all
possible combinations of decision models, so that statically accurate
conclusions could be inferred. This approach has been replicated for both
the simple newsvendor setting and the beer distribution game.
The results that are obtained indicate that the overall efficiency of the
wholesale price contract differs significantly from the theoretical
prediction of the corresponding standard normative models. It varies
greatly and depends largely on the interplay between the pricing and
ordering strategies that the interacting supply chain partners adopt. In view
of this, real world echelon managers are advised to use prices as an
effective mechanism to control demand and, also, keep their total supply
chain profits in mind when making their respective decisions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This PhD thesis was motivated by the simple observation that the objectives of
distinct supply chain managers are often conflicting. This is exactly what
constitutes the underlying cause of incentive misalignment in supply chains.
Supply chain incentive misalignment has numerous negative consequences and
can even hurt the long-term prosperity and viability of all the firms that
participate in a supply chain (these are defined as the distinct supply chain
partners). This problem is usually addressed via supply chain contracts that
intend to align these objectives to the overall benefit of the entire supply chain. In
respect to this, there is some analytical evidence. Nevertheless, there still remains
some anecdotal practical evidence that comes in stark contrast with the analytical
expectations. In order to explain this deviation, this PhD thesis identifies the
over-simplifying assumptions that are inherent with the existing analytical
models and, thus, recognises the limited degree to which these analytical models
can predict the decisions of human supply chain managers. To this end, it builds
on the acknowledgment that human supply chain managers may not in practice
be in a position to make perfectly rational decisions and accommodates their need
to make heterogeneous decisions that are specified by their own individual
intentions, actions and reactions. In this regard, it introduces the notion of
bounded rationality and explores the effect that bounded rationality may bring in
supply chain decision making. Building on this, this PhD thesis presents an
original and novel contribution to knowledge in a number of different aspects that
are highlighted in the remainder of this chapter.
Chapter 1- Introduction
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In greater detail, this chapter introduces the topic of this PhD thesis and
sets the background of the work that is undertaken, as explained in the following
chapters. It also presents the issues that are inherent with decision making in
supply chains and the associated complications that bounded rationality may
introduce. This chapter serves to provide some principal definitions. It also
briefly explains the reasoning that was behind this study and discusses the initial
thoughts that stimulated it.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.1 summarises the effect of
misaligned objectives in supply chains, while Section 1.2 explains how supply
chain contracts serve to address this problem. The notion of bounded rationality
and the effect that it may bring in supply chain decision making are discussed in
Section 1.3. All the above are brought together in Section 1.4 that discusses what
this PhD thesis is really about. Finally, an overview of the contents of this PhD
thesis is provided in Section 1.5.
1.1 The Effect of Misaligned Objectives in Supply Chains
A supply chain is defined as an integrated system of firms that are involved,
through upstream and downstream linkages, in the different activities that are
required to produce the final product, which is delivered to the end consumer
(e.g. Chopra and Meindl, 2007; Simchi-Levi et al, 2008). In respect to this
definition, any supply chain consists of multiple firms, each of which is managed
by different managers. Based on the information that is locally available to each
of these individuals, they make their respective pricing and purchasing decisions,
which jointly determine the overall supply chain performance. In case these
individuals share the common goal to optimize the system-wide performance,
then they behave as a ‘team’ and aim to lead the entire system to its optimum
Chapter 1- Introduction
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performance. In the opposite case, their objectives may come into conflict and,
thus, prevent the overall supply chain from attaining its optimum performance.
Allowing each organization to implement locally “optimal” policies, thus, may
lead to overall supply chain performances that are much inferior to the optimum
(Lee, 2004; Narayan and Raman, 2004; Li and Wang, 2007).
The latter can sometimes have results that are even catastrophic for the
entire supply chain’s prosperity. For example, “Wall Street still remembers the
day it heard that Cisco’s much-vaunted supply chain had snapped” (Narayan et
al, 2004: pp. 94). This was due to demand forecasts that were over-exaggerated
by $2.5 billion, which is almost half as its sales in the quarter of spring 2001.
Furthermore, “in the summer of 1997, movie fans flocked to their local
Blockbuster video stores eager to rent The English Patient and Jerry Maguire,
only to find that all available copies of it had already been checked out” (Cachon
and Lariviere, 2001: pp. 20). The results were customer frustration and lost sales.
But providing managers with the appropriate incentives that induce
optimal decisions is a non-trivial task, given the complications that the
interactions between numerous decision makers generate. The reason that the
“world's largest network-equipment provider” (Narayan et al, 2004: pp. 94)
suffered from such huge losses was the vast amounts of assembly boards and
semiconductors that Cisco’s suppliers had stockpiled in their warehouses and
over which Cisco had to assume responsibility. Cisco’s suppliers ordered
inconsistently with the sudden decrease in demand that occurred in the economic
downturn of 2001, because they were rewarded only for delivering supplies
quickly and did not assume any of the cost that was associated with excess
Chapter 1- Introduction
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inventory. In other words, the suppliers’ objectives came in direct conflict with
Cisco’s.
As for the problems with the video rental industry, they were that the cost
of a video tape was traditionally high relative to the price of a rental and the peak
popularity of a title did not last for very long. The result was that acquisition of a
sufficient number of copies could not be justified and, so, the initial peak demand
could not be entirely covered (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005).
In summary, the objectives of distinct supply chain managers are often
conflicting. In order to align these objectives to the team overall optimal benefit,
‘contracts’ or else ‘transfer payment schemes’ are extensively used. The section
that follows briefly introduces how contracts are designed to operate in supply
chains.
1.2 Supply Chain Contracts
A supply chain contract or else a transfer payment scheme fully determines the
terms of trade and the payment agreements that take place between adjacent
supply chain partners (Tsay et al, 1999; Cachon, 2003). A contract or transfer
payment scheme is said to coordinate a supply chain if it forces the aggregate
channel performance to coincide with the first-best case1 optimum performance
1The term “first-best case” is adapted from the term “first best” that is used by Lee and
Whang (1999) to reflect the overall channel performance that would be attained, if the
team optimal solution was adopted by all echelon managers (Chen, 1999) or there was a
central planner (i.e. headquarters) that had access to all sites’ inventory-related
information and made all decisions for the entire system (Lee and Whang, 1999). The
reason that this term is used is to reflect the fact that this is the absolute optimum
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(Cachon, 2003). In respect to this, its efficiency is assessed in regard to whether
it produces an aggregate channel performance that is not inferior to the first-best
case optimum performance that would be achieved in the case that the distinct
echelon2 managers behaved as a team (Lariviere, 1999; Tsay et al, 1999).
In this regard, the existing contracting literature concentrates on either
assessing a contract’s efficiency or proposing contracts that may induce the first-
best case optimum performance. The simplest contract that can exist is the
wholesale price contract, according to which there is only one incentive that may
coordinate the distinct echelon managers’ decisions to the team optimal solution,
that is, the wholesale price. But this contract has been since long analytically
established as inefficient (Lariviere and Porteus, 2001; Cachon, 2003). In greater
detail, its inability to attain the first-best case optimum performance is confirmed
via standard normative models that are built on the assumption of perfectly
rational decision makers, who are exclusively interested in optimizing their
performance that can be attained by the entire channel when seen as a whole (e.g.
Cachon, 2003; Cachon and Netessine, 2004).
2The term “echelon” is used in accordance with Clark’s (1958) definition (as found in
Clark and Scarf, 1960) to reflect a site, in which the inventory for which it is accountable
consists of: i. the inventory that exists in this site, ii. the inventory that is in transit to this
site and iii. the inventory that is on hand at a lower site [Source: Clark, A. 1958, A
dynamic, single item, multi-echelon inventory model, RM-2297, Santa Monica,
California, The RAND Corporation].
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respective individual objectives and, to this end, are assumed to have access to
perfect symmetric information3.
In order to overcome the inefficiency of the simple wholesale price
contract a number of more sophisticated transfer payment schedules have been
suggested. These proven as efficient supply chain contracts force the team
optimal solution to be adapted and, in this way, the first-best case optimum
performance to be attained. Some indicative examples are the buyback contract
(Pasternack, 1985; Lau et al, 2007), the revenue sharing contract (Cachon and
Lariviere, 2005), the quantity discount contract (Moorthy, 1987; Kolay et al,
2004), the responsibility tokens of Porteus (2000) and the simple linear transfer
payment schemes of Cachon and Zipkin (1999). The supply chain contracts that
are of relevance to this PhD thesis are reviewed in Sub-section 2.3.1. The
majority of these transfer payment schemes are built on a number of over-
simplifying assumptions, such as, for example: that the team optimum solution is
common knowledge to all partners; or that there is one firm that presumes the
responsibility of compensating the other firms and, thus, adequately allocating
the costs between them; or that all echelon managers are always willing to share
all private information with their supply chain partners without the need for being
compensated for doing so; or that the interacting firms are deprived the ability to
3The term “perfect symmetric information” is used in accordance with Cachon and
Netessine’s (2004) use to reflect the fact that exactly the same information is available to
all interacting supply chain partners. The term comes in opposition to “information
asymmetry”, a popular term in economics and contract theory, according to which one
party has more accurate or better information [Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_asymmetry , last accessed: 29/08/2010].
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make some profit of their own. For detailed surveys of all the above contracts and
reviews of the analytical results that are acquired so far the interested reader is
referred to Tsay et al. (1999), Cachon (2003) and Simchi-Levi et al. (2008).
In spite of the aforementioned contracts’ efficiency, there is some
anecdotal evidence that the wholesale price contract remains more popular
among supply chain managers, especially in industries such as the publishing and
movie rental industries (Cachon and Lariviere, 2001; Narayan and Raman, 2004;
Cachon and Lariviere, 2005). The practical prevalence of the wholesale price
contract over the efficient transfer payment schemes remains paradoxical. There
are certainly some important benefits associated with its implementation, such as,
for example, it is much simpler to be put in force, easier to administer and it only
requires one transaction to take place between each interacting party. But are
these benefits the only reasons that explain its wide popularity? Could perhaps its
true efficiency be significantly different from its corresponding theoretical
prediction? These are some intriguing questions that this PhD thesis aims to
explore. To this end, this PhD thesis recognises that supply chain managers might
in reality not make perfectly rational decisions. The section that follows discusses
how the notion of bounded rationality could affect the true efficiency that the
wholesale price contract can in practice attain. Although this PhD thesis restricts
attention to the simple wholesale price contract, similar ideas are also applicable
to the other, more complicated supply chain contracts as well. In this regard, their
true efficiency may be significantly different from their corresponding theoretical
predictions.
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1.3 Boundedly Rational Decision Makers
Supply chain managers, like all decision makers, might in reality not make
perfectly rational decisions. There are three different reasons that explain why
supply chain managers might need to compromise at non-perfectly rational
decisions, namely ‘boundedly rational’ decisions. First, they may lack the
required information, as in practice access to perfect symmetric information
might not always be possible in supply chain settings. The underlying reason is
that most supply chain partners would not be willing to share their private
information with their partners, at least not without being compensated in some
way for doing so (e.g. Cachon and Fisher, 2000; Chen, 2003). Second, supply
chain managers may “experience limits in formulating and solving complex
problems and in processing information” (Simon 1957 in Williamson 1981: pp.
553), and, thus, suffer from limited knowledge and finite cognitive abilities
(Sterman, 1989; Simon, 1996; North and Macal, 2007; Gilbert, 2008). Last,
supply chain managers might only have a finite amount of time available to make
their respective decisions. That is why they might have to settle at reasonable,
thus satisficing, choices.
For these reasons, supply chain partners might not be in a position to
search the entire solution space and, thus, identify the optimal decisions; they are
boundedly rational (Simon, 1996; North and Macal, 2007; Gilbert, 2008). Since,
in view of their bounded rationality, the standard normative models that are built
on the assumption of optimizing objectives lose their accuracy, the notion of
bounded rationality complicates the decision making that takes place in supply
chains further.
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In greater detail, different decision makers seem to be characterised by
individual preferences, limited knowledge and finite cognitive abilities, which are
in turn responsible for the behavioural biases that influence significantly their
respective decisions (Camerer, 1995; Loch and Wu, 2007; Gino and Pisano,
2008). In other words, not all supply chain managers are anticipated to have
exactly the same priorities, knowledge and abilities. Further to this, their
preferences, information and limitations are expected to vary to a great extent.
Therefore, their respective decisions are expected to deviate from the perfectly
rational decisions to varying degrees. The result is that different supply chain
managers exhibit different degrees of bounded rationality or else are perceived as
heterogeneously boundedly rational. Thus, a “richer real world environment”
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) of different than expected interactions is
anticipated to emerge.
In this emerging richer world, interactions become very different from
their corresponding analytical expectations. As different supply chain managers
appear to have different priorities and abilities, they adopt different strategies
and, thus, make significantly different decisions. Hence, the theory – driven,
standard normative models retain little power to predict supply chain partners’
decisions. In a similar way, their predictions of a contract’s resulting efficiency
may also become out of date. In respect to this, the wholesale price contract
might perform significantly differently than theoretically predicted. It is also
possible that it leads to the first-best case optimum performance. As such, the
wholesale price contract’s practical efficiency would offer an additional
important explanation for its wide practical popularity, beyond just its simplicity.
It would also justify its dominance over contracts that are analytically proven as
efficient, especially since their true performances might also be significantly
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different than predicted. This constitutes the reason that this PhD thesis aims at
exploring the true efficiency of the wholesale price contract under conditions of
real human interactions. Section 1.4 sheds light on what exactly the object of this
PhD thesis is.
1.4 What is this thesis about?
The purpose of this PhD thesis is to explore the true efficiency of the wholesale
price contract in human supply chain managers’ interactions, that is, given the
heterogeneous bounded rationality that is inherent with their decision making.
Hence, the main question that drives the research that is undertaken in this thesis
is:
“Could the wholesale price contract in practice generate the first-best case
maximum performance of a supply chain setting and if so, under which specific
conditions?”.
The reason that this is an interesting question is because it can explain the
paradoxical wide popularity of the wholesale price contract in a variety of
different settings. As for the conditions under which the wholesale price
contract’s efficiency could be attained (that is provided that this efficiency is
feasible), these conditions could reveal some important managerial insights.
These favourable conditions would also highlight some recommendations that
would help supply chain managers to ensure the efficiency of their interactions
under the wholesale price contract.
In respect to this research question, the main objectives that drive this PhD
thesis can be formulated as follows:
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1. To develop a methodology that revisits the over-simplifying assumptions
of the existing theory-driven, standard normative models. This
methodology needs to be apt to predict accurately the decisions of human
supply chain decision makers.
2. To assess how different the decisions of human supply chain decision
makers are to the corresponding predictions of the standard normative
models when the wholesale price contract is assumed to be in force.
3. To investigate the efficiency of the wholesale price contract when human
supply chain decision makers interact with each other.
4. To consider the impact that different pricing strategies have on the
wholesale price contract’s efficiency.
In order to address these questions, this PhD thesis uses as computational
frameworks two distinct settings: the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer
Distribution Game. The Newsvendor Problem is the simplest supply chain setting
that can exist, where there is only one supplier and one retailer that interact with
each other. The reason that this setting is studied is because it constitutes the
fundamental building block of any supply chain configuration. The Beer
Distribution Game represents a periodic review production-distribution supply
chain with serial echelons, which operates in a de-centralised fashion. The reason
that this setting is chosen to be studied is it mimics the material, information and
financial flows of any general type, serial multi-echelon supply chain. The reason
that these two settings are selected is because, combined, they provide a broader
view of the way that general type, serial multi-echelon supply chains operate. The
exact specifications of the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game
are provided in Sub-sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.1, respectively.
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The work carried out in this PhD thesis is considered to be an original and
novel contribution to knowledge for a number of reasons. First, it develops and
applies a novel approach to answer the main research question and, also, address
the research objectives. The reason that this approach is considered novel is
because it is the first study in the field that supplements the laboratory
experiments with simulation experiments. The corresponding simulation models
have been calibrated via the results from the laboratory experiments, which were
run with human subjects. In this way, the requirements of multiple interactions,
prolonged interaction lengths and multiple replications, which would not have
been possible if only experiments with human subjects were run, could be
simultaneously addressed. The end result of this novel approach is that it
successfully addresses the existing literature gaps, which are identified in Section
2.4 (s. Table 2.5).
Second, this PhD thesis extends for the first time the wholesale price
contract to a more complicated supply chain setting than the Newsvendor
Problem. It applies for the first time the wholesale price contract to the Beer
Distribution Game, which is an accurate representation of any general type, serial
multi-echelon supply chain. In spite of the contract’s simplicity, only complicated
transfer payment schemes have as yet been implemented in the Beer Distribution
Game setting. In this way, it proves the distinctively different way that the
wholesale price contract operates in the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer
Distribution Game settings and, thus, introduces an issue of scalability for most
existing analytical and experimental studies that exclusively study this contract in
the Newsvendor Problem setting. Following this, a deeper understanding of the
way that the wholesale price contract operates in any serial multi-echelon supply
chain is gained.
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Last but not least, this PhD thesis contributes some counter-intuitive and
interesting results about the practical efficiency of the wholesale price contract.
The results that concern the Newsvendor Problem are reported in Chapter 5,
while the results that concern the Beer Distribution Game are reported in Chapter
8. The common managerial implications and insights that can be inferred from
these results are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9, while some general
lessons about supply chain settings are offered in Chapter 10.
1.5 Overview of Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 defines the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution
Game settings and also determines the arrangements of different supply chain
contracts that have been enforced in these two settings. It also reviews the
standard normative models that correspond to these two settings and also
explores which of their simplifying assumptions have been revisited by existing
laboratory – based investigations. The chapter concludes by summarising the
remaining literature gaps.
Chapter 3 describes and justifies the approach that this PhD thesis adopts
to address the existing literature gaps. This approach enables one to investigate
the effect that different, prolonged interactions between dynamic, autonomous
and heterogeneous decision makers can have on the wholesale price contract’s
overall efficiency.
Chapter 4 adapts this approach to the needs of the Newsvendor Problem,
while Chapter 5 reports on the results that are obtained. A brief discussion and a
reflection on the managerial implications and practical significance of these
results is also provided.
Chapter 1- Introduction
35
Chapter 6 introduces the new version of the Beer Distribution Game where
the wholesale price contract becomes the basis of any interaction that takes place
between adjacent supply chain partners. This new version of the game is named
the “Contract Beer Distribution Game”. The chapter also develops the standard
normative models that are associated with the Contract Beer Distribution Game,
namely, makes provision for the inclusion of prices in them.
Chapter 7 adapts the approach that is proposed in this PhD thesis to the
needs of the Beer Distribution Game. Chapter 8 reports on the results that are
obtained. A brief discussion and a reflection on the managerial implications and
practical significance of these results is provided.
Chapter 9 discusses, explains and justifies the differences that are observed
between the results of the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game.
It also critically reflects on the common themes that seem to emerge from these
two settings.
Building on these common themes, Chapter 10 proceeds to the general
lessons about serial multi-echelon supply chain settings that can be gained from
this study. In addition, Chapter 10 reflects on whether the objectives of this study
have been satisfied, summarizes the main contribution of this PhD thesis,
recognises its main limitations and proposes directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Supply Chain Models and Contracts: Analytical and Experimental
Results
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: The first objective is to define the two
settings that are used as computational frameworks in this PhD thesis; namely,
the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game, and also determine
how the arrangements of different supply chain contracts can be applied in these
two settings. The second objective of this chapter is to review the existing
research in the area. In this regard, the standard normative models that
correspond to the aforementioned two settings and the supply chain contracts are
first described. These are built on the assumption that all supply chain managers
are perfectly rational in their respective decisions, namely they are exclusively
interested in optimizing their individual objectives; to this end, they are assumed
to almost ignore their partners’ corresponding decisions and their surrounding
environment. Since these common assumptions of the existing standard
normative models are over-simplifying, subsequently the experimental studies
that have explored how different the real human decisions that are observed in the
laboratory are from these theoretical predictions are reviewed. The main focus is
to highlight which of these assumptions are successfully revisited. The
experimental protocols that are followed, as well as the key findings are
additionally presented.
The chapter is organised as follows: First, the Newsvendor Problem is
outlined (Section 2.1). Later on the Beer Distribution Game is discussed (Section
2.2). Last but not least, the supply chain contracts that have been applied to the
Chapter 2- Supply Chain Models and Contracts: Analytical and Experimental
Results
37
Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game are separately presented
(Section 2.3). In each of these three distinct sections, the extant analytical results
are first summarised, while the relevant behavioural studies are subsequently
reviewed.
2.1 The Newsvendor Setting
In this section the typical newsvendor setting is considered. First presented by
Whitin (1955), it is still receiving increasing attention, mostly due to diminishing
product lifecycles and dominance of pure service and mixed retail/service
industries, for which it is particularly applicable (Khouja, 1999). For a review of
the existing analytical results and the extensions that have been applied to it so
far the interested reader is referred to Khouja (1999), Lariviere (1999) and
Cachon (2003).
In Sub-section 2.1.1 the standard normative models of the typical
newsvendor setting are described. First is outlined the case, where there is only
one decision maker involved, namely an integrated newsvendor who replenishes
stock to satisfy customer demand. This centralised operation mimics the
material, information and financial flows of a system that has access to all
available information and, thus, is in a position to optimize the system-wide
performance or else to attain the first-best case maximum profit. Attention is
subsequently turned to the case that the setting operates in a de-centralised
operation fashion; the problems that the manufacturer and the retailer face are
then discussed separately. Since neither of them takes into account the effect of
his/her individual decisions on the other’s profit, a deviation occurs between the
first-best case maximum profit and the aggregate profit that is achieved, when the
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two partners make their decisions independently. This phenomenon is known as
the “double marginalization problem” (Spengler, 1950) and is subsequently
discussed.
In Sub-section 2.1.2 the laboratory investigations of decisions that human
decision makers make in the laboratory are reviewed. The assumptions of the
standard normative theories that are revisited by these experimental studies are
first summarised; the experimental protocols that are applied are subsequently
outlined; their key findings are last delineated.
2.1.1 Standard Normative Models
The Centralised Operation
The typical integrated newsvendor setting is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Well in
advance of each time period t, this integrated newsvendor needs to specify the
order quantity q that he/she chooses to satisfy customer demand. This entire
quantity is assumed to be instantaneously delivered to the integrated newsvendor
at a constant marginal cost of c per unit. The retail price is fixed at p per unit,
which is determined by market competition, as is usual for commodity products
(Hirschey et al, 1993; Chopra and Meindl, 2007). The product under study can
only last for one selling season and no left-over inventories at the end of a season
can be carried over from one period to the next. For each unit of demand that is
not satisfied, a goodwill penalty cost of g is incurred. It is also assumed that the
stochastic customer demand x follows a continuous distribution F(x) on the non-
negative reals with density f(x). F is invertible, strictly increasing and
differentiable with a continuous derivative ݂ᇱ(ݔ) and F(0) = 0. Also let ܨത(ݔ) =
1 − ܨ(ݔ); ߤ= ܧ(ݔ) and ߪଶ = ܸ ܽݎ(ݔ).
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In summary, the following notation is used throughout this sub-section:
x customer demand, a random variable
f(x) probability density function of x
F(x) cumulative distribution function of x
p selling price per unit
c manufacturing cost per unit
g lost sales (goodwill) penalty cost
Co unit overage cost = c
Cu unit underage cost = p+g-c
q order quantity
It is also assumed that all the above information is common knowledge to the
integrated newsvendor. Based on this, the integrated newsvendor’s profit per
period is given by:
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Figure 2.1: The integrated newsvendor problem
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ߨ௜௡௧ = ൜(݌− )ܿ ∙ ݍ− ݃ ∙ (ݔ− ݍ), ݂݅ ݔ≥ ݍ݌ ∙ ݔ− ܿ∙ ݍ, ݂݅ ݔ< ݍ 
Simplifying and taking the expected value of ߨ௜௡௧ gives the following expected
profit:
which can be easily transformed as follows:
ߎ௜௡௧ = ܧ(ߨ௜௡௧) = ݌ܵ (ݍ) − ܿݍ− ݃ܤ(ݍ)
or else: ߎ݅݊ ݐ = (݌+ ݃) (ܵݍ) − ܿݍ− ݃ߤ (2.1)
S(q) represents the expected sales quantity and B(q) the unsatisfied customer
demand, in the case that an order quantity of q is placed.
Let the superscript * denote optimality. Application of the Leibnitz’s rule
about differentiation under the integral sign (Kaplan, 2002) for the derivatives of
first and second order demonstrates that ߎ௜௡௧ is concave and, thus, there is a
unique ݍ௜௡௧∗ that maximises ߎ௜௡௧. As proven by Khouja (1999) and Lariviere
(1999) the sufficient optimality condition that would maximise the perfectly
rational integrated newsvendor’s expected profit ∏
݅݊ ݐ
is given by formula (2.2):
ݍ௜௡௧
∗ = ܨିଵ(௣ା௚ି௖
௣ା௚
) =ܨିଵ( ஼ೠ
஼೚ା஼ೠ
) (2.2)
The De-centralised operation
The manufacturer-retailer setting is illustrated in Figure 2.2 that follows. The
simplest contract that can exist is assumed to be in force, i.e. the wholesale price
contract. According to this, there are only two pieces of information exchanged
ߎ݅݊ ݐ = ݌∫ ݂ݔ (ݔ)݀ݔ− ܿݍ0 ∫ ݂ݍ (ݔ)݀ݔݍ0 +(p+g-c) ∫ ݂ݍ (ݔ)݀ݔ−∞ݍ
݃ ∫ ݂ݔ (ݔ)݀ݔ∞
ݍ
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between the interacting manufacturer and retailer: i. the price that the
manufacturer charges to the retailer and ii. the order quantity that is placed by the
retailer (Lariviere and Porteus, 2001; Cachon, 2003). The events in each time
period t unfold as follows: Well in advance of each time period t, the
manufacturer needs to specify the wholesale price w that he/she wishes to charge
to the retailer. In response to that, the retailer must choose an order quantity q.
The manufacturer is assumed to instantaneously deliver to the retailer any
quantity that he/she places an order for. The retailer is, in turn, responsible for
satisfying customer demand. The retailer sells each unit of product at the price of
p; the manufacturer has to incur a unitary production cost of c.
As in the de-centralised operation, the product under study can only last
for one selling season and no left-over inventories at the end of a season can be
carried over from one period to the next. The notation that is used in the previous
section is also used throughout this sub-section.
Figure 2.2: The de-centralised operation newsvendor problem
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The problem that the retailer is facing is now studied. The retailer’s profit
per period ߨ௜௡௧ is given by:
ߨ௥ = ൜(݌− ݓ) ∙ ݍ− ݃ ∙ (ݔ− ݍ), ݂݅ ݔ≥ ݍ݌ ∙ ݔ− ݓ ∙ ݍ, ݂݅ ݔ< ݍ 
The same rationale applied for the integrated newsvendor’s problem is
again followed to get the retailer’s expected profit:
ߎ௥ = ܧ(ߨ௥) = ݌ܵ (ݍ) − ݃ܤ(ݍ) − ݓݍ
ߎ௥ =
∫ ݂ݔ (ݔ)݀ݔ௤଴ − ݓ ∫ ݂ݍ (ݔ)݀ݔ௤଴ + (݌+ ݃− ݓ) ∫ ݂ݍ (ݔ)݀ݔஶ௤ −
݃∫ ݂ݔ (ݔ)݀ݔஶ௤
(2.3)
or else: ߎ௥ = (݌+ ݃) (ܵݍ) − ݃ߤ− ݓݍ
From this the order quantity (ݍ௥∗) that the rationally optimizing retailer
would order to maximise his/her expected profit ߎ௥ can be easily calculated:
ݍ௥
∗ = ܨିଵ൬݌+ ݃− ݓ
݌+ ݃ ൰= ܨିଵ(݌+ ݃− ݓܥ௢ + ܥ௨ ) (2.4)
Now the manufacturer’s problem is studied. Acting as the Stackelberg
leader (Stackelberg, 1934 in: Cachon and Netessine, 2004), the manufacturer
initiates any interaction and is, thus, the first who determines the preferred
wholesale price w. While making this decision, the manufacturer correctly
anticipates the retailer’s response order quantity to this price, namely the
retailer’s demand curve ݍ௠∗ (ݓ). In this regard, the manufacturer’s profit per
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period ߨ௠ (ݓ) is given by the following formula, according to Lariviere and
Porteus (2001) and Cachon (2003):
ߨ௠ = (ݓ − )ܿ ∙ ݍ௠ (ݓ)
Therefore, the manufacturer’s expected profit becomes:
ߎ௠ = ߃(ߨ௠ ) = (ݓ − )ܿ ∙ ݍ௠ (ݓ) (2.5)
A rationally optimizing manufacturer would charge as much (w*) as would
maximise his/her expected respective profit, namely:
∏௠
∗ = ݉ ܽݔ{∏௠ (ݓ)} = (ݓ ∗ − )ܿ ∙ ݍ௠∗ (ݓ ∗) (2.6)
In equation (2.6) ݍ௠∗ represents the order quantity that the rationally
optimizing retailer would place in response to this price w*, or else ݍ௠∗ =arg mൣax ∏
୫
(ݓ ∗,ݍ)൧=ܨିଵ(௣ା௚ି௪ ∗
௣ା௚
), according to (2.4). According to this,
equation (2.6) gets transformed to (2.7):
∏௠
∗ = (ݓ ∗ − )ܿ ∙ ܨିଵ(௣ା௚ି௪ ∗
௣ା௚
) (2.7)
Equation (2.7) can be used to calculate the rationally optimizing manufacturer’s
maximum profit that would be attained if he/she charged w*. But (2.7) does not
provide the actual w*-price that the rationally optimizing manufacturer needs to
charge in order to achieve this maximum profit. In order, thus, to estimate this
rationally optimizing price w* Lariviere and Porteus’ (2001) approach is
followed. According to this, instead of concentrating on the retailer’s demand
curve ݍ௠∗ = ܨିଵ(௣ା௚ି௪௣ା௚ ), the retailer’s inverse demand curve, which is:
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ݓ(ݍ௠∗ ) = (݌+ ݃)ܨത(ݍ௠∗ ) = (ܥ௢ + ܥ௨)ܨത(ݍ௠∗ ), is looked at. From Leibnitz’s rule
and the derivative of (2.5) of first order the manufacturer’s sufficient optimality
condition is calculated for the case of a demand distribution that has an increasing
generalised failure rate (IGFR):
ݓ ∗(ݍ௠∗ )ቆ1 − ݍ (݂ݍ௠∗ )
ܨത(ݍ௠∗ )ቇ= ܿ (2.8)
Lariviere and Porteus (2001) define a distribution’s generalised failure rate as:
݃(ݔ) = ݔ௙(௫)
ிത(௫). In this regard, a distribution is said to have IGFR if ݃ᇱ(ݔ) > 0 for
all x on the non-negative reals that (݂ݔ) is defined. In the case of any such
distribution (2.8) becomes the sufficient optimality condition of the
manufacturer’s maximum profit and can be used to estimate the rationally
optimizing manufacturer’s w* - price. In addition, Lariviere and Porteus (2001)
describe the elasticity of retailer’s response orders as: ߥ(ݔ) = ଵ
௚(௫), which allows
for transformation of the first-order optimality condition (2.8) to the following,
much simpler form:
ݓ ∗(ݍ௠∗ )൬1 − 1ߥ(ݍ௠∗ )൰= ܿ
The above form is preferred to (2.8), because it can be used more easily to
infer managerial insights (Lariviere and Porteus, 2001).
In the sub-section that follows attention is turned to overall supply chain
performances, in the two distinct cases of centralised operation and de-
centralised operation of the newsvendor setting.
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Supply Chain Performance
As already seen in the previous sub-sections, in the case of centralised operation
the maximum profit, or else the first-best case maximum profit of the overall
channel can be attained, that is: ߎ௖∗ = ߎ௜௡௧∗ . In the case where the rationally
optimizing manufacturer and retailer interact with each other, the manufacturer
would charge ݓ ∗ (making, thus, a profit of ∏௠∗ ), while the retailer would order
ݍ௥
∗ (making, in turn, a profit of ∏௥∗). When these decisions are combined, they
generate an aggregate channel profit of ∏
ୡ
= ∏௠
∗  + ∏௥
∗ . The overall supply
chain performance is in this case assessed via the “efficiency score” that is
attained. The closer an efficiency score is to one, the better the overall supply
chain performance is, or else the more of the first-best case maximum profit is
attained by the manufacturer – retailer channel that is studied. The efficiency
score is defined according to relation (2.9):
ܧ݂݂ . = ∏௖∗
∏௜௡௧
∗
(2.9)
Without loss of generality and in order to demonstrate how the double
marginalization problem arises, a simple numerical example is hereby cited. It is
assumed that: p=250 m.u. (i.e. monetary units); c=50 m.u.; g=1 m.u and that
customer demand follows the truncated at zero normal distribution with μ=140
and σ = 80, because it more closely reflects real cases, where limited information
about the distribution of customer demand is available (Gallego and Moon,
1993; Son and Sheu, 2008; Ho et al, 2009). Because of this truncation at zero,
demand mean and variance need to be modified according to Barr and Sherrill
(1999)’s recommendations to μ’≈147 and σ’ ≈ 65. For simplicity the example of a 
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single demand observation D=140 is taken. Under these circumstances the
rationally optimizing integrated newsvendor would order ݍ௜௡௧∗ = 202 units and
only incur the manufacturing cost ݓ௜௡௧∗ = ,ܿ leading the entire channel to the
first-best case maximum profit of ∏୧୬୲∗ = 24,900 m.u. As for the rationally
optimizing manufacturer, not taking into account the effect of his/her own
decision on the retailer’s profit, he/she would charge w*=184 m.u., leading the
retailer to place an order of q*=106 units. The result of this allocation of profits
(i.e. ∏௠∗ = 14,204 m.u. and ∏୰∗ = 6,962 m.u.) would be an aggregate channel
profit of ∏ୡ∗ = 21,166 m.u., which is significantly lower than ∏௜௡௧∗ . This
phenomenon where neither partner would take into account the effect of his/her
own decision on the other’s profit is known as the “double marginalization”
problem (Spengler, 1950). The result is that the overall efficiency score attained
would be: ܧ݂݂ = ∏ౙ∗
∏౟౤౪
∗ = 0.85. The fact that ܧ݂݂ <1 signifies the wholesale price
contract’s inefficiency.
Let’s now consider the case that the manufacturer charges w=150<184= w*
and the retailer orders q=125<130=q*(w). The interaction of these two decisions
would generate an aggregate channel profit of ∏ୡ = 24,985 ≈ 24,990 m.u.,
which is the first-best case maximum profit and also ensures a more equitable
allocation of profits between the manufacturer and the retailer (i.e. ∏௠ = 13,500
m.u. and ∏୰ = 11,485 m.u.). In practical terms, a sacrifice on the part of the
manufacturer of only 34 m.u. per unit sold and 704 m.u. in total would increase
the retailer’s profit share by 4,523 m.u. and the aggregate channel profit by 3,824
m.u. But the fact that neither the manufacturer nor the retailer take into account
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the effect of their own decisions on the aggregate channel profit causes the
double marginalization problem.
Yet, very seldom in reality would human decision makers follow the above
decisions (e.g. Benzion et al, 2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian, Holt and
Smith, 2008), leading the newsvendor setting to overall performances that are
significantly different from the ones that are theoretically predicted. In Sub-
section 2.1.2 that follows the experimental research that has already been
conducted in the newsvendor area is reviewed. This field of research establishes
the systematic divergence of human newsvendors’ order quantities from the
quantities that are predicted by the standard normative models; this field of
research additionally investigates the individual behavioural biases that could be
held responsible for this deviation. That is why this existing field of research is
here named as the “behavioural newsvendor”.
Since interactions of human manufacturers that on average charge
significantly different prices from ݓ ∗ and human retailers that order quantities,
which on average diverge significantly from ݍ௥∗ give rise to widely fluctuating
efficiency scores, the efficiency scores that are attained overall can in practice
deviate significantly from the above theoretical prediction (which for this
particular numerical example becomes equal to 0.85). That is why it becomes
interesting to explore the true efficiency scores that the supply chain contracts
attain in the laboratory and compare them with their respective theoretical
predictions. In this regard, although laboratory investigations of supply chain
contracts are still scarce, there is already a number of papers that are concerned
with exploring the predictive success of the existing supply chain contracting
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theories. These are reviewed in Sub-section 2.3.2 that limits attention to the
existing laboratory investigations of supply chain contracts.
2.1.2 The Behavioural Newsvendor
Carlson and O’Keefe (1969) and Fisher and Raman (1996) constitute the first
papers that perform controlled human experiments of the newsvendor problem.
Even though for Carlson and O’Keefe (1969) the newsvendor problem only
represents a sub-set of participants’ allocated decision task, both the innate ability
of some participants to make reasonably good decisions without being taught a
formal rule and the tendency of other participants to make “almost every kind of
mistake” (p. 483) are recognised. Fisher and Raman (1996) conduct an industrial
experiment at a fashion apparel manufacturer’s site that enforces a ‘Quick
Response’ system (i.e. they allow placing orders only after and in response to
initial demand observations). Under these conditions, Fisher and Raman (1996)
ascertain that managers order quantities that are systematically inferior from the
quantities that are calculated by their exact Lagrangian decomposition - based
algorithm. Neither Carlson and O’Keefe (1969) nor Fisher and Raman (1996) are
concerned with either explaining this observed behavioural bias or reflecting on
its potential persistence at different settings. The reason is it was not until
relatively recently that a systematic behavioural perspective was brought to the
field of operations management and, thus, to the newsvendor problem (Bendoly
et al, 2006; Loch and Wu, 2007; Gino and Pisano, 2008). In this regard, these
two papers are not considered in the account of existing experimental research on
the newsvendor setting that follows. In this elaborate account the assumptions of
the standard normative theories that that are revisited are addressed, along with
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the experimental protocols that are applied and the experimental evidence that is
collected.
Assumptions Revisited
In order to review the assumptions that are revisited so far by laboratory
experiments, the Analysis of Assumptions framework is followed, as applied by
Bendoly et al. (2006). According to this, the models’ assumptions are classified
in the following three broad categories: Intentions, Actions and Reactions. In the
paragraphs that follow these are defined and the papers that revisit each of these
assumptions are reviewed.
Intentions refer to the accuracy of the studied model in reflecting the actual
goals of the decision maker under study (Bendoly et al, 2006). In this regard, the
standard normative models that are presented in Sub- section 2.1.1 are built on
the common assumption that any decision maker would be exclusively interested
in maximising his/her own individual net profit. But in reality, a decision maker
might display a variety of different objectives: For example, he/she could weigh
profits and/or underage (i.e. p+g-c) and overage (i.e. c) costs in an un-even
fashion, that is, assign different priorities to the different sub-objectives (i.e.
factor weighting). Alternatively, he/she might not be risk-neutral, as assumed by
the aforementioned models that are built on expected value calculations, but
instead adopt a risk seeking (i.e. he/she might prefer a choice with a lower
expected value but a higher risk) or a risk averse attitude (i.e. he/she might be
reluctant to choose an alternative with a lower expected value but a higher risk).
He/she could also exhibit different concerns, of a more social nature, for example
an inclination to sustaining justice or fairness towards his/her remaining partners,
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an interest in maintaining trust and good prior relationships with them, altruistic
concerns or group, rather than individual, goals.
Building on the seminal paper by Eeckhoudt et al. (1995) that is the first
that applies the expected utility function approach in the newsvendor setting,
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) make provision for a variety of different retailers’
intentions:
i. Risk-seeking: a risk-seeking attitude implies that human retailers would
prefer to order quantities that include a higher uncertainty, although they
might be associated with a lower expected value. Risk-seeking retailers
would prefer to order higher quantities than risk-neutral profit maximising
retailers, as predicted by the standard normative models (ݍ௥∗).
ii. Risk-aversion: a risk-averse attitude implies that human retailers would
prefer to order quantities that include a lower uncertainty; therefore, they
would prefer to order lower quantities than risk-neutral profit maximising
retailers, as predicted by the standard normative models (ݍ௥∗).
iii. Reference-dependence, according to Prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979): reference-dependent preferences would tend to reproduce
human retailers’ risk aversion over the domain of gains and risk seeking
over the domain of losses. As a result, retailers acting according to prospect
theory preferences would order less than ݍ௥∗, when for all possible order
quantities they would strictly make profits, while they would order more
than ݍ௥∗, when for all possible order quantities they would strictly make
losses. For the cases that both profits and losses would be possible for all
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the order quantities of their choice, they could maximise their respective
expected utility function by ordering either less or more than ݍ
ݎ
∗.
iv. Loss-aversion: a loss averse preference reflects those human retailers that
are reluctant towards ordering quantities that might generate losses, namely
they would prefer to order quantities that would be expected to generate
only gains to their current wealth status.
v. Waste-aversion: a waste averse attitude represents retailers’ particular
dislike of holding excess inventory at the end of a time period (Arkes,
1996). Waste aversion is modelled via an additional penalty that occurs for
each unit of inventory not sold during the time period. Waste averse
retailers would tend to order less than the rationally optimizing retailer ݍ
ݎ
∗.
vi. Stock-out aversion: a stock-out averse attitude represents retailers’
particular dislike of lost customer sales; it is modelled via an additional
goodwill penalty that occurs every time customer demand appears, but
there is no sufficient inventory in stock to satisfy this demand. Stock-out
averse retailers would tend to order more than the rationally optimizing
retailer ݍ
ݎ
∗.
vii. Opportunity costs under-estimation: an attitude towards under-valuing
opportunity costs occurs when a retailer discounts the marginal value of
forgone sales. Opportunity costs arise when there are forgone sales, namely
when there is unsatisfied customer demand. Retailers that under-estimate
opportunity costs would tend to order less than ݍ
ݎ
∗.
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viii. Ex-post inventory error minimisation: the ex-post inventory error is
defined as the difference between the order quantity and the actual demand
(Bell, 1982; 1985). So, an attitude towards minimisation of ex-post
inventory error reflects the high significance that some retailers assign to
minimising this difference. This priority most probably stems from
retailers’ potential disappointment from not choosing the realised demand
(i.e. psychology of regret: Camerer, 1995; Loch and Wu, 2007) and can be
modelled via an additional penalty that occurs every time a human
retailer’s chosen order quantity differs from realised demand.
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) formally prove that for the cases of
demand, of which cumulative distribution functions are symmetric about the
mean ߤ, human newsvendors’ intention to minimise ex-post inventory error
generates a systematic too low/too high pattern. This too low/too high pattern
signifies human retailers’ tendency to order quantities that are lower than ݍ௥∗ for
products of the high profit type and higher than ݍ௥∗ for products of the low profit
type. This phenomenon is known as the “pull-to-centre effect” (Bostian et al,
2008).
In addition, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) revisit the standard normative
models’ assumptions about human intentions by building their laboratory
experiments on the postulation that human retailers aim at minimising ex-post
inventory error. Kremer et al. (2008) further explore their subjects’ individual
and psychological biases that drive this intention. Following the same rationale,
Bostian et al. (2008) empirically collect data and fit different models to this data,
among which there is a quadratic regret error term that encapsulates the intention
that is relevant to minimising ex-post inventory error, as recognised by
Chapter 2- Supply Chain Models and Contracts: Analytical and Experimental
Results
53
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000). Subsequently, Bostian et al. (2008) further
extend this decision rule by incorporating dynamic parameters: namely, they let
the degree by which inventory errors influence subsequent order decisions to vary
over time.
Actions refer to the rules or implied behaviour of human decision makers
(Bendoly et al, 2006). The inherent assumption of the standard normative models
that are presented in Sub-section 2.1.1 is that all human newsvendors are
perfectly rational in their decisions. This assumption pre-supposes that all human
decision makers possess both the required perfect symmetric information and the
cognitive and processing abilities to do so. But in practice, human retailers might
not be aware of the true customer demand distribution (e.g. Gallego and Moon,
1993), or even if they are, they might not be willing to share this private
information with their partners, at least not without being compensated in some
way for doing so (e.g. Cachon and Fisher, 2000). But provision of related
incentives would completely distort the analytical results of the Newsvendor
Problem setting that are presented in Sub-section 2.1.1 (Chen, 2003). In addition,
human decision makers might lack the processing means and the time to search
the entire solution space and identify the optimal decisions (Chen, 2003). In
summary, they might “experience limits in formulating and solving complex
problems and in processing information” (Simon 1957 in Williamson 1981: pp.
553) and, for this reason, might need to settle at reasonable, thus satisficing,
choices (Sterman, 1989; Simon, 1996; North and Macal, 2007; Gilbert, 2008).
For this reason, the standard normative models need to remove these over-
simplifications and, thus, be adapted to accommodate bounded rationality
(Simon, 1996).
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In order to address human retailers’ bounded rationality, Schweitzer and
Cachon (2000) make provision for appropriate modifications of Kahneman et
al.’s (1982) “anchoring and insufficient adjustment” heuristic to govern their
decisions. In accordance with this heuristic, participants would initially choose an
order quantity (“anchor”) and subsequently modify or insufficiently adjust this
order quantity (“insufficiently adjust”) towards a desired stock level. From the
available anchors, namely the expected demand, the initial, pre-determined order
quantity and past demand realizations, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) consider
mean demand and prior order quantity, according to the following two heuristics:
i. Mean anchor: the mean anchor heuristic implies that a retailer would
initially choose an order quantity according to mean demand, which is
his/her anchor and subsequently insufficiently adjust towards the profit
maximising quantity ݍ௥∗.
ii. Demand chasing: the demand chasing heuristic implies that a retailer
would initially anchor on a prior order quantity and thereafter insufficiently
adjust towards prior demand realizations.
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) also demonstrate that the mean anchor
heuristic reproduces the same pull-to-centre systematic too low/too high pattern
that is caused by human retailers’ intention to minimise ex-post inventory error.
After Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) applied the Kahneman et al.’s (1982)
anchoring and insufficient adjustment heuristic to the Newsvendor Problem
setting a number of subsequent papers further investigate its presence: Benzion et
al. (2008), Bolton and Katok (2008), Bostian et al. (2008) and Kremer et al.
(2008) explore whether participants would tend to order quantities that would
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follow the mean anchor decision rule, while Benzion et al. (2008), Kremer et al.
(2008), Bostian et al. (2008) and Lurie and Swaminathan (2009) seek for further
evidence in favour of the demand chasing decision rule.
Nevertheless, except for Kahneman et al.’s (1982) anchoring and
insufficient adjustment heuristic, there is a number of additional behavioural
biases that might influence human decisions (Camerer, 1995; Loch and Wu,
2007). For this reason, a number of papers collectively model human decision
makers’ potential bounded rationality, instead of specifically identifying and,
thus, directly addressing their distinct behavioural biases. Examples are Bostian
et al. (2008) and Su (2008), who treat all possible order decisions as discrete
choices and develop different models that would assign to each different possible
choice a different probability of getting selected.
Bostian et al. (2008) develop a dynamic model of bounded rationality,
learning and adjustment, which concretely represents the mental decision
processes of human decision makers. According to this model, each possible
order decision is assigned a different probability of being chosen, according to
the studied participant’s respective level of rationality and each possible choice’s
respective weight. The level of rationality varies from 1 to , where 1 represents
a decision maker who would make completely random choices (i.e. completely
irrational) and  indicates a decision maker who would make decisions perfectly
in accordance with Bostian et al. ’s learning and adjustment model (i.e. perfectly
rational). As for the order quantity’s relevant weight, Bostian et al. define this
weight as the weighted sum of two distinct components: i. the weight that is
assigned to this order decision in the last round and ii. the counter-factual profit
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that would have been generated by this order decision in the last round, given the
demand realization that has been truly observed. Each of these two components’
respective weight is determined by each decision maker’s respective memory
bias, namely his/her tendency to ignore or not historical performances of different
order decisions. This consideration of historical performances incorporates the
learning that human decision makers experience during the course of the game.
As for the counter-factual profit that would have been generated by true customer
demand in the last round, Bostian et al. make provision for participants to either
consider the counter-factual profits of alternative choices or not, according to
their implicit reinforcement bias. This reinforcement bias encapsulates
participants’ degree of adjustment to the results of previous choices.
Su (2008) develops a quantal choice4 behavioural model, according to
which different order decisions are assigned different probabilities of being
chosen, according to their respective expected utility function values. It is
ensured that alternatives with higher expected utility function values are chosen
more often. Su considers expected utility function values, which are equal to the
expected profits ݍ௥∗ that are calculated by the standard normative models. In this
model, decision makers’ bounded rationality varies from 0 to , with 0 reflecting
a perfectly rational decision maker who would only choose the order quantities
4The classic “quantal choice” theory (s. Thurstone, 1927; Luce, 1959) postulates that
people may not make the best decisions all the time, but make good decisions more often
than worse ones. [Sources: 1. Thurstone, L. 1927. A law of comparative judgement.
Psychological Review 34, 273-286; 2. Luce, R. 1959. Individual choice behaviour: a
theoretical analysis. Wiley, New York].
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that would generate the highest expected utility function value and  representing
a completely naive decision maker who would randomize over the possible
alternative order quantities with equal probabilities.
Both Bostian et al. (2008) and Su (2008) validate subsequently their
respective bounded rationality models by fitting to them data that they have
collected empirically.
Reactions refer to human players’ response to model parameter changes.
They might include implied rules for how decisions makers learn, perceive and
process feedback information or are influenced by environmental factors
(Bendoly et al, 2006). The standard normative models that are presented in Sub-
section 2.1.1 embed the assumption that people do not react to changes going on
around them and, since they make perfectly rational decisions, they do not need
to use the information that is available to them to further improve their decisions.
Yet, this is seldom the case in practice: human decision makers may react to the
changes that occur around them. Since, in addition, there is potential for them to
improve their imperfect decisions, they may learn from available past
information. In this regard, the existing experimental research addresses well the
behavioural newsvendor’s reactions to learning (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000;
Schultz and McClain, 2007;Benzion et al, 2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian
et al, 2008), environmental changes (Schultz and McClain, 2007; Bolton and
Katok, 2008; Bostian et al, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008; Lurie and Swaminathan,
2009) and feedback information (Bolton and Katok, 2008; Lurie and
Swaminathan, 2009).
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Learning is mostly treated as the gradual convergence of participants’
order quantity to the rationally optimizing quantity ݍ
ݎ
∗, that is predicted by the
standard normative models. In view of this, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) test
the existence of learning in participants’ decisions, as exhibited over 30 rounds.
Benzion et al. (2008) extend the period to 100 decision rounds and, additionally,
investigate exactly how participants’ previous round’s decision affect their
subsequent decisions. Bolton and Katok (2008) explore whether decision makers’
increased experience helps them to enhance their realised profits. Bostian et al.
(2008) recognise that different decision makers’ learning attitudes could vary
from complete ignorance to high prioritization of historical performances and, as
a result, incorporate this range in their dynamic model via a memory bias
parameter. For Schultz and McClain (2007) human retailers’ learning is
associated with the environmental set-up and, for this reason, they investigate
whether explicit statement of opportunity costs would improve participants’
learning.
Schultz and McClain (2007) are also among the first studies that
investigate the environment’s effect on participants’ observed decisions. They
explore whether the framing of the decision task, namely whether the emphasis is
put on losses or gains, affects participants’ order quantities. A number of
subsequent papers follow a similar rationale: Kremer et al. (2008) test whether
and how the framing and the complexity of the decision task influences
participants’ tendency to follow the mean anchor and the ex-post inventory error
minimising decision rules. But instead of treating the framing of the decision task
in terms of whether the emphasis is put on losses or gains, they manipulate it by
means of the information related to customer demand that is provided to
Chapter 2- Supply Chain Models and Contracts: Analytical and Experimental
Results
59
participants. Kremer et al. (2008) also treat task complexity by the number of
quantity choices that are available to participants and the magnitude of the space
of true customer demand. Bolton and Katok (2008) investigate whether and how
the framing and the complexity of the decision task influence the profits that are
attained by human participants. In this regard, they treat the framing of the
decision task in terms of whether information about forgone options is provided
to participants. They control for decision complexity by reducing: i. the number
of decision options that are available to participants and ii. the number of distinct
decisions that are required. Lurie and Swaminathan (2009) investigate whether
decision complexity affects participants’ order decisions and their respectively
realised profit. To this end, like Bolton and Katok (2008), they treat complexity
via the number of distinct decisions they ask participants to make. Finally,
Bostian et al. (2008) incorporate environmental impact in their already discussed
dynamic model via the reinforcement bias parameter. This reinforcement bias
parameter relates well to the environmental impact, because it encapsulates
participants’ degree of adjustment to the respective results of previous choices.
Providing information about forgone options is a form of feedback
information. That is why we consider Bolton and Katok (2008) to address the
impact of feedback information on participants’ attained profits. But Lurie and
Swaminathan (2009) are more directly concerned with investigating the effect of
presentation and frequency of feedback information on participants’ decisions
and resulting profits.
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The Protocols Applied
In all papers reviewed in this sub-section, human participants are asked to
determine their newsvendor order quantity decisions facing stochastic customer
demand in computerized simulation games. They are expected to enter these
order quantity decisions in specifically designed computer interfaces. These
interfaces ensure that participants would only have access to the information that
is dictated by the research questions being addressed. Human newsvendors are
asked to iteratively make quantity decisions over 30 (Schweitzer and Cachon,
2000; Bostian et al, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008; Lurie and Swaminathan, 2009), 40
(Schultz and McClain, 2007) or 100 (Benzion et al, 2008; Bolton and Katok,
2008; Su, 2008) rounds. Customer demand is assumed to follow the uniform
(Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Schultz and McClain, 2007; Benzion et al, 2008;
Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008; Su, 2008; Lurie
and Swaminathan, 2009) or normal (Benzion et al, 2008) distributions. Most
studies pay participants a flat minimum participation fee and, in addition, a
variable rate that is determined by the profits that they have realized in a
randomly selected round of the experiment (Schultz and McClain, 2007; Benzion
et al, 2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008; Su, 2008).
Key Findings
Most studies of the behavioural newsvendor confirm the existence of the pull-to-
centre effect, namely provide evidence for the too low/too high systematic pattern
of human newsvendors’ order quantities (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Benzion
et al, 2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al, 2008). Schweitzer and Cachon
(2000) find support for both the ex-post inventory error minimisation and
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demand chasing decision rules; Benzion et al. (2008) reproduce the demand
chasing and the mean anchor decision rules; while Kremer et al. (2008)
corroborate the existence of ex-post inventory error minimisation, demand
chasing and mean anchor. In addition, Kremer et al. (2008) establish that the
information that is available to participants may have a significant effect on their
respective tendencies to follow any of these three decision rules: ex-post
inventory error minimisation, demand chasing and mean anchor.
Although Schultz and McClain (2007) could not support participants’
learning through increased experience, Benzion et al. (2008) and Bolton and
Katok (2008) establish the effect of experience-based learning, as human
newsvendors’ decisions would move closer to the rationally optimizing quantities
ݍ୰
∗. In addition, average profits per period would increase with the number of
decision rounds that the game is played. Furthermore, Schultz and McClain
(2007) do not find the alternative framing of the required decision task (with the
emphasis on losses or gains) to have any significant effect on the participants’
order decisions and realised profits. In accordance to this, Bolton and Katok
(2008) could not find support for the notion that any additional information about
foregone profits would increase profits. Yet, reducing the number of decisions
required from participants does seem to have the potential to increase the profits.
Lurie and Swaminathan (2009) establish that offering feedback information too
frequently to decision makers would degrade their profits and diverge their
respective order quantities away from optimal quantities ݍ୰∗.
Bostian et al. (2008) compare the predictive power of their learning,
adjustment and bounded rationality model with that of the mean anchor and
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demand chasing decision rules. Su (2008) assesses the goodness-of-fit of his
bounded rationality model in respect to the predictions of the standard normative
theories. Both papers base their evaluations on the Schwarz or Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978), because they follow the maximum
likelihood procedure and fit a different number of independent variables in each
model (McCulloch et al, 2008; Fox, 2008). These comparisons confirm
confidence in the explanatory potential of these models.
2.1.3 Summary
Section 2.1 presents the main analytical results that are known for the
Newsvendor Problem setting; it also reviews the true decisions that human
newsvendors have been observed to make in the laboratory. In this regard, Table
2.1 provides a breakdown of the articles that revise the common behavioural
assumptions of the standard normative newsvendor models. Following the
organisation of Sub-section 2.1.2, this table is structured according to the
Analysis of Assumptions framework, as applied by Bendoly et al. (2006).
It is evident from Table 2.1 that the systematic divergence of human
newsvendors’ order quantities from the quantities that are predicted by the
standard normative models is established (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Schultz
and McClain, 2007; Benzion et al, 2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al,
2008; Kremer et al, 2008; Su, 2008; Lurie and Swaminathan, 2009). These
observed deviations are attributed to a number of individual behavioural biases,
such as for example:
 risk-seeking (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000),
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 risk-aversion (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000),
 reference-dependence (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000),
 loss-aversion (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000),
 waste-aversion (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000),
 stock-out aversion (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000),
 opportunity costs under-estimation (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000),
 ex-post inventory error minimisation (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000;
Bostian et al, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008),
 mean anchor (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Benzion et al, 2008; Bolton
and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008),
Table 2.1: Distribution of behavioural papers in the context of the Newsvendor Problem
by assumption type
Research Paper Behavioural assumptions Key Findings
Intentions: decision makers’ actual goals might be different from maximisation of the
aggregate channel’s profit
Schweitzer and Cachon
(2000)
Risk-seeking; risk-aversion;
reference-dependence; loss-
aversion, waste-aversion;
stock-out aversion;
opportunity costs under-
estimation; ex-post
inventory error
minimisation
Ex-post inventory error
minimisation
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Research Paper Behavioural assumptions Key Findings
Bostian et al. (2008) Ex-post inventory error
minimisation
No systematic evidence
Kremer et al. (2008) Ex-post inventory error
minimisation
Ex-post inventory error
minimisation
Actions: decision makers’ behaviour might differ from the behaviour that is specified by
their respective intentions
Carlson and O’Keefe
(1969)
No systematic account of
observed deviations
Existence of systematic
deviations of participants’
decisions from the order
quantities that would
maximise the newsvendor’s
profit
Fisher and Raman (1996) No systematic account of
observed deviations
Systematic difference
between supply chain
managers’ true decisions
and corresponding exact
optimal solution
Schweitzer and Cachon
(2000)
Mean anchor; demand
chasing
Pull-to-centre effect;
demand chasing
Benzion et al. (2008) Mean anchor; demand
chasing
Pull-to-centre effect; mean
anchor; demand chasing
Bolton and Katok (2008) Mean anchor No systematic evidence
Bostian et al. (2008) Mean anchor; demand
chasing; learning;
adjustment; bounded
rationality
Learning, adjustment and
bounded rationality model
Kremer et al. (2008) Mean anchor; demand
chasing
Demand chasing; mean
anchor
Su (2008) Bounded rationality Bounded rationality
behavioural model
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Research Paper Behavioural assumptions Key Findings
Lurie and Swaminathan
(2009)
Demand chasing No systematic evidence
Reactions: decision makers might learn, process feedback information and react to
environmental changes
Schweitzer and Cachon
(2000)
Learning No systematic evidence
Schultz and McClain
(2007)
Learning; framing of
decision task
No systematic evidence
Benzion et al. (2008) Learning No systematic evidence
Bolton and Katok (2008) Learning; framing and
complexity of decision task;
presentation of feedback
information
Simplification of required
decision task would
improve decisions
Bostian et al. (2008) Learning; environmental
impact
Learning, adjustment and
bounded rationality model
Kremer et al. (2008) Framing and complexity of
decision task
Impact of relevant
information provided
Lurie and Swaminathan
(2009)
Decision complexity;
presentation and frequency
of feedback information
Too frequent information
would degrade decisions
 demand chasing (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Benzion et al, 2008;
Bostian et al, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008; Lurie and Swaminathan, 2009).
The aforementioned individual behavioural biases are also collectively
characterised as bounded rationality (Bostian et al, 2008; Su, 2008). Last but not
least, the impact of environmental factors is also accounted for (Schweitzer and
Cachon, 2000; Schultz and McClain, 2007; Benzion et al, 2008; Bolton and
Katok, 2008; Bostian et al, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008; Lurie and Swaminathan,
2009).
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2.2 The Beer Distribution Game
In this section the typical Beer Distribution Game setting is considered. Since
first used by Sterman (1989) as an experimental framework, the Beer
Distribution Game is still very popular in supply chain management classes all
over the world (Sterman, 1992; 2000) and is also still extensively used in
experimental research (e.g. Steckel et al, 2004; Croson and Donohue, 2006; Wu
and Katok, 2006). The reasons for its popularity are that it is sufficiently simple
for human subjects to quickly understand and learn how to play, but also retains
key features of real supply chains. The Beer Distribution Game mimics the
material, information and financial flows of a de-centralised operation, periodic
review production-distribution supply chain with a number of serial echelons.
Participants in the game are asked to minimise total inventory holding and
backlog costs. Although they would attain the first-best case minimum cost by
simply ordering as much as they are themselves requested to deliver (Chen, 1999;
Lee and Whang, 1999), human decision makers are naturally inclined to pass on
to their respective suppliers orders that are of amplified size and variance, when
compared to their incoming orders (Lee et al, 1997a; b). This tendency of orders
to increase in magnitude and variance as one moves upstream away from the
customer to the manufacturer is defined as the ‘bullwhip effect’, or else ‘Forrester
effect’ (Forrester, 1958; 1961). Figure 2.3 presents an indicative example of a
supply chain configuration with three serial echelons, where the bullwhip effect
takes place. The relevant evidence is provided by the fact that orders magnify in
size and variance upstream, that is, from the retailer to the wholesaler to the
manufacturer. Since the bullwhip effect increases inventory holding and backlog
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costs (Chen et al, 1999; Dejonckheere et al, 2003; Sucky, 2009) and, thus, further
augments overall supply chain inefficiencies, a common pre-occupation of
researchers of the Beer Distribution Game is to establish its persistence. To this
end they have resorted to both analytical models and laboratory experiments.
Figure 2.3: The bullwhip effect
Sub-section 2.2.1 concentrates on the relevant standard normative
models, after the game set-up has been described and some basic notation has
been introduced. Sub-section 2.2.2 focuses on existing experimental research.
The exact assumptions of the standard normative models that these experimental
studies intend to revisit are first summarised. The experimental protocols are then
outlined and the key findings are finally presented.
2.2.1 Standard Normative Models
Figure 2.4 illustrates the typical Beer Distribution Game setting. Customer
demand arises at echelon i=1; echelon i=1 replenishes its stock from echelon i=2,
echelon i=2 from i=3 etc., and echelon N(=3) from a perfectly reliable outside
supplier (N+1=4). Customer demand is assumed to be stationary and independent
t
OQi(t)
݋ܳ ௐ ு௅(ݐ)݋ܳ ெ ஺ே (ݐ)
݋ܳ ோா்(ݐ)
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across periods. For reasons of simplicity Steckel et al.’s (2004) experimental
setup is followed, according to which there are three serial echelons (namely
N=3), that is, the retailer (i=1), the wholesaler (i=2) and the manufacturer (i=3).
At the beginning of each period t, each echelon’s manager decides how much to
order from echelon i+1, therefore places an order quantity OQi(t), with i=1,..,N.
Information in the form of replenishment orders flows from downstream to
upstream (i.e. from i to i+1), while material flows in the opposite direction: from
upstream to downstream(i.e. from i to i-1).
The set-up is additionally complicated by order processing and
production/shipment delays that occur between each manufacturer/customer pair.
As Figure 2.5 demonstrates, these respectively represent the time required to
receive, process, produce/ship and deliver orders. In greater detail, once an order
is placed from site i, a constant information lead time (li = 2) of two time periods
occurs before the order actually arrives to the supply site i+1, while when an
order is filled by the supply site i+1 a fixed transportation lead time (Li= 2) of two
time periods passes before the shipment gets delivered to site i. The total lead-
time is Mi=li + Li. At the highest echelon level (i=3) production requests represent
production quantities. Since the external supplier is assumed to receive and
satisfy orders from the manufacturer instantaneously (i.e. lN=1), a total of MN = 3
periods are required to process and manufacture an order. This is why the
manufacturer, not facing any supply uncertainty, is illustrated in Figure 2.5 to
receive all placed production requests after exactly M3 = 3 time periods.
WM R
Supply Demand
Transportation delays
l3
i=3 i=2 i=1
l2 l1
L2 L1L3
Information delays
Figure 2.5: Lead times in the Beer Distribution Game
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It is also assumed that each echelon i needs to satisfy as much of
outstanding orders from the downstream customer i-1 as possible from available
on-hand inventory. But in case i runs out of stock, i backlogs the unsatisfied
portion of customer orders and incurs a backlog penalty of ௜ܾ=1 m.u. for every
unit of unsatisfied demand; echelon i subsequently treats this as an outstanding
order from downstream customer i-1. Each echelon i also has to incur linear
inventory holding cost of ℎ௜=0.50 m.u. for every unit of product that is kept in
inventory for one period. Finally, the retailer sells each case of beer at the fixed
selling price of p = 3 m.u. and the manufacturer produces each case of beer at the
fixed manufacturing cost of c = 0.50 m.u.
For clarity, a convention that is typically accepted in the field is here also
followed: It is assumed that all replenishment activities occur at the beginning of
the period. Therefore, the significant events for each echelon i unfold as follows:
1. the shipment from the upstream manufacturer ܵ݅+1(ݐ− ݅ܮ ) is received, 2. If
there is any backlog, it is filled, 3. the incoming order from the downstream
customer ݋ܳ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) is received, 4. as much of the incoming order as
possible is filled and shipped to the downstream customer i-1, namely ௜ܵ(ݐ), that
is provided that there is any inventory left in warehouse; in addition, in case there
are any outstanding orders, these are added to the existing backlog and last, 5. an
order is placed with the upstream manufacturer ݋ܳ ୧(ݐ).
In summary, for every site i=1,...,N the following notation is used:
ݔ customer demand, a random variable
(݂ݔ) probability density function of x
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ܨ(ݔ) cumulative distribution function of x
݌ selling price per unit
ܿ manufacturing cost per unit
ܾ݅ lost sales (goodwill) penalty cost
ℎ݅ inventory holding cost
݋ܳ (݅ݐ) order quantity of site i in time period t
ܵ݅ (ݐ) shipment sent from site i to site site i-1 in time period t (i.e. site i-1
will receive this shipment in period t+ܮ௜ି ଵ)
ܰܫ (݅ݐ) net inventory position of site i in time period t (a site’s net
inventory position is given by its on-hand inventory position minus
the backlogged orders from the downstream customer, or
backlogged customer demands for the case of the retailer)
݅ܮ production/transportation lead-time from site i+1 to site i
݈݅ information lead-time from site i to site i+1
ܯ ݅ total lead-time Mi=li + Li
ℒ݅ downstream information lead-time = ∑ ௝݈௜ି ଵ௝ୀଵ with ℒଵ = 0
Based on the above notation and assumptions, it is evident that any echelon
i sends to its respective downstream customer i-1 the portion of backlogs, if any,
and incoming orders that can be satisfied, depending on i’s available inventory,
that is:
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1ܵ(ݐ) = ݉ ݅݊ ൛ܦ(ݐ),݉ ܽݔ{ܰܫ 1(ݐ− 1) + 2ܵ(ݐ− ܮ1) ,0}ൟ (2.10)
ܵ݅ (ݐ) = ݉ ݅݊ ቄ݋ܳ −݅1(ݐ− ݈݅) ,݉ ܽݔ{ܰܫ (݅ݐ− 1) + ܵ݅+1(ݐ− ݅ܮ ) ,0}ቅ (2.11)
Following this, any echelon’s i inventory increases by the shipments that it
receives from its upstream manufacturer i+1 (in turn given by relations (2.10) and
(2.11)) and decreases by the incoming orders that it receives from its downstream
customer i-1. Therefore, the following inventory balance equations can be
deduced:
ܰܫ ଵ(ݐ) = ܰܫ ଵ(ݐ− 1) + ଶܵ(ݐ− ܮଵ) − ܦ(ݐ) (2.12)
ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) = ܰܫ ௜(ݐ− 1) + ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜) − ݋ܳ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈) for ݅= 2, 3 (2.13)
Centralised operation
The ultimate objective of the game under the hypothetical scenario of centralised
operation is to attain the first-best case minimum cost, namely, minimise the total
inventory holding and backlog costs. Each site i has to incur a total inventory and
backlog cost of ܫܥ௜(ݐ), as given by equation (2.14) :
ܫܥ௜(ݐ) = ℎ௜∙ [ܰܫ ௜(ݐ)]ା + ௜ܾ∙ [ܰܫ ௜(ݐ)]ି (2.14)
( [ݔ]ା ≝ ݉ ܽݔ{ݔ, 0} and [ݔ]ି ≝ ݉ ܽݔ{−ݔ, 0}. ).
The result is that the total supply chain inventory holding and backorder cost in
period t is given by:
ܫܥ௖(ݐ) = ෍ [ℎ௜∙ [ܰܫ ௜(ݐ)]ା + ௜ܾ∙ [ܰܫ ௜(ݐ)]ି]ே
௜ୀଵ
= ෍ [ℎ௜∙ ܣ+ ௜ܾ∙ ܤ]ே
௜ୀଵ
(2.15)
Hence, the total supply chain costs through to period T become:
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෍ ܫܥ஼(ݐ)்
௧ୀଵ
= ෍ ෍ [ܫܥ௜(ݐ)]ே
௜ୀଵ
்
௧ୀଵ
(2.16)
It is obvious from (2.16) that since customer demand is stationary and
independently distributed across periods, the stochastic game reduces to a
sequence of similar single period games, under the assumption of a stationary
inventory policy. For this reason, it suffices to minimise overall supply chain
costs in period t ܫܥܥ(ݐ) in order to minimise ∑ ܫܥܥ(ݐ)ܶݐ=1 (Federgruen and
Zipkin, 1984; Axsäter, 2003). The set of decision making strategies that would
generate the first-best case minimum cost IC*t constitutes the team optimal
solution ܫܥை(ݐ).
Although most analytical papers explore this team optimal solution for
multi-echelon inventory systems without provision for information lead-times
(e.g. Clark and Scarf, 1960; Federgruen and Zipkin, 1984; Chen and Zheng,
1994), Lee and Whang (1999) and Chen (1999) are the exceptions and do
accommodate the presence of information lead-times. Lee and Whang (1999) are
concerned with developing a transfer payment scheme that fairly allocates overall
system costs to distinct echelon managers, but takes their optimum ordering
policies for granted. Chen (1999) identifies the team optimal solution and, in
addition, echelon managers’ distinct ordering policies that would minimise their
own respective inventory and backlog costs. Chen (1999) additionally estimates
the penalties that should be charged to echelon managers in order for their
distinct ordering policies not to deviate from the team optimal solution.
While Chen (1999) is evidently more closely connected with the aim here
to recognise the team optimal solution, it differs from it in three aspects: i).
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dissimilarly to Chen (1999), quantities in transit from one site to another as well
as backlogged demands do not incur any inventory holding costs; ii). all sites
(that is not only the retailer, like in Chen, 1999) incur a linear backlog penalty ௜ܾ
for all non-immediately satisfied demands that they receive from their respective
downstream customers; iii). in contrast to Chen (1999), no echelon incremental
holding cost rates apply. The reason is that in the Beer Distribution Game no
value adding activities take place. These differences originate from the attempt
to keep the model formulation as consistent as possible with Sterman’s (1989,
1992) original Beer Distribution Game set-up.
Chen (1999) relies on three optimality conditions to apply Chen and
Zheng’s (1994) procedure to identify and simplify Clark and Scarf‘s (1960) and
Federgruen and Zipkin’s (1984) optimum ordering policies. Although there is no
reason for these optimality conditions not to hold in the case of the Beer
Distribution Game, this has as yet not been confirmed. Therefore, it still remains
to be formally proven that the team optimizing echelon managers in the Beer
Distribution Game would follow Chen’s (1999) decision rules.
At this point we consider noteworthy two details about these optimal
decision rules: First, although Chen (1999) follows the exact same proof
procedure with Chen and Zheng (1994), by making provision for information
lead-times, he identifies order-up-to level policies ( ଵܼ∗, … , ேܼ∗ ) as optimum for all
firms and not for all but the retailer, like Chen and Zheng (1994). According to
these order-up-to level policies ( ଵܼ∗, … , ேܼ∗ ), all echelon managers i (=1,..., N)
need to order as much as would keep their respective site’s inventory level at ௜ܼ∗
(Johnson and Montgomery, 1974; Hopp and Spearman, 2001). If these order-up-
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to level policies ( ଵܼ∗, … , ேܼ∗ ) are followed by all distinct echelon managers, the
first-best case minimum cost is attained by the entire supply chain of the Beer
Distribution Game (Chen, 1999; Lee and Whang, 1999). It is very interesting that
Lee and Whang (1999) also support the same order-up-to level policies as
minimising the overall inventory cost.
Second, even though Clark and Scarf (1960), Federgruen and Zipkin
(1984) and Chen and Zheng (1994) express the optimal decision rules in the form
of echelon base stock policies, Chen (1999) and Lee and Whang (1999) transform
these to installation stock levels. The difference between installation stock levels
and echelon base stock policies is that the former are expressed in terms of a
site’s inventory level, while the latter comprises of the inventory levels of all
subsequent sites until the retailer (Chen, 1999). Axsäter and Rosling (1993)
demonstrate that the conversion of echelon base stock levels to installation stock
levels does not alter overall costs. A difference occurs only in the case where
initial echelon stock inventory positions are above the optimal order-up-to
positions, for which the above installation-based stock policies may fail (Axsäter,
2003).
It is finally very interesting to note that in the case that distinct echelon
managers are perfectly rational and exclusively interested in minimising the team
overall cost, there is no bullwhip effect. The reason is that when they follow these
optimal decision rules, they simply order as much as they are themselves
requested to deliver to their respective customers. So, the variance of all
incoming orders remains exactly the same.
But it is also very interesting to understand what happens when distinct
echelon managers independently choose their order quantities and are exclusively
Chapter 2- Supply Chain Models and Contracts: Analytical and Experimental
Results
75
interested in minimising their respective individual costs, that is, when they
remain indifferent to the team optimal solution. Under this scenario of de-
centralised operation, there are two important questions: i. whether the aggregate
channel cost ICc would differ from the first-best case minimum cost IC*t and ii.
whether the bullwhip effect would arise. The sub-section that follows answers
these questions.
De-centralised operation
Cachon and Zipkin (1999) prove that in the case of de-centralised operation the
deriving aggregate cost ICc is greater than the first-best case minimum cost IC*o,
namely ICc > IC*o. They also demonstrate that the aggregate channel cost ICc
differs in the case where echelon level or local inventory information is used.
This potential gap that might exist between the aggregate channel costs ܫܥܥ =
∑ ܫܥ݅
ܰ=݅1 and the overall minimum backlog and inventory holding cost (or else
the first-best case minimum cost) IC*0 is usually quantified via the ‘competition
penalty’ (Cachon and Zipkin, 1999; Cachon, 2003), which is defined according to
relation (2.17):
ܥܲ = ܫܥ஼ − ܫܥ଴∗
ܫܥ଴
∗
(2.17)
The closer to 0 a competition penalty is the better the overall performance
of the multi-echelon inventory system under study and also the closer the cost
that is incurred, ICc, to the first-best case minimum cost IC*o. But Cachon and
Zipkin’s (1999) inventory system consists of only two echelons: a supplier and a
retailer. Therefore, it still remains to be explored whether under de-centralised
operation of the Beer Distribution Game there would be any difference between
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the first-best case minimum cost IC*o and the aggregate channel cost ICc that
would be incurred and also whether the bullwhip effect would persevere.
In order to decrease this aggregate channel cost ICc and bring it as close as
possible to the overall minimum backlog and inventory holding cost IC*o, a
number of transfer payment schemes between local firm managers have been
proposed in a number of different multi-echelon inventory systems (e.g. Lee and
Whang, 1999; Porteus, 2000; Cachon and Zipkin, 1999). These transfer payment
schemes determine all terms of trade between interacting partners. Contractual
arrangements as they are, they are reviewed in the Sub-section of 2.3.1 that is
relevant to the Beer Distribution Game setting. Nevertheless, the question of
exactly how the corresponding standard normative model would predict the
performance of the wholesale price contract in the typical Beer Distribution
Game setting has as yet not been explored.
Another interesting question is what happens in the case where there is at
least one decision maker whose decisions are not dictated by perfect rationality.
In this case, the standard normative models cannot predict human decisions. As a
result, discrepancies between the resulting aggregate channel cost ICc and the
first-best case minimum cost IC*o drastically change. In addition, since human
decision makers might make significantly different decisions than their perfectly
rationally optimizing counterparts, it is likely that the bullwhip effect might occur.
The investigation of the real decisions that human participants in the Beer
Distribution Game really make constitutes the object of the sub-section that
follows.
Chapter 2- Supply Chain Models and Contracts: Analytical and Experimental
Results
77
2.2.2 Behavioural Studies of the Beer Distribution Game
Forrester (1958; 1961) is the first that revealed the bullwhip effect, along with its
negative consequences. Since then a number of researchers are pre-occupied with
demystifying its underlying causes. The Beer Distribution Game, both in its
board-based (Sterman, 1989; 1992) and computer versions (Kaminsky and
Simchi-Levi, 1998; Simchi-Levi et al, 2008) provide the most usual experimental
framework for such studies.
Although it was not until relatively recently that a systematic behavioural
perspective has been brought to the operations management literature (Croson
and Donohue, 2002; Bendoly et al, 2006; Loch and Wu, 2007; Gino and Pisano,
2008), Sterman’s (1989) seminal paper describes the first behavioural experiment
that is conducted within the Beer Distribution Game setting. This paper
demonstrates individuals’ bounded rationality and, hence, limited ability to
understand and control systems with lagged, indirect and non-linear feedbacks. In
this regard, Sterman paves the way for a number of subsequent laboratory
investigations that further confirm the presence of behavioural complexities in
human decisions that are related to the Beer Distribution Game. The assumptions
of the standard normative models of Sub-section 2.2.1 that are revisited by this
behavioural research are first reviewed. The experimental protocols that are
applied are subsequently summarized and finally the main findings are outlined.
Assumptions Revisited
In order to review the assumptions that are revisited so far the Analysis of
Assumptions framework, as applied by Bendoly et al. (2006), is followed.
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The standard normative models that are discussed in Sub-section 2.2.1 are
built on the common assumption that all interacting decision makers would be
interested in minimising either the team overall or own individual backlog and
inventory holding costs (Chen, 1999; Lee and Whang, 1999). All the laboratory
investigations of the Beer Distribution Game ask participants to play as members
of a team; each team consists of the supply chain configuration to which
participants have been allocated. These studies subsequently explore whether
participants’ decisions, when combined, give rise to the first-best case minimum
cost IC*t or, else, the team overall minimum backlog and inventory holding cost,
as predicted by the standard normative models (e.g. Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi,
1998; Steckel et al, 2004). Laboratory experiments also investigate whether
participants’ decisions, when combined, generate the bullwhip effect (e.g. Croson
and Donohue, 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007). The main focus is
so far placed on the bullwhip effect, because it is considered to be the lead cause
of all cost amplifications. By comparing participants’ aggregate results with the
team optimal solution’s, these studies aim at either confirming or refuting the
existence of behavioural complexities or else individual biases in participants’
decision making. These behavioural complexities or individual biases are then
used to explain the deviation between the analytical predictions of the standard
normative models and the phenomena that are observed in the laboratory.
Therefore, minimisation of overall costs is still considered by the plethora of
these papers as the ultimate objective of all participating players. As such, the
assumption about team minimising cost intentions of decision makers, as
prescribed by the standard normative models, has as yet not been revisited.
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The only minor exception is the relatively small stream of experimental
research that is concerned with how human subjects perform in comparison to or
in collaboration with artificial agents (e.g. Kimbrough et al, 2002; Hieber and
Hartel, 2003; Nienhaus et al, 2006). In these papers, artificial agents are fully pre-
programmed to act according to the following intentions: complying with pre-
determined genetic algorithm rules that would approximate minimum overall
supply chain backlog and inventory holding costs (Kimbrough et al, 2002);
ordering according to either the base stock policy (Hieber and Hartel, 2003;
Nienhaus et al, 2006) or the economic order quantity (Hieber and Hartel, 2003);
ordering as much as they are requested to provide (Hieber and Hartel, 2003) or as
much as would reproduce a moving average of their own history orders (Hieber
and Hartel, 2003; Nienhaus et al, 2006). A base stock policy ensures that a firm’s
inventory level would never fall below the specified target level, while the
economic order quantity represents the inventory level that minimises total
inventory holding and ordering costs (Johnson and Montgomery, 1974; Hopp and
Spearman, 2001). These intentions differ from aggregate cost minimisation, as
prescribed by the standard normative models. By comparing participants’
aggregate results with the artificial agents’ and, thus, establishing human decision
makers’ systematic under-performance, these studies serve to confirm the
existence of behavioural complexities or individual biases in participants’
decision making.
But behavioural complexities or individual biases imply that decision
makers’ actions might differ from their intentions. This recognition about actions
is exactly what constitutes the main difference of most behavioural studies to the
standard normative models. In this regard, Croson and Donohue (2006), Wu and
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Katok (2006) and Croson et al. (2007) establish that the bullwhip effect persists,
even after removal of all its operational causes, as recognised by Lee et al.
(1997a; b). In this way, Sterman’s (1989) earlier finding that the behavioural
complexities are the phenomenon’s lead causes is confirmed.
A number of papers attempt to identify among the individual biases that
are suggested by Camerer (1995) and Loch and Wu (2007) the precise ones that
are responsible for these observed divergences between real and predicted
decisions. Sterman (1989) explores whether participants tend to apply the
Kahneman et al. (1982) anchoring and insufficient adjustment heuristic in their
decision making logic. According to this heuristic, participants would initially
choose their order quantities (“anchor”) based on the current stock levels and
subsequently make insufficient adjustments (“insufficiently adjust”) towards
desired stock levels. Sterman (1989), Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi (1998), Croson
and Donohue (2003; 2005; 2006) and Croson et al. (2007) further explore
whether subjects would tend to “under-weight” their supply line in their realised
decisions. Participants under-weight their supply line, if for every new order
quantity decision they make they seem to almost ignore their outstanding orders
(i.e. orders that they have placed but not yet received), but instead over-value
their current inventory positions.
Other papers are mostly interested in revealing new behavioural biases that
can exist in the Beer Distribution Game and, for this reason, turn to
systematically exploring their respective impact on participants’ decisions and the
resulting occurrence of the bullwhip effect. Wu and Katok (2006) define
‘organizational learning’ as the interaction between role-specific and system-
wide training and communication and investigate whether its lack could be one of
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the main behavioural biases leading to the bullwhip effect. Croson et al. (2007)
perceive ‘coordination risk’ as the lack of: i. trust in other partners’ actions and ii.
common knowledge about the team optimal solution. They propose this to be a
potential trigger for the subjects’ tendency to under-weight their supply line. Su
(2008) considers as the lead cause of the bullwhip effect supply chain members’
need to safeguard against potential biases that may be inherent in other partners’
decisions. For this reason, he offers an analytical framework to quantify the
above defined coordination risk of Croson et al.’s
But the existing experimental research on the Beer Distribution Game
setting is not exclusively concerned with revealing the behavioural complexities
that cause the bullwhip effect. Another significant segment of this research
methodically investigates the behavioural benefits, or else improvements to
human decisions, that can be achieved, if institutional or structural simplifications
are applied to the original game setup. Namely, a number of papers explore
decision makers’ reactions to environmental changes. Indicative examples are
time lag reduction (Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 1998; Kimbrough et al, 2002;
Steckel et al, 2004), sharing of additional information between players
(Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 1998; Croson and Donohue, 2003; Steckel et al,
2004; Croson and Donohue, 2005; Croson and Donohue, 2006; Nienhaus et al,
2006), or other more drastic changes, such as centralised operation management
of the entire supply chain by one player (Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 1998) or
provision for storing extra inventory or public awareness of the team optimum
policy (Croson et al, 2007).
Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi (1998) and Steckel et al. (2004) investigate the
effect of reducing the required lead times between shipment and delivery.
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Kimbrough et al. (2002) introduce lead time uncertainty by forcing lead times to
follow a uniform distribution that ranges from 0 to 4 and explore the effect of this
additional complexity on the overall supply chain performances that are attained
by their artificial agents. Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi (1998), Croson and
Donohue (2005), Croson and Donohue (2006) and Nienhaus et al. (2006) address
the question of whether making all participants’ inventory information publicly
known to all of them would improve overall performance. Kaminsky and Simchi-
Levi (1998) additionally publicize customer demand information to all
participants of the game. Croson and Donohue (2003) and Steckel et al. (2004)
limit their attention to only making Point-Of-Sales (POS) demand information
available to all participants. In addition, Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi (1998) study
whether the centralised operation management of the entire Beer Distribution
Game supply chain by a sole player would enhance the overall performance
attained. Last but not least, Croson et al. (2007) explore the effect of two more
drastic changes to the usual experimental setup of the Beer Distribution Game:
They make provision for their participants’ extra possibility to hold excess
inventory (which they call coordination stock), in order to be protected against
coordination risk. They also inform all their participants what their inventory
management policy should be in order to generate the team optimal solution or
else not exceed the corresponding first-best case minimum cost. This policy
seems to severely reduce the extent of the bullwhip effect.
The Protocols Applied
In Sterman’s seminal paper (1989) human participants are asked to interact over
the board version of the game (Sterman, 1992). In all the remaining papers
reviewed in this sub-section, human participants are asked to determine their
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order quantity decisions in computerized simulation games of the Beer
Distribution Game setting, according to the specifications that are provided by
Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi (1998) and Simchi-Levi et al. (2008). Steckel et al.
(2004) apply the implementation of the Beer Distribution Game with 3 players,
while all other papers (e.g. Kimbrough et al, 2002; Croson and Donohue, 2003;
Hieber and Hartel, 2003; Croson and Donohue 2005; Croson and Donohue, 2006;
Nienhaus et al, 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007) explore the 4
echelons implementation. Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi ’s (1998) and Hieber and
Hartel ‘s (2003) participants interact with automated responses that simulate all
remaining three roles’ policies; the number of pre-simulated responses that
Nienhaus et al.’s (2006) participants face vary from 0 to 3. Players of all other
studies interact with and against each other via network (Steckel et al, 2004; Wu
and Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007) or web-based (Croson and Donohue, 2003;
Croson and Donohue, 2005; Croson and Donohue, 2006; Nienhaus et al, 2006)
implementations of specifically designed computer interfaces. These interfaces
ensure that participants would only have access to the information that is
specified by the exact research questions addressed.
Kimbrough et al. (2002), Hieber and Hartel (2003) and Nienhaus et al.
(2006) only resort to laboratory investigations to compare human decisions to
artificial agents’ performances and subsequently base all their conclusions on
their simulation and ‘what-if’ analyses results. Nonetheless, all remaining papers
infer their conclusions from the decisions that the human participants are
observed to make in the laboratory (e.g. Kimbrough et al, 2002; Croson and
Donohue, 2003; Hieber and Hartel, 2003; Steckel et al, 2004; Croson and
Donohue 2005; Croson and Donohue, 2006; Nienhaus et al, 2006; Wu and
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Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007). Steckel et al. (2004) is the only paper that
reports on restricting the time that each participant has to make a decision in each
round (to 90 seconds).
Participants in the Beer Distribution Game are asked to iteratively make
order quantity decisions over 25-50 (Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 1998), 35
(Kimbrough et al, 2002), 36 (Sterman, 1989; Steckel et al, 2004), 48 (Croson and
Donohue, 2003; 2005; 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007), 50 or 100
rounds (Hieber and Hartel, 2003). Researchers avoid end-of-game effects by
hiding from all participants the true length of the experiment (Croson and
Donohue, 2003; Steckel et al, 2004; Croson and Donohue, 2005; 2006; Wu and
Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007).
Some studies also require players to participate in some additional
activities at the beginning or the end of the game, which also prove to play a
rather significant role in the results that are obtained. In order to ensure that the
participants have an in-depth understanding of the game dynamics and inherent
complexity, Steckel et al. (2004) make provision for an additional 8 trial rounds
to be run before the start of the actual game. The result from these rounds do not
count toward the calculations of final outcomes. To the same end, Croson et al.
(2007) invite participants to complete a test on the game rules and the meaning of
customer demand, before starting to record their decisions and results. Because of
the exact research questions addressed by Wu and Katok (2006), they
additionally make training and study sessions possible, before the beginning of
the actual game, in accordance with the research questions addressed. A training
session would enable participants to practice for 20 periods in either a specific
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role or all roles of the game, while a study session would encourage participants
to study the instructions, finish a quiz and reflect upon strategies to be
implemented during the actual game for 10 minutes. After the end of the game,
Croson et al. (2007) ask participants to complete a quiz that encourages them to
reflect on the results obtained and their overall experience.
Sterman (1989) considers customer demand to follow a simple step-up
function, according to which customer demand is fixed at 4 units for the first 4
weeks and increases to 8 units in week 5 and remains fixed at 8 units thereafter.
Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi (1998), Kimbrough et al, (2002), Hieber and Hartel
(2003), Nienhaus et al. (2006) and Steckel et al. (2004) follow Sterman’s (1989)
simple step-up demand function. Steckel et al. (2004) additionally study the case
of S-shaped demand patterns with and without noise.
Lee et al. (1997a; b) identify the following four as causes of the bullwhip
effect for the case of perfectly rational decision makers: i. demand signal
processing (i.e. transformation of current demand information into future demand
forecast), ii. shortage games (i.e. allocation of manufacturers’ limited resources to
competing partners), iii. order batching (i.e. ordering less frequently than once
per time period) and iv. price fluctuations (discounts and promotions that usually
encourage forward buying). From these, it naturally follows that Sterman’s
(1989) step-up demand function does not control for demand signal processing.
In order, thus, to remove all operational causes of the bullwhip effect, Croson and
Donohue (2006), Wu and Katok (2006) and Croson et al. (2007) assume that
customer demand in each period follows the uniform distribution ranging from 0
to 8 units. In addition, they inform all participants of this demand distribution, as
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suggested by Chen and Samroenraja (2000). Kimbrough et al. (2002) force
customer demand to follow the uniform distribution that ranges from 0 to 15. In
order to remove all demand-related uncertainty, Croson et al. (2007) keep
customer demand fixed at 4 units and again announce this to all players prior to
the beginning of the game. Hieber and Hartel (2003) prefer to keep customer
demand fixed at 8 units per period.
Most studies offer to participants financial incentives to make better
decisions. Wu and Katok (2006) and Steckel et al. (2004) pay their participants
according to their team performance, that is irrespectively from other teams’
cumulative costs. In greater detail, Wu and Katok (2006) initially provide each
team with an endowment of 5,000 tokens. All backlog and inventory holding
costs incurred by all members of the team are then subtracted from the tokens
that are initially made available to the team. The tokens that are at the end of the
game still available to the team represent the total team earnings and are split
equally among all team members. Steckel et al. (2004) pay all participants a flat
minimum participation fee and, in addition, a variable rate that is determined by
the total cumulative costs that are incurred at the end of the game by their own
team. Meanwhile Sterman (1989), Croson and Donohue (2003), Croson and
Donohue (2005), Croson and Donohue (2006) and Croson et al. (2007)
incorporate an additional element of competition between different teams, by
compensating them in relation to how their total costs rank among the other
teams’ overall costs. Sterman (1989) asks all participants at the beginning of the
game to place a $1 bet to a kitty. At the end of the game the team with the lowest
overall costs receives all bets placed and splits all bets equally to all members of
the team. Croson and Donohue (2003), Croson and Donohue (2005), Croson and
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Donohue (2006) and Croson et al. (2007) pay participants according to a
continuous incentive scheme, that consists of two separate elements, that is, a
minimum participation fee and a fee that is based on the difference between the
lowest cumulative costs incurred and the team’s own cumulative costs.
Table 2.2 summarises the different experimental protocols that the papers
reviewed in this sub-section apply. Since Sterman’s (1989) original game set-up
constitutes the base for all subsequent investigations, it is shaded in grey colour
and separated from all other papers in this table by a line.
Key Findings
Kimbrough et al. (2002), Hieber and Hartel (2003) and Nienhaus et al. (2006)
observe their participants to systematically under-perform, when compared with
fully pre-programmed artificial agents. In this way, these three papers further
confirm the prevalence of individual biases in human decision making in the Beer
Distribution Game setting. The latter is additionally reported by a significant
number of laboratory investigations (Sterman, 1989; Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi,
1998; Croson and Donohue, 2003; Croson and Donohue, 2005; Croson and
Donohue, 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007).
In greater detail, Sterman (1989) mostly attributes the supply chain’s
excess total costs and the bullwhip effect to Kahneman et al.’s (1982) anchoring
and insufficient adjustment heuristic. He demonstrates that participants in the
Beer Distribution Game initially choose their order quantities (“anchor”) based
on initial stock levels and subsequently make insufficient adjustments
(“insufficiently adjusted”) towards desired stock levels.
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Table 2.2: Distribution of experimental protocols applied in the Beer Distribution Game setting
Research Paper Game Setup Customer demand Changes and
Information Sharing
Incentives Basis of Analysis
Sterman (1989) 4 echelons
36 rounds
Board-based version
Step –up increase
No relevant information
is provided to
participants
Base for all subsequent
investigations
Bet placed by all teams
Bet earned by the
lowest cost incurring
team
Experiments with
human subjects
Kaminsky and Simchi-
Levi (1998)
4 echelons
25-50 rounds
Computer-based version
3 automated partners’ responses
Centralised control
Step –up increase
Real-time information
about customer demand
is common knowledge
Real-time information
about inventory status
is shared
Reduction of
transportation and
information lead-times
Not reported Experiments with
human subjects
Kimbrough et al.
(2002)
4 echelons
35 rounds
Computer-based version
 Step –up increase
Uniform [0,15]
Reduction of
transportation and
information lead-times
Not reported Results from simulation
experiments with:
 lead-times distributed
acc. to: uniform [0,4]
 network with 8 roles
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Research Paper Game Setup Customer demand Changes and
Information Sharing
Incentives Basis of Analysis
Croson and Donohue
(2003)
4 echelons
48 rounds
Interactive web-based simulation game
Participants unaware of true game duration
Uniform [0,8]
Demand distribution is
common knowledge
Real-time information
about demand is
common knowledge
Continuous incentive
scheme that consists of
a minimum
participation fee and a
variable fee according
to team’s rank of cost
overall performance
Experiments with
human subjects
Hieber and Hartel
(2003)
4 echelons
50 and 100 rounds
Computer-based version
3 automated partners’ responses
Step –up increase
Deterministic [8]
Not reported Not reported Results from ‘what-if’
simulation runs
Steckel et al. (2004) 3 echelons
36 rounds
Interactive simulation game
Participants unaware of true game duration
8 trial periods
Step –up increase
S-shaped demand
pattern without noise
S-shaped demand
patterns with random
noise
Reduction of
transportation and
information lead-times
Continuous incentive
scheme that consists of
a flat participation fee
and a variable fee
according to team’s
overall cost
Experiments with
human subjects
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Research Paper Game Setup Customer demand Changes and
Information Sharing
Incentives Basis of Analysis
Croson and Donohue
(2005)
4 echelons
48 rounds
Interactive web-based simulation game
Participants unaware of true game duration
Uniform [0,8]
Demand distribution is
common knowledge
Real-time information
about upstream
inventory status is
shared
Real-time information
about downstream
inventory status is
shared.
Continuous incentive
scheme that consists of
a minimum
participation fee and a
variable fee according
to team’s rank of cost
overall performance
Experiments with
human subjects
Croson and Donohue
(2006)
4 echelons
48 rounds
Interactive web-based simulation game
Participants unaware of true game duration
Uniform [0,8]
Demand distribution is
common knowledge
Real-time information
about inventory status
is common knowledge
Continuous incentive
scheme that consists of
a minimum
participation fee and a
variable fee according
to team’s rank of cost
overall performance
Experiments with
human subjects
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Research Paper Game Setup Customer demand Changes and
Information Sharing
Incentives Basis of Analysis
Nienhaus et al. 2006 4 echelons
Computer-based version
Against varying (0-3) automated partners’
responses
Step –up increase Not reported Provision of financial
incentives not clearly
reported
Comparison of
decisions observed in
the laboratory with
artificial agents’
decisions
Wu and Katok (2006) 4 echelons
48 rounds
Interactive simulation game
Participants unaware of true game duration
Provision of training and study sessions at
the beginning of the game
Uniform [0,8]
Demand distribution is
common knowledge
Not reported Participants are paid the
difference between
their team overall
inventory holding and
backorder costs and
their initial endowment
of tokens
Experiments with
human subjects
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Research Paper Game Setup Customer demand Changes and
Information Sharing
Incentives Basis of Analysis
Croson et al. (2007) 4 echelons
48 rounds
Interactive web-based simulation game
Participants unaware of true game duration
Before the start of the game provision for a
quiz that tests the participants’
understanding of the game rules
At the end of game provision for a quiz that
asks participants to reflect on their results
and game experience
Deterministic [4]
Customer demand is
common knowledge
Team optimum solution
is common knowledge
Provision for storing
extra inventory
Continuous incentive
scheme that consists of
a minimum
participation fee and a
variable fee according
to team’s rank of cost
overall performance
Experiments with
human subjects
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Sterman (1989), Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi (1998), Croson and Donohue
(2003; 2005; 2006) and Croson et al. (2007) establish subjects’ tendency to
under-weight their supply line in their realised decisions, that is, for every new
order quantity decision they make, they assign higher significance to their current
inventory position than to their outstanding orders (i.e. orders they have placed
but have not yet received from their upstream manufacturers). Wu and Katok
(2006) recognise the deficiency of organizational learning, training and
communication as the main causes of the bullwhip effect. Croson et al. (2007)
ascribe coordination risk as at least partly responsible for the bullwhip effect and
discover that the participants’ usual lack of awareness about the team optimal
solution seems to have a more significant contribution on the extent of the
bullwhip effect than the participants’ lack of trust in other partners’ decisions.
2.2.3 Summary
Section 2.2 discusses some standard normative models that are applicable to the
Beer Distribution Game. Section 2.2 also reviews the true decisions that human
participants in the Beer Distribution Game are observed to make. In this regard,
Table 2.3 provides a breakdown of the articles that revise the common
behavioural assumptions of the standard normative models.
Table 2.3 is structured according to the Analysis of Assumptions
framework, as applied by Bendoly et al. (2006). Table 2.3 demonstrates how the
systematic divergence of human decisions from the standard normative models’
predictions is confirmed in the laboratory (Sterman, 1989; Kaminsky and Simchi-
Levi, 1998; Croson and Donohue, 2003; Steckel et al, 2004; Croson and
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Donohue, 2005; Croson and Donohue, 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006; Croson et al,
2007).
This inability of human participants in the Beer Distribution Game to
follow the standard normative models’ predictions is explained by the presence of
a number of individual behavioural biases, such as, for example:
 anchoring and insufficient adjustment heuristic (Sterman, 1989);
 supply line under-weighting (Sterman, 1989; Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi,
1998; Croson and Donohue, 2003; Croson and Donohue, 2005; Croson and
Donohue, 2006; Croson et al, 2007);
 organizational learning (Wu and Katok, 2006); coordination risk (Croson
et al, 2007);
 protection against other partners’ biases (Su, 2008).
Table 2.3: Distribution of behavioural papers in the context of the Beer Distribution
Game by assumption type
Research Paper Behavioural assumptions Key Findings
Intentions: decision makers’ actual goals might be different from maximisation of the
aggregate channel’s profit
Kimbrough et al. (2002) Approximate minimisation
of aggregate channel
backlog and inventory
holding costs, according to
a specially designed genetic
algorithm
Human decisions
systematically deviate from
these objectives; persistence
of behavioural complexities
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Research Paper Behavioural assumptions Key Findings
Hieber and Hartel (2003) Satisfaction of economic
order quantity; compliance
with base stock policy;
matching supply with
demand; matching supply
with a moving average of
own history orders
Human decisions
systematically deviate from
these objectives; persistence
of behavioural complexities
Nienhaus et al. (2006) Compliance with base stock
policy; matching supply
with a moving average of
own history orders
Human decisions
systematically deviate from
these objectives; persistence
of behavioural complexities
Actions: decision makers’ behaviour might differ from the behaviour that is specified by
their respective intentions
Sterman (1989) Anchoring and insufficient
adjustment heuristic; supply
line under-weighting
Prevalence of individual
biases in human decision
making; anchoring and
insufficient adjustment
heuristic; supply line under-
weighting
Kaminsky and Simchi-
Levi (1998)
Supply line under-weighting Prevalence of individual
biases in human decision
making
Croson and Donohue
(2003)
Supply line under-weighting Prevalence of individual
biases in human decision
making; supply line under-
weighting
Croson and Donohue
(2005)
Supply line under-weighting Prevalence of individual
biases in human decision
making; supply line under-
weighting
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Research Paper Behavioural assumptions Key Findings
Croson and Donohue
(2006)
Supply line under-weighting Recognition of behavioural
complexities as the bullwhip
effect’s lead cause; supply
line under-weighting
Wu and Katok (2006) Organizational learning Recognition of behavioural
complexities and deficiency
of organizational learning,
training and communication
as the bullwhip effect’s lead
cause
Croson et al. (2007) Supply line under-
weighting; coordination risk
Recognition of behavioural
complexities and
coordination risk as the
bullwhip effect’s lead cause;
supply line under-
weighting; participants’
usual lack of awareness
about the team optimal
solution has a significant
contribution on the
perseverance of the
bullwhip effect
Su (2008) Protection against other
partners’ biases
Analytical framework to
quantify Croson et al.’s
(2007) coordination risk;
formal proof of why the
existence of at least one
non-perfectly rational
decision maker constitutes a
necessary and sufficient
condition for the bullwhip
effect
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Research Paper Behavioural assumptions Key Findings
Reactions: decision makers might learn, process feedback information and react to
environmental changes
Kaminsky and Simchi-
Levi (1998)
Time lag reduction; public
inventory information;
centralised decision making
Time lag reduction reduces
overall costs; benefits of
centralised decision making
Kimbrough et al. (2002) Time lag reduction; lead
time uncertainty
Results not clearly reported
Croson and Donohue
(2003)
Public POS information Sharing POS data could
significantly reduce the
extent of the bullwhip effect,
when all partners are aware
of underlying customer
demand
Steckel et al. (2004) Time lag reduction; public
POS information
Time lag reduction
improves decision makers’
order quantity decisions for
the cases of noise-free
demand distributions;
sharing POS data could
significantly reduce overall
supply chain costs for the
cases of customer demand
patterns with single changes
Croson and Donohue
(2005)
Public inventory
information
Sharing downstream
inventory information could
eliminate order oscillation
Croson and Donohue
(2006)
Public inventory
information
Sharing inventory
information could eliminate
order oscillation
Nienhaus et al. (2006) Public inventory
information
Conclusions that can be
generalised not clearly
reported
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Research Paper Behavioural assumptions Key Findings
Croson et al. (2007) Possibility to hold
coordination stock;
information about inventory
management policy that
would generate the team
optimal solution
Neither coordination stock
nor common knowledge of
the team optimal policy
could eliminate the bullwhip
effect
The results of these erroneous human decisions are two-fold: i. a persistent
discrepancy between the resulting aggregate channel cost ICc and the first-best
case minimum cost IC*0 (Sterman, 1989; Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 1998;
Steckel et al, 2004) and ii. a prevalence of the bullwhip effect (Sterman, 1989;
Croson and Donohue, 2003; Croson and Donohue, 2005; Croson and Donohue,
2006; Wu and Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007). As already discussed, the
bullwhip effect further magnifies overall supply chain costs (Chen et al, 1999;
Dejonckheere et al, 2003; Sucky, 2009).
2.3 Supply Chain Contracts
In this section the contracts or transfer payments schemes that are proposed to
coordinate supply chains are considered. A contract or transfer payment scheme
is said to coordinate a supply chain if it forces the aggregate channel
performance, namely, the aggregate channel profit ߎ௖ or aggregate channel cost
ICc,, to coincide with the first-best case maximum profit Πo* or the first-best case
minimum cost IC*t, respectively (Cachon, 2003). This section starts by reviewing
contractual agreements that are applicable to the simple newsvendor setting and
later proceeds to outlining the transfer payment schemes that are suggested as
appropriate for the Beer Distribution Game setting. The reasons that different
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contractual arrangements may be required in these two settings are due to the
structural differences that exist between them. These differences concern the
following five aspects:
i. Although in the Newsvendor Problem, there is no inventory, in the Beer
Distribution Game setting there is inventory that is kept at each echelon
level.
ii. Even though in the Newsvendor Problem all unsatisfied demand is lost, in the
Beer Distribution Game any unsatisfied demand is backlogged.
iii. In contrast to the Newsvendor Problem setting, in which all orders get
immediately processed, in the Beer Distribution Game setting there is a fixed
information lead-time for all orders to get transmitted and processed.
iv. Dissimilarly to the Newsvendor Problem, in which all shipments get prepared
and delivered immediately, in the Contract Beer Distribution Game, there are
fixed, non-zero production and transportation lead-times.
v. Although in the Newsvendor Problem all associated partners deal with
demand uncertainty only, in the Beer Distribution Game setting all partners
face uncertainty from both the supply and demand sides.
Sub-section 2.3.1 outlines the way that the supply chain contracts are
designed to operate under the assumption of perfectly rational decision makers in
both the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings. Sub-
section 2.3.2 reviews the relevant behavioural research, which explores whether
and how different human decisions are from the relevant predictions of the
standard normative models. In this regard, the same organization with the
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preceding sections is followed. Sub-section 2.3.2 starts by reflecting on how
laboratory investigations update standard normative models’ assumptions, in
view of decision makers’ intentions, actions and reactions; it then outlines the
experimental protocols that these studies apply and finally presents their key
findings. This sub-section also tries to answer the question of how do these
observed divergences of humans’ true decisions from perfectly rational decisions
affect the true efficiency of the contract that is assumed to be in force; namely,
whether this true efficiency score differs from its corresponding theoretical
prediction.
2.3.1 Standard Normative Models
The Newsvendor Setting
Although a number of contracts are suggested to align the individual decision
makers’ incentives with the integrated newsvendor’s, so that the first-best case
maximum profit is attained (e.g. buy-back: Pasternack, 1985; Lau et al, 2007,
quantity discount: Moorthy, 1987; Kolay et al, 2004, quantity-flexibility: Tsay,
1999, sales rebate: Taylor, 2002; Arcelus et al, 2007; Burer et al, 2008, revenue
sharing: Cachon and Lariviere, 2005), only two of these, namely the buy-back
and revenue sharing contracts, have been studied in the laboratory. Hence,
attention is limited here to the way that these two contracts work. The reason that
only these two contracts have so far been studied in the laboratory are two-fold:
first, they are simple and second, they are widely used in a variety of industries,
such as, for example, the publishing, movie rental, computer software, computer
hardware and pharmaceuticals (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005; Katok and Wu,
2009). For detailed surveys of all the above supply chain contracts and reviews
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of the analytical results acquired so far the interested reader is referred to Tsay et
al. (1999), Cachon (2003) and Simchi-Levi et al. (2008).
In the buyback contract the manufacturer pays the retailer a rebate b for
every unit not sold or, else, that is in excess of realised demand at the end of the
period. The contractual agreement between the manufacturer and the retailer in
every time period, thus, consists of the buyback price b and the corresponding
wholesale price wbb. Therefore, the transfer payment between the retailer and the
manufacturer becomes: ܶ(ݍ, ,ܾݓ௕௕) = ܾܵ (ݍ) + (ݓ௕௕ − )ܾݍ. The retailer’s
expected profit from an order quantity q is given by:
ߎݎ = (݌+ ݃) (ܵݍ) − ݃ߤ− ܶ(ݍ, ,ܾݓ ܾܾ ) = (݌+ ݃) (ܵݍ) −
݃ߤ− ܾܵ (ݍ) − (ݓ௕௕ − )ܾݍ 
ߎ௥ = (݌+ ݃− )ܾ (ܵݍ) − (ݓ௕௕ − )ܾݍ− ݃ߤ (2.18)
with an optimal order quantity: ݍ௥∗ = ܨିଵቀ௣ା௚ି௪ ್್௣ା௚ି௕ ቁ, according to (2.4). The set
of buyback parameters (wbb, b) that satisfy any integer value  with 01 is
now considered:
݌+ ݃− ܾ= l(݌+ ݃)
(ݓ௕௕ − )ܾ = lܿ
A comparison with the integrated newsvendor’s profit, as given by equation
(2.1), transforms the retailer’s expected profit given by (2.18) as follows:
ߎݎ = l(݌+ ݃) (ܵݍ) − l ܿݍ− ݃ߤ
ߎݎ = lߎ݅݊ ݐ-(1 − l) ݃ߤ
Chapter 2- Supply Chain Models and Contracts: Analytical and Experimental
Results
102
which is an affine function 5of the integrated newsvendor’s profit. It follows
immediately that ݍ௥∗ = ݍ௜௡௧∗ for the retailer. Interestingly, this same order quantity
coincides with the manufacturer’s most preferred order quantity because the
manufacturer’s expected profit also proves to be an affine function of the
integrated newsvendor’s profit:
ߎ௠ = ߃(ߨ௦) = ߎ௜௡௧− ߎ௥ = ߎ௜௡௧− lߎ௜௡௧ -(1 − l) ݃ߤ
ߎ௠ = (1 − l)ߎ௜௡௧∗ − (1 − l) ݃ߤ
As a result, both the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s decisions are aligned
with the integrated newsvendor’s and, hence, when combined, generate the first-
best case maximum profit. Hence, the buy-back contract can coordinate the
newsvendor problem and, for this reason, is an efficient contract.
The revenue sharing contract is an alternative contractual arrangement that
Cachon and Lariviere (2005) prove that it is completely equivalent to the buy-
back contract. In the revenue sharing contract the retailer shares some of his/her
revenue with the manufacturer, or else passes a fraction of the selling price to the
manufacturer, namely (1-r)p. The contractual agreement between the
manufacturer and the retailer in every time period, thus, consists of the revenue
fraction r that the retailer keeps for him/her self and the corresponding wholesale
price wrs. Therefore, the transfer payment between the retailer and the
5The term “affine function” describes a function with a constant slope, which implies that
the dependent variable may have a non-zero value when all independent variables take
zero values [source: http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/affine.htm, last
accessed: 29/10/2010].
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manufacturer becomes: ܶ(ݍ,ݎ,ݓ௥௦) = (1 − ݎ)݌ܵ (ݍ) + ݓ௥௦ݍ. The retailer’s
expected profit from an order quantity q is given by:
ߎݎ = (݌+ ݃) (ܵݍ) − ݃ߤ− ܶ(ݍ,ݎ,ݓݎݏ)= (݌+ ݃) (ܵݍ) − ݃ߤ− (1 − ݎ)݌ܵ (ݍ) − ݓݎݏݍÞ
ߎ௥ = (ݎ݌+ ݃) (ܵݍ) − ݓ௥௦ݍ− ݃ߤ (2.19)
with an optimal order quantity: ݍ௥∗ = ܨିଵቀ௥௣ା௚ି௪ೝೞ௥௣ା௚ ቁ, according to (2.4). The set
of revenue sharing parameters (wrs, r) that satisfy any integer value  with 01
is now considered:
ݎ݌+ ݃ = l(݌+ ݃)
ݓ௥௦ = lܿ
Under these terms the retailer’s expected profit given by (2.19) becomes:
ߎݎ = l(݌+ ݃) (ܵݍ) − l ܿݍ− ݃ߤ ߎݎ = lߎ݅݊ ݐ-(1 − l) ݃ߤ
which is an affine function of the integrated newsvendor’s profit. It follows
immediately that the retailer’s order quantity becomes: ݍ௥∗ = ݍ௜௡௧∗ . For the same
reasons with the buy-back contract, this same order quantity would also
maximise the manufacturer’s respective profit, namely ݍ௠∗ = ݍ௜௡௧∗ . The result is
that the revenue sharing contract can generate the first-best case maximum profit
and, therefore, can coordinate the newsvendor problem, i.e. it is efficient.
Albeit the buyback and revenue sharing contracts can attain efficiency,
they are costly to administer and implement. They also require more than one
transaction to take place between the manufacturer and the retailer: one at the
delivery and receipt of any ordered quantity and one at the end of the season,
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after customer demand has occurred. In addition, they are built on the assumption
that the retailer is willing to share with the manufacturer at the end of the period
either his/her true inventory status or a portion of his/her revenues. But in case
these goods are not required to be physically transported to the manufacturer’s
site, the manufacturer does not have any means to confirm the accuracy of the
information that is provided by the retailer. In summary, there is a high
administrative burden that is associated with the implementation of the above
coordinating contracts. This could at least partially explain their relatively
limited applicability in practice.
Nevertheless, the wholesale price contract may not coordinate the
newsvendor setting and can still leave discrepancies between the first-best case
maximum profit and the channel’s aggregate profit, but it is the simplest to put in
force and, in addition, only requires one transaction between the interacting
manufacturer and retailer. Although this simplicity is an obvious and important
reason for the wholesale price contract’s wide popularity, it remains open to
further exploration whether there is any additional reason associated with this:
namely, it is interesting to inquire whether its true performance might in practice
be better than theoretically predicted. As discussed in Section 1.4, this constitutes
one of the questions that this PhD thesis aims to address.
The Beer Distribution Game
Most researchers are influenced by the way that the buyback contract operates in
the Newsvendor Problem setting and propose relevant transfer payment schemes
to take place between local firm managers in the Beer Distribution Game in order
to force them to follow the team optimizing decision rules and, thus, lead the
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aggregate channel to attain the first-best case minimum cost IC*0 (e.g. Lee and
Whang, 1999; Porteus, 2000; Cachon and Zipkin, 1999). In this regard, in order
to minimise the arising competition penalty, they force the manufacturers to
assume their responsibility for any unsatisfied customer demand.
In greater detail, Lee and Whang (1999) force manufacturers to incur
backlog penalties (i.e. shortage reimbursements), every time they fail to fully
deliver the requested quantities. Lee and Whang demonstrate that given the
properties of these non linear transactions schemes, the intention of echelon
managers to minimise their own respective backlog and inventory holding cost
ICi leads to aggregate channel costs ܫܥ஼ = ∑ ܫܥ௜ே௜ୀଵ that would not be different
from the overall minimum backlog and inventory holding cost IC0*. With respect
to the same objective, Chen (1999) calculates the exact penalties that distinct
echelon managers should be forced to pay, in order not to deviate from the team
optimal decision rules. Cachon (2003) proves the equivalence between Lee and
Whang’s (1999) and Chen’s (1999) suggested schemes. Porteus (2000) further
facilitates the execution of Lee and Whang’s (1999) transfer payment scheme. In
lieu of backlog penalties, Porteus proposes a responsibility token to be issued
every time a manufacturer cannot meet incoming order quantities. In this way,
the manufacturer assumes full responsibility of arising customer backlog. The
result is that exactly the same effect with Lee and Whang ’s (1999) transfer
payment scheme is produced, but without the need to compute all consequences
in advance. Furthermore, Cachon and Zipkin (1999) suggest simple linear
transfer payment schemes based on on-hand inventory and backlog information;
these linear transfer payment schemes would eliminate local firm managers’
incentives to deviate from the team optimal decision rules. Although Cachon and
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Zipkin’s transfer payment schemes might sometimes not lead to the team
minimum cost, they are much simpler and, thus, easier to implement than Lee and
Wang’s. Finally, Cachon (2003) generalises these linear transfer payment
schemes.
Nevertheless, these transfer payment schemes are based on information
about partners’ on-hand inventories and backlogs (Cachon and Zipkin, 1999;
Cachon, 2003) and true customer demand (Lee and Whang, 1999); information
which they might not always be willing to share, at least not without being
compensated via some form of incentive (Cachon and Fisher, 2000; Chen, 2003).
In addition, they are built on the pre-assumption that either the team optimal
solution is common knowledge to all partners (Cachon and Zipkin, 1999; Lee and
Whang, 1999; Cachon, 2003) or there is one firm that presumes the responsibility
of compensating the other firms and, thus, adequately allocating the costs
between them (Chen, 1999; Lee and Whang, 1999). Last but not least, the
participating firms are deprived the ability to make some profit of their own
(Chen, 1999). These assumptions that are required to make the above transfer
payment schemes converge to the team optimum solution are considered as over-
simplifying and, hence, unrealistic. This might be a good explanation for why
echelon managers do not often resort to them in practice and insist on resorting to
the simplest contractual agreement that can exist, that is, the wholesale price
contract (e.g. Narayan and Raman, 2004). Nevertheless, the way that the
wholesale price contract would work, if applied to the Beer Distribution Game
setting, has as yet not been explored.
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2.3.2 Behavioural Studies of Supply Chain Contracts
Although experimental research on supply chain contracts is still in its infancy,
there is already a number of papers that are concerned with either confirming or
refuting the analytical predictions of the supply chain contracting theories. These
studies explore the true efficiency scores that supply chain contracts attain in the
laboratory and subsequently compare them with their respective theoretical
predictions. The newsvendor setting is already extensively used to assess supply
chain contracts’ true efficiency. This is, however, not the case for the Beer
Distribution Game setting. This is exactly why there are no references to papers
on the Beer Distribution Game in the paragraphs that follow. The reasons that the
Beer Distribution Game has as yet not been used as a framework to explore the
efficiency of different contractual arrangements are due to the structural
complications of the setting.
In the sub-sections that follow the same organization with the preceding
sections is followed. Namely, first the assumptions of the standard normative
models that are updated by the different behavioural studies are outlined, later the
protocols that are applied are summarized and last the key findings are presented.
Assumptions Revisited
All behavioural research on supply chain contracts revises the common
assumption of the aforementioned normative contracting theories, where all
manufacturers and retailers are considered as perfectly rational and exclusively
interested in maximising their respective profits. In this regard, laboratory
investigations of supply chain contracts extend previous laboratory investigations
of the Newsvendor Problem (e.g. Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Schultz and
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McClain, 2007; Benzion et al, 2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al,
2008; Kremer et al, 2008; Su, 2008; Lurie and Swaminathan, 2009) in that they
recognise human retailers’ natural tendency to conform with individual biases
(Keser and Paleologo, 2004; Katok and Wu, 2009; Kremer, 2008) or their own
implicit bounded rationality (Su, 2008).
Building on this, they additionally explore whether this is also the case for
manufacturers’ decision making. In greater detail, by making provision for
human manufacturers and retailers interacting with each other, Keser and
Paleologo (2004) compare the true performance of the wholesale price contract
with its theoretical prediction. Katok and Wu (2009) evaluate the practical
improvement offered by the coordinating buy-back and revenue sharing contracts
over the wholesale price contract, in terms of attained efficiency scores. For this
reason, all participants in the experiments of Katok and Wu (2009) are asked to
play two different games: one with the wholesale price contract and one with a
coordinating contract, either the buyback or the revenue sharing contract. Each is
assigned in a random way. Su (2008) aims to explain the resulting behaviour of
these two coordinating contracts that is reported by Katok and Wu as worse than
theoretically predicted. Last, Kremer (2008) explores whether participants would
prefer the buyback or revenue sharing contracts over the wholesale price
contract, namely in the case that they are offered the choice of transiting from the
wholesale price contract to one of the other two. In summary, laboratory
investigations of supply chain contracts revisit the standard normative models’
assumptions about decision makers’ actions being perfectly aligned with their
respective intentions. There are as yet no research papers that revisit the standard
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normative models’ assumptions about profit maximising intentions and lack of
reactions to occurring changes.
The Protocols Applied
In most papers reviewed in this section customer demand is assumed to follow
the uniform distribution (Keser and Paleologo, 2004; Kremer, 2008; Katok and
Wu, 2009) and participants are offered different types of financial incentives.
Keser and Paleologo (2004) pay their subjects according to a linear payment
scheme that makes provision for a minimum participation fee and an extra fee
that incorporates the percent cumulative profit realised by the participant that is
higher than the average cumulative profit that is realised by all participants who
play the same role. Katok and Wu (2009) pay their participants the actual
earnings that are accumulated over the total duration of the two gaming sessions
in cash. Kremer (2008) pays a random draw of approximately 4% of his
participants their actual earnings and a minimum participation fee.
Nevertheless, these research papers apply different experimental
approaches that vary from interactive simulation games to surveys. Keser and
Paleologo (2004) randomly assign participants to the role of either the
manufacturer or the retailer and match them in pairs in a random way. In their
study anonymity is ensured in that participants are seated in isolation from each
other and they do not know who their partner is. Participants who play the role of
the manufacturer are asked to determine prices for 30 consecutive time periods,
while participants who play the role of the retailer are asked to determine order
quantities for the corresponding 30 periods. Each participant responds in real
time to his/her partners’ decisions. All subjects participate in the experiment via
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computer software, developed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007), a special purpose
facility widely used to design and conduct experiments in economics. As soon as
participants read the instructions of the experiment, they are asked to complete a
questionnaire that tests their level of understanding of the rules of the game and
the arising dynamics; only after all questions are correctly answered does the
game start.
Katok and Wu (2009) ask each participant playing the role of either the
manufacturer or the retailer to make 200 separate price or quantity decisions,
respectively, against a computer simulated retailer or a computer simulated
manufacturer that maximises his/her individual profit in a perfectly rationally
manner. Under the wholesale price contract 100 periods’ decisions are made;
while under either the buyback or revenue sharing contract, whichever is
randomly assigned, another 100 decisions are made. The participants playing the
role of the manufacturer, before actually entering their final choice, are given
information about their expected realised profits for each of their potential
decisions, so that they can make as much of an informed decision as possible. No
form of communication is allowed between different participants.
Kremer ’s (2008) approach is very different; his study is the first and only
behavioural research study encountered so far that bases the findings on a
questionnaire. Participants are again randomly assigned the role of the
manufacturer or the retailer and informed about their existing wholesale price
contractual agreement. They are subsequently asked to choose whether they
would prefer to keep the wholesale price contract currently in force or change to
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a pre-selected random choice between the buyback or the revenue sharing
contract.
Key Findings
Keser and Paleologo ’s (2004) manufacturers charge prices w that are on average
significantly lower than their rationally optimizing counterpart’s w*. This is,
however, not the case for Katok and Wu’s (2009) manufacturers, who do not
charge significantly different prices than w*. As for retailers, Keser and
Paleologo (2004) do not find any supporting evidence for the pull-to-centre
effect, namely the too low/too high systematic pattern of order quantities
(Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Bostian et al, 2008), as most of their human
retailers order on average lower quantities than the corresponding quantities q*
that would represent their best possible replies to the manufacturers’ prices. But
Katok and Wu’s (2009) human retailers reproduce the pull-to-centre effect. When
the wholesale price contract is in force, their human retailers may order on
average lower quantities than q*, but the anchoring and insufficient adjustment
decision rule still seems to apply. This is what explains the occurrence of the
pull-to-centre effect in the case of the wholesale price contract. When any of the
two coordinating contracts is in force, Katok and Wu’s retailers order
significantly more than when the wholesale price contract is in force; yet, they
order in most cases quantities that are still significantly lower than their
corresponding theoretical predictions q*. For this reason, when the buyback or
revenue sharing contracts are in force, Katok and Wu’s retailers reproduce the
demand chasing decision heuristic, which is what explains the presence of the
pull-to-centre effect in these cases.
Chapter 2- Supply Chain Models and Contracts: Analytical and Experimental
Results
112
The aforementioned combination of observed behaviours for human
manufacturers and retailers permits a more equitable allocation of profits between
Keser and Paleologo’s (2004) and Katok and Wu’s (2009) subjects. Nonetheless,
the average efficiency scores that are attained by the wholesale price contract in
Keser and Paleologo’s and Katok and Wu’s experiments do not differ
significantly from the theoretical prediction of the corresponding standard
normative model. As far as the two coordinating contracts are concerned, Katok
and Wu (2009) establish their superior performance over the wholesale price
contract. Still, neither the buyback nor the revenue sharing contract could
reproduce the first-best case maximum profit that is theoretically expected. Thus,
both attain an efficiency score that is strictly lower than 1. Su (2008) builds on his
quantal choice behavioural model, according to which different order decisions
are assigned different probabilities of being chosen, to explain the two contracts’
worse than theoretically predicted performance. He proves analytically that when
manufacturers and retailers are characterized by the same degree of bounded
rationality, none of the above coordinating contracts can give rise to the first-
best case maximum profit.
Another question that can be explored in the laboratory is whether these
two contracts are truly equivalent when real people use them as the basis of their
interaction, as has been mathematically proven. In this regard, Katok and Wu
(2009) establish that they are only equivalent in manufacturers’ perceptions. Yet,
this equivalence is not confirmed by Kremer (2008). As Kremer’s manufacturers
prove to be risk-averse, they tend to avoid assuming any substantial part of the
risk that is associated with customer demand and for this reason, they prefer the
revenue sharing and buyback contracts, in decreasing order. But Katok and Wu
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and Kremer agree that the buyback and revenue sharing contracts are not
equivalent in human retailers’ perceptions. Katok and Wu (2009) find support for
retailers’ average order quantities being significantly different under these two
contracts, while Kremer (2008) establishes that retailers prefer the buyback and
revenue sharing contracts, in decreasing order.
2.3.3 Summary
Section 2.3 presents the main analytical results that are known for the most
popular supply chain contracts or transfer payments schemes that are applicable
to the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings. Section 2.3
also reviews how different human decisions, as observed in the laboratory, can be
to the standard normative models’ predictions. In respect to this, Table 2.4
summarises the papers that revisit the common behavioural assumption of the
standard normative models of supply chain contracts. In this table there are only
references to the Newsvendor Problem setting. The reason is that the Beer
Distribution Game is as yet not used as a computational framework to assess the
efficiency scores that supply chain contracts can attain in the laboratory, namely,
when human participants are asked to interact with each other. It is also evident
from Table 2.4 that all laboratory investigations of supply chain contracts aim to
update the standard normative models’ assumption about human actions being
consistent with their intention to maximise their own profits (Keser and
Paleologo, 2004; Katok and Wu, 2009; Kremer, 2008; Su, 2008). In greater
detail, a number of different individual biases are identified as responsible for
diverting human decisions away from their respective intentions to maximise
their own profits. Examples are the anchoring and insufficient adjustment (Katok
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and Wu, 2009) and demand chasing (Katok and Wu, 2009) decision heuristics, as
well as human decision makers’ implicit bounded rationality (Su, 2008). But it is
still assumed that all human decision makers intend to maximise their respective
profits; therefore, the assumption of the standard normative models about
decision makers’ intention to maximise individual profits is still widely accepted.
The impact that environmental factors can have on human decisions and,
hence, the overall efficiency scores that are attained by supply chain contracts is
as yet not accounted for. Hence, Table 2.4 only contains papers that update the
standard normative models’ common assumption about actions. Although
experimental research on supply chain contracts is still in its infancy, the
divergence of contracts’ observed efficiencies from the corresponding standard
normative prediction is already well established.
Table 2.4: Summary of behavioural papers in the context of Supply Chain Contracts
Research Paper Behavioural assumptions Key Findings
Newsvendor Problem setting
Actions: decision makers’ behaviour might differ from the behaviour specified by their
respective intentions
Keser and Paleologo
(2004)
Prevalence of individual
biases in human decision
making
Equitable allocation of
profits between
manufacturers and retailers;
the efficiency score
achieved by the wholesale
price contract is
comparable to its theoretical
prediction
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Research Paper Behavioural assumptions Key Findings
Katok and Wu (2009) Prevalence of individual
biases in human decision
making
Pull-to-centre effect;
anchoring and insufficient
adjustment decision rule
when the wholesale price
contract is in force; demand
chasing under operation of
the buyback and revenue
sharing contracts; the
efficiency achieved by the
wholesale price contract is
comparable to its
theoretical prediction; the
efficiency achieved by the
buyback and revenue
sharing contracts is
significantly lower than
their corresponding
theoretical prediction; the
buyback and revenue
sharing contracts are not
perceived as equivalent by
retailers
Kremer (2008) Prevalence of individual
biases in human decision
making
Most popular contract for
manufacturers is the
wholesale price; the most
popular for retailers is the
buyback
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Research Paper Behavioural assumptions Key Findings
Su (2008) Bounded rationality Formal proof of why the
interaction of manufacturers
and retailers characterised
by the same degree of
bounded rationality would
keep efficiency scores to
values that are strictly lower
than 1
In this regard, it is already confirmed that the wholesale price contract,
although still unable to coordinate the Newsvendor Problem setting, performs
better in the laboratory than theoretically expected (Keser and Paleologo, 2004;
Katok and Wu, 2009). This improved practical performance of the wholesale
price contract, when combined with the zero risk that it carries on the
manufacturers’ part, might explain human manufacturers’ preference for it, which
comes in direct opposition with the predictions of the standard normative models
(Kremer, 2008).
As for the coordinating contracts, i.e. the buyback and revenue sharing
contracts, they still attain higher efficiency scores than the wholesale price
contract. Nonetheless, in stark contrast to theoretical predictions, they prove
unable to coordinate the Newsvendor Problem (Su, 2008; Katok and Wu, 2009).
Since the two coordinating contracts allocate a portion of customer demand
uncertainty to manufacturers, human manufacturers tend to perceive the buyback
and revenue sharing contracts as equivalent (Katok and Wu, 2009) and, thus,
risk-averse as they are, the least preferred (Kremer, 2008). On the contrary,
human retailers seem to prefer sharing some of the inherent risk with their
manufacturers and, for this reason, prefer the coordinating contracts over the
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wholesale price contract (Kremer, 2008). Nevertheless, they do not perceive
them as equivalent (Katok and Wu, 2009) and, hence, prefer the buyback over the
revenue sharing contract (Kremer, 2008).
2.4 Summary of Analytical and Experimental Results of Supply Chain
Models and Contracts
This chapter demonstrates that there are two main operational inefficiencies that
most supply chains tend to suffer from. First, when individual firm managers
make independent decisions that optimize their own respective performances, the
resulting aggregate channel performance tends to be inferior to the first-best case
optimum performance that would have been achieved if there was a central
planner that made all decisions in the supply chain under study. Second, while
making purchasing decisions, individual firm managers tend to place orders of
quantities that are higher in both size and variance than the ones that they are
themselves requested to deliver. Therefore, they are inclined to generate the
bullwhip effect, which, in turn, further amplifies performance discrepancies. In
order to bridge the gaps between aggregate channel performances and the first-
best case optimum performance and, in addition, eliminate the bullwhip effect, a
number of contractual arrangements or else transfer payments schemes between
interacting supply chain partners are proposed. The settings of the Newsvendor
Problem and the Beer Distribution Game are both extensively used to assess the
performance of these contracts. Their performance is quantified by the attained
efficiency score in the case of the Newsvendor Problem setting and the
competition penalty in the case of the Beer Distribution Game setting.
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The standard normative models prove that when the interacting
manufacturers and retailers are exclusively interested in maximising their
respective profits in the Newsvendor Problem setting, the resulting aggregate
channel profit is inferior to the first-best case maximum profit that would be
achieved if there was an integrated newsvendor who made all decisions. The
reason is that neither partner takes into account the effect of his/her decisions on
the other’s profit and the overall profit, a phenomenon that is known as the
double marginalization problem. Since the wholesale price contract attains an
efficiency score that is strictly lower than one, it can be said to be unable to
coordinate the newsvendor supply chain. Nevertheless, there are a number of
other, yet more complicated and expensive to administer and implement contract
types that can coordinate the newsvendor supply chain, such as, for example, the
buyback and the revenue sharing contracts. These analytical results are built on a
set of common assumptions about decision makers’ intentions, actions and
reactions: First, they assume that all decision makers intend to maximise their
respective profits. Second, they postulate that all decision makers would act in
perfect accordance with their intentions. Last, they take for granted that since
decision makers are a priori perfectly rational, they do not need to react to the
changes that go on around them, do not use the information that is available to
them and do not learn from their previous experiences.
But in reality a human decision maker may be: i. concerned about a variety
of different objectives, possibly other than exclusive profit maximisation, ii.
unable, for various different reasons, to act according to his/her intentions and iii.
influenced, in a variety of different ways, by occurring environmental changes
and also learning. By revisiting the corresponding standard normative models’
Chapter 2- Supply Chain Models and Contracts: Analytical and Experimental
Results
119
assumptions about human newsvendors’ intentions, actions and reactions,
experimental research demonstrates that human retailers’ order quantities may
differ significantly from their corresponding theoretical predictions. This
systematic divergence is justified by a number of individual biases that may be
present in human decision making, such as, for example ex-post inventory error
minimisation, mean anchor, demand chasing, or collectively bounded rationality.
Following a similar rationale, laboratory investigations of supply chain
contracts, as applied in the Newsvendor Problem setting, make provision for a
number of individual behavioural biases that might influence all interacting firm
managers’ decisions. In this way, these laboratory investigations of supply chain
contracts revisit the assumption of the standard normative models that human
decision makers’ actions are always aligned with their respective profit
maximising intentions. Yet, they treat the sources of this inherent bounded
rationality as standard and homogeneous, while individuals may in practice have
varying preferences, priorities and cognitive limitations. These preferences,
priorities and cognitive limitations might even differ to such a degree that would
not allow for generalizations. What is even more important, decision makers may
make their own independent decisions in a completely autonomous way.
Moreover, these experimental papers still consider the contracting
theories’ assumptions about decision makers’ intentions and reactions as valid.
But firm managers might in reality not be exclusively interested in maximising
their own individual profits; they might also be concerned about aggregate
channel performances and/or the fair and equitable allocation of profits between
their partners and them, because that would enhance the long term sustainability
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of their partnerships. In addition, firm managers might react to the changes going
on around them, use the information that is presented to them to improve their
decisions and, thus, learn, especially when they interact for prolonged periods of
time.
The findings of these laboratory investigations of supply chain contracts in
the Newsvendor Problem setting are that not only human retailers’ order
quantities might differ significantly from their rationally optimizing
counterparts’, but also human manufacturers’ pricing decisions’ might be
substantially different from their profit maximising prices. As a result, the
efficiency scores that are attained by supply chain contracts in the laboratory are
significantly different from their corresponding theoretical predictions. The
efficiency scores quantify how close the aggregate channel profit is to the first-
best case maximum profit. Namely, the inefficient wholesale price contract,
although still inefficient, performs better than theoretically predicted, while the
coordinating buyback and revenue sharing contracts prove in practice unable to
coordinate the newsvendor supply chain. Whether there could be any
manufacturer – retailer interactions that could make the wholesale price contract
efficient remains open to further exploration.
The standard normative models that are applicable to the Beer Distribution
Game setting are built on the same set of assumptions about decision makers’
intentions, actions and reactions. These analytical models prove that when all
supply chain partners are exclusively interested in minimising their own
inventory holding and backlog costs, the resulting aggregate channel costs might
be superior to the first-best case minimum cost that would have been achieved if
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all distinct partners were interested in attaining the team optimal solution. A
number of complicated transfer payment schemes between adjacent supply chain
partners have been proposed to bring the aggregate channel cost as close as
possible to the first-best case minimum cost. Their respective success in bridging
the gap between the aggregate channel cost and the first-best case minimum cost
is assessed via the competition penalty that is attained. According to the relevant
analytical models, the competition penalty can be maximised, when all supply
chain partners adhere strictly to the team optimizing decision rules and, thus,
order exactly as much as requested. If this is the case, there is an additional
important benefit: there is no bullwhip effect. But in spite of the wholesale price
contract’s wide practical popularity, there is as yet no standard normative model
that predicts the effect that the wholesale price contract can have on cost
discrepancies and the bullwhip effect in the Beer Distribution Game.
A number of laboratory investigations update the standard normative
models’ assumptions about the intentions, actions and reactions of supply chain
partners’ quantity decisions in the Beer Distribution Game setting. These
establish that human decision makers make significantly different decisions from
their corresponding theoretical predictions. There is evidence for a number of
individual behavioural biases that could explain this systematic divergence of
human decisions from the standard normative models’ predictions, such as, for
example the following decision heuristics: anchoring and insufficient adjustment
heuristic, supply line under-weighting, organizational learning and coordination
risk. These are recognised as responsible in great part for the persistence of the
bullwhip effect in all laboratory investigations. Nevertheless, the existing
experimental research does as yet not explore the divergence of human decisions
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from standard normative models’ predictions, when a transfer payment scheme is
in force. Hence, the true overall supply chain performance that can be attained in
the laboratory when adjacent supply chain partners interact via a concrete
contractual arrangement remains open to future investigation.
In summary, this chapter identifies a number of gaps that still exist in the
analytical and experimental supply chain contracting literature. In greater detail,
experimental research still needs to revisit standard normative contracting
theories’ assumptions about decision makers’ intentions and reactions. It also
needs to accommodate their possibly heterogeneous bounded rationality and
further explore the effect that interactions between varying, independent and
autonomous decision making strategies can have on a contract’ s observed
efficiency score or competition penalty, whichever is applicable. Moreover, the
development of a version of the Beer Distribution Game where contractual
arrangements between adjacent supply chain partners can take place will shed
some additional light on the complex nature of real life supply chain transactions.
Given the wholesale price contract’s simplicity, a reasonable start could be made
from it. In this regard, a standard normative model that would predict the
competition penalty of the wholesale price contract would further contribute to
the field’s understanding of complicated supply chain transactions. Following the
already existing contracting theories that are applicable to the Beer Distribution
Game, this standard normative model could be built on the assumption of
perfectly rational supply chain partners that would always intend to maximise
their own total profits and would not react to any occurring environmental
changes.
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As already discussed in Chapter 1, this PhD thesis restricts attention to the
wholesale price contract. In respect to this, Table 2.5 summarises the sub-set of
the above literature gaps that this PhD thesis aims to address.
Table 2.5: Summary of the literature gaps that this PhD thesis aims to address
Literature Gap Name Code
Accommodation of potentially different from profit
maximising human intentions
Human
intentions (G.1)
Accommodation of boundedly rational actions that may be
heterogeneous
Human
actions (G.2)
Accommodation of human decisions that may react to
environmental changes
Human
reactions (G.3)
Accommodation of independent and autonomous decisions Human
decisions
(G.4)
Development of a version of the Beer Distribution Game
where the wholesale price contract is the basis of any
transaction that takes place between any interacting pair of
supply chain partners
Contract
Beer
Distribution
Game (G.5)
Development of a standard normative model that predicts
the performance of the wholesale price contract in the Beer
Distribution Game setting
Contract
Beer
Distribution
Game ‘s
standard
normative
models
(G.6)
Chapter 3 that follows describes the approach that this PhD thesis has adopted to
address the literature gaps G.1-G.4 that are outlined in Table 2.5. The reason that the
literature gaps about human intentions, actions, reactions, and decisions (i.e. G.1 – G.4)
are discussed in Chapter 3 is because they concern both the Newsvendor Problem and the
Beer Distribution Game settings. As for the literature gaps that reflect the design of the
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Contract Beer Distribution Game (i.e. G.5) and the development of the corresponding
standard normative models (i.e. G.6), they are applicable only to the Beer Distribution
Game setting. Therefore, they are discussed in Chapter 6 that concerns specifically the
implementation of the wholesale price contract in the Beer Distribution Game.
125
Chapter 3
Research Design: The Approach
As its title implies, this chapter describes the approach that this PhD thesis has
adopted to address the gaps of the existing behavioural literature on human
intentions (i.e. G.1), actions (i.e. G.2), reactions (i.e. G.3) and decisions (i.e.
G.4), as presented in Table 2.5 (i.e. Section 2.4). Since these literature gaps
concern both the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings,
this approach has been applied to both of these settings. This chapter describes in
some detail the main characteristics of the approach that are applicable to both
settings. More specific details about each setting are provided in Chapters 4 and
7, respectively.
This chapter only addresses the literature gaps G.1 – G.4 that are presented
in Table 2.5. The literature gaps G.5 and G.6 concern respectively: i. the
development of a new version of the Beer Distribution Game, where the
wholesale price contract determines all terms of exchange between any pair of
interacting supply chain partners and ii. the foundation of the corresponding
standard normative model. Therefore, both G.5 and G.6 are specific to the Beer
Distribution Game. As a result, they are not addressed here, but in Chapter 6 that
introduces the Beer Distribution Game, along with its associated standard
normative models.
3.1 Overview of Approach
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the approach that this PhD thesis has
adopted to investigate the effect that the different possible interactions between
dynamic, autonomous and heterogeneous decisions of supply chain managers can
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have on the wholesale price contract’s overall performance. In greater detail, this
approach aims to accommodate: i. human intentions that might be different from
profit maximisation or cost minimisation (i.e. G.1 of Table 2.5 in Section 2.4), ii.
human actions that might differ from their corresponding intentions (i.e.
boundedly rational actions) in possibly heterogeneous ways (i.e. G.2), iii. human
reactions that might depend on changes occurring in their surrounding
environments if any (i.e. G.3), iv. human decisions that might be independent and
autonomous (i.e. G.4).
In this regard, running experiments with human subjects in the laboratory
would be necessary to investigate human decisions. According to the existing
tradition of behavioural operations management, as described in Chapter 2, this
approach represents a way to capture the variety of different possible human
intentions. Therefore, running experiments with human subjects would
successfully address the literature gap that concerns human intentions (i.e. G.1)
that is presented in Table 2.5. Yet, there are a number of limitations that are
recognised as inherent with running experiments with human subjects alone. The
most important of these is the risk that human subjects might lose their interest
and, thus, let their levels of concentration decline during the course of the
experiment (Camerer, 1995; Croson, 2002; Duffy, 2006). As a result, human
subjects could not be asked to interact: i. with or against a number of different
partners, ii. over prolonged session durations and iii. for a statistically accurate
number of replications.
First, asking all human subjects to interact with the same response sets
across all experimental sessions would eliminate the potential to study different
interactions, that is, heterogeneous decisions. But this comes in contrast with the
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literature gap that concerns human actions (i.e. G.2) that is presented in Table
2.5. Next, asking human subjects to interact over limited periods of time would
deprive one from the ability to capture the effect of subjects’ increased
experience and, thus, learning. But this is in opposition with the literature gap
that concerns human reactions (i.e. G.3: Table 2.5). Last, asking human subjects
to interact for only one replication would seriously reduce the accurateness of all
inferred results. Thus, for the needs of multiple interactions, prolonged
interaction lengths and multiple replications, another set of experiments “in
silico”6 (Bonabeau, 2002; Samuelson and Macal, 2006) are required; these
experiments in silico would complement the laboratory experiments that would
be run with human subjects in the laboratory. In addition, these experiments in
silico would enable one to infer statistically accurate results. That is exactly why
the approach used here is to simulate human interactions over a prolonged period
of time. As for the exact simulation technique that has been selected it needs to
be one that is adequate to model autonomous and independent decisions, so that
the literature gap that concerns differing human decisions (i.e. G.4) can be
addressed. More details about the chosen simulation technique and a discussion
on the reasons for its choice are now provided.
3.2 Agent Based Simulation
Agent Based Simulation (ABS) provides a natural test-bed for modelling
phenomena that are represented as systems of autonomous agents that follow
6The expression “in silico” originates from the latin expression “in vitro” (i.e. “in glass”)
that is used to refer to experiments in a test tube; in a similar manner, the expression “in
silico” refers to experiments in computer simulation or virtual reality [source:
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/in_silico#English, last accessed: 19/02/2010].
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rules for any decision and transaction that they make (Casti, 2001; Axelrod,
2005; Samuelson and Macal, 2006; North and Macal, 2007; Gilbert, 2008) and
where strong ‘emergent phenomena’ come into play (Casti, 1997; Holland, 1998;
Bonabeau, 2002; Lyons, 2004). This is exactly the reason why ABS is in this
PhD thesis proposed to complement the human experiments.
As Figure 3.1 illustrates, any ABS model is typically defined by (i) its
constituting agents, (ii) the underlying environment and (iii) the combined
evolution of its agents and the underlying environment (Choi et al, 2001). In
view of this, the supply chain managers that interact in the Newsvendor Problem
and the Beer Distribution Game settings would be modelled as distinct agents;
while the industry in which the supply chain under study is active and all
remaining model parameters, such as selling prices and manufacturing costs,
whichever are applicable, would constitute the underlying environment. The
paragraphs that follow define all distinct components of an ABS model and
specify the equivalent ABS representation of the Newsvendor Problem and the
Beer Distribution Game settings. These paragraphs also explain how each of
these elements would help to address the literature gaps about human intentions,
actions, reactions and decisions, namely G.1-G.4 of Table 2.5 (s. Section 2.4).
I. Agents
Agents are uniquely defined by their corresponding set of attributes and
behaviours. The attributes define what an agent is, while the behavioural
characteristics define what an agent does (North and Macal, 2007). Although
agents may have widely varying characteristics, consensus has at least been
reached in that the most important characteristics that are associated with agents
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are the following (Sanchez and Lucas, 2002; North and Macal, 2007; Gilbert,
2008; Macal and North, 2009):
 Social Ability to communicate with each other and their surrounding
environment,
 Capability to learn, modify and, thus, adopt their behaviours according to
any occurring changes,
 Autonomy, that is separate and well determined goals to achieve and clearly
defined internal logic rules that govern their actions, and
 Heterogeneity, namely differing intentions that force their respective
decisions.
In this PhD thesis, the supply chain managers that are responsible for
different firms have been modelled as agents. In this regard, supply chain
managers have been treated as being able to communicate with each other only
via the wholesale price contract, since the wholesale price contract has
Agents
 Social ability
 Learning
 Autonomy
 Heterogeneity
Combined
Evolution
 Emergence
Environment
 Dynamism
 Rugged
landscapes
Figure 3.1: Fundamental Principles of an ABS model (adopted from Choi et al, 2001)
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constituted the basis of any interaction that takes place in both the Newsvendor
Problem (Chapters 4-5) and the Beer Distribution Game settings (Chapters 6-8).
The exact set of attributes and behavioural characteristics that fully define the
agents of the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game are presented
in Chapters 4 and 7, respectively.
Since supply chain managers have been modelled as agents, they have also
been treated as apt to learn and react to changes, able to make autonomous and
independent decisions and also with differing characteristics, namely as
heterogeneous. Their aptitude to learn and react to changes would enable one to
address the literature gap that concerns human reactions (i.e. G.3 of Table 2.5 in
Section 2.4). Moreover, supply chain managers’ ability to make autonomous and
independent decisions could accommodate the needs of the literature gaps that
concern human intentions and decisions (i.e. G.1 and G.4 of Table 2.5). Last but
not least, supply chain managers’ heterogeneity would satisfy the needs of the
literature gap that concerns actions that may not be consistent with their
corresponding intentions (i.e. G.2 of Table 2.5).
II. Environment
The environment consists of the agents and their interconnections that have not
been included within the boundaries of the model. The environment is mainly
characterized by (Choi et al, 2001):
 dynamism, namely constantly recurring changes,
 rugged landscapes, namely if the function of the system’s ‘goodness’ or
‘fitness’ is represented on a landscape, this would be uneven and it would,
thus, become hard to distinguish the component combinations that would
give rise to the overall system optimality.
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In this PhD thesis for both the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer
Distribution Game settings the environment is seen as dynamic in that customer
demand is stochastic in nature and constantly evolving over time. If the supply
chain’s performance is represented on a landscape, overall optimality could be
attained by a number of different, possibly surprising combinations. Identifying
and justifying these combinations in both the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer
Distribution Game settings constitutes one of the main purposes of this PhD
thesis.
III. Combined evolution
The most important element of the combined evolution of agents and their
underlying environment is emergence, which is defined as the arising of new,
unexpected structures, patterns, properties, or processes that are not required to
describe the behaviour of the underlying agents (Casti, 1997; Holland, 1998;
Gilbert and Terna, 2000).
This PhD thesis aims at identifying whether ‘globally good’ performances
could emerge from the interactions of ‘locally poor’ decisions in any or both of
the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings. In case such
emergent patterns are revealed, this PhD thesis aims at shedding light on the
underlying reasons for these emergent phenomena. Chapters 4 and 7 define
exactly which performances are perceived as ‘locally poor’ and ‘globally good’
in the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings,
respectively. Chapters 5 and 8 report whether ‘globally good’ performances
emerge from ‘locally poor’ decisions in any or both of the Newsvendor Problem
and the Beer Distribution Game settings.
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3.3 The Approach
It has so far been argued that running experiments with human subjects in the
laboratory would enable one to investigate the effect of human decisions on the
overall performances of the wholesale price contract. It has also been
demonstrated that modelling supply chain managers as agents would allow one to
address the literature gaps that concern human intentions, actions, reactions and
decisions (i.e. G.1-G.4 of Table 2.5 in Section 2.4). Modelling the supply chain’s
activity as the underlying environment in the simulation model would enable one
to identify possible emergent phenomena, where perhaps surprising combinations
of ‘locally poor’ decisions could give rise to ‘globally good’ performances.
Therefore, ABS would be useful to infer statistically accurate results about the
effect that different prolonged interactions between dynamic, heterogeneous and
autonomous decisions could have on the wholesale price contract’s overall
performance. Via running adequate ABS models, a human’s decision making
strategies could interact with any number of other decision making strategies over
any period of time and for any required number of replications. Therefore, the
limitations of human experiments identified in Section 3.1 could be overcome. To
this end, instead of following the example of the seminal papers by Schelling
(1978), Axelrod (1984) and Epstein and Axtell (1996) where human behaviour is
not taken into account at all and all agents are assigned simple, adaptive learning
rules based on intuition, in this PhD thesis the evidence gained from human
experiments is used to calibrate the associated ABS models.
Figure 3.2 presents the approach that is followed in this PhD thesis for both
the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings. In this way,
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knowledge on how human subjects make their decisions is elicited and the
overall performance of all their possible interactions is assessed.
This approach is based on the Knowledge Based Improvement
methodology of Robinson et al. (2005) and consists of four distinct stages: that is,
understanding the decision making process, conducting the gaming sessions,
fitting the decision making strategies and running the ABS model. These four
stages are represented within the dashed rectangles of Figure 3.2. The concrete
outcomes of each stage are indicated within solid outer lines. As is evident from
Figure 3.2, the focal element of this approach is the ABS model that corresponds
to the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game, respectively. These
ABS models are also adjusted to build the computer interfaces of the simulation
games that the human subjects were asked to interact with. There are three
reasons that explain the central importance of these ABS models. First, they are
developed in the early stages of the approach; next, they are subsequently
employed by almost all stages that follow; last, the final assessments of the
Figure 3.2: The Approach (adapted from Robinson et al, 2005)
Stage 1:
Understand the
Decision- Making
Process
Stage 2:
Conduct the Gaming
Sessions
Stage 3:
Fit the Decision
Making Strategies
Stage 4:
Run the ABS ModelKey
Outcomes
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overall performance of the wholesale price contract are based on these.
Consequently, the conclusions on the research hypotheses that are of relevance to
the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings (i.e. as
formulated in Sections 4.2 and 7.2, respectively) are drawn on the basis of the
corresponding ABS models. More specific details about the way that the
simulation games were built based on the ABS models and the scenarios or
response sets that the different participants in the Newsvendor Problem and the
Beer Distribution Game were provided are given in Sub-sections 4.3.2. and 7.3.2,
respectively.
Figure 3.2 illustrates that the purpose of the first step (Stage 1) is to
understand the underlying decision making process of each role that comes into
play in the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game supply chains.
To this end, the two settings ought to be first comprehended in some detail. The
detailed specification of the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution
Game settings, as well as the corresponding theory that is reviewed in Sub-
sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.1 serve to recognise the decisions that each of the
interacting partners in the two settings is entrusted with (or else the decision
variables). But for each of these decisions to be made, a number of different
factors (or else decisions attributes) need to be taken into consideration. Informal
pilot sessions with volunteers, which were followed by interviews, enable one to
identify the significant decision attributes. The objective is to identify among the
information that is available to all volunteers the subset that is considerably taken
into account by them. The ABS models that correspond to the Newsvendor
Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings could then be developed,
building on the specification of the two settings and the decision attributes
revealing as significant. These models are based on the activities that each agent
Chapter 3- Research Design: The Approach
135
needs to perform, their exact order and sequence, the conditions that trigger each
activity, the decisions that each agent is responsible for and the corresponding
decision attributes. The only information that is still missing from the ABS
models, though, is the exact decisions that human participants in the two games
truly make.
In order, thus, to capture human decisions, gaming sessions with human
subjects are performed in Stage 2. To this end, volunteers have been randomly
assigned to the different supply chain roles and asked to play these in simulation
games in the laboratory. As is shown in Figure 3.2 the majority of the participants
is asked to interact with appropriate modifications of the corresponding ABS
model. More details about this correspondence are provided in Sub-sections 4.3.2
and 7.3.2, respectively. All their decisions over time are recorded. A separate data
set is created for each participant’s recorded decisions at the course of the
simulation game, which can be seen as the concrete outcome of Stage 2 in Figure
3.2. Each participant is assumed to follow his/her own decision making strategy,
namely it is assumed that there is a unique relationship between each of the
participant’s decision variables and the corresponding attributes (e.g. the
decision variable price is associated, for example, with the decision attributes
past order quantity and realised profit). In order to determine a participant’s
specific decision making strategy, Stage 3 is subsequently performed.
The object of Stage 3 is to determine the decision model of each
participant in the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings.
For this, adequate statistical models have been fitted to each participant’s dataset
of recorded decisions. The exact fitting procedures that have been followed, as
well as the exact decision models that correspond to the participants in the
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Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings, are described in
Sub-sections 4.3.3 and 7.3.3, respectively. These decision models are
subsequently input into the corresponding ABS model and combined in a way
that ensures that the strategies of all participants are combined with each other.
This constitutes the object of Stage 4.
In Stage 4 all possible combinations of decision models, or else inferred
human decision making strategies, are simulated, so that their respective
outcomes can be compared. So, the key outcomes that serve to investigate the
research hypotheses of the two settings originate from appropriate runs of the
ABS models. The research hypotheses that are relevant to the Newsvendor
Problem setting are presented in Section 4.2, while the research hypotheses that
are related to the Beer Distribution Game are provided in Section 7.2.
These four stages along with their associated outcomes are described in
some detail in the paragraphs that follow.
3.3.1 Stage 1: The Decision Making Process
The purpose of this first stage is two-fold: i. identify the decision task(s) that each
participant is entrusted with or else the decision variable(s) of each agent, ii.
recognise the factors or else decision attributes that most human participants
seem to take into account in order to make these decisions, respectively. The
decision variable(s) derive from the specification of the setting, namely the
Newsvendor Problem or the Beer Distribution Game. In order to recognise the
most significant decision attributes for any role’s decision variable, the reported
results from relevant experimental research are referred to, as outlined in Chapter
2. Informal pilot sessions with student volunteers have been conducted to confirm
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the applicability of these reported results on the settings under study. These
sessions have been followed by interviews, during which all subjects were given
the opportunity to describe and explain the underlying reasoning behind their
decisions. All relevant details for the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer
Distribution Game are provided in Sub-sections 4.3.1 and 7.3.1, respectively.
The final concrete outcome that derives from Stage 1 is equation (3.1) that
represents the one-to-one association between each role’s (i) k-th decision
variable (k = 1,..,K) ݀ݒ௜௞ and the corresponding decision attributes ݀ ௝ܽ, where j is
the index of a specific decision attribute that can take up to the value of J. J
represents the total number of decision attributes that have been identified as
significant for the role’s (i) k-th decision variable, namely ݀ݒ௜௞.
݀ݒ௜
௞ = ௜݂ௗ௩೔ೖൣ݀ ଵܽ,݀ ଶܽ, … ,݀ ௝ܽ, … ,݀ ௃ܽ൧ (3.1)
In any setting there are i=1,...,I different possible roles. In the Newsvendor
Problem i takes the values of the manufacturer and the retailer (i.e. MAN and
RET, respectively); while in the Beer Distribution Game i can take the values of
the manufacturer, the wholesaler and the retailer (i.e. MAN, WHL and RET,
respectively).
The detailed specification of the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer
Distribution Game settings that are provided in Sub-sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.1,
respectively, combined with the decision functions of type (3.1), lead to the
development of the corresponding ABS models. For reasons of speed of model
build, ease of use and familiarity with the data presentation, these have been
developed in Excel-VBA, following Robinson’s (2004) and North and Macal’s
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(2007) suggestions. These models are described in some detail in Sub-sections
4.3.1 and 7.3.1, respectively.
3.3.2 Stage 2: The Gaming Sessions
The objective of the second stage is to collect data for each human decision
maker. To this end, volunteers were recruited from a pool of 2007, 2008 and
2009 intakes of graduate students at the University of Warwick (PhD in
Management, MSc in Engineering Business Management, MSc in Management,
MSc in Management Science and Operational Research, MSc in Business
Analytics and Consulting) and asked to play different supply chain roles,
depending on the setting that was used as the computational framework, namely
the Newsvendor Problem or the Beer Distribution Game. The only requirement
set for participation was that all participants had received formal classroom
training in the principles of inventory management, prior to the experiment, as
part of their curriculum. This requirement, in line with recent empirical studies
that confirmed the overall analogous performance of well trained students when
compared with experienced supply chain managers (Croson and Donohue, 2006;
Bolton et al, 2008), intended to control and, thus, ensure a standard and common
level of knowledge across all participants7.
7The author of this PhD thesis is aware of the stream of research that casts doubt about
the validity and reliability of the use of students as surrogates of real life decision makers
in behavioural experiments in fields such as human relations in business (i.e. justify a
manager’s decision to fire with no apparent reasons a subordinate: Alpert, 1967),
financial reporting and accounting (e.g. Birnberg and Nath, 1968; Copeland, Francia and
Strawser, 1973) and banking (i.e. make a decision about granting a loan to a firm: Abdel-
Khalik, 1974). Nevertheless, the author of this PhD thesis adopts the view of Dickhaut,
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In the case of the Newsvendor Problem all participants were asked to
interact via a computer interface with a set of representative response sets or else
scenarios. This computer interface has been adapted from the ABS model of the
Newsvendor Problem. The exact way that these scenarios have been generated is
discussed in Sub-section 4.3.2. In the case of the Beer Distribution Game some
participants were asked to interact over the specially designed board of the game,
while some others were asked to interact via a computer interface with a set of
pre-selected partners’ responses. The computer interface has been adapted from
the ABS model of the Beer Distribution Game. Whether a participant would be
asked to play over the board or via the computer interface, and the exact set of
responses or else scenarios that were provided to him/her have been rigorously
Livingstone and Watson (1972) according to which the appropriateness of students as
subjects depends on the setting and nature of the decision task at hand. For this reason,
the recent empirical finding of Croson and Donohue (2006) and Bolton et al. (2008) in
the area of inventory management, that is relevant to this thesis, is instead accounted for.
[Sources:
Abdel-Khalik, A. 1974. On the efficiency of subject surrogation in accounting research.
The Accounting Review 49(4), 743-750.
Alpert, B. 1967. Non-Businessmen as surrogates for businessmen in behavioral
experiments. The Journal of Business 40(2), 203-207.
Birnberg, J., Nath, R. 1968. Laboratory experimentation in accounting research. The
Accounting Review 43(1), 38-45.
Copeland, R., Francia, A., Strawser, R. 1973. Students as subjects in behavioral business
research. The Accounting Review 48(2), 365-372. ]
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selected via a specially developed methodology. This methodology is described
in Sub-section 7.3.2.
In both the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings,
in total S different subjects were assigned to each of the available roles i (i =
1,...,I). The available roles i = 1,...,I were the factors of analysis, while the
different subjects s = 1,...,S were the different levels for each factor. In this
regard, is reflects the s-th participant that was assigned to the role i. Since each
role i was assigned in total ௜ܵdifferent subjects or else levels, there were in total
ଵܵ × ଶܵ × … × ூܵpossible combinations.
The decisions of all participants over time were recorded and constituted the
associated datasets of decisions that can be seen in Figure 3.2.
3.3.3 Stage 3: The Decision Making Strategies
The object of the third stage is to determine the decision model that corresponds
to each participant, namely identify the relations of type (3.1) that associate all k
= 1,...K decision variables of a participant is with the corresponding decision
attributes:
݀ݒ௜ೞ
௞ =
௜݂ೞ
ௗ௩೔ೞ
ೖ
ൣ݀ ଵܽ,݀ ଶܽ, … ,݀ ௝ܽ, … ,݀ ௃ܽ൧ (3.2)
Since Bowman’s managerial coefficient theory (Bowman, 1963) has
already been widely used to model decision making in experimental work (e.g.
Remus, 1978; Croson and Donohue, 2006; Kunc and Morecroft, 2007, Benzion et
al, 2008), appropriate modifications of it have been applied in this PhD thesis.
According to this, the importance that each participant is assigns to his/her j-th
decision attribute for his/her k-th decision (i.e. ݀ݒ௜ೞ
௞) is portrayed by the value of
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each coefficient
௝ܽ
ௗ௩೔ೞ
ೖ
in appropriate linear models. In respect to this, each
participant’s decision making strategies (3.2) are portrayed by simple linear
models, that is:
〈݀݅ݒ
ݏ
݇〉
݅ݏ
= 0ܽ݀݅ݒݏ݇ + 1ܽ݀݅ݒݏ݇ ∙ ݀ 1ܽ + ⋯ + ଶܽௗ௩೔ೞೖ ∙ ݀ ଶܽ + ⋯ + ௃ܽௗ௩೔ೞೖ ∙ ݀ ௃ܽ (3.3)
These linear models are built on the assumptions of independence,
linearity, normality, and homo-skedasticity (Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006;
Fox, 2008). In order, thus, to assess the compliance of all dependent and
independent variables with these assumptions, elaborate tests have been
performed; the scatterplot matrix is only used as a first indicator to this end. All
details of the exact fitting procedures that have been followed in the cases of the
Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings are provided in
Sub-sections 4.3.3 and 7.3.3, respectively. These sub-sections also discuss the
remedies that have been pursued to overcome the departures from linearity,
normality and homo-skedasticity that have been observed in the two settings
under study. In addition, they present the different decision models that have
been fitted to the different participants’ datasets of recorded decisions.
3.3.4 Stage 4: The Agent-Based Simulation Model Runs
The object of the fourth stage is to explore the overall performance of the
wholesale price contract under all possible interactions of inferred decision
making strategies. To this end, the ABS models that correspond to the
Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game are run for all possible
combinations of decision models or else treatment factors [is]. Since the total
number of all possible combinations (i.e. ଵܵ × ଶܵ × … × ூܵ) is not prohibitively
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high, the corresponding full factorial experimental design is followed, according
to which each factor level is combined with all possible levels of all other factors
(Robinson, 2000; Toutenburg, 2002; Mukerjee and Wu, 2006). The results that
are obtained from the corresponding ABS models are subsequently used to infer
statistically accurate conclusions about the research hypotheses that are of
relevance to the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings.
These research hypotheses are formulated in Sections 4.2 and 7.2, respectively.
The key results that are generated from the ABS model of the Newsvendor
Problem concern: i. the prices that are charged by the simulated human
manufacturers, ii. the quantities that are ordered by the simulated human
retailers, iii. the efficiency scores that are attained by the simulated interactions of
all inferred decision models. The key results that are obtained from the ABS
model of the Beer Distribution Game reflect: i. the prices that are charged by the
simulated human participants, ii. the quantities that are ordered by the simulated
human participants, iii. the competition penalties that are attained by the
simulated interactions of inferred decision models, iv. the degree to which the
bullwhip effect prevails in different simulated interactions of decision making
strategies. The key outcomes that correspond to the Newsvendor Problem and the
Beer Distribution Game are reported in Sub-sections 4.3.4 and 7.3.4,
respectively.
3.4 Verification and Validation
Before using the results that are obtained from the appropriate ABS models, the
models’ internal consistency and external validity are tested (Pidd, 2004;
Robinson, 2004; Law, 2007; North and Macal, 2007). Although verification and
validation are performed in parallel with all other activities of this PhD thesis
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(North and Macal, 2007; Robinson, 2008), for reasons of simplicity and clarity
the steps that have been undertaken to verify and validate the ABS models that
correspond to the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game are
discussed in Sections 4.4 and 7.4, respectively.
3.5 Summary
This chapter describes the approach that this PhD thesis has followed to
investigate the effect that the different possible interactions between dynamic,
autonomous and heterogeneous decisions of supply chain managers can have on
the wholesale price contract’s overall performance.
By basing the research on the interaction of human subjects in supply chain
settings, this approach makes provision for: i. human intentions that might be
different from profit maximisation or cost minimisation, ii. human actions that
might differ from their corresponding intentions in heterogeneous ways (i.e.
heterogeneous boundedly rational actions), iii. human reactions that might
depend on their surrounding environments and any occurring changes to it , iv.
human decisions that might be independent and autonomous. In this way, this
approach aims at addressing the literature gaps about human intentions (i.e. G.1),
actions (i.e. G.2), reactions (i.e. G.3) and decisions (i.e. G.4) that are identified in
Table 2.5 of Section 2.4. The approach manages to address these existing
literature gaps by complementing laboratory experiments with simulation
experiments (i.e. experiments in silico). In greater detail, the simulation models
are calibrated via the results that have been obtained from the experiments run in
the laboratory with human subjects. In this way, statistically accurate conclusions
about the effect that different prolonged interactions between dynamic,
heterogeneous and autonomous decisions can have on the wholesale price
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contract’s overall performance are drawn. The reason that these conclusions are
statistically accurate is that they can simultaneously address the requirements of
multiple interactions, prolonged interaction lengths and multiple replications,
which would not have been possible if only experiments with human subjects
were run.
In greater detail, this approach builds on Robinson et al.’s (2005)
Knowledge Based Improvement methodology, but appropriately adopts it to the
needs of Agent Based Simulation (ABS). The reason that ABS is chosen to study
the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game settings is that by
modelling different supply chain managers as agents, their aptitude to have
various differing intentions, make heterogeneous actions, learn and react to
changes (i.e. reactions), make independent and autonomous decisions is captured.
In addition, in ABS models, any human decision making strategy could be input
as a factor of analysis and combined with any other existing decision making
strategy over extended periods of time and for many independent replications.
Furthermore, via ABS models one has the potential to shed light on the possible
existence of emergent phenomena. Some indicative examples of expected
emergent phenomena are the emergence of ‘globally good’ performances from
‘locally poor’ decisions.
This approach comprises five distinct stages: The purpose of the first stage
is to identify the decision variable(s) of each agent and the most popular decision
attributes that relate to each decision variable. The objective of the second stage
is to collect data for each human decision maker. To this end, volunteers have
been randomly assigned to the available supply chain roles; their respective
decisions over time have been recorded in simulation games. The object of the
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third stage is to determine the exact decision model that associates each
participant’s decision attributes to the decision variables. The fourth stage aims
at exploring the overall performance of the wholesale price contract under all
different interactions of inferred decision making strategies. Adequate runs of the
ABS models that correspond to the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer
Distribution Game are to this end used. This approach is adapted in Section 4.3 to
the exact needs of the Newsvendor Problem setting. Section 7.3 adapts this
approach to the needs of the Beer Distribution Game setting.
The reader should at this point be reminded that the remaining two
literature gaps that are identified in Table 2.5 (s. Section 2.4) and concern the
Contract Beer Distribution Game (i.e. G.5) and its corresponding standard
normative models (i.e. G.6) require as a pre-requisite the development of a new
version of the Beer Distribution Game, where the wholesale price contract
constitutes the basis of any interaction between adjacent supply chain partners.
This is the reason why these two literature gaps are specifically addressed in
Chapter 6, where the mechanics of the game and the standard normative models
that correspond to it are explored.
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Chapter 4
The Newsvendor Problem Approach
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the approach that this PhD thesis has
undertaken to investigate the effect that different prolonged interactions between
manufacturers’ and retailers’ dynamic, heterogeneous and autonomous decisions
can have on the wholesale price contract’s efficiency, when applied to the
Newsvendor Problem setting. In other words, this chapter formulates the research
hypotheses that are of interest to the Newsvendor Problem setting and, in
addition, explains how the approach of this PhD thesis, as outlined in Chapter 3,
has been applied to this setting. In respect to this, Chapter 3 describes how this
approach successfully addresses the literature gaps that concern human intentions
(i.e. G.1), actions (i.e. G.2), reactions (i.e. G.3) and decisions (i.e. G.4), as have
been identified in Table 2.5 (s. Section 2.4), in the case that the wholesale price
contract is put in force in the Newsvendor Problem setting.
The chapter starts by a brief description of the Newsvendor Problem and its
existing analytical and experimental results. It subsequently uses these extant
results to build the research hypotheses that are of interest to this study. It then
discusses in some detail all steps of the approach that have been followed to
address these research hypotheses. Last but not least, the chapter concludes with
a brief summary.
4.1 The Newsvendor Problem
The typical integrated newsvendor setting is illustrated in Figure 4.1. In this case,
the only decision that needs to be made is the order quantity q. The reader is at
this point reminded that customer demand is assumed to follow the truncated at
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zero normal distribution (with μ=140 and σ = 80), because it more closely reflects
real cases, where limited information about the distribution of customer demand
is available (Gallego and Moon, 1993; Son and Sheu, 2008; Ho et al, 2009).
Because of this truncation at zero, demand mean and variance need to be
modified according to Barr and Sherrill (1999)’s recommendations to μ’≈147 and 
σ’ ≈ 65. It is also assumed that: p=250 m.u.(i.e. monetary units); c=50 m.u.; g=1
m.u.
If this integrated newsvendor is exclusively interested in maximising the
overall profit ∏c, then he/she would order as much as ݅ݍ݊ݐ∗ , as given by equation
(2.2), and would consequently generate the first-best case maximum profit of the
entire channel ∏int∗ that is given by relation (2.1). Relations (2.1) and (2.2) are
provided in Sub-section 2.1.1. In Sub-section 2.1.1 can also be found the notation
that is used here.
Nevertheless, in the case that there are two distinct decision makers in the
Newsvendor Problem setting that interact via the wholesale price contract, the
setting differs in the way that Figure 4.2 demonstrates. In greater detail, each
decision maker needs to make exactly one decision: the manufacturer needs to
determine the price w that is charged to the retailer in each time period t, while
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Figure 4.2: The de-centralised operation newsvendor problem
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the retailer needs to specify the chosen order quantity q. If the manufacturer is
exclusively interested in maximising his/her individual profit, he/she charges w*,
as given by equation (2.8) (s. Sub-section 2.1.1), where ݍ௠∗ represents the order
quantity that the rationally optimizing retailer would place in response to this
price w*, or else ݍ௠∗ = arg mൣax ∏୫ (ݓ ∗, q)൧=ܨିଵ(௣ା௚ି௪ ∗௣ା௚ ). The result is that
the manufacturer would expect to produce a profit of ∏௠∗ , that is given by
equation (2.7). If the retailer is in turn exclusively interested in maximising
his/her individual profit, he/she orders exactly ݍ௥∗ units as calculated by relation
(2.4) and subsequently expects to attain a profit of ߎ௥, according to equation
(2.3). When these decisions are combined, they generate an aggregate channel
profit of ∏
ୡ
= ∏௠
∗  + ∏௥
∗ , that is significantly lower than the aggregate first-best
case maximum profit of  ∏௜௡௧∗ (Lariviere and Porteus, 2001; Cachon, 2003).
Relations (2.3), (2.4), (2.7) and (2.8) are provided in Sub-section 2.1.1.
The results is that the efficiency score that is attained by this interaction of
w* with ݍ௥∗ (which in this case happens to coincide with ݍݏ
∗) is ܧ݂݂ = ∏ౙ
∏౟౤౪
∗ < 1,
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which signifies the wholesale price contract’s inefficiency. The reason is that
neither the manufacturer, who is the first to make any decisions and, therefore the
Stackelberg leader (Stackelberg, 1934 in: Cachon and Netessine, 2004), nor the
retailer, take into account the effect of their decisions on the overall channel’s
profit. This phenomenon is known as the double marginalization problem
(Spengler, 1950).
Nevertheless, it has already been established that very rarely would human
manufacturers and retailers make price and quantity decisions, respectively, that
follow the above decision rules. Thus, whether the double marginalization
problem perseveres, or else whether the efficiency score attained would remain
strictly lower than one, is still open to further exploration. In a number of
laboratory experiments that have been conducted with human subjects, it is
confirmed that there persists a systematic divergence of both human
manufacturers’ prices and human retailers’ order quantities from the
corresponding prices and quantities that are predicted by the standard normative
models. First, human manufacturers are found to charge prices (w) that are
significantly different from the prices that would maximise their individual
profits w* (Keser and Paleologo, 2004; Katok and Wu, 2009). Second, human
retailers are found to systematically order quantities (q) that are significantly
different from the quantities that their rationally profit maximising counterparts
would order (ݍ
ݎ
∗), that is, in response to the prices w that are charged to them
(Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Schultz and McClain, 2007; Benzion et al, 2008;
Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008; Su, 2008; Lurie
and Swaminathan, 2009).
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In greater detail, human retailers are found to: i. under-order, namely order
less than ݍ௜௡௧∗ , if the product being exchanged is of the high profit type and ii.
over-order, namely order more than ݍ௜௡௧∗ , if the product being exchanged is of the
low profit type (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Benzion et al, 2008; Bolton and
Katok, 2008; Bostian et al, 2008). Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) make the
distinction that a product is characterized as being of the high profit type if its
“critical fractile” is greater than 0.5, while a product is characterized as being of
the low profit type, if its critical fractile is less than 0.5. A critical fractile is
defined according to relation (4.1) that follows:
Critical Fractile under Centralised Operation
ܥݎ.ܨݎ. = ݌+ ݃− ܿ
݌+ ݃ (4.1)
Given the aforementioned product specification (i.e. p=250 m.u, c=50 m.u.,
g=1 m.u.), the critical fractile becomes according to relation (4.1): ܥݎ.ܨݎ. =
௣ା௚ି௖
௣ା௚
=0.8>0.5, which signifies that the product under study here is of the high
profit type.
This too low/too high systematic pattern of human retailers’ order
quantities is known as the pull-to-centre effect (Bostian et al, 2008). A number of
different individual behavioural biases are used by different researchers to justify
these systematically erroneous decisions of human retailers, such as for example
risk-seeking, risk-aversion, reference-dependence, loss-aversion, waste-aversion,
stock-out aversion, opportunity costs under-estimation, ex-post inventory error
minimisation, mean anchor, demand chasing, or collectively bounded rationality
(Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Benzion et al, 2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008;
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Bostian et al, 2008; Kremer et al, 2008; Su, 2008; Lurie and Swaminathan,
2009).
The result of the combination of the previous human decisions (i.e. w and
q) is that the wholesale price contract is unable to give rise to the first-best case
maximum profit  ∏୧୬୲∗ ; its inefficiency, thus, predominates and the double
marginalization problem remains. Nevertheless, the efficiency score that it attains
is significantly higher than theoretically predicted. For this reason, it is
established that the wholesale price contract‘s overall performance is much better
than theoretically expected (Keser and Paleologo, 2004; Katok and Wu, 2009).
But it still remains open to further exploration whether it would be possible for
the wholesale price contract to coordinate the Newsvendor Problem, namely
attain an efficiency score that may not statistically differ from 1.
Building on the aforementioned existing results, the section that follows
formulates the research hypotheses that this PhD thesis seeks to address for the
Newsvendor Problem setting.
4.2 Research Hypotheses
This study addresses three distinct sets of research hypotheses: First, there is a
research hypothesis that tests how human manufacturers’ prices compare with
perfectly rational, profit maximising prices w*. Second, there are research
hypotheses that test how human retailers’ order quantities compare with overall
profit maximising quantities ݅ݍ
݊ݐ
∗ and individual profit maximising quantities q*.
Last, there are research hypotheses that concern the efficiency score that is
attained by the overall channel; these test how the overall efficiency score
compares to its corresponding theoretical prediction and whether the double
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marginalization problem dominates, namely, whether the efficiency score
remains strictly lower than one. The paragraphs that follow outline and justify
these research hypotheses.
4.2.1 Manufacturers’ w-prices
In line with Keser and Paleologo’s (2004) and Katok and Wu’s (2009) earlier
experimental results, human manufacturers would be expected to charge prices
that are not consistent with the profit maximising price w*. This is exactly what
the first research hypothesis suggests. Although Keser and Paleologo (2004)
provide evidence in favour of human manufacturers charging significantly lower
prices than the rationally optimizing manufacturer w*, the prices of Katok and
Wu’s (2009) subjects differ and depend on the magnitude of customer demand.
Therefore, it is safer to leave the first research hypothesis about human
manufacturers’ w-prices as two-tailed.
Hypothesis NP.1 Human manufacturers charge w-prices that are
significantly different from the rationally optimizing manufacturer’s price w*
(ww*)
Since the price that the rationally optimizing manufacturer would charge
(w*) would maximise the manufacturer’s profit, this price w* could be
considered as a ‘locally good’ price. So, this first research hypothesis implies that
human manufacturers would not be expected to make ‘locally good’ decisions.
4.2.2 Retailers’ q-quantities
Human retailers would be expected to order significantly different quantities than
the ones that are predicted by the relevant standard normative models. In this
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regard, human retailers would be expected to reproduce the pull-to-centre effect
that is experimentally verified for high profit products (e.g. Schweitzer and
Cachon, 2000; Benzion et al, 2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al, 2008),
since the product that is here under study is of the high profit type (i.e. ܥݎ.ܨݎ. =
௣ା௚ି௖
௣ା௚
=0.8>0.5). For this reason, human retailers would be anticipated to under-
order, namely order significantly lower quantities than the rationally profit
maximising integrated newsvendor ݍ௜௡௧∗ . Hence, research hypothesis 2.1 is as
follows:
Hypothesis NP.2.1 Human retailers place orders of q-quantities that are
significantly lower than the rationally profit maximising integrated newsvendor’s
quantities ݍ௜௡௧∗ (ݍ< ݍ௜௡௧∗ )
Moreover, human retailers would not be expected to order in accordance
with the corresponding quantities q* that would represent their best possible
replies to manufacturers’ prices (Keser and Paleologo, 2004; Katok and Wu,
2009). So, human retailers would be expected to order significantly different
quantities than their rationally optimizing counterparts.
The different prices w that manufacturers charge to human retailers
transform the critical fractiles defined by Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) as
implied by relation (4.2).
Critical Fractile under De-centralised Operation
ܥݎ.ܨݎ. = ݌+ ݃− ݓ
݌+ ݃ (4.2)
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The result is that a retailer may perceive a product of the high profit type as
of the low profit type and may, additionally, interpret a product of the low profit
type as a high profit product, depending on the price w that the interacting
manufacturer charges.
Hence, the different manufacturer prices w have a significant effect on a
retailer’s individual interpretation of the pull-to-centre effect. This could be one
of the reasons explaining why Keser and Paleologo (2004) and Katok and Wu
(2009) obtain conflicting results for the pull-to-centre effect. Although Keser and
Paleologo obtain no evidence of the pull-to-centre effect, Katok and Wu establish
its prevalence. Since Keser and Paleologo’s and Katok and Wu’s human
manufacturers charge significantly different prices, they also perceive critical
fractiles in completely different ways and, thus, place orders of significantly
different quantities. Nevertheless, both papers confirm human retailers’ natural
tendency to order significantly lower quantities than their best possible replies to
manufacturers’ prices q*, that is irrespectively of these prices w. This is exactly
why research hypothesis NP. 2.2 seeks to address whether human retailers’ order
quantities are significantly lower than their rationally optimizing counterparts,
instead of testing human retailers’ compliance with their individual
interpretations of the pull-to-centre effect.
Hypothesis NP.2.2 Human retailers place orders of q-quantities that are
significantly lower than the rationally optimizing retailer’s quantities q* (q<q*).
Since the quantity that the rationally optimizing retailer would order (q*)
would maximise the retailer’s profit, this quantity q* could be considered as a
‘locally good’ order quantity. So, the research hypothesis NP.2.2 implies that
human retailers would not be expected to make ‘locally good’ decisions.
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4.2.3 Efficiency Scores
In line with Keser and Paleologo’s (2004) earlier experimental result, the overall
efficiency scores that would be attained by human manufacturer-retailer
interactions are expected to closely follow their corresponding theoretical
prediction of 0.85, which is the efficiency score that Sub-section 2.1.1 estimates
for the interaction of the price w* that maximises the manufacturer’s profit ∏
ݏ
∗
with the order quantity q* that maximises the retailer’s profit ∏
ݎ
∗. This is exactly
what research hypothesis 3.1 seeks to address.
Hypothesis NP.3.1 The attained efficiency scores do not differ from 0.85
(Eff=0.85)
Yet, even in the instances that the overall attained efficiency scores do not
coincide with 0.85 (Katok and Wu, 2009), provided that these instances exist, the
overall efficiency scores are anticipated to remain significantly lower than 1
(Katok and Wu, 2009). In respect to this, it is expected that the double
marginalization problem would persevere. The research hypothesis 3.2 serves to
test exactly this phenomenon.
Hypothesis NP.3.2 The attained efficiency scores are significantly lower
than 1 (Eff<1).
Since an efficiency score equal to one signifies that the first-best case
maximum profit is attained, the research hypothesis NP.3.2 implies that the
interaction of human manufacturers and retailers would not be expected to give
rise to ‘globally efficient’ interactions, or else eliminate the double
marginalization problem.
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Now that the research hypotheses of this study have been formulated, how
the approach of this PhD thesis, as outlined in Chapter 3, is applied to the
Newsvendor Problem setting is described. In this way, the aforementioned
research hypotheses can be tested.
4.3 The Approach
In order to elicit knowledge on how human subjects make their price and order
quantity decisions and assess the overall performance of all their possible
interactions, the approach that is presented in Figure 3.2 (i.e Section 3.3) has been
adapted to the needs of the Newsvendor Problem. In this regard, in Stage 1 the
decision variables of each agent are recognised, namely the price for the
manufacturer and the order quantity for the retailer. Following informal pilot
sessions, the decision attributes that correspond to each decision variable are also
identified. In Stage 2 volunteers are randomly assigned to play the manufacturer
and the retailer roles in simulation games and their consecutive decisions over
time are recorded. To this end, all participants interact with a representative set of
scenarios that are generated in accordance with the specification of the
Newsvendor Problem. More specific details about the exact response sets that the
different participants were provided follow in Sub-section 4.3.2. In Stage 3
multiple regression models of the first order auto-regressive time-series type are
fitted to each participant’s data set of recorded decisions. In Stage 4 the ABS
model that corresponds to the Newsvendor Problem is run for all possible
combinations of all human manufacturers’ decision models with all human
retailers’ decision models. In this way, the respective outcomes can be compared
and, thus, the research hypotheses about manufacturers’ prices (i.e. NP.1),
retailers’ order quantities (i.e. NP2.1 - NP.2.2) and deriving efficiency scores (i.e.
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NP.3.1 – NP.3.2) are investigated. Each of these stages is now described in some
detail.
4.3.1 Stage 1: The Decision Making Process
The objective of the informal pilot sessions is to identify the decision attributes
that correspond to the two decision variables of this study: that is, the price for
manufacturers and the order quantity for retailers. These pilot sessions were
conducted via simulation games, but differed from Stage 2 gaming sessions in
two ways. First, the subjects were provided all information that was relevant to
their respective role over the course of the entire game; no previous round’s data
were hidden from them. Next, these simulation games were shorter in duration,
yet, they were followed by interviews, during the course of which the subjects
were encouraged to discuss which information they had found of relevance to
their required decision task. They were also asked to explain the underlying
reasoning for the decisions that they had made. In this way, the decision
attributes that they had considered as significant for their respective decisions
were identified.
From these informal sessions evidence is found that most participants
almost ignore all history information, except for the last round. They also choose
to take into account information about the present round, because this seems to
have an immediate effect on their realised profits; this is why human retailers
consider the prices that they are currently charged in their order quantity
decisions. This selective behaviour of human subjects relates well to the
individual bias that Camerer (1995) and Loch and Wu (2007) define as
immediacy. The result of this selective behaviour of human subjects is the
prominence, or else salience, of a sub-set of the available information over all
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history information, that is the past and present round’s. Camerer (1995) and
Loch and Wu (2007) also recognise salience as another significant behavioural
bias that affects individual decision making.
In addition, in the informal interviews most human manufacturers admitted
that they had relied heavily on the retailers’ previous order quantities for their
price decisions, while human retailers stated that they had based their order
quantity decision on the previous demand realizations. The reason was that
manufacturers could not predict with certainty the incoming order quantities; in
the same way retailers could not predict with certainty the customer demand.
Camerer (1995) and Loch and Wu (2007) perceive this tendency of individual
decision makers to use relevant information that is available as a substitute for the
underlying uncertainty. Last but not least, after the end of the game most
volunteers revealed that they had difficulty in understanding how their current
decisions would affect their profits and the system overall performance in the
next round of the game. In order, thus, to make simpler and faster decisions, they
preferred to use their own previously realised profit, as given to them by the
computer interface. This simplification is viewed as the result of the complexity
that is inherent with the Newsvendor Problem; Camerer (1995) and Loch and Wu
(2007) consider complexity as another behavioural bias that seems to have a
significant effect on individual decision making.
In accordance with the aforementioned behavioural biases and with
Axelrod’s (1997) KISS principle (i.e. Keep It Simple Stupid), human
manufacturers (i = MAN) are considered to base each period’s wholesale price
decision w(t) on the following three factors:
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i. the previously charged wholesale price w(t-1) [i.e. immediacy and
salience],
ii. the previously placed order quantity q(t-1) [i.e. immediacy, salience and
ambiguity], and
iii. the previously realized profit ெܲ (ݐ− 1) [i.e. immediacy, salience and
complexity]
These are the manufacturers’decision attributes that have been used in the
subsequent gaming sessions. Therefore, the relation (3.1) that presents the one-to-
one association of the manufacturer’s (i = MAN) decision variable w(t) with all
corresponding decision attributes (i.e. w(t-1); q(t-1); ெܲ (ݐ− 1)) becomes:
The Price’s Decision Function
< ݓ(ݐ) >ெ ஺ே= ெ݂ ஺ே௪ (௧)[ ݓ(ݐ− 1),ݍ(ݐ− 1), ெܲ (ݐ− 1)] (4.3)
For the same reasons, human retailers (i = RET) are considered to base each
period’s order quantity decision q(t) on the following four factors:
i. the currently charged wholesale price w(t) [i.e. immediacy],
ii. the last period’s order quantity q(t-1) [i.e. immediacy and salience],
iii. the previously observed demand d(t-1) [i.e. immediacy, salience and
ambiguity] and
iv. the previously realized profit ௥ܲ(ݐ− 1) [i.e. immediacy, salience and
complexity].
These are the retailers’decision attributes that have been used in the subsequent
gaming sessions. Therefore, the relation (3.1) that presents the one-to-one
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association of the retailer’s (i = R) decision variable q(t) with all corresponding
decision attributes (i.e. w(t); q(t-1); d(t-1); ோܲ(ݐ− 1)) becomes:
The Order Quantity’s Decision Function
< ݍ(ݐ) >ோா்= ோ݂ா்௤(௧)[ ݓ(ݐ),ݍ(ݐ− 1),݀(ݐ− 1), ோܲ(ݐ− 1)] (4.4)
The description of the Newsvendor Problem that is provided in Sub-section
2.1.1 along with the decision functions (4.3) and (4.4) fully specify the ABS
Newsvendor model, which is described in greater detail in the sub-section that
follows.
Outcome 1: The Agent-Based Simulation Newsvendor Model
According to the exact specification of the Newsvendor Problem that is provided
in Sub-section 2.1.1, there are two different types of agents: the manufacturer-
agent and the retailer-agent. In accordance with the definition of an agent that is
provided in Section 3.2, the bulleted list that follows briefly summarises how
both the manufacturer-agent and the retailer-agent satisfy all requirements and
are, thus, eligible to be considered as agents:
 Social Ability: both the manufacturer-agent and the retailer-agent have the
social ability to communicate with each other and their surrounding
environment. The wholesale price contract specifies all terms of trade and
any exchange that occurs between them.
 Capability to learn: both the manufacturer-agent and the retailer-agent use
the feedback information that is provided to them to better understand their
partners’ reactions and any changes that are occurring to their environment.
In this way, they can modify and, thus, adapt their behaviours accordingly.
The reader should at this point be reminded that the decision functions of
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both the manufacturer-agent (i.e. relation 4.3) and the retailer-agent (i.e.
relation 4.4) may remain fixed, but the agents’ exact decisions do vary with
time, depending on the previous period’s results. This dynamic behaviour
encapsulates their capability to learn.
 Autonomy: both the manufacturer-agent and the retailer-agent have separate
and well determined goals to achieve and clearly defined internal logic rules
that govern their actions.
 Heterogeneity: both the manufacturer-agent and the retailer-agent follow
their own intentions and make different decisions.
In this regard, Table 4.1 outlines the basic structure (i.e. attributes and
behavioural characteristics) of the manufacturer-agent; while Table 4.2 does so
for the retailer-agent.
It is evident from Table 4.1 that the different manufacturer-agents only
differ in the exact values of their corresponding attributes; these are in turn given
by the specific decision models of type (4.3) that have been fitted to the
associated human manufacturer’s respective decisions. Their exact values are
reported in Sub-section 4.3.3, where the decision models that have been fitted to
all participants’ datasets of recorded decisions are presented. Nevertheless, the
association of the manufacturer’s (i = MAN) decision variable w(t) with any
decision attribute, that is the corresponding decision model coefficient,
constitutes exactly what specifies the ABS model attribute (e.g. the association of
w(t) with w(t-1) provides the ABS model attribute
௪ܽ (௧ି ଵ)௪ (௧).ಾ ೔, that differs accross
different manufacturer-agents).
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Following the same rationale, Table 4.2 shows that the different retailer-
agents only differ in the exact values of their corresponding attributes. These
ABS model attributes are in turn given by the decision models of type (4.4) that
have been fitted to the human retailers’ respective decisions. Although their exact
values are reported in Sub-section 4.3.3, their specification is provided by the
decision model of type (4.4) that associates the retailers’ decision variable q(t)
with all corresponding decision attributes.
Table 4.1: The basic structure of the manufacturer-agent
The Manufacturer-Agent
Attributes: Decision Model Coefficients
 0ܽݓ(ݐ).ܯ ݅

ܽݓ(ݐ−1)ݓ(ݐ).ܯ ݅

ܽݍ(ݐ−1)ݓ(ݐ).ܯ ݅
 ܽܲ
ܯ (ݐ−1)ݓ(ݐ).ܯ ݅
Behaviours:
 Deciding a price w
 Accepting an order (of quantity q)
 Producing
 Delivering a shipment
 Incurring production cost
 Earning profits
Table 4.2: The basic structure of the retailer-agent
The Retailer-Agent
Attributes: Regression Coefficients
 ߚ0ݍ(ݐ).ܴ݆
 ߚ
ݓ(ݐ)ݍ(ݐ).ܴ݆
 ߚ
ݍ(ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ).ܴ݆
 ߚ
݀(ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ).ܴ݆
 ߚ
ܴܲ(ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ).ܴ݆
Behaviours:
 Accepting a price w
 Deciding an order quantity (of
quantity q)
 Receiving a shipment
 Paying the total shipment cost
 Satisfying customer demand
 Incurring remaining inventory cost
 Earning profits
The behaviour of the manufacturer-agent is presented in the statechart of
Figure 4.3; while the behaviour of the retailer-agent is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
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From Figure 4.3 it is evident that the manufacturer-agent is considered to
be in idle (i.e. awaiting) state while waiting for his/her partner’s response to
his/her initial decision. From Figure 4.4 it is evident that the retailer-agent is in
an awaiting state in two different instances: first, while waiting for his/her
Figure 4.3: The statechart of the manufacturer-agent
Figure 4.4: The statechart of the retailer-agent
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partner’s initiating price decision and second, while waiting to receive the
manufacturer’s shipment.
The underlying environment of the ABS model symbolizes the market, that
is, the environment reflects the customer demand that is uncertain in nature. The
element of combined evolution is of most relevance to the research hypotheses
NP.3.1and NP.3.2 that concern, respectively, whether the emerging efficiency
scores differ statistically from their corresponding theoretical prediction of 0.85
or are significantly lower than 1. In this way, it can be established whether
‘globally efficient’ interactions can emerge from the interactions of ‘locally poor’
decisions. ‘Globally efficient’ interactions would attain overall efficiency scores
that would not differ significantly from 1. As for ‘locally poor’ decisions, they
would be decisions that would differ substantially from the corresponding
rationally optimizing counterparts’.
Based on the above specifications, given the problem’s small size and
mostly for reasons of speed of model build, ease of use and familiarity with the
data presentation, a spreadsheet version of the model (in Excel-VBA) has initially
been developed (Robinson, 2004; North and Macal, 2007). Nevertheless, North
and Macal’s (2007) suggestion to incrementally move up to a special purpose
agent modelling facility has subsequently been followed. For this reason, a
version of the model in AnyLogic® Version 6.2.2 (XJ Technologies, 2007) has
then been developed. Figure 4.5 presents an example from an interface from the
AnyLogic® version of the model.
In both of these two versions of the ABS Newsvendor Problem model true
customer demand instances are obtained via integer values of normal distribution
variates truncated at zero, according to Barr and Sherrill’s (1999)
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recommendations. In order to ensure the efficacy and repeatability of results,
these variates are produced by using the Mersenne-Twister pseudo-random
number generator (Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998). This AnyLogic© version
of the model produces exactly the same results as the spreadsheet version of the
model. The results that are obtained from the two different models have complete
numerical identity, hence, successful “alignment” or “docking” of the two models
is guaranteed (Axelrod, 1997: pp. 183).
4.3.2 Stage 2: The Gaming Sessions
The objective of the second stage is to collect data for each human decision
maker. To this end, volunteers were recruited from a pool of 2007 graduate
students at the University of Warwick. Three were asked to act as manufacturers
Figure 4.5: The AnyLogic© interface of the ABS Newsvendor model
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(i.e. SMAN = 3), denoted as MAN1 to MAN3 and four as retailers (i.e. SRET = 4),
denoted in turn as RET1 to RET4. Table 4.3 summarizes the main demographic
characteristics of the human subjects that played the role of the manufacturer,
while Table 4.4 does so for those who played the role of the retailer. The only
requirement set was that all participants had received formal classroom training
in the Newsvendor Problem prior to the experiment as part of their curriculum.
The reason is that an earlier empirical study confirms the superior performance of
well trained students acting as newsvendors compared to experienced supply
chain managers (Bolton et al, 2008).
Participants were randomly assigned to play either the role of the
manufacturer or the retailer against an automated retailer or manufacturer,
respectively. They worked with a computer interface that simulated the
interacting partner’s responses. This computer interface has been adapted from
the ABS model of the Newsvendor Problem that is developed at the end of Stage
1 (i.e. Outcome 1). An illustrative screen shot of this computer interface, as
shown to the human manufacturers, is given in Figure 4.6; while the
corresponding screenshot of the computer interface that was presented to the
human retailers is shown in Figure 4.7.
Table 4.3: The human manufacturers - subjects
Factor level Course Age
MAN1 PhD in Management
Subject Area: Information Systems and Management
29
MAN2 MSc in Management 25
MAN3 MSc in Management Science and Operational
Research
23
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Table 4.4: The human retailers - subjects
Factor
level
Course Age
RET1 MSc in Management Science and Operational
Research
24
RET2 PhD in Management
Subject Area: Industrial Relations / Organizational
Behaviour
27
RET3 MSc in Engineering Business Management 25
RET4 PhD in Management
Subject Area: Employment Research
27
At this point it is admitted that provision of automated players may not be as
realistic as direct interaction of human manufacturers and retailers would, but it
controls for social preferences and reputational effects, such as, for example,
players’ possible concern regarding fairness, reciprocity, status seeking and group
identity (Loch and Wu, 2008; Katok and Wu, 2009) that remains outside the
interests of this study.
Written instructions on the required task were distributed to all participants
well in advance of their allocated session, so they could get familiar with the task
and the available software as quickly as possible. The instructions informed the
participants that the product under study is a perishable widget of general nature
facing random customer demand. They were also made aware that each round’s
demand is independent of any previous round’s, but they were not informed
about the exact type of distribution that customer demand follows. The main
reason is to protect the experimental design from the additional behavioural
biases that are associated with the participants’ potential inability to fully
understand the nature of the demand distribution (Bearden and Rapoport, 2005).
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The instructions that were distributed to the subjects who played the role of the
manufacturer are presented in Appendix A.1, while the instructions that were
distributed to the subjects who were asked to play the role of the retailer are
outlined in Appendix A.2.
The participants were also instructed to make decisions that, to their best
knowledge, would make the entire aggregate channel as highly profitable as
possible. But in order to reflect real manufacturer-retailer interactions as
accurately as possible, participants were not provided information about the
aggregate channel profit that was realised at the end of each round. Finally, the
participants were not offered any financial incentives, because there was no
budget available to this end. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether providing
financial incentives would have a significant impact on the inferred decision
Figure 4.6: The computer interface of the simulation game that is faced by the human
manufacturers
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making strategies (Smith and Walker, 1993; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Croson,
2002).
Apart from written instructions, the participants could address questions
both before the start of the session and during its course. Nevertheless, the game
could not be re-started once it had begun. Participants were asked to make their
respective decisions consecutively, that is over a number of periods. In order to
give participants some time to get used to their new roles, the first 10 rounds
were used as trial periods; the participants were informed in advance about the
fact that these rounds were only meant for their practice and would not count
towards the final outcome (i.e. ‘dry-run’ periods: Friedman and Sunder, 1994, pg.
78). In total, the game was run for 50 consecutive rounds for each participant
(including the trial periods). After every period participants received feedback on
Figure 4.7: The computer interface of the simulation game that is faced by the human
retailers
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their previous decisions and their realized profit. The retailer also received
feedback on the previous round’s demand.
The reasons that manufacturers did not have access to this customer
demand information were two-fold. First, customer demand did not have any
impact on the manufacturer’s profit, according to relation (2.5) (s. Sub-section
2.1.1). Second, according to the existing tradition of “business flight simulators”
(Sterman, 1989; 1992), sharing customer demand information would not
represent reality accurately. The participants were not aware of the exact
session’s duration, so that end-of-game effects could be eliminated (Steckel et al,
2004). In order to comply with the minimum sample size requirements and
ensure sufficient statistical power, more than 10 samples for each decision
attribute were collected (Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006), namely 3x10 for the
manufacturers’ and 4x10 for the retailers’ decision models, as given by relations
(4.3) and (4.4), respectively.
All participants acting as the manufacturer were asked to play against the
same automated retailer that exhibits all possible ordering strategies ranging from
0 to ݍ∗ + 3 ∙ ߪ (σ = 80). In order to ensure consistency across different subjects’
gaming sessions, all human manufacturers were presented with the same series of
scenarios in exactly the same order. Figure 4.8 illustrates an indicative example
of one of the participants’ w-decisions over time (i.e. MAN2). It is evident that
MAN2 systematically orders lower prices than would the rationally optimizing
manufacturer ݓ ∗ (i.e. w<w*), which is in accordance with the research hypothesis
NP.1 that postulates that human manufacturers charge w-prices that are
significantly different from the rationally optimizing manufacturer’s price w*
(ww*).
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attempt to closely follow customer demand (i.e. demand chasing) is obvious. In
Figure 4.9 demand realisations are coloured in green.
Figure 4.9: RET1 q- quantities, as observed in the laboratory
Outcome 2: The Datasets of Participants’ recorded Decisions
All participants’ recorded decisions are collectively gathered with the associated
decision attributes in appropriate datasets. The dataset of recorded decisions of
RET1 is indicatively attached to Appendix A.3.
4.3.3 Stage 3: The Decision Making Strategies
The objective of the third stage is to determine the decision model that
corresponds to each participant, namely specify the relations of type (4.3) that
correspond to each human manufacturer i (MANi with i = 1,...,3) and the relations
of type (4.4) that correspond to each human retailer j (RETj with j = 1,...,4).
Since all participants’ recorded w- and q- decisions satisfy the linearity,
normality and hetero-skedasticity requirements of linear regression (Weisberg,
2005; Hair et al, 2006), each human manufacturer’s (MANi ) pricing strategy is
portrayed as the first order auto-regressive time-series models AR(1) of type (4.5)
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and each human retailer’s (RETj ) ordering strategy is reflected by the
corresponding first order auto-regressive time-series models AR(1) of type (4.6)
(Mills, 1990; Box et al, 1994; Hamilton, 1994; Greene, 2002). The exact testing
procedure that has been followed to ensure that the linearity, normality and
hetero-skedasticity requirements of linear regression are satisfied is attached to
Appendix A.4 (Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006).
Types of Decision Models in the Newsvendor Problem
〈ݓ(ݐ)〉ܯܣܰ݅ = 0ܽݓ(ݐ).ܯܣܰ݅+ ܽݓ(ݐ−1)ݓ(ݐ).ܯܣܰ݅ ∙ ݓ(ݐ− 1) + ܽݍ(ݐ−1)ݓ(ݐ).ܯܣܰ݅ ∙
ݍ(ݐ− 1) +
௉ܽಾ (௧ି ଵ)௪ (௧).ಾ ಲಿ೔ ∙ ெܲ (ݐ− 1) (4.5)
〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ܴܧ݆ݐ = ߚ0ݍ(ݐ).ܴܧ݆ܶ + ߚݓ(ݐ)ݍ(ݐ).ܴܧ݆ܶ ∙ ݓ(ݐ) + ߚݍ(ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ).ܴܧ݆ܶ ∙ ݍ(ݐ− 1)+ ߚ (݀ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ).ܴܧ݆ܶ ∙ (݀ݐ− 1)+ߚܴܲ(ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ).ܴܧ݆ܶ ∙ ܴܲ(ݐ− 1) (4.6)
In these simple linear models, the value of each coefficient
ܽ݇
ݓ(ݐ).ܯܣܰ݅(where k = ݓ(ݐ− 1); ݍ(ݐ− 1); ெܲ (ݐ− 1)) and ߚ௞௤(௧).ೃಶ೅ೕ (where k =
ݓ(ݐ); ݍ(ݐ− 1); ݀(ݐ− 1); ோܲ(ݐ− 1)) reflects the importance that each
manufacturer MANi and retailer RETj, respectively, assign to each of the decision
attributes that they consider for their respective decision variables 〈ݓ(ݐ)〉ெ ஺ே೔
and 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா்ೕ.
The reason that no interaction terms are included in the above decision
models (4.5) and (4.6) is that the high adjusted coefficients of determination that
have been attained by all decision models fitted (i.e. R2>70%) are interpreted as
an indication that there is no reason to include any additional terms (Weisberg,
2005; Hair et al, 2006; Fox, 2008). Although the adjusted coefficient of
Chapter 4- The Newsvendor Problem Approach
174
determination and the coefficient of determination indicate the degree of the
dependent variable’s variability that is explained by the list of independent
variables, the reason that the adjusted coefficient of determination is preferred
over the coefficient of determination to assess a decision model’s goodness-of-fit
is that it additionally incorporates the possible effect of the sample size (Hair et
al, 2006; Fox, 2008). More details about the decision models’ goodness-of-fit are
provided later on.
At this point the reader should be informed that for some of the human
manufacturers’ MANi and retailers’ RETj decision models the corresponding
profits ெܲ (ݐ− 1) and ோܲ(ݐ− 1) are removed from the list of independent
variables. This is due to the high multi-collinearity that is existent between the
profits ெܲ (ݐ− 1) and ோܲ(ݐ− 1) and the remaining independent variables (i.e.
w(t-1), q(t-1) and w(t), q(t-1), d(t-1), respectively). High multi-collinearity is
exhibited by tolerance levels that are lower than 0.10. Tolerance levels are
defined as the amount of variability of ெܲ (ݐ− 1) and ோܲ(ݐ− 1), that cannot be
explained by the remaining independent variables, that is w(t-1), q(t-1) and w(t),
q(t-1), d(t-1), respectively (Hair et al, 2006).
Since in the decision models (4.5) and (4.6) the lagged dependent variable
(i.e. w(t-1) and q(t-1)) is included in the list of explanatory variables, auto-
correlation is existent within all the collected data-sets, which is also confirmed
by the Breusch-Godfrey test (Breusch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978). For this reason, the
appropriate quasi-differences data transformations are applied. Nevertheless,
because of the relatively small sample sizes (i.e. NM|AN=30, NRET=40) and the low
values of correlation ρ, the ordinary least squares estimators are used instead of
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the feasible generalised least squares that are tailored to time-series processes
(Rao and Griliches, 1969).
Outcome 3: The Participants’ Decision Models
The linear regression models that have been fitted to the human manufacturers
MANi datasets of recorded decisions, along with their corresponding t-values and
p-values are presented in Table 4.5, while the respective models that have been
fitted to the human retailers RETj sets of decisions are provided in Table 4.6. The
p-values demonstrate the lowest significance level for which the corresponding
decision attributes are taken into account by subjects MANi and RETj in their
respective decisions variables 〈ݓ(ݐ)〉ܷܵ ܲ݅ and 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ܴܧܶ .݆
It is evident from Table 4.5 that all human manufacturers (MANi with
i=1,..,3) assign significant importance to the wholesale price that they charged
during last period w(t-1) (significant at levels lower than 0.1%). Nevertheless, no
human manufacturer takes into account the profit that he/she previously realized
(t-values<2.763, which is the critical value at the 0.1% significance level).
Although human manufacturers do assign some marginal consideration to
the retailer’s response quantity (q(t-1)), the corresponding t-values indicate that
this effect might not differ statistically from zero (corresponding p-values>0.45).
Most probably it is because the manufacturers lack the knowledge and control
over the way that retailers order that they tend to only base their w-decisions on
their own previous w-prices. Overall the decision models that have been fitted to
human manufacturers are statistically significant at the 1% level and explain
more than 85% of the total variation that exists in their recorded decisions
(adj.R2).
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Table 4.5: Human manufacturers’ linear regression decision models
MAN1 MAN2 MAN3
Coef. t-value
p-
value Coef.
t-
value
p-
value Coef.
t-
value
p-
value
0ܽݓ(ݐ)ܯ ܣܰ݅ 115.851 14.710 <0.001 43.929 4.919 <0.001 11.733 2.596 0.015
ܽݓ(ݐ−1)ݓ(ݐ)ܯ ܣܰ݅ 0.506 15.941 <0.001 0.769 19.098 <0.001 0.921 32.955 <0.001
ܽݍ(ݐ−1)ݓ(ݐ)ܯ ܣܰ݅ -0.014 -0.708 0.485 0.011 0.404 0.689 -0.002 -0.097 0.923
ܽܲ
ܯ (ݐ−1)ݓ(ݐ)ܯ ܣܰ݅ 0 -0.002 0.998 0 0.003 0.998 0 0.005 0.996
Adj. R2 0.852 0.889 0.958
Table 4.6 demonstrates that RET1, RET2 and RET3 concentrate on the
wholesale price w(t) that their manufacturer charges to them (significant at levels
lower than 0.1%). On the contrary, RET4 seems to ignore this exogenously set
price for which he has neither understanding nor control (t-values<2.712,
which is the critical value at the 1% significance level). Instead he prefers to
concentrate on his own earlier order quantity decision q(t-1) and previously
realised profit ோܲ(ݐ− 1) (significant at levels lower than 0.1%). Finally, RET2 is
the only human retailer who does take into account the previous demand
realization d(t-1) for his order quantity decision q(t) (significant at the 0.5%
level).
Overall the decision models that have been fitted to human retailers’
decisions are statistically significant at the 1% level and explain more than 70%
of the total variation that is inherent in their recorded decisions (adj.R2).
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Table 4.6: Human retailers’ linear regression decision models
RET1 RET2
Coef. t-value p-value Coef. t-value p-value
ߚ0ݍ(ݐ)ܴܧ݆ܶ 246.807 18.564 <0.001 258.416 12.294 <0.001
ߚ
ݓ(ݐ)ݍ(ݐ)ܴܧ݆ܶ -0.945 -17.686 <0.001 -1.030 -13.110 <0.001
ߚ
ݍ(ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ)ܴܧ݆ܶ -0.033 -0.449 0.656 0.180 2.311 0.027
ߚ
݀(ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ)ܴܧ݆ܶ -0.045 -0.852 0.400 0.262 3.018 0.005
+ߚ
ܴܲ(ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ)ܴܧ݆ܶ 0 0.813 0.421 -0.001 -3.146 0.003
Adj. R2 0.867 0.778
RET3 RET4
Coef. t-value p-value Coef. t-value p-value
ߚ0ݍ(ݐ)ܴܧ݆ܶ 246.067 14.492 <0.001 32.589 2.938 0.006
ߚ
ݓ(ݐ)ݍ(ݐ)ܴܧ݆ܶ -0.952 -18.690 <0.001 -0.048 -1.048 0.301
ߚ
ݍ(ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ)ܴܧ݆ܶ 0.035 0.469 0.642 0.455 5.797 <0.001
ߚ
݀(ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ)ܴܧ݆ܶ 0.173 2.285 0.028 0.029 0.794 0.432
ߚ
ܴܲ(ݐ−1)ݍ(ݐ)ܴܧ݆ܶ -0.001 -1.591 0.120 0.002 6.785 <0.001
Adj. R2 0.881 0.724
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4.3.4 Stage 4: The Agent-Based Simulation Model Runs
The object of the fourth stage is to explore under all possible interactions of
inferred decision making strategies the overall performance of the wholesale
price contract in the Newsvendor Problem setting. To this end, the ABS model of
the Newsvendor Problem is run for all possible combinations of decision models.
In greater detail, the interacting manufacturers’ and retailers’ respective decision
models are treated as the two treatment factors of analysis (TF1: manufacturer,
TF2: retailer), with TF1 appearing at s1=4 levels (SUPi, i=1, 2, 3, OPT) and TF2 at
s2=5 levels (RETj, j=1, 2, 3, 4, OPT). The reason that the rationally optimizing
manufacturer and retailer (with the index OPT) are kept in the experimental
design is that in this way it would be much easier to directly compare the human
manufacturers’ and retailers’ decisions to their rationally optimizing
counterparts’. Since the total number of all possible TF1 – TF2 combinations (TF1
x TF2 =20) is not prohibitively high, Chapter 5 reports the simulation results of
the resulting asymmetrical, full factorial ‘two way layout’ experimental design
(Robinson, 2000; Toutenburg, 2002; Mukerjee and Wu, 2006).
But in order to draw statistically accurate conclusions and, thus, test the
research hypotheses that concern the simulated human manufacturers’ w- prices
(i.e. NP.1), the simulated human retailers’ q-quantities (i.e. NP. 2.1 and NP. 2.2)
and the attained efficiency scores (i.e. NP. 3.1 and N.P. 3.2), a number of
conventions need to be applied to all ABS model runs. The run strategy that is
followed (i.e. warm-up, run length and number of replications) is summarized in
the paragraph that follows.
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 demonstrate how manufacturers’ and retailers’
decision rules require some time to converge to their steady state mean values,
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since they start from an initial state that is far removed from the corresponding
steady state mean values. To this end, the examples of the manufacturer
when interacting with
MAN1, are illustrated in purple colour. Similar conclusions can also be drawn for
all decisions of all parti
Figure 4.10: MAN
interaction with RET
In order, thus, to ensure that inferences are not made while the
“initialization bias” phenomenon
et al, 2009a) is still present and, in addition, to obtain accurate estimates of mean
performances, the following run strategy is implemented:
warm-up length is established, according to th
White and Spratt, 2000). The
(i.e. of the efficiency score) for all the output values to amount to 160 time
periods. ii. The model is run for 1,800 time periods (including the w
according to Banks
RET1 and the retailer RET1, when in turn interacting with
cipants in all studied treatment combinations.
1 w-decisions over time, according to the simulation model (when in
1)
(Pidd, 2004; Robinson, 2004; Law, 2007; Hoad
i. An estimate of the
e MSER-5 method
warm-up length is found from the longest warm
et al.’s (2005) recommendation to run for at least ten times
MAN1 decisions over time
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(White, 1997;
-up
arm-up),
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mean performances each simulation ran is replicated for
Hoad et al.’s (2009b)
Figure 4.11: RET
interaction with MAN
Outcome 4: The Key Outcomes
The key outcomes that are obtained from the
manufacturers’
efficiency scores
4.4 Verification and Validation
Although verification and validation
any version of the ABS
2008), some steps that have been undertaken to verify and validate the ABS
model are summarised in the paragraphs that follow.
-up period. iii. In order to obtain accurate estimates of
n=100 times, following
replications algorithm.
1 q-decisions over time, according to the simulation model (when in
1)
ABS Newsvendor
w-prices, retailers’ q-quantities and emergent
) are presented in Chapter 5.
are performed in parallel with developing
Newsvendor model (North and Macal, 2007; Robinson,
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model (i.e.
interactions’
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Since the objective of all verification activities is to ensure that the ABS
model performs according to its intended use and specification from an
operational perspective (Law, 2007; North and Macal, 2007), source code
analysis and ‘unit testing’ have been performed (Pidd, 2004; North and Macal,
2007).
As the objective of validation is to check whether the ABS model under
study successfully represents and correctly reproduces the behaviours that are
observed in its real-world equivalent, both the agents’ distinct behavioural rules
and the overall ABS model behaviour have been validated (Robinson, 2004; Law,
2007; North and Macal, 2007). In respect to validating the agents’ decision rules,
a reliable correspondence (of at least 80%) between the agents’ simulated
decisions and the corresponding participants’ true decisions, as observed in the
laboratory, has been ensured (Sterman, 1989). In view of validating the overall
ABS model behaviour, ‘black box validation’ (Pidd, 2004; Robinson, 2004) has
been performed, according to which the results that are obtained from the ABS
model seen as a whole are compared with extant, confirmed, results
(Swaminathan et al, 1998; North and Macal, 2007). The exact reasoning under
which ‘black box’ validation has been performed is highlighted in Section 5.3.
Last but not least, the successful “alignment” or “docking” (Axelrod, 1997: pp.
183) of the spreadsheet and Anylogic versions of the model are viewed as a
further successful validation exercise of this study (North and Macal, 2007).
4.5 Summary
This chapter reminds the reader of the Newsvendor Problem’s specification and
the existing analytical and experimental results. It then uses these known results
to build the research hypotheses about human manufacturers’ w-prices being
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significantly different from the rationally optimizing manufacturer’s price w* (i.e.
NP.1), human retailers’ q-quantities being significantly lower than the rationally
profit maximising integrated newsvendor’s quantities ݍ௜௡௧∗ (i.e. NP.2.1) and the
rationally optimizing retailer’s quantities q* (i.e. NP.2.2), the emerging efficiency
scores being not significantly different from 0.85 (i.e. N.P.3.1) and significantly
lower than 1 (i.e. NP.3.2).
The chapter subsequently describes the approach that this PhD thesis has
followed to address the aforementioned research hypotheses. In greater detail,
this research uses adequate ABS models, which have been calibrated via human
experiments. In this way, it builds statistically accurate conclusions about the
effect that different prolonged interactions between dynamic, heterogeneous and
autonomous decisions of human manufacturers and retailers can have on the
wholesale price contract’s efficiency. Therefore, it manages to accommodate: i.
human intentions that might be different from profit maximisation, ii. human
actions that might differ from their corresponding intentions in heterogeneous
ways (i.e. heterogeneous bounded rationality), iii. human reactions that might
depend on their surrounding environment and changes that occur, if any and iv.
human decisions that are independent and autonomous. In this way, it
successfully addresses the literature gaps G.1-G.4 that are identified in Table 2.5
(s. Section 2.4) for the Newsvendor Problem.
Chapter 5 presents the results that are obtained from the ABS Newsvendor
model, so that statistically accurate conclusions about the research hypotheses
NP.1, NP.2.1-NP.2.2 and NP.3.1-NP.3.2 can be drawn.
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Chapter 5
The Newsvendor Problem Results
The purpose of this chapter is to draw statistically accurate conclusions about the
effect that different prolonged interactions between manufacturers’ and retailers’
dynamic, heterogeneous and autonomous decisions can have on the wholesale
price contract’s efficiency, when applied to the Newsvendor Problem setting. To
this end, this chapter presents and discusses the results that are obtained from the
ABS model that is described in the previous chapter (i.e. sub-section 4.3.4). In
this way, Chapter 5 addresses the research hypotheses that concern human
manufacturers’ w-prices (ww*: i.e. NP1), human retailers’ q-quantities (ݍ<
ݍ௜௡௧
∗ : i.e. NP.2.1 and q<q*: i.e. NP.2.2) and the emerging efficiency scores
(Eff=0.85: i.e. N.P.3.1; Eff<1: i.e. NP.3.2) that are formulated in Section 4.2.
This chapter presents the results that are acquired from the ABS model in
the same order that the research hypotheses are also provided. It starts by
discussing the simulated human manufacturers’ w-prices, proceeds to the
simulated human retailers’ q-quantities and finishes with exposing the emergent
interactions’ efficiency scores. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion and
a reflection on the managerial implications and practical significance of the
results that are obtained.
The steady-state mean results of n=100 simulated replications for all
possible treatment combinations are presented in corresponding tables. These
tables also report between parentheses () in italics font the standard deviation of
all the replications’ results, while they also provide between brackets [] in bold
font the half widths of the corresponding 99% confidence intervals. The reason
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all inferences are based on the low significance level of  = 0.01 is on the side of
caution in rejecting a null hypothesis and, so, reducing the probability of
committing a Type I error.
5.1 Manufacturers’ w-prices
The object of this section is to test the research hypothesis about human
manufacturers’ w-prices being significantly different from the rationally
optimizing manufacturer’s price w* (i.e. NP1). In this regard, Table 5.1 presents
all simulated human manufacturers’ steady- state mean ݓഥ-prices over n = 100
simulated replications for all 20 treatment combinations studied.
It is evident from Table 5.1 that the human manufacturers’ simulated ݓഥ-
prices have standard deviations that are equal to or very close to 0, that is, they do
not vary much, when asked to interact with different retailers. The reason is that
for every new decision they make they do not take into account their retailers’
response quantities to a statistically significant degree, as the non-differing than 0
coefficients for q(t-1) (i.e.
௤ܽ(௧ି ଵ)௪ (௧).ಾ ೔) can demonstrate (s. Table 4.3). Meanwhile,
MANOPT consistently charges w*=184 monetary units (according to expression
(2.7)), which is independent of the retailer’s response and, thus, the underlying
random demand observations. This is why the standard deviations in the last row
of Table 5.1 are exactly equal to 0, turning all corresponding half-width 99%
confidence intervals for all ݓഥ-decisions reported to 0. The same is also true for all
standard deviations and half-width 99% confidence intervals in the last column of
Table 5.1, as RETOPT consistently orders quantities that would maximise his/her
respective expected profit. So, there is no fluctuation in the mean ݓഥ–prices for
the different replications.
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From Table 5.1 there seem to be two different strategies that the simulated
human manufacturers i=1,...,3 employ to ensure their profitability. First, they
might attempt to maximise their individual profits by reserving strictly positive
profit margins; in this regard, charging high prices would guarantee strictly
positive profit margins. For this reason, this pricing strategy can be characterised
as ‘profit margin - driven’. Alternatively, they might prefer to attract a demand
that is sufficiently high to maximise their individual profit; in order to achieve
this, they might insist on charging low prices. In this regard, this pricing strategy
could be viewed as ‘demand – driven’. In respect to these pricing strategies,
MAN1 appears to adopt the first strategy (i.e. ‘profit margin – driven’), initially
charging the highest price and subsequently adjusting his initial decision only to a
moderate degree. In contrast, MAN3 appears to adopt the completely opposite
strategy (i.e. ‘demand – driven’) by initially charging lower prices to stimulate
demand and then adjusting her prices to further improve the interacting retailers’
response quantities. As for MAN2, he prefers some mixture of the above two
strategies (i.e. ‘demand and profit margin – driven’), because he initially charges
low prices, while he subsequently increases his prices to such a degree that
become on average higher than the rationally optimizing manufacturer’s (i.e.
w*=184 m.u.).
MAN1, in all the interactions in which he participates, charges the highest
mean ݓഥ-prices. Thus, MAN1 systematically ‘over-charges’, namely charges prices
that are even higher than the rationally optimizing manufacturer’s MANOPT (at a
significance level that is lower than 0.1%). MAN1’s prices are followed in order
of decreasing magnitude by MAN2’s, whose ݓഥ-prices are still significantly higher
than w* (at a significance level that is lower than 1%). As for MAN3, in all the
interactions in which he participates, MAN3 ‘under-charges’, namely charges
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prices that are significantly lower than the rationally optimizing manufacturer’s
MANOPT (at a significance level that is lower than 0.1%).
Since all simulated human manufacturers charge significantly different
prices than the rationally optimizing manufacturer MANOPT, the research
hypothesis NP.1 could not be rejected (i.e. ww*: at p<0.01). It is very interesting
that some of the simulated human manufacturers’ bounded rationality leads them
to charge prices that are even higher than required to maximise their expected
profit. That is why it becomes even more interesting to understand the emergent
efficiency scores that these high prices would generate.
5.2 Retailers’ q-quantities
Attention is now turned to how boundedly rational human retailers respond to the
above manufacturer ݓഥ-prices. The reason that the simulated retailers’ ݍത-
quantities are interesting is because the simulated human manufacturers’ ݓഥ-prices
are high and, thus, generate low profit margins for the retailers. That is why, in
contrast to the research hypothesis NP.2.2, the simulated human retailers would
normally be anticipated to ‘over-order’, that is on average order higher quantities
than their rationally optimizing counterpart (ݍ∗(ݓഥ)). This is due to their
individual interpretations of the pull-to-centre effect, as results from the high ݓഥ-
prices that they are charged by the simulated human manufacturers. In other
words, their respective, individual versions of the pull-to-centre effect differs
from the aggregate channel’s, because each human retailer individually perceives
the product under study as of the low profit type, given that the ݓഥ-prices that they
are charged produce critical fractiles ௣ା௚ି௪ഥ
௣ା௚
that are well below 0.5 for all studied
treatment combinations.
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In this regard, the purpose of this section is two-fold: i. test the research
hypotheses that concern human retailers’ q-quantities being significantly lower
than the rationally profit maximising integrated newsvendor’s quantities ݍ௜௡௧∗ (i.e.
NP.2.1) and the rationally optimizing retailer’s quantities q* (i.e. NP.2.2) and ii.
test whether the simulated human retailers comply with their individual
interpretations of the pull-to-centre effect. In respect to this, Table 5.2 presents all
simulated human retailers’ steady-state mean ݍത-quantities over n = 100 simulated
replications for all 20 treatment combinations studied.
From the last column of Table 5.2 it is detected that the standard deviations
of all observations and resulting half width 99% confidence intervals of all
combinations, in which the rationally optimizing retailer participates, amount to
0. The reason is again that the rationally optimizing retailer orders quantities that
would maximise his/her expected profit and, thus, do not depend at all on the
demand observations that vary from one period to the next.
Table 5.2 demonstrates that all human retailers order significantly lower
quantities than the rationally optimizing integrated newsvendor would (݅ݍ
݊ݐ
∗ =202). Therefore, the research hypothesis NP.2.1 cannot be rejected (q<ݍ௜௡௧∗ : at
p<0.001). This conclusion provides further favourable evidence for the pull-to-
centre effect as perceived on the aggregate channel’s level, that is, in addition to
the already existing evidence (e.g. Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Benzion et al,
2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008; Bostian et al, 2008).
Moreover, RET1 is the only simulated human retailer who orders quantities
that are significantly lower than the rationally optimizing retailer’s (ݍ∗(ݓഥ)). Thus,
the research hypothesis NP.2.2 cannot be rejected for RET1 (q<q*: at p=0.01) and
it can also be concluded that RET1 does not order according to his individual
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interpretation of the pull-to-centre effect. In other words, the ‘under-ordering’
behaviour that RET1 employs seems to be driven by his strong preference to
‘minimise left - overs’ that at the end of the period need to be dismissed. The
result is that RET1 quantity decisions are kept further away from the rationally
optimizing integrated newsvendor’s (݅ݍ
݊ݐ
∗ ).
RET2 and RET4 order significantly higher quantities than the rationally
optimizing retailer (ݍ∗(ݓഥ)). Therefore, the research hypothesis NP.2.2. needs to
be rejected for RET2 and RET4 (at the 1% significance level). But RET2 and RET4
are the only simulated human retailers who satisfy their individual interpretations
of the pull-to-centre effect. This ordering behaviour that is exhibited by both
RET2 and RET4 seems to be driven by their strong preference to ‘maximise sales’.
In greater detail, neither RET2 nor RET4 would like to lose sales because of
inventory unavailability. The result is that, in their attempt not to disappoint any
potential customers, RET2 and RET4, order quantities that tend to more closely
approximate the rationally optimizing integrated newsvendor’s (݅ݍ
݊ݐ
∗ ).
Finally, RET3 is the only simulated human retailer whose order quantities do
not substantially differ from the rationally optimizing retailer’s (ݍ∗(ݓഥ)). Hence,
the research hypothesis NP.2.2. needs to be rejected for RET3 (at the 1%
significance level). It is also evident that since RET3 ‘s ݍത-quantities closely
follow the rationally optimizing retailer’s (ݍ∗(ݓഥ)), RET3 almost ignores his
individual interpretation of the pull-to-centre effect. In greater detail, RET3
appears to order slightly more than ݍ∗(ݓഥ) in the case where he interacts with the
most expensively charging manufacturer, namely SUP1, and significantly less
than ݍ∗(ݓഥ), in the case where he interacts with the remaining manufacturers
SUP2, SUP3 and SUPOPT. For this reason, RET3 appears to employ in his ordering
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decisions a combination of preferences, that is, ‘left - overs minimisation and
sales maximisation’.
In summary, it is surprising that although RET1, RET2, RET3 follow rather
similar ordering strategies in that they mostly rely on the prices that are currently
charged by their manufacturer w(t), they place order quantities that are so
considerably different. It is also very interesting that the simulated human
retailers who are driven by ‘sales maximisation’ would tend to comply with their
own individual interpretation of the pull-to-centre effect, while the simulated
human retailers who are driven by ‘left – overs minimisation’ would almost
ignore their own individual interpretation of the pull-to-centre effect. Last but not
least, most of the simulated human retailers prove to be consistent in their
preferred ordering strategies, namely they do not vary noticeably their order
quantities in response to the prices that are charged to them. Attention is now
turned to how these ordering strategies affect the emergent efficiency scores that
are attained by all the interactions studied.
5.3 Emergent Efficiency Scores
The objective of this section is to test the research hypotheses that concern the
emergent efficiency scores, namely test whether these are not different to the
corresponding theoretical prediction of 0.85 (i.e. NP.3.1) and significantly lower
than 1 (i.e. NP.3.2). In this regard, Table 5.3 presents the mean efficiency score
(ܧ݂݂തതതതത) over n=100 replications achieved by all 20 treatment combinations studied.
From Table 5.3 it becomes evident that the efficiency score achieved, when
the rationally optimizing manufacturer (MANOPT) and the rationally optimizing
retailer (RETOPT) interact with each other (i.e. last cell of Table 5.3), is exactly as
theoretically predicted (i.e. 0.85). As this concurs with the analytical result, it
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provides further confidence in the validity of the model (i.e. a “black-box
validation” test: Robinson, 2004). Hence, the research hypothesis NP.3.1 for the
interaction of the rationally optimizing manufacturer and the rationally
optimizing retailer cannot be rejected (ܧ݂݂ *<1: at p<0.01).
It is also very interesting that there are another 3/20 simulated interactions
that attain efficiency scores that are not significantly different from 0.85 (i.e.
MAN1-RET2, MAN3-RET1, MAN3-RET4). Therefore, in total, the research
hypothesis NP.3.1 could not be rejected for 20% of the interactions studied
(Eff=0.85: at p<0.01).
Nevertheless, the research hypothesis NP.3.1 needs to be rejected for the
remaining 80% of the interactions studied. Obviously, the research hypothesis
NP.3.2 also has to be accepted for the 4 interactions studied, for which the
research hypothesis NP.3.1 is accepted (i.e. Eff<1 at p<0.01 for MAN1-RET2,
MAN3-RET1, MAN3-RET4, MANOPT-RETOPT).
From the remaining interactions studied 9/20 attain efficiency scores that
are significantly lower than 0.85 (i.e. MAN1-RET1, MAN1-RET3, MAN1-RETOPT,
MAN2-RET1, MAN2-RET3, MAN2-RETOPT, MANOPT-RET1, MANOPT-RET2,
MANOPT-RET3). Therefore, the research hypothesis NP.3.2 is also accepted for
these 9 interactions studied (Eff<1 at p<0.01). Since these interactions give rise to
lower efficiency scores than the interaction of their rationally optimizing
counterparts, these interactions could be characterised as ‘under-performing’. It is
interesting that RET1 and RET3 often come into play in these ‘under-performing’
interactions. The reason is that both RET1 and RET3, concerned about
‘minimisation of left – overs’ as they are, systematically place orders of low
quantities, namely they order, respectively, either less than or approximately as
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much as the rationally optimizing retailer would ݍ∗(ݓഥ). This is problematic,
because the rationally optimizing retailer, exclusively interested in his/her
expected profit as he/she is, systematically orders significantly lower quantities
than the rationally optimizing integrated newsvendor and, therefore, causes the
aggregate total channel profit to be far-off from the first-best case maximum
profit.
The remaining 7/20 simulated human manufacturer-retailer interactions
attain efficiency scores that are significantly higher than 0.85 (i.e. MAN1-RET4,
MAN2-RET2, MAN2-RET4, MAN3-RET2, MAN3-RET3, MAN3-RETOPT, MANOPT-
RET4). As these 7 interactions emerge as ‘nearly efficient’, they could be
characterised as ‘well performing’. Therefore, testing research hypothesis NP.3.2
for these nearly efficient interactions would shed some light on whether true
efficiency is achieved by any of these simulated human manufacturer-retailer
interactions.
One of these interactions generates an efficiency score with a 99%
confidence interval that includes the value of one: the interaction of MAN3 with
RET2 (i.e. the shaded cell in Table 5.3). This implies that this particular
interaction gives rise to an efficiency score that does not differ statistically from
1. Therefore, the research hypothesis NP.3.2 needs to be rejected for the
interaction of MAN3 with RET2 (at the 1% significance level). Thus, in stark
contrast to analytical predictions, it cannot be rejected that human decision
makers’ bounded rationality can lead the aggregate channel to the first-best case
maximum profit. Even though MAN3 and RET2 both make ‘locally poor’
decisions, namely charge prices and order quantities, respectively, that
systematically deviate from the rationally optimizing integrated newsvendor’s,
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when combined, they may give rise to an overall efficient interaction. Therefore,
it is from the interaction between MAN3 and RET2, namely the interplay between
their differing preferences and cognitive limitations, and not the performance of
their distinct decision making strategies that the wholesale price contract’s
efficiency may emerge. This result is considered as a valuable addition to the
existing experimental research on supply chain contracts.
It is also very interesting that both MAN3 and RET2 are better aligned with
the rationally optimizing integrated newsvendor’s corresponding decisions in that
MAN3, ‘demand – driven’ as she is, she systematically ‘under-charges’ and RET2,
‘sales maximising’ as he is, he consistently ‘over-orders’. That is why it also
becomes important to understand why it is the interaction of RET2 and not RET4
with MAN3 that generate efficiency. RET4 is ‘sales maximising’ as well and,
indeed, exhibits an even greater degree of ’sales maximisation’ by on average
ordering quantities than are higher than RET2’s. Still, RET4 ‘s interaction with
MAN3 fails to attain the first-best case maximum profit. The reason is that RET4,
in order to determine his quantity decisions, mostly relies on his own earlier order
quantity decision qt-1 and previously realised profit ௥ܲ(ݐ− 1). Since he almost
ignores the prices that are charged to him in each round, he ends up ordering
higher quantities than would give rise to the first-best case maximum profit.
Hence, RET4 demonstrates an unnecessary ‘too-high’ degree of ’sales
maximisation preference’. What mainly differentiates RET2 from exhibiting a
similar ‘too-high’ ‘sales maximisation preference’ is the high priority that he
assigns to the wholesale prices that are charged to him.
For the remaining 6/20 nearly efficient simulated human manufacturer-
retailer interactions (i.e. MAN1-RET4, MAN2-RET2, MAN2-RET4, MAN3-RET3,
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MAN3-RETOPT, MANOPT-RET4) the research hypothesis NP.3.2 could not be
rejected, in spite of the higher than 0.85 efficiency scores that are attained. It does
not come as a surprise that the ‘demand – driven’ MAN3 or the ‘sales maximising’
decision makers RET2 or RET4 participate in these nearly efficient interactions.
The reasons are two-fold: MAN3 is the only simulated human manufacturer who
on average charges lower prices than his rationally optimizing counterpart. RET2
and RET4 comply with their individual interpretations of the pull-to-centre effect
and, thus, order on average higher quantities than their rationally optimizing
counterparts would. So, even though the decisions of MAN3, RET2 and RET4 are
significantly different from their rationally optimizing counterparts’, they follow
them more closely than most other simulated human manufacturers and retailers.
This is exactly what explains why their participation plays such an important role
in the high efficiency scores that are attained by them.
This is also what helps draw some general prescriptions about how supply
chain efficiency could be achieved in practice when the wholesale price contract
is in force. Generally, decision makers would be advised to follow the example of
the ‘demand – driven’ MAN3 and the ‘sales maximising’ RET2, in that they deviate
from their isolated views of individual profit and keep the aggregate channel
profit in mind when making their respective decisions. In this way, they are better
aligned with the rationally optimizing counterparts’ decisions. But since they do
not have access to perfect symmetric information, they can simply resort to the
relevant information that is available to them, namely, follow the example of
MAN3, who determines her prices by prioritizing the previously received order
quantity and the example of RET2, who places his order quantities by prioritizing
the currently charged wholesale prices. In addition, considering the previous
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order quantities and manufacturer prices may protect them from unnecessarily
compromising their prices and order quantities, respectively.
5.4 Concluding Discussion
This chapter presents the results that are obtained from the ABS model that is
described in Sub-section 4.3.4 and, therefore, addresses the research hypotheses
that concern human manufacturers’ w-prices (ww*: i.e. NP1), human retailers’
q-quantities (ݍ< ݍ௜௡௧∗ : i.e. NP.2.1 and q<q*: i.e. NP.2.2) and the emerging
efficiency scores (Eff=0.85: i.e. N.P.3.1; Eff<1: i.e. NP.3.2), as are formulated in
Section 4.2. In this way, Chapter 5 reports on the first study that explores the
effect that different prolonged interactions between manufacturers’ and retailers’
dynamic, heterogeneous and autonomous decisions can have on the wholesale
price contract’s efficiency, that is when applied to the Newsvendor Problem
setting.
The simulated human manufacturers charge prices that are significantly
different from the prices that their rationally optimizing counterparts would
charge, irrespective of whether they prefer to adopt a pricing strategy that is
‘profit margin – driven’ or ‘demand - driven’. As for the simulated human
retailers, they order significantly lower quantities than the rationally optimizing
integrated newsvendor would. For this reason, they reproduce the pull-to-centre
effect, as perceived on the aggregate channel’s level. Nevertheless, only 50% of
the simulated human retailers satisfy their corresponding individual
interpretations of the pull-to-centre effect. The result is that the majority of the
simulated human retailers don’t take into account the small profit margins that
are left to them by their respective manufacturers’ high prices. In addition, the
simulated human retailers’ order quantities greatly vary, when compared to the
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corresponding order quantities of their rationally optimizing counterparts. A
number of them order significantly lower quantities, while others order
significantly higher quantities; yet there still is one simulated human retailer
whose order quantities closely follow the rationally optimizing retailer’s. Overall
the different simulated human retailers exhibit different preferences, depending
on their individual preferences and cognitive abilities; these individual
preferences vary from ‘left - overs minimisation’ to ‘sales maximisation’.
This range of simulated human retailers’ ordering behaviours generates
varying efficiency scores. These results, as obtained from the ABS model, are
surprising: In stark contrast to previous theoretical results, the results indicate that
the exact efficiency scores fluctuate greatly. Although the majority of interactions
studied (i.e. 65%) attain efficiency scores that are not significantly higher than the
standard normative model’s theoretical prediction (i.e. 0.85), there is a significant
portion of interactions studied (i.e. 35%) that attain near efficiency, that is
efficiency scores that are significantly higher than 0.85. More importantly, there
is also one interaction for which it could not be rejected that overall efficiency is
achieved (i.e. an efficiency score that may not differ significantly from 0).
It is also very interesting that the exact efficiency score that is attained by
each interaction under study is largely dependent on the interplay between the
preferences that the interacting partners demonstrate. In greater detail, there is
evidence that the interests of human retailers who comply with their individual
interpretations of the pull-to-centre effect are better aligned with the aggregate
channel’s efficiency score. Overall, the existence of a ‘left – overs minimising’
decision maker in an interaction aggravates the efficiency scores, while the
presence of at least one ‘demand – driven’ or ‘sales maximising’ decision maker
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has the potential to generate a nearly efficient interaction. Indeed, the
participation of only ‘demand – driven’ and ‘sales maximising’ decision makers
in an interaction may generate the first-best case maximum profit. Among these
decision making strategies, the most efficient are the ones that exhibit a high
responsiveness to the interacting partners’ decisions, such as, for example, order
quantities for the case of manufacturers and incurred wholesale prices for the
case of retailers.
The results that are obtained from this study are of equal significance to
both academics and practitioners. Academics will find an interest in the
methodological differences of this experimental study from prior relevant work
on the Newsvendor Problem. This is as yet the first study that explores the effect
that different prolonged interactions between manufacturers’ and retailers’
dynamic, heterogeneous and autonomous decisions can have on the wholesale
price contract’s efficiency in the Newsvendor Problem setting. It clearly differs
from prior existing experimental research in that it accommodates for: i. human
manufacturers’ and retailers’ distinct intentions that might be different from
profit maximisation, ii. human manufacturers’ and retailers’ distinct actions that
might differ from their corresponding intentions (i.e. boundedly rational
decisions) in heterogeneous ways, iii. human manufacturers’ and retailers’
distinct reactions to their surrounding environments and changes to it, if any, iv.
human manufacturers’ and retailers’ independent and autonomous decisions. In
this way, this PhD thesis successfully addresses the literature gaps G.1 - G.4 of
Table 2.5 (s. Section 2.4). Furthermore, in stark contrast to existing research, this
study establishes that it cannot be rejected that the overall efficiency of the
wholesale price contract in the Newsvendor Problem setting may emerge,
depending on the interplay between the different strategies that the interacting
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partners adopt. In this regard, the exact conditions under which the wholesale
price contract’s efficiency can be achieved will also be of interest to academics.
In addition, this study introduces some innovative ideas that are useful for
practitioners. In this regard, the managerial implication of this research is that it
can help supply chain managers understand that instead of solely investing in
implementing and administering complex, yet efficient, contract types, they could
alternatively consider effective management training that focuses on overall
efficiency. The reason is that in spite of a partner’ s ‘locally poor’ individual
decisions, global efficiencies can be achieved. So, it is important to train decision
makers to focus on overall aggregate channel profits instead of their own
individual profits, in order to reach the decisions that would give rise to ‘overall
efficient’ interactions. With respect to this, it also becomes very important that
decision makers take into account and flexibly respond to their partners’
decisions, instead of exclusively focusing on their own decisions. This is exactly
where the simulation games that are developed in this study could help as training
tools along the lines of ‘business flight simulators’ (Sterman, 1992; 2000; van der
Zee and Slomp, 2009). The ABS model could also serve as a ‘routine decision
support’ tool in that it can reduce the complexity that is faced by supply chain
managers and thus, support the required thinking and analysis (Pidd, 2010).
Moreover, since many pricing and purchasing decisions are in reality made in
group settings and conform to well-established company policies and accepted
conventions (i.e. “group-think”: Janis, 1972; 1982) the simulation games and
ABS models that are developed in this study can also serve to enhance group
decision making by demonstrating the potential benefits of competing decision
making strategies. The modifications and extensions required for this objective
Chapter 5- The Newsvendor Problem Results
198
(e.g. provision of additional decision attributes and modification of deriving
decision models) can be easily applied to the models of this study.
Nevertheless, this study is not without limitations. One potential limitation
is that human manufacturers and retailers were asked to play against computer
pre-automated scenarios. Although this approach was followed to eliminate
potential biases stemming from social preferences and reputational effects (Loch
and Wu, 2008; Katok and Wu, 2009), asking individuals to play interactively
against each other, as is usually done in participatory simulation (North and
Macal, 2007), could add some useful insights to the analysis and potentially
reduce some of the approach’s inherent bias. An indicative example is whether
individuals learn from and adapt to their partners’ actions and decisions.
Future research in this area may examine the robustness of the results that
are obtained in this study in different supply chain settings. It would also be
interesting to apply a similar approach and explore the effect of interactions
between varying individual preferences and cognitive abilities on the overall
efficiency of different contractual forms, such as for example the buyback
contract (Pasternack, 1985; Lau et al, 2007), the quantity discount contract
(Moorthy, 1987; Kolay et al, 2004), the quantity-flexibility contract (Tsay, 1999),
the sales rebate contract (Taylor, 2002; Arcelus et al, 2007; Burer et al, 2008),
the revenue sharing contract (Cachon and Lariviere, 2005). It would be very
interesting to explore how different, if any, the efficiency scores attained by these
contracts would be from their theoretical predictions, as given by the
corresponding standard normative models. The standard normative models of the
buyback and the revenue sharing contracts are provided in Sub-section 2.3.1.
Finally, additional empirical work is undoubtedly required to identify more fully
Chapter 5- The Newsvendor Problem Results
199
the range of situations over which the experimental results obtained from the
ABS model of the Newsvendor Problem hold.
200
Table 5.1: Simulated human manufacturers’ steady- state ࢝ഥ-prices
F1
F2
RET1 RET2 RET3 RET4 RETOPT
MAN1
233.98 (0.002)
[0.001]
232.56 (0.011)
[0.005]
233.08 (0.006)
[0.003]
233.17 (0.006)
[0.003]
233.07 (0)
[0]
MAN2
192.85 (0.003)
[0.001]
195.55 (0.014)
[0.007]
194.29 (0.008)
[0.004]
192.28 (0.008)
[0.004]
194.77 (0)
[0]
MAN3
146.53 (0.002)
[0.001]
144.68 (0.006)
[0.003]
145.75 (0.004)
[0.002]
147.97 (0.004)
[0.002]
145.57 (0)
[0]
MANOPT
(w*)
184 (0)
[0]
184 (0)
[0]
184 (0)
[0]
184 (0)
[0]
184 (0)
[0]
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Table 5.2: Simulated human retailers’ steady- state ࢗഥ-quantities
F1
F2
RET1 RET2 RET3 RET4 RETOPT
MAN1
17.58 (0.06)
[0.028]
97.74 (0.29)
[0.133]
59.97 (0.21)
[0.09]
124.71 (0.38)
[0.15]
58.96 (0)
[0]
MAN2
44.98 (0.06)
[0.03]
125.87 (0.25)
[0.11]
85.82 (0.18)
[0.08]
118.13 (0.32)
[0.71]
92.68 (0)
[0]
MAN3
97.84 (0.06)
[0.03]
178.12 (0.18)
[0.08]
133.40 (0.13)
[0.06]
107.82 (0.24)
[0.11]
135.07 (0)
[0]
MANOPT
(w*)
1.19 (0.03)
[0.01]
78.78 (0.31)
[0.14]
102.41 (0.22)
[0.10]
129.66 (0.43)
[0.20]
106 (0)
[0]
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Table 5.3: The emergent steady-state efficiency scores
F1
F2
RET1 RET2 RET3 RET4 RETOPT
MAN1
0.132 (0.055)
[0.026]
0.812 (0.081)
[0.037]
0.572 (0.110)
[0.050]
0.911 (0.059)
[0.027]
0.572 (0.110)
[0.051]
MAN2
0.428 (0.120)
[0.055]
0.918 (0.060)
[0.027]
0.756 (0.089)
[0.041]
0.892 (0.064)
[0.029]
0.798 (0.084)
[0.039]
MAN3
0.822 (0.080)
[0.037]
0.998 (0.020)
[0.009]
0.941 (0.053)
[0.024]
0.857 (0.072)
[0.033]
0.946 (0.051)
[0.024]
MANOPT
(w*)
0.004 (0.007)
[0.003]
0.705 (0.100)
[0.044]
0.387 (0.106)
[0.049]
0.923 (0.055)
[0.025]
0.85 (0)
[0]
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Chapter 6
The Contract Beer Distribution Game
Chapters 4and 5 limit attention to the Newsvendor Problem, that is the simplest
supply chain setting that can exist, where there is only one supplier and one
retailer that interact with each other. Although this setting constitutes the
fundamental building block of any supply chain configuration and, thus, serves to
obtain an in depth understanding of the impact that bounded rationality can have
on supply chain decision making, it can only to a very limited degree be used to
draw accurate generalizations. The reasons are three-fold: First, in real supply
chains more than two partners interact with each other; second, inventories are
carried over from one period to the next; and last, unsatisfied demand is
backlogged and needs to be satisfied in subsequent periods. Therefore, decision
making becomes notoriously more complicated. Since the Beer Distribution
Game represents a de-centralised operation, periodic review production-
distribution supply chain with serial echelons, it manages to more realistically
represent real life supply chains. As for the combination of the Newsvendor
Problem and the Beer Distribution Game setting, it provides some general
lessons about the way that the wholesale price contract operates in serial multi-
echelon supply chains of general type. That is why in Chapters 6-8 attention is
turned to the Beer Distribution Game.
In respect to this, the purpose of this chapter is to modify the Beer
Distribution Game in a way that ensures that the basis of any interaction between
adjacent supply chain partners is the wholesale price contract. To this end, both
the board and the mechanics of the Beer Distribution Game are adapted. In this
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regard, this chapter introduces this new version of the Beer Distribution Game,
which is for this reason thereafter named the “Contract Beer Distribution Game”.
After the Contract Beer Distribution Game is designed, the corresponding
standard normative models, as described in Section 2.2.1 for the traditional Beer
Distribution Game, are modified. These standard normative models serve to
predict the perfectly rational price and order quantity decisions that participants
in the Contract Beer Distribution Game would make, under both scenarios of
centralised and de-centralised operation. These standard normative models are
built under the assumption of echelon managers, who are characterised by: i. an
exclusive interest in maximising the overall supply chain profit, under centralised
operation (i.e. team optimal solution) and their individual aggregate profit, under
de-centralised operation, ii. perfect rationality with no effect of individual,
behavioural biases and iii. no account of environmental changes and, thus, no
effect of learning. In this way, the team optimal solution can be identified and,
therefore, the resulting first-best case optimum supply chain performance can be
compared to the aggregate supply chain performance that would be generated, if
the distinct echelon managers made separate decisions (i.e. de-centralised
operation). Hence, the gap between the first-best case optimum supply chain
performance and the aggregate supply chain performance can be evaluated.
Given the team optimizing and individual performance optimizing decision rules,
occurrence of the bullwhip effect can also be assessed. The bullwhip effect or else
Forrester effect has been defined in Section 2.2 as the tendency of orders to
increase in magnitude and variance from the customer to the manufacturer
(Forrester, 1958; 1961). The reason it is separately considered is because it
further increases inventory holding and backlog costs and, thus, further amplifies
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overall supply chain inefficiencies (Chen et al, 1999; Dejonckheere et al, 2003;
Sucky, 2009).
In summary, this chapter addresses the literature gap G.5 outlined in Table
2.5 (s. Section 2.4), because it develops the Contract Beer Distribution Game,
that is the new version of the Beer Distribution Game, where all terms of trade
between interacting supply chain partners are determined by the wholesale price
contract. Moreover, since Chapter 6 also develops the standard normative
models that make provision for inclusion of prices, namely are associated with
the Contract Beer Distribution Game, it also addresses the literature gap G.6 of
Table 2.5.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the main differences between
Sterman’s (1989) traditional version of the Beer Distribution Game and the
Contract Beer Distribution Game are outlined (Section 6.1). Later on the game
set-up and the mechanics are described in some detail (Section 6.2). The basic
notation and underlying dynamic transactions that take place in the setting are
subsequently provided (Section 6.3). Last but not least, the standard normative
models that correspond to the setting’s distinct scenarios of centralised and de-
centralised operation are presented in Section 6.4.
6.1 Key Differences between the Contract Beer Distribution Game and
Sterman’s Beer Distribution Game
The need for the development of the Contract Beer Distribution Game originates
from the requirement to force the wholesale price contract to constitute the basis
of any interaction that takes place in the Beer Distribution Game. In this way, the
impact of prices on the ordering behaviour of participants can be fully explored.
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The underlying reasoning behind the pricing decisions of participants in the
Contract Beer Distribution Game is that they need to charge prices that would
appropriately control the incoming order quantities. The result is that price
decisions are distinctively hard to make. Participants need to identify the trade-
off between prices that would ensure, on the one hand, satisfactory profit
margins, in respect to the prices that they are themselves charged and, on the
other hand, target sales; target sales are in great part determined by the
participants’ current inventory availability. In greater detail, as is also the case in
the traditional version of the Beer Distribution Game, sales or demand that is too
high would provoke high arising backlog costs, while demand that is too low
would, in turn, generate high arising inventory holding costs.
Hence, the inclusion of prices in the Contract Beer Distribution Game
causes two major differences between this new version of the game and the
traditional Beer Distribution Game. First, echelon managers are not entrusted
with exactly one decision task, but instead they have two distinct decisions to
make in each time period, namely they need to determine, in addition to the order
quantities, the prices that they wish to charge to their respective downstream
customers. To be consistent with the Newsvendor Problem, the supplier of each
interaction pair is the Stackelberg leader (Stackelberg, 1934 in: Cachon and
Netessine, 2004) and, thus, the first to make the price decision. In this regard,
each order is only placed in response to the associated price that is charged in
each time period t.
The second major difference between the Contract Beer Distribution
Game and the Beer Distribution Game is that since specific prices are charged in
each time period, participants’ objective is not to minimise overall inventory
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holding and backlog costs, but to maximise profits instead. The net profits derive
from the revenues that are earned in each time period minus the total costs. The
total costs consist of inventory holding and backlog costs and, in addition,
production or acquisition costs, depending on the participant’s role. Inventory
holding and backlog costs are calculated in exactly the same way as in Sterman’s
(1989) original game set-up. The production costs in each time period t are
calculated by the product of the received quantity and the fixed manufacturing
cost. As for the acquisition costs in each time period t, they are calculated in a
slightly more complicated way: by the product of the quantity received and the
corresponding price. The revenues are calculated in each time period t by the
product of the quantity delivered and the agreed price. The revenues that are
received in a time period t from the customer of an interaction pair are exactly
equal to the acquisition cost that is received from the supplier of the interaction
pair. But the agreed price for different shipments might differ, depending on the
decision maker’s preferred pricing strategy. That is why a detailed account of the
price that is charged in each time period t also needs to be kept.
As a result of the above two major differences between the Contract Beer
Distribution Game and the traditional version of the Beer Distribution Game, the
operation of the game has to be adjusted as follows:
i. All adjacent partners of any interaction pair complete the same order slip.
The upstream supplier of the interaction pair completes the selected price
on the left hand side column of the order slip. This semi-completed order
slip is subsequently passed on to the downstream customer of the
interaction pair, so that he/she can complete his/her chosen order quantity
on this same order slip’s right hand side column. In this way, all customers
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place order quantities that are strictly in response to the prices that are
charged in each time period t. In addition, all interacting pairs in the game
make both of their decisions at the same time, yet on different order slips.
ii. All shipments in transit to a partner’s site have their corresponding order
slips attached to them. Hence, all cases of beer that exist in the system have
order slips attached to them; the only exceptions are the cases of beer that
exist inside a partner’s warehouse. The reason is that, in line with
Sterman’s (1989) original game set-up, all inventories incur the same
unitary inventory holding costs. By making provision for order slips
travelling with cases of beer between partners’ warehouses, the customer of
any exchange pair remembers, at the time of a shipment’s receipt, the exact
price that has been agreed at the time of order placement. In this way, the
acquisition cost that is incurred by the interaction’s customer can be
correctly calculated, while the revenues that are earned from the
interaction’s supplier at the same time can also be correctly calculated. The
supplier’s revenues are exactly equal to the customer’s acquisition cost.
iii. An account of all backlogged orders is kept separately, depending on the
associated price that is agreed between the interaction’s supplier and
customer, at the time of order placement. Namely, all slips of backlogged
orders are placed at an appropriately designed section of the Contract Beer
Distribution Game board. These slips of backlogged orders contain the
corresponding prices on their left hand side columns and the unsatisfied
order quantities on their right hand side columns. These prices serve to
correctly calculate the acquisition costs that are incurred at the time of the
shipment’s receipt by the interaction’s customer, as well as the revenues
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that are earned by the interaction’s customer (which are exactly equal to the
customer’s acquisition costs). To this end, whenever the interaction’s
supplier acquires inventory at his/her warehouse, he/she ships any quantity
of cases of beer that he/she has available to his/her respective customer
with the corresponding backorder slip attached.
In order to implement the Contract Beer Distribution the board and
mechanics of the game have to be appropriately modified. Section 6.2 now
describes the board, mechanics and the sequence of steps that participants in the
Contract Beer Distribution Game undertake.
6.2 The Contract Beer Distribution Game
The purpose of this section is to describe the set-up and the mechanics of the
Contract Beer Distribution Game. Building on the aforementioned key
differences between the Contract Beer Distribution Game and Sterman’s (1989)
traditional version of the Beer Distribution Game, this section starts in Sub-
section 6.2.1 by describing the board of the game and then proceeds in Sub-
section 6.2.2 to discussing the mechanics of the game, namely the sequence of
steps that the participants in the game need to undertake.
6.2.1 The Contract Beer Distribution Game Board
The game is played on a board which portrays the production and distribution of
cases of beer (Sterman, 1989; 1992). Figure 6.1 illustrates the board of the
Contract Beer Distribution Game. As already explained, orders for cases of beer
are represented by slips that move around the board, according to the game
instructions. Cases of beer are represented by pennies, which are in turn
manipulated by the players. Each supply chain consists of three serial echelons:
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the retailer (RET), the wholesaler (WHL) and the manufacturer (MAN) (Steckel et
al, 2004).
Figure 6.1 also delineates the differences between the boards of the
Contract Beer Distribution Game and Sterman’s (1989; 1992) traditional version
of the Beer Distribution Game. In greater detail, these differences are:
i. All order slips, as they are moving around the board and being exchanged
between suppliers/ customers interaction pairs, they consist of two separate
columns; these columns are designed specifically to include the supplier’s
price and the customer’s order quantity that is placed. In each time period t
the suppliers of each interaction pair are the first to complete the left hand
side column of the order slip with their chosen price, while the customers
of each interaction pair subsequently complete the right hand side column
of the order slip with their selected order quantity (s. Section 6.1). When a
supplier receives an order, he/she can see not only the ordered quantity, but
also the price that he/she has charged at the time of order placement. Once
the order is filled and the corresponding cases of beer are shipped from the
supplier, these order slips travel with the shipment to the customer’s site. In
this way, when the customer receives the shipment, he/she can remember
correctly what he/she was charged at the time of order placement and,
therefore, can calculate correctly the resultant acquisition cost. In this way,
the interaction’s supplier can also be correctly informed about the revenues
that he/she earns at that same time.
ii. There is a section of the board that is specifically designed to accommodate
all players’ backorders, along with their associated respective quantities
and prices. The reason is that not all ordered quantities are agreed on the
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basis of the same prices; that is why once a supplier of an interaction pair
obtains some inventory to satisfy a backorder, he/she needs to have a
memory of the agreed price, so that he/she can calculate his/her expected
revenues correctly. Hence, the backorder slips serve exactly the same
purpose as the order slips that are associated with shipments. The exact
way that the backorder slips are created and managed is described in the
paragraphs that follow, which present the sequence of steps that the
participants in the game undertake.
As in Sterman’s (1989; 1992) original Beer Distribution Game setup, a
deck of cards represents customer demand. In each time period t customers
demand beer from the retailer, who ships the requested beer out of inventory.
Customer demand is assumed to follow the truncated at zero normal distribution
with μ=5 and σ = 2, because it reflects reality when limited information about the
distribution of customer demand is available (Gallego and Moon, 1993; Son and
Sheu, 2008; Ho et al, 2009) and also closely approximates Sterman’s (1989;
1992) step-up function that is often used in laboratory investigations (e.g.
Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 1998; Kimbrough et al, 2002; Hieber and Hartel,
2003; Steckel et al, 2004; Nienhaus et al, 2006). The retailer, in turn, orders beer
from the wholesaler, in response to the price that the wholesaler is currently
charging. The wholesaler subsequently ships the requested beer out of inventory.
Likewise the wholesaler orders and receives beer from the manufacturer,
depending on the price that the manufacturer is currently charging. The
manufacturer produces the beer facing no capacity restrictions.
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Figure 6.1: The board of the Contract Beer Distribution Game
i. Price- and order quantity- columns of order slips
ii. Section of the board designed for positioning the backorders.
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Each echelon is managed by a different player i, i = 1,..,K (=3), that is
reflected by a different colour scheme: i = 1 with a green colour corresponds to
the retailer (RET); i = 2 with a blue colour corresponds to the wholesaler (WHL);
i = 3 with a red colour corresponds to the manufacturer (MAN). Each participant
is responsible over a series of time periods t=1,...,T for: a). placing orders to the
corresponding upstream supplier; b). charging a price to his/her downstream
customer; c). filling orders received (i.e. placed by the corresponding downstream
customer); d). keeping track of all backlogged orders, in order of receipt and e).
recording the payments that need to be made upon receipt of a shipment from the
corresponding upstream supplier.
Figure 6.1 that presents the board of the Contract Beer Distribution Game
also provides the initial conditions of the game. It is evident that each site initially
holds an inventory of 12 cases; each shipping and production delay contains 4
cases of beer. Each order slip requests an order quantity of 4. The manufacturer
initially charges the wholesaler the price of 2.5 m.u. (i.e. monetary units), while
the wholesaler initially charges the retailer the price of 4.5 m.u. At the start of the
game, the order cards are turned upside down, so that they can only be seen as
dictated by the rules of the game.
The game is additionally complicated by order processing and
production/shipment delays that occur between each supplier/customer pair. As
Figure 6.2 demonstrates, these order processing and production/shipment delays
represent, respectively, the time required to receive, process and produce/ship and
deliver orders. In greater detail, once an order is placed from site i, a constant
information lead time (li = 2) of two time periods occurs before the order actually
arrives to the supply site i+1, while when an order is filled by the supply site i+1
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a fixed transportation lead time (Li= 2) of two time periods passes before the
shipment gets delivered to site i. The total lead-time is Mi=li + Li. At the highest
echelon level (i=3) production requests represent production quantities.
Therefore, a total of MN = 3 periods are required to process and manufacture an
order. This is why the manufacturer, who does not face any supply uncertainty, is
illustrated in Figure 6.2 to receive all placed production requests after exactly M3
= 3 time periods.
6.2.2 Playing the Contract Beer Distribution Game
The participants’ objective is to maximise the total profits during the game. The
net profits derive from the revenues that are earned in each time period minus the
total costs. The revenues are calculated in each time period t by the product of the
quantity delivered and the agreed price.
The total costs consist of the inventory holding and backlog costs and, in
addition, the shipment or the production costs. The inventory holding cost
amount to ℎ݅=0.50 m.u. for every unit of product that is kept in inventory at
player’s i warehouse for one period. The backlog costs amount to ܾ݅ =1 m.u. for
every unit of unsatisfied beer demand. Finally, the retailer sells each case of beer
at the fixed selling price of p = 3 m.u. and the manufacturer produces each case of
beer at the fixed manufacturing cost of c = 0.50 m.u.
WHLMAN RET
Supply Demand
Transportation delays
l3
i=3 i=2 i=1
l2 l1
L2 L1L3
Information delays
Figure 6.2: Lead times in the Contract Beer Distribution Game
Chapter 6- The Contract Beer Distribution Game
215
All participants in the game are required in each simulated time period t to
perform the following sequence of nine steps:
a) Receive inventory and pay supplier: The contents of the shipping delay
immediately to the right of the inventory (“DELAY 2”) are added to the
inventory. The retailers and the wholesalers use the attached order slip to
calculate the acquisition cost that they need to pay to their corresponding
upstream supplier8. The wholesalers and the manufacturers also earn
revenues from their respective downstream customer (i.e. the retailer and
the wholesaler, respectively). These revenues are exactly equal to the
customer’s acquisition cost that the respective downstream customers
need to incur.
b) Advance shipping delays: The contents of the shipping delay on the far
right (“DELAY 1”) are moved into the delay on the near right (“DELAY
2”).
c) Fill backorders: In case there are any backlogged orders, for as long as
there is inventory left, the backlogged quantity written on the first slip
from the top is shipped to the downstream customer with the backorder
slip attached to it. In case there is no sufficient inventory to fully satisfy a
backorder, as much inventory as there is available, is shipped to the
customer. The backorder slip that is attached to it is modified to reflect
the true shipped quantity. In this case, a new backorder slip is
8 The formulae that the participants use to calculate the corresponding shipment
costs are provided in their instructions sheet (For more details the interested
reader is referred to Appendices B.1 – B.3).
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additionally created with the unsatisfied order quantity; this new
backorder slip is positioned at the top of the pile of backorder slips, if
any.
d) Fill incoming orders: Retailers lift the top card in the “Customer Orders”
position, while all other players inspect the contents of the “Incoming
Order” that is positioned at their respective section of the board. They
ship as much of this ordered quantity as their available inventory permits,
out of their warehouse with the associated order slip attached. In case
there is not sufficient inventory to fully satisfy an order, the order slip
that is attached to the partial shipment is modified to reflect the true
shipped quantity. A new backorder slip is also created to reflect the
unsatisfied order quantity. This new backorder slip is positioned at the
bottom of their pile of backorder slips, if any. Retailers also earn
revenues from their customers, according to the quantity that is sold. As
already discussed, it is assumed that the retailers sell at a fixed selling
price p=3 m.u. that is set by competition, as is usually the case for
commodity products (Hirschey et al, 1993; Chopra and Meindl, 2007).
e) Record inventory or backlog.
f) Calculate and record profits: The net profits derive from the revenues
that are earned in each time period t minus the total costs.
g) Advance incoming order slips: The retailers and the wholesalers move
the order slips from the “Orders Placed” position to the “Incoming
Orders” position to the immediate right. The manufacturers introduce the
contents of the “Production Requests” to the top “Production Delay”
(“DELAY 1”).
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h) Determine prices: The wholesalers and the manufacturers decide how
much they desire to charge their respective customers, record these prices
and complete the left hand side column of a new order slip with these.
They subsequently pass these semi-completed order slips on to the
retailers and the wholesalers, respectively.
i) Place orders: All players decide how much they wish to order and record
these quantities. The retailers and the wholesalers complete these
quantities on the right hand side column of the semi-completed order slip
that they just received. They subsequently place these completed order
slips face down in the “Orders Placed” position of the board that
corresponds to them, respectively. The manufacturers complete these
quantities on a new production request slip and place it on the
“Production Request” position of the board.
It is evident from the above sequence of steps a-i that only steps h and i
involve decision tasks on the part of participants in the Contract Beer
Distribution Game. All remaining activities include book-keeping and routine
tasks. The exact sequence of steps that the subjects who play the role of the
retailer need to perform are detailed in Appendix B.1, while appendices B.2 and
B.3, respectively, present the exact sequence of steps that the subjects playing the
role of the wholesaler and the manufacturer need to undertake.
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6.3 The Dynamic Transactions of the Contract Beer Distribution Game
This section builds on the dynamic transactions that take place in the Contract
Beer Distribution Game to define the basic notation that is used in the remainder
of this chapter. In respect to this, Figure 6.3 illustrates the material and
information transactions that take place in the Contract Beer Distribution Game
setting. It is evident from Figure 6.3 that in this setting, material flows from
upstream to downstream (i.e. from i to i-1) and information flows from
downstream to upstream (i.e. from i to i+1), in the form of replenishment orders,
and from upstream to downstream (i.e. from i to i-1), in the form of charged
prices.
Therefore, the Contract Beer Distribution Game’s setting is more
complicated than Sterman’s (1989; 1992) original Beer Distribution Game setting
in that information flows in two directions. But Figure 6.3 does not present, for
reasons of clarity, the financial transactions that take place in the Contract Beer
Distribution Game. In this setting, funds flow from downstream to upstream (i.e.
from i to i+1), that is opposite to material. From Figure 6.3 the two distinct
decision tasks that each echelon manager i faces in each time period t are also
missing:
Figure 6.3: An overview of the Contract Beer Distribution Game setting
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a) the price desired to be charged to the downstream customer i-1
[ݓ ௜ܲ(ݐ)] and
b) the order quantity placed with the upstream supplier i+1 [݋ܳ ௜(ݐ)].
Last but not least, Figure 6.3 omits to further highlight that material flows
are simultaneously accompanied by information exchanges, given that all
shipments are received with their corresponding order slips attached. The last
point that should be raised about Figure 6.3 is that for simplicity it adapts the
convention that N=3, according to Steckel et al.’s (2004) 3-player
implementation that is followed in this game ‘s set-up. But the logic can be easily
extended to the general case that N>3. As already specified in Sub-section 6.2.1,
the customer demand D(t) in each time period t, namely the random variable x, is
assumed to follow the truncated at zero normal distribution with μ=5 and σ = 2.
In order, thus, to address the aforementioned omissions of Figure 6.3,
Figure 6.4 more fully explores the complicated game dynamics that each echelon
manager i faces in each time period t. In this figure, physical cases of beer are not
displayed to keep the graphic as simple as possible. Furthermore, lined arrows
(with lining of the form: ) represent material flows; single spaced arrows (with
lining of the form: ) reflect information exchanges; dotted arrows (with lining
of the form: ) indicate decisions; large arrows () signify financial transactions.
The notation that is used for every site i=1,...,N is as follows:
ݔ customer demand, a random variable
(݂ݔ) probability density function of x
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ܨ(ݔ) cumulative distribution function of x
݌ selling price per unit
ܿ manufacturing cost per unit
௜ܾ lost sales (goodwill) penalty cost per unit
ℎ௜ inventory holding cost per unit and time period
ܱܳ௜(ݐ) order quantity of site i in time period t
ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ) price charged by site i in time period t (per unit)
௜ܵ(ݐ) shipment sent from site i to site site i-1 in time period t (i.e. site i-1
will receive this shipment in period t+ܮ௜ି ଵ)
ܹ ௜ܵ(ݐ) price associated with shipment sent from site i to site site i-1 in
time period t (i.e. site i-1 will receive this shipment in period
t+ܮ௜ି ଵ)
ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) net inventory position of site i in time period t (a site’s net
inventory position is given by its on-hand inventory position minus
the backlogged orders from the downstream customer, or
backlogged customer demand for the case of the retailer)
ܣܥ௜(ݐ) acquisition cost that site i needs to pay to upstream supplier i+1
(the manufacturer i=3 needs to incur the manufacturing cost
accordingly)
ܴ௜(ݐ) revenues earned by site i in time period t
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ܫܥ (݅ݐ) inventory holding and backlog cost incurred by site i in time period
t
௜ܲ(ݐ) net profit of site i in time period t
ܮ௜ production/transportation lead-time from site i+1 to site i
௜݈ information lead-time from site i to site i+1
ܯ௜ total lead-time Mi=li + Li
ℒ௜ downstream information lead-time = ∑ ௝݈௜ି ଵ௝ୀଵ with ℒଵ = 0
௜ܼ
∗ optimal inventory target level of site i under centralised operation
ݖ௜
∗ optimal inventory target level of site i under de-centralised
operation
It is evident from Figure 6.4 that once cases of beer are transported, they
are accompanied by their associated order slips, which in turn signify information
exchange. The direction of arrows suggests the exact way by which the
movement or exchange or transaction takes place: for example, the arrow
indicating i’s revenues ܴ௜(ݐ) points into i’s own site to signify that these are
funds that enter into i’s site; while the arrow indicating i’s acquisition cost ܣܥ௜(ݐ)
points out of i’s own site to indicate that these are funds that leave i’s site. The
numbers in circles denote the specific sequence by which any
transportation/exchange/transaction occurs.
In accordance to the sequence that is shown in Figure 6.4, the significant
events that unfold for each echelon manager i in each time period t are the
following. At this point the reader is reminded that the following numbered list
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presents the significant events for each echelon manager i and not the steps that i
needs to undertake.
1. Shipments arrive from the upstream supplier i+1. The relevant financial
transactions take place.
The first significant event for echelon manager i is to receive the incoming
shipment from the upstream supplier, which is a material transaction. This
shipment is accompanied by its attached order slip that denotes its size ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ−
ܮ௜) and the corresponding price ݓܹ ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜) (1 ≤ ݅< ܰ), which is an
information transaction. Because of this shipment, echelon manager i needs to
pay the upstream supplier the corresponding acquisition cost ܵܥ௜(ݐ). For this
reason, echelon managers 1 < ݅≤ ܰ also receive payments from their
downstream customers i-1 ܴ −݅1(ݐ), respectively. The retailer (i=1) receives
payment, when customer demand is satisfied. Payments and revenues constitute
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Figure 6.4: The detailed dynamics of the Contract Beer Distribution Game (shown for one
echelon)
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the financial transactions that occur at the same time with the first significant
event of each time period t.
Since echelon manager i receives the incoming shipment of size ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ−
ܮ௜) and corresponding price ܹ ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜) (1 < ݅≤ ܰ) i needs to pay the
acquisition cost that is given by relation (6.1a). Since the unitary manufacturing
cost is fixed, the manufacturer’s corresponding production cost is given by
relation (6.1b).
Echelon Managers’ Acquisition costs in time period t
ܣܥ௜(ݐ) = ܹ ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜) ∙ ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜) for 1 ≤ ݅< ܰ (6.1a)
ܣܥே(ݐ) = ܿ∙ ܱܳே (ݐ− ܯே ) (6.1b)
The revenues that echelon manager i (1 < ݅≤ ܰ) receives originate from
the shipment that the downstream customer i-1 just received. Therefore, these
revenues are exactly equal to the downstream customer’s respective acquisition
costs at the same time, according to relation (6.2a):
Echelon Managers’ Revenues in time period t
ܴ௜(ݐ) = ܣܥ௜ି ଵ(ݐ) = ܹ ௜ܵ(ݐ− ܮ௜ି ଵ) ∙ ௜ܵ(ݐ− ܮ௜ି ଵ) for 1 < ݅≤ ܰ (6.2a)
The revenues that are received by the retailer (i=1) are calculated by
equation (6.2b). The retailers’ revenues depend on customer demand and since
customer demand arises as a subsequent significant event for retailers, equation
(6.2b) is presented later on, when customer demand actually appears at the
retailer’s site.
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A point worthy of further attention is that in equations (6.1a) and (6.2a) no
distinction is made as to whether a price that is assigned to a shipment originates
from a newly received order or a backorder. It is, therefore, assumed for clarity of
notation and simplicity of illustration that the shipment has in its entirety exactly
the same price assigned to it, that is ܹ ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜), although this is not
necessarily the case. Namely, in case i fills previously backlogged orders (i.e.
ܰܫ ௜(ݐ− 1)  < 0) prices might differ across orders that are backlogged from
different periods. But this simplification does not alter calculations of profits,
because all backlogged orders are satisfied in a strict First-Come First-Served
(i.e. FCFS) discipline, which does not affect participants’ choices in any way.
This is further explained in Section 6.4, where the standard normative models that
correspond to the Contract Beer Distribution Game’s centralised operation and
de-centralised operation are provided.
2. Backlog is filled.
If there is any backlog (i.e. ܰܫ ௜(ݐ− 1)  < 0), as much as the currently available
inventory permits of this is filled. The backorder is lifted (i.e. information
transaction), the appropriate quantity is shipped to the downstream customer (i.e.
material transaction) with its associated order slip attached to it (i.e. information
transaction).
3. New orders arrive from downstream customers.
The retailer (i=1) lifts the top demand card, while echelon manager i (1 < ݅≤ ܰ)
lifts the incoming order card (i.e. information transaction). The result of this
information transaction is that the retailer (i=1) receives customer demand ܦ(ݐ)
and echelon manager i (i>1) receives orders of quantity ܱܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) and
agreed price ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) from the respective downstream customer i-1.
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4. Newly received orders are satisfied.
Each echelon manager i satisfies as much of the ordered quantity as the currently
available inventory permits. The appropriate quantity is shipped to the
downstream customer i-1 (i.e. material transaction) with its associated order slip
attached to it (i.e. information transaction). This is also the time that the retailer
(i=1) receives revenues from the customer demand that he/she just satisified. So,
there also is a financial transaction for retailers. For reasons of simplicity this
financial transaction is not reflected in Figure 6.4.
But the exact revenues that are earned by the retailer (i=1) at this time
period can be calculated by relation (6.2b):
Retailers’ Revenues in time period t
ܴଵ(ݐ) = ݌ ∙ ଵܵ(ݐ) (6.2b)
After both the significant events 2 and 4 have taken place, a total quantity
of ௜ܵ(ݐ) has been shipped by each echelon manager i to the respective
downstream customer i-1.This shipment entails both backlogged orders, if any,
and newly received orders, depending on the inventory that is available. Equation
(6.3a) presents the total quantity that is shipped by echelon managers 1 < ݅≤
ܰat time period t, while Equation (6.3b) presents the total quantity that is shipped
by the retailer (i=1) at time period t:
Echelon Managers’ Shipment Quantity in time period t
௜ܵ(ݐ) = ݉ ݅݊ ൛ܱ ܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈) ,݉ ܽݔ{ܰܫ ௜(ݐ− 1) + ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜) ,0}ൟfor i=2, ...,N. (6.3a)
ଵܵ(ݐ) = ݉ ݅݊ ൛ܦ(ݐ),݉ ܽݔ{ܰܫ ଵ(ݐ− 1) + ଶܵ(ݐ− ܮଵ) ,0}ൟ (6.3b)
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In equations (6.3a) and (6.3b) ܰܫ ௜(ݐ− 1) represents the net inventory position
of echelon i in time period t-1.
5. Prices are charged to downstream customers.
The fifth significant event happening in time period t to each echelon manager i
(i>1) is the first decision task. Each echelon manager i (i=2,3,...,N) sets a unit
price ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ) to his/her respective downstream customer i-1.
6. Orders are placed with upstream suppliers.
The sixth significant event happening in time period t to each echelon manager i
is the second decision task, that is, determine the order quantity ܱܳ௜(t).
In greater detail, each echelon manager i (i>1) receives from his/her
respective upstream supplier i+1 a semi-completed order slip with a price
ܹ ௜ܲାଵ(ݐ), completes it with his/her chosen order quantity ܱܳ௜(t) and places it
with the upstream supplier i+1. The manufacturer (i = 3) places a production
request of quantity ܱܳܰ(t).
It is evident from the above significant events that occur in any time period
t that any site’s inventory increases by the shipments it receives from its upstream
supplier and decreases by the incoming orders it receives from its downstream
customer (according to relations (6.3a) and (6.3b)). Therefore, the following
inventory balance equations can be easily deduced:
Echelon Managers’ Net Inventory Positions in time period t
ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) = ܰܫ ௜(ݐ− 1) + ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜) − ܱܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈) for 1 < ݅≤ ܰ (6.4a)
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ܰܫ ଵ(ݐ) = ܰܫ ଵ(ݐ− 1) + ଶܵ(ݐ− ܮଵ) − ܦ(ݐ) (6.4b)
Following this, all holding and backorder costs are also assessed at the end
of the period. Hence, every echelon manager i has to incur a total inventory and
backlog cost of ܫܥ௜(ݐ), that is based on his/her inventory level at the end of the
period, according to relation (6.5):
Echelon Managers’ Inventory Holding and Backlog Costs in time period t
ܫܥ௜(ݐ) = ℎ௜∙ [ܰܫ ௜(ݐ)]ା + ௜ܾ∙ [ܰܫ ௜(ݐ)]ି (6.5)
where [ݔ]ା ≝ ݉ ܽݔ{ݔ, 0} and [ݔ]ି ≝ ݉ ܽݔ{−ݔ, 0}.
As already mentioned, each echelon manager’s (i) net profits are calculated
from the difference between revenues [ܴ (݅ݐ)] and total costs, where total costs
consist of inventory holding and backlog costs [ܫܥ (݅ݐ)] and, in addition,
production or acquisition costs [ ܵܥ (݅ݐ)]. Equation (6.6) calculates the net profits
of any echelon manager i.
Echelon Managers’ Net Profits in time period t
௜ܲ(ݐ) = ܴ௜(ݐ) − ܣܥ௜(ݐ) -ܫܥ௜(ݐ) (6.6)
The section that follows discusses the price and order decisions that
perfectly rational participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game would
make, if exclusively interested in maximising either the aggregate supply chain
profit (i.e. under centralised operation) or their individual profit (i.e. under de-
centralised operation). These standard normative models also present the first-
best case maximum profit and aggregate supply chain profit that would be
attained in each case, respectively.
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6.4 Standard Normative Models
This section develops standard normative models that correspond to the Contract
Beer Distribution Game. These standard normative models serve to predict the
perfectly rational price and order quantity decisions that participants in the
Contract Beer Distribution Game would make, under both scenarios of
centralised and de-centralised operation. These standard normative models are
built under the assumption of echelon managers, who are characterised by: i. an
exclusive interest in maximising the overall supply chain profit, under centralised
operation and their individual aggregate profit, under de-centralised operation, ii.
perfect rationality with no effect of individual, behavioural biases and iii. no
account of environmental changes that may occur. In this way, the overall supply
chain profits that would be attained in each of these distinct cases are assessed. A
judgement as to whether the bullwhip effect arises is also made.
Sub-section 6.4.1 concentrates on the hypothetical scenario of centralised
operation, while Sub-section 6.4.2 turns attention to the scenario of de-
centralised operation. Sub-section 6.4.3 compares the overall performance of
these two distinct cases.
6.4.1 The centralised operation
In this sub-section the team optimal solution of the Contract Beer Distribution
Game that would be obtained from a system of N distinct echelons arranged in
series is identified. These team optimizing decision rules consist of the prices and
order quantities that perfectly rational echelon managers would make, if they
were exclusively interested in maximising the team overall profit. The team
overall profit is defined as the sum of the net profits that are realised by all
interacting supply chain partners i=1,...,N over the time interval T under study.
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According to this definition, the first-best case maximum profit can serve as the
absolute upper bound of the Contract Beer Distribution Game’s overall profit.
This definition of the first-best case maximum profit of the Contract Beer
Distribution Game suggests three important underlying pre-suppositions: i). all
echelon managers share the common goal to maximise total supply chain profits
through period T and act to this end, ii). all echelon managers make perfectly
rational decisions, so that there is no discrepancy between their intentions and
their decisions and iii). all echelon managers, since they are perfectly rational
optimizers, do not need to resort to feedback information and previous
experiences to learn and, thus, improve their decisions; for this reason, they do
not take into account any environmental changes that may occur.
Since any echelon manager’s total net profit in time period t is given by
equation (6.6), the overall supply chain net profit in period t, ܲܥ(ݐ), would be
calculated by relation (6.7).
Total Supply Chain Net Profit in time period t
஼ܲ(ݐ) = ෍ ௜ܲ(ݐ)ே
௜ୀଵ
= ෍ [ܴ௜(ݐ) − ܣܥ௜(ݐ) − ܫܥ௜(ݐ)]ே
௜ୀଵ
(6.7)
Hence, the total supply chain profits through to period T become:
Total Supply Chain Net Profit through to period T
෍ ஼ܲ(ݐ)்
௧ୀଵ
= ෍ ෍ [ ௜ܲ(ݐ)]ே
௜ୀଵ
்
௧ୀଵ
(6.8)
Since customer demand is stationary and independently distributed across
periods, given (6.8), the stochastic game reduces to a sequence of similar single
period games, under the assumption of a stationary inventory policy. For this
reason, it suffices to maximise overall supply chain profits in period t, ஼ܲ(ݐ), in
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order to maximise total profits through to period T, ∑ ஼ܲ(ݐ)்௧ୀଵ . This is why
attention is now turned to the prices ܹ ܲ (݅ݐ) and order quantities ݋ܳ (݅ݐ) that
echelon managers i should place to maximise ஼ܲ(ݐ), as given by relation (6.7),
namely attain ைܲ∗(ݐ) = max { ஼ܲ(ݐ)}.
This team optimal solution is mostly relevant to two previous analytical
papers that concern information de-centralised operation multi-echelon supply
chains: Lee and Whang (1999) and Chen (1999). As already mentioned in Sub-
section 2.2.1, Lee and Whang (1999) are concerned with developing a transfer
payment scheme that fairly allocates overall system costs to distinct echelon
managers, but takes their optimum ordering policies for granted; Chen (1999)
identifies the echelon managers’ ordering policies that minimise overall inventory
and backlog costs. The team optimal solution sought in this sub-section extends
these previous standard normative models in that it also includes the prices that
perfectly rational echelon managers would charge to their respective customers.
While Chen (1999) is evidently more closely connected with the aims here,
Chen differs from the team optimal solution of the Contract Beer Distribution
Game in a number of aspects:
i. Unlike Chen (1999), it is assumed here that the ultimate objective of
distinct echelon managers is to maximise total supply chain profits and
not minimise total inventory and backlog costs;
ii. Dissimilarly to Chen, quantities in transit from one site to another as well
as backlogged demands do not incur any inventory holding costs;
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iii. All sites (that is not only the retailer, like in Chen) incur a linear backlog
penalty ௜ܾ for all non-immediately satisfied demands that they receive
from their respective downstream customers;
iv. In contrast to Chen, no echelon incremental holding cost rates apply. The
reason is that the Contract Beer Distribution Game supply chain mainly
serves the distribution of cases of beer and, hence, there are no value
adding activities.
These differences originate from the attempt to keep the model formulation as
consistent as possible with Sterman’s (1989, 1992) original Beer Distribution
Game’s set-up.
In Appendix B.4 it is demonstrated that these differences are exclusively
responsible for the different formulation of objectives between the Contract Beer
Distribution Game’s team optimal model and Chen’s team model. Appendix B.4
provides the formal proof that these differences areinsufficient to alter the firms’
optimal decision rules. The basis of this formal proof consists of equation (6.9)
that presents the Contract Beer Distribution Game’s overall supply chain profit.
The underlying reasoning is that all echelon managers’ distinct net profits, as
provided by relations of type (6.6), and the supply chain’s aggregate net profit, as
calculated by relation (6.7), demonstrate that the revenues and acquisition costs
of all intermediate echelons (1 < ݅< ܰ), namely of all firms but the retailer and
the manufacturer, cancel each other out. As can be seen from equation (6.9), the
result is that the prices ݓ iܲ(ݐ) that echelon managers i charge to their
downstream customers i-1 do not have any influence on overall supply chain
profits ܲܥ(ݐ).
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Total Supply Chain Net Profit in time period t
஼ܲ(ݐ) = ܴଵ(ݐ) − ܣܥே(ݐ) − ෍ ܫܥ௜(ݐ)ே
௜ୀଵ
(6.9)
where ܴଵ(ݐ) is given by (6.2b), ܵܥே(ݐ) by (6.1b) and ܫܥ௜(ݐ) by (6.5).
The proof that is presented in Appendix B.4 explains why if each echelon
manager i = 1,...,N, behaved as a perfectly rational team and was interested in
maximising the team overall profit, then he/she would order to keep his/her
installation stock9 at the constant level ܼ݅∗, i=1,…,N, where ௜ܼ∗ = ௜ܻ, which is the
finite maximum point of the function ܩ௜ (ݕ), defined following Chen’s
recommendation in relation (B.4.8). Hence, the precise decision rule that each
echelon manager i needs to follow to attain this maximum total profit is easy to
implement: As soon as local installation stock reaches the optimal target level ௜ܼ∗,
he/she needs to place an order of size equal to the last received order, namely
follow the decision rules that are given by relations (6.10a) and (6.10b),
respectively:
Echelon managers’ Decision Rules that maximise the Team Overall Profit
(6.10a)
ܱܳ௜(ݐ) = ܱܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) for 1 < ݅≤ ܰ (6.10b)
In the case that all echelon managers i=1,...,N behaved as a perfectly rational
team and, thus, followed these optimum order-up-to level policies ( ଵܼ∗, … , ேܼ∗ ),
9The term “installation stock” refers to the local inventory position of an installation (or
site) of a multi-echelon inventory system [Source: Chen, F. 1998. Echelon re-order
points, installation re-order points and the value of centralized demand information,
Management Science 44(12), part 2/2, S221-S234.
ܱܳ1(ݐ) = ܦ(ݐ− 1)
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then the first-best case maximum profit ைܲ∗(ݐ)10, as given by (6.9), would be
attained. The first-best case maximum profit ைܲ∗(ݐ), constitutes the absolute upper
bound of the Contract Beer Distribution Game supply chain’s total profit. It only
remains to explore exactly how much the first-best case maximum profit ைܲ∗(ݐ)
amounts to. This question is answered in Sub-section 6.4.3 that concerns overall
supply chain performances.
6.4.2 The de-centralised operation
In this sub-section the decision rules for prices and order quantities that would be
adopted by N distinct echelon managers under a de-centralised operation are
explored. This is the case that the wholesale price contract constituted the basis
of all interactions and, in addition, the case where all echelon managers were
exclusively interested in maximising their own individual total net profit. Based
on this, it is evident the standard normative model that is developed in this sub-
section builds on three important simplifying assumptions: i). all echelon
managers aim at maximising their respective net profits through to period T and
act to this end, ii). all echelon managers make perfectly rational decisions, so
there is no discrepancy between decision makers’ intentions and decisions and
iii). all echelon managers, since they are perfect optimizers, do not need to resort
to feedback information and previous experiences to learn. Therefore, they do not
take into account any environmental changes that may occur.
In this regard, under de-centralised operation each distinct echelon
manager needs to determine the respective price ݓܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ) and order quantity
10The reader is at this point reminded that the subscript o is used to denote overall
optimality.
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݋ܱ ܳ௜(ݐ) that would maximise his/her corresponding total net profit ∑ ௜ܲ(ݐ)்௧ୀଵ ,
where a period’s net profit ௜ܲ(ݐ) is given by relation (6.6). As already explained
in Sub-section 6.4.1, since customer demand is stationary and independently
distributed across periods the stochastic game reduces to a sequence of similar
single period games, under the assumption of a stationary inventory policy.
Hence, it suffices for each echelon manager i to maximise his/her respective net
profit in period t, ௜ܲ(ݐ), in order to maximise his/her total profits through to
period T ∑ ௜ܲ(ݐ)்௧ୀଵ . This is why attention is now turned to the prices ܹ ܲ (݅ݐ)
and order quantities ܱܳ (݅ݐ) that each echelon manager i should place to
maximise ௜ܲ(ݐ), as given by relation (6.6).
It is obvious from (6.6) that the net profit that is realised by each echelon
manager i depends on the shipment that he/she received from the corresponding
upstream supplier i+1 in time period t (i.e. via ܣܥ௜(ݐ)). But this shipment that is
received from the supplier i+1 is in turn determined by the supplier’s inventory
availability (i.e. ܰܫ ௜ାଵ(ݐ− ௜݈)), according to relations of type (6.3). Inventory
balance equations of type (6.4) demonstrate that the supplier’s (i+1) inventory
availability is in part determined by the supplier’s (i+1) own order quantity
decision and in part by the inventory availability of the supplier’s supplier (i+2)
and so on. In any case, the status of the upstream supplier (i+1) is completely out
of i’s own control. Because of this uncertainty that is inherent with (6.6),
intending to maximise (6.6) is not considered a feasible objective for any echelon
manager i. In order to overcome this problem, we have followed the example of
existing management and accounting literature (e.g. Horngren and Foster, 1991;
Chen, 1999) and, thus, assumed that i's objective is to maximise his/her
respective expected net profit, from which all supply uncertainty is eliminated.
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Appendix B.5 presents the formal proof about the price and order quantity
decisions that perfectly rational echelon managers would make in the Contract
Beer Distribution Game. It is there demonstrated why under conditions of
assumed perfect rationality, the retailer i=1 would make order quantity decisions
ܱܳଵ(ݐ)that would satisfy the condition (6.11), while all other echelon managers i
>1 would make price ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ) decisions and order quantity ܱܳ௜(ݐ) decisions that
would satisfy the conditions (6.12) and (6.13). In other words, all echelon
managers’ i=1,...,N order quantity decisions would be such that would maintain
their corresponding optimal target levels ݖ௜∗. Namely, as soon as their respective
inventory availabilities reach the corresponding optimal target levels ݖ௜∗ that are
defined by (6.11) and (6.13), they would follow the optimal decision rules (6.10a)
and (6.10b), respectively.
Retailers’ Optimal Inventory Target Level under De-centralised Operation
݌ ∙ ܨ(ݖଵ∗) + (ℎଵ + ଵܾ) ∙ ܨெభାଵ(ݖଵ∗) = ଵܾ + ݌ (6.11)
In relation (6.11) ܨ reflects the cumulative distribution function of customer
demand and ܨெ భ represents the cumulative distribution function of the customer
demand that has occurred over the last M1 periods.
Conditions for Echelon Managers’ Optimal Price and Quantity Decisions under De-
centralised Operation
∫ ݑ ௜݂(ݑ)݀ݑ௭೔଴ +∫ ݖ௜݂ ௜(ݑ)݀ݑஶ௭೔ = 0 for 1 < ݅≤ ܰ (6.12)
ݓ௜∙ ܨ௜(ݏ௜∗) + (ℎ௜+ ௜ܾ) ∙ ܨ௜ெ ೔(ݏ௜∗) = ௜ܾ+ ݓ௜ for 1 < ݅≤ ܰ (6.13)
In relations (6.12) and (6.13) ܨ௜ reflects the cumulative distribution function of
the demand that echelon manager i faces (incoming from i-1) and ܨ௜
ெ ೔ the
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cumulative distribution function of the demand that echelon manager i faces over
the last Mi periods.
From relations (6.11), (6.12) and (6.13) it is evident that the common
underlying assumption is that the distinct echelon managers are perfectly
knowledgeable of the distribution that their corresponding demand follows. The
result is that the demand that each echelon manager faces follows exactly the
same customer demand distribution. So, it becomes a time-shifted truncated at
zero normal distribution with μ=5 and σ = 2.
As the strategy profile of all order-up-to level policies (ݖ1∗ , … , ܰݖ∗ ) is the
result of all echelon managers’ perfect rationality, it prevails as an iterated
dominance equilibrium11 (e.g. Rasmusen, 1989; Camerer, 2003). Now it only
remains to explore exactly to how much the aggregate channel profit would
amount, in case all echelon managers were perfectly rational and, thus, followed
the above decision rules (6.10a) and (6.10b). This question is answered in Sub-
section 6.4.3 that concerns overall supply chain performances.
At this point the reader should be reminded that in Sub-section 6.4.1 is
shown that the perfectly rational echelon managers under centralised operation
follow again the same order-up-to-level policies ( 1ܼ∗ , … ,ܼܰ∗ ), but with different
optimal target levels (i.e. ܼ݅∗ and not with ݅ݖ∗). As soon as these levels are
11 The term “iterated dominance equilibrium” refers to the “strategy profile” (i.e. the
specification of strategies or actions that each player of the game employs), in which
every strategy or action employed constitutes the best response to every other strategy or
action played. A strategy or action is assessed in regard to the corresponding payoff that it
generates [source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solution_concept last accessed:
31/08/2010].
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reached, in order to attain the first-best case maximum profit, the perfectly
rational echelon managers follow the same optimal decision rules that are given
by (6.10a) and (6.10b), respectively. In this regard, it appears very interesting that
the assumed perfectly rational echelon managers would follow the same policies
and the same optimal decision rules for their order quantity decisions,
irrespectively of whether they aim at maximising the team overall profit (i.e.
under centralised operation) or their own individual profit (i.e. under de-
centralised operation). For this reason, it also becomes very interesting to
identify the discrepancy between the first-best case maximum profit ଴ܲ∗and the
aggregate channel profit ෠ܲ஼, under de-centralised operation, that is if any. This is
usually quantified via the ‘competition penalty’ (Cachon and Zipkin, 1999;
Cachon, 2003), which is defined according to relation (6.14). Relation (6.14)
adapts the definition of the competition penalty that is provided in (2.17), in
respect to net profits instead of total costs:
Competition Penalty
ܥܲ = ଴ܲ∗෢ − ෠ܲ஼
଴ܲ
∗෢
(6.14)
The closer to 0 a competition penalty is the better the overall performance
of the multi-echelon inventory system under study and, also, the closer the
aggregate channel net profit Pc to the first-best case maximum profit P*o . The
relevant discussion is provided in Section 6.4.3.
6.4.3 Supply Chain Performance
The objective of this sub-section is to assess the overall supply chain
performance in the cases of centralised operation and de-centralised operation.
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To this end, it first calculates the expected value of the aggregate channel profit
that would have been realised, if all echelon managers were perfectly rational and
intended to maximise the team overall profit (i.e. centralised operation), while it
subsequently establishes the deviation that would occur, if any, in case the
distinct echelon managers intended to maximise their respective individual
profits. In both of these settings the degree to which the bullwhip effect prevails is
also explored.
The case of centralised operation is first considered. Under this
hypothetical scenario, all distinct echelon managers implement order-up-to level
policies ( ଵܼ∗, … , ேܼ∗ ). In this regard, as soon as they have reached their respective
optimal target levels ௜ܼ∗, they place orders of sizes that are exactly equal to their
incoming order quantities. In this way, they can together attain the first-best case
maximum profit ைܲ∗෢ of the Contract Beer Distribution Game supply chain. As
already discussed in Sub-section 6.4.1, the prices ݓ ୧ܲ(ݐ) that they would decide
to charge to their respective downstream customers would not have any impact
on the supply chain’s expected profit ைܲ∗(ݐ). Since ைܲ∗෢ = ݉ ܽݔ{ ஼ܲ෢ }, the first-best
case maximum profit ைܲ∗෢ of the Contract Beer Distribution Game is calculated
from the expected value of relation (6.9) that the perfectly rational team
optimizing decision rules (6.10a) and (6.10b) would generate. The reason is that
the steady state expected net profit of the Contract Beer Distribution Game
supply chain is under study here, so all perfectly rational decision makers are
assumed to have already reached their respective optimal target levels ௜ܼ∗.
In order, thus, to calculate the steady state expected value of (6.9), the
expected value of the retailer’s revenues ܴଵ෢ = ܧ{ܴଵ} needs to be first calculated.
In this regard, since there is over the long run in the retailer’s warehouse
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sufficient inventory to fully satisfy customer demand, the retailer’s steady state
expected net profit is given by (6.15):
Retailer’s Steady State Expected Net Profit
ܴଵ෢ = ݌ ∙ ܧ{ݔ} = ݌ ∙ ߤ (6.15)
The expected value of the production cost that the manufacturer has to
incur can be calculated by (6.1b): ܵܥே෢ = ܿ∙ ܱܳே (ݐ− ܯே ). By recursive
application of the decision rules (6.10a) and (6.10b) the expected value of the
manufacturer’s production cost easily gets transformed to:
Manufacturer’s Expected Production Cost
ܵܥே෢ = ܿ∙ ܦ(ݐ− ܯே − ே݈ିଵ − ⋯ − ଵ݈ − 1) (6.16)
As for the expected value of the inventory holding and backlog cost that
each echelon manager i has to incur, it is estimated via (6.5), taking into account
that each echelon manager i adopts the decision rules that are given by (6.10a)
and (6.10b):
Echelon Managers’ Expected Inventory Holding and Backlog Costs
ܫܥ෢ ௜= ℎ௜∙ [ ௜ܼ∗ − ܦ(ݐ− ଵ݈ − ଶ݈ − ⋯ − ௜݈ି ଵ)]ା + ௜ܾ
∙ [ ௜ܼ∗ − ܦ(ݐ− ଵ݈ − ଶ݈ − ⋯ − ௜݈ି ଵ)]ି (6.17)
By combining (6.15), (6.16) and (6.17) according to (6.9) the expected
value of the total net profit of the Contract Beer Distribution Game supply chain,
or else the first-best case maximum profit ܱܲ∗෢ becomes:
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Expected Total Supply Chain Net Profit
(6.18)
Since all echelon managers of the Contract Beer Distribution Game would
follow the decision rules of type (6.10a) and (6.10b) under this hypothetical
scenario of centralised operation, they would simply order as much as they are
themselves requested to deliver to their respective customers. So, the variance of
all orders across different roles would remain exactly the same (i.e. ܸ ܽݎ[ܦ(ݐ)] =
ߪଶ) and, so, there would be no bullwhip effect.
Attention is now turned to the case of de-centralised operation. Under this
hypothetical scenario, all distinct echelon managers would implement order-up-
to level policies (ݖଵ∗, … ,ݖே∗ ) in order to maximise the expected value of their
respective individual net profits ෠ܲ௜. In this regard, as soon as they have reached
their respective optimal target levels ݖ௜∗, they place orders of sizes that are exactly
equal to their incoming order quantities. Since the expected value of their net
profits is of interest here, it can be safely assumed that their respective optimal
target levels ݖ௜∗ have been reached and, therefore, their order quantity decisions
would be determined by the decision rules of type (6.10a) and (6.10b). But the
decision rules of type (6.10) are exactly the same as the decision rules that would
dictate the perfectly rational decisions under centralised operation. In this regard,
the aggregate channel profit ෠ܲ஼ that would arise in the case of de-centralised
operation is given by relation (6.9) and is exactly equal to the first-best case
maximum profit ைܲ∗෢ of the Contract Beer Distribution Game, or else ଴ܲ∗෢ =
෠ܲ
஼. Therefore, according to relation (6.14) the competition penalty of the de-
centralised operation would become equal to 0, which denotes a perfect
0ܲ∗ = ݌ ∙ߤ− ܿ∙ܦ(ݐ− ܯ ܰ − ݈ܰ −1 − ⋯ − 1݈ − 1) − ∑ ℎ݅ ∙ܰ=݅1 [ ܼ݅∗ − ܦ(ݐ− 1݈ − 2݈ − ⋯
݈݅−1]+ + ܾ݅ ∙ [ ܼ݅∗ − ܦ(ݐ− 1݈ − 2݈ − ⋯ − ݈݅−1]−
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coordination of the Contract Beer Distribution Game supply chain. As already
discussed, the decision rules of type (6.10a) and (6.10b) that the perfectly rational
decision makers would follow also ensure that the bullwhip effect does not occur.
6.5 Summary
This chapter designs a new version of the Beer Distribution Game, named the
Contract Beer Distribution Game, where the wholesale price contract constitutes
the basis of any interaction that takes place between adjacent supply chain
partners. In order, thus, to accommodate the extra decision task that participants
are asked to perform (i.e. charge prices to their respective downstream customers)
and the associated complications that this causes, the board, the rules and the
mechanics of the traditional Beer Distribution Game are appropriately modified.
This chapter serves to introduce this new game.
Building on this game, the chapter additionally develops the corresponding
standard normative models that predict the perfectly rational price and order
quantity decisions that participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game
would make, under both scenarios of centralised and de-centralised operation.
These standard normative models are built under the assumption of echelon
managers, who are characterised by: i. an exclusive interest in maximising the
overall supply chain profit, under centralised operation (i.e. team optimal
solution) and their individual aggregate profit, under de-centralised operation, ii.
perfect rationality with no effect of individual, behavioural biases and iii. no
account of environmental changes and, thus, no effect of learning.
The chapter follows a rigorous formal procedure to prove that although the
exact optimal inventory targets under the two hypothetical scenarios of
centralised operation (i.e. ௜ܼ∗) and de-centralised operation (i.e ݖ௜∗) substantially
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differ, the inventory policies remain exactly the same. Namely, in order to
maximise the team overall profit or the individual profit, all distinct echelon
managers need to follow the same order-up-to level policies, yet of different
order-up-to levels. Following this, once they have reached their respective
optimal inventory targets, they apply exactly the same order quantity decision
rules. The result is that in steady state they attain exactly the same aggregate
supply chain profit, namely the first-best case maximum profit ைܲ∗෢ of the Contract
Beer Distribution Game supply chain, or else ଴ܲ∗෢ = ෠ܲ஼. In addition, after having
reached their respective optimal target levels ௜ܼ∗or ݖ௜∗, all echelon managers,
under both modes of centralised and de-centralised operation would order as
much as they have been requested to deliver to their respective customers.
Therefore, the size and variance of orders would stay exactly the same across the
whole Contract Beer Distribution Game supply chain (i.e. equal to ߪଶ). Thus,
there would be no bullwhip effect.
In summary, by introducing the Contract Beer Distribution Game and
developing the corresponding standard normative models, Chapter 6 starts to
address the literature gaps G.5 and G.6 that are identified in Table 2.5 (s. Sub-
section 2.4). In greater detail, this chapter demonstrates that the wholesale price
contract, when applied to the Beer Distribution Game setting, offers remarkably
improved performances in comparison to when applied to the simpler
Newsvendor Problem setting. In stark contrast to the analytical results that are
known about the wholesale price contract, as applied in the Newsvendor Problem
setting (s. Section 2.1.1), the wholesale price contract can perfectly coordinate
the Beer Distribution Game. It establishes that an intention to maximise the team
overall profit or the individual profit does not cause any divergences of either the
inventory policies, or the decision rules, or the aggregate channel profit that can
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be attained. This can explain why there is an absolute coincidence of the
aggregate channel profit that would be attained in the cases of centralised
operation and de-centralised operation. Moreover, it demonstrates that the
wholesale price contract is able to eliminate the bullwhip effect, provided that all
interacting echelon managers make perfectly rational decisions and possess
perfect symmetric information.
Nevertheless, it still remains to further explore what would happen in the
case where there was at least one decision maker whose decisions were not
dictated by perfect rationality, as is highly likely. (For a detailed survey of the
behavioural biases that are already recognised to prevent human decision makers
from perfectly rational decisions in the Beer Distribution Game setting the reader
is referred to Sub-section 2.2.2). In this case, the standard normative models that
are presented in this chapter cannot predict human decisions. The result is that
discrepancies might arise between the first-best case maximum profit ܲ0∗෢ that
would be attained under centralised operation and the aggregate channel profit
෠ܲ
஼ that the separate decisions of distinct echelon managers would generate. For
this reason, a competition penalty equal to zero might not be practically feasible
and, therefore, the wholesale price contract might in practice be unable to
perfectly coordinate the Beer Distribution Game supply chain. Since human
decision makers might, in addition, make significantly different decisions than
their perfectly rationally optimizing counterparts, it is likely that the bullwhip
effect might occur.
In this regard, Chapters 7 and 8 concentrate on investigating the true
decisions that human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game make
and how different they are, if any, to the decisions of their perfectly rational
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counterparts that are predicted by the standard normative models of Chapter 6.
Chapters 7 and 8 additionally explore the effect of these decisions on the
resulting overall supply chain performance and how this acquired overall supply
chain performance diverges from its equivalent theoretical prediction of Chapter
6. In greater detail, Chapter 7 describes the approach that is undertaken to this
end, while Chapter 8 presents and discusses the results that are obtained. In this
way, Chapter 8 builds on these results to draw managerial implications and novel
insights for the Contract Beer Distribution Game.
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Chapter 7
The Contract Beer Distribution Game Approach
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the approach that this PhD thesis has
undertaken to investigate the effect that different prolonged interactions between
dynamic, heterogeneous and autonomous decisions can have on the wholesale
price contract’s performance in the context of the Beer Distribution Game. This
chapter explains how the approach of this PhD thesis, as outlined in Chapter 3, is
applied to the Beer Distribution Game setting. By making provision for: i. human
decision makers’ distinct intentions that might differ from profit maximisation, ii.
human actions that might differ from their corresponding intentions in
heterogeneous ways (i.e. boundedly rational decisions), iii. human reactions to
changes going on in the surrounding environment and iv. human decisions that
may be independent and autonomous, this approach successfully addresses the
literature gaps G.1-G.4 of Table 2.5 (s. Section 2.4) for the Beer Distribution
Game setting.
The chapter starts by reminding the reader of the most important analytical
results about the Contract Beer Distribution Game that are obtained in Chapter 6
and the most relevant experimental results that are presented in Section 2.2.2. It
subsequently uses these extant results to build the research hypotheses that are of
interest to this study. It then discusses in some detail all steps of the approach that
have been followed to address these research hypotheses. The chapter concludes
with a brief summary.
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7.1 The Wholesale Price Contract in the Beer Distribution Game
In Sub-Section 6.4.1 is shown that in the case where all distinct echelon managers
that come into play in the Contract Beer Distribution Game setting share the
common intention to maximise the team overall profit, then they do not need to
pay any attention to the intermediate prices that they decide to charge to each
other. In order to attain the first-best case maximum profit ைܲ∗෢ , they simply need
to place with their respective upstream suppliers orders of sizes that would satisfy
order-up-to level policies; namely they would need to reach their corresponding
optimal target levels ௜ܼ∗ and thereafter order as much as they have been
themselves requested to deliver. The result of this policy is that not only would
the first-best case maximum profit ைܲ∗෢ be achieved, but there would also be no
increase in the size and variance of orders across different roles; hence, there
would be no bullwhip effect. The reason that the absence of the bullwhip effect is
considered significant is because it is a key determinant of operational
inefficiencies in the Beer Distribution Game.
Sub-section 6.4.2 formally proves that in the case where the interacting
distinct echelon managers are interested in maximising their respective individual
profits, then they need to charge prices and, also, order quantities that satisfy
certain conditions. It is very interesting that the conditions that concern order
quantity decisions force the distinct echelon managers to follow similar order-up-
to level policies. The exact optimal inventory targets ݖ௜∗ may be different from the
inventory target levels ௜ܼ∗ that they would follow if they intended to maximise the
team overall profit. Yet, once they reach their respective optimal inventory
targets ݖ௜∗ they apply exactly the same order quantity decision rules in order to
maximise their respective individual profits పܲ∗෢ . The result is that in steady state
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the aggregate supply chain profit that they would together attain is exactly equal
to the first-best case maximum profit ܱܲ∗෢ of the Contract Beer Distribution Game
supply chain, or else ܲ0∗෢ = ෡ܲܥ.
This perfect coincidence of the aggregate channel profit that the individual
profit maximising decision makers would attain ෠ܲ஼ with the first-best case
maximum profit ܲ0∗ signifies that the competition penalty would be exactly equal
to 0. In accordance with this, the wholesale price contract is demonstrated as
being in a position to perfectly coordinate the Beer Distribution Game supply
chain. Last but not least, following the order-up-to level policies that the
perfectly rational decision makers would adopt to maximise their individual
profit, there would again be no increase in the size and variance of orders and, so,
there would be no bullwhip effect. The elimination of the bullwhip effect serves as
an additional indication of the overall good performance of the wholesale price
contract in the Contract Beer Distribution Game setting.
Nevertheless, a number of previous laboratory investigations of Sterman’s
(1989; 1992) original Beer Distribution Game set-up, establish that very rarely
would human decision makers’ decisions, as observed in the laboratory, follow
the above perfectly rational decision rules (Sterman, 1989; Kaminsky and
Simchi-Levi, 1998; Croson and Donohue, 2003; Steckel et al, 2004; Croson and
Donohue, 2005; Croson and Donohue, 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006; Croson et al,
2007). The reason is that in reality a human decision maker may be: i. concerned
about a variety of different objectives, possibly other than exclusive profit
maximisation, ii. unable, for various different reasons, to act according to his/her
intentions and iii. influenced, in a variety of different ways, by occurring
environmental changes and also learning. In addition, a number of individual
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behavioural biases are held responsible for this systematic divergence of human
decisions from standard normative models’ predictions, such as for example:
anchoring and insufficient adjustment heuristic (Sterman, 1989); supply line
under-weighting (Sterman, 1989; Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 1998; Croson and
Donohue, 2003; Croson and Donohue, 2005; Croson and Donohue, 2006; Croson
et al, 2007); organizational learning (Wu and Katok, 2006); coordination risk
(Croson et al, 2007); protection against other partners’ biases (Su, 2008). These
might vary from subject to subject (i.e. heterogeneity). In this regard, the results
of these erroneous human decisions that are established are two-fold: i. a
persistent discrepancy between the resulting aggregate channel performance and
the first-best case optimum performance (Sterman, 1989; Kaminsky and Simchi-
Levi, 1998; Steckel et al, 2004) and ii. a prevalence of the bullwhip effect
(Sterman, 1989; Croson and Donohue, 2003; Croson and Donohue, 2005; Croson
and Donohue, 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007).
Since the inclusion of prices has as yet not been explored in the laboratory,
there is still no laboratory evidence about the true price decisions that participants
in the Contract Beer Distribution Game would make, in the case where the
wholesale price contract constitutes the basis of all interactions. Following this, it
still remains open to further exploration what would happen at the aggregate
channel level when human price and order quantity decisions are combined
together. In respect to this, it would be very interesting to explore whether the
wholesale price contract is in a position to perfectly coordinate the Beer
Distribution Game setting (that is, attain a competition penalty that would be
exactly equal to 0), as has been analytically predicted (s. Section 6.4).
Furthermore, it would be valuable to investigate whether the bullwhip effect
persists in the Beer Distribution Game setting or whether the inclusion of prices
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in the Contract Beer Distribution Game setting manages to completely eliminate
it, as is analytically predicted by the corresponding standard normative models (s.
Section 6.4).
The section that follows builds on the aforementioned existing results to
formulate the research hypotheses that this PhD thesis seeks to address for the
Beer Distribution Game setting.
7.2 Research Hypotheses
This study addresses four distinct sets of research hypotheses: First, there is a
research hypothesis that concerns the prices ݓ ௜ܲ that human participants in the
Contract Beer Distribution Game would decide to charge to their respective
downstream customers. Second, there is a research hypothesis that relates to the
quantity decisions ݋ܳ ௜ that human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution
Game would decide to place with their respective upstream suppliers. Third, there
is a research hypothesis that reflects the true competition penalty CP that the
overall channel would attain. This research hypothesis serves a dual purpose. On
the one hand, it directly tests how the overall competition penalty CP compares to
0, which is the corresponding theoretical prediction of the performance of the
wholesale price contract, when it is assumed to be in force in the Beer
Distribution Game setting. On the other hand, it indirectly explores, under the
same assumption, the level of profits that the overall channel can secure, that is, if
any. Last, there is a research hypothesis that tests whether the bullwhip effect
dominates, namely, whether the variance of orders between adjacent supply chain
roles strictly increases, in the case where the wholesale price contract is imposed
as the basis of all interactions. The paragraphs that follow outline and justify
these research hypotheses.
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7.2.1 Participants’ wPi - prices
There is no previous laboratory evidence on the true price decisions ݓܲതതതത݅ that
human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game would make, in the
case where the wholesale price contract constitutes the basis of all interactions.
For this reason, the relevant experimental results that exist for the Newsvendor
Problem setting are adapted in an appropriate way that can reflect expectations of
human participants’ prices.
In this regard, in line with earlier experimental results (Keser and
Paleologo, 2004; Katok and Wu, 2009; Dimitriou et al, 2009), human
manufacturers would be expected to charge prices that are not consistent with the
prices that their perfectly rational counterparts would charge. Under centralised
operation, there is no firm condition about the prices that the perfectly rational
echelon managers should follow in order to maximise the team overall profit and,
hence, attain the first-best case maximum profit ଴ܲ∗ (s. Sub-section 6.4.1). Under
de-centralised operation the prices that the perfectly rational echelon managers
should charge in order to maximise their respective individual profit ௜ܲ∗ must
satisfy conditions (6.12) and (6.13) (s. Sub-section 6.4.2). These conditions
combined ensure that the selected prices are neither too high nor too low, so that
desired sales can be attracted and, also, sufficient profit margins can be
guaranteed. Nevertheless, these conditions appear distinctively hard for human
subjects to quickly understand and, thus, implement. This is why they are found
rather unrealistic. For this reason, a simplification based on common intuition is
instead preferred. Human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game are
anticipated to charge prices that would be strictly higher than the prices that they
are themselves charged by their corresponding upstream suppliers. This charging
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behaviour would at least help them attain a reasonable profit margin. This is
exactly what the first research hypothesis suggests.
Hypothesis CBG.1 Human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution
Game charge wPi -prices that are strictly higher than the prices that they are
charged wPi+1 (ܹ ܲതതതതത௜> ܹ ܲതതതതത௜ାଵ).
Since charging strictly higher prices than being charged is but a
simplification of conditions (6.12) and (6.13) that the perfectly rational prices
should satisfy, this pricing rule of closely following the price of the upstream
supplier ܹ ܲതതതതത௜ାଵ could be considered as a ‘locally good’ price. So, this first
research hypothesis implies that human participants in the Contract Beer
Distribution Game would be expected to make ‘locally good’ decisions.
7.2.2 Participants’ oQi - quantities
In accordance with previous experimental research on Sterman’s (1989, 1992)
original Beer Distribution Game (Sterman, 1989; Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi,
1998; Croson and Donohue, 2003; Steckel et al, 2004; Croson and Donohue,
2005; Croson and Donohue, 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007),
human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game would be expected to
order significantly different quantities than the ones that are predicted by the
relevant standard normative models. This constitutes the basis of the second
research hypothesis.
The standard normative models that correspond to the Contract Beer
Distribution Game are provided in Section 6.4. These demonstrate that the
perfectly rational distinct echelon managers that participate in the game first need
to attain the optimal target levels that are implied by their respective intentions to
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either maximise the team overall profit ଴ܲ∗ under centralised operation (that is,
ܼ݅
∗) or the individual profit ௜ܲ∗ under de-centralised operation (that is, ݅ݖ∗). Once
they reach these target levels, they simply need to follow the optimal decision
rules that are given by relations (6.10a) and (6.10b), depending on their
respective roles. Following these optimal decision rules, perfectly rational
echelon managers order (݋ܳതതതത௜) as much as they are themselves requested to
deliver (݋ܳതതതത௜ି ଵ).
Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi’s (1998), Croson and Donohue’s (2003; 2005;
2006) and Croson et al.’s (2007) human participants tend to under-weight their
supply line in their order quantity decisions, that is, for every new order quantity
decision they make, they assign higher significance to their current inventory
position than to their outstanding orders (i.e. orders they have placed but have not
yet received from their upstream manufacturers). The result is that they are
inclined to order higher quantities than they are requested to deliver. But this is
not the case for Sterman’s (1989) subjects, who anchor their order quantities on
initial stock levels and subsequently insufficiently adjust towards desired stock
levels. This application of Kahneman et al.’s (1982) anchoring and insufficient
adjustment heuristic by Sterman’s (1989) participants implies that they
practically order quantities that are different from the quantities that they are
themselves requested to deliver. That is why it is safer to leave the second
research hypothesis about human participants’ oQi - quantities as two-tailed.
Hypothesis CBG.2 Human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution
Game order OQi - quantities that are significantly different from the quantities
that they are requested to deliver OQi-1 (ܱܳതതതത௜≠ ܱܳതതതത௜ି ଵ).
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Since ordering as much as being requested to deliver would maximise both
the individual profit that each distinct echelon manager could make and the team
overall profit, this decision rule of ordering as much as the downstream customer
requests ܱܳതതതത௜ି ଵ could be considered as a ‘locally good’ order quantity decision.
In respect to this, the second research hypothesis implies that human participants
in the Contract Beer Distribution Game would be expected to make ‘locally
poor’ order decisions.
7.2.3 Competition Penalties
Earlier experimental research on Sterman’s (1989, 1992) original Beer
Distribution Game demonstrates that there exists a persistent discrepancy
between the resulting aggregate channel cost ICc that is incurred by human
participants and the first-best case minimum cost IC*0 that would be attained by
perfectly rational echelon managers (Sterman, 1989; Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi,
1998; Steckel et al, 2004). This systematic deviation implies that the competition
penalty that is attained by interacting human decision makers is strictly different
than 0. The competition penalty CP is defined according to relation (2.17), when
supply chain overall costs come into play.
In line with this existing experimental research, the competition penalties
that would be attained by interactions of human participants in the Contract Beer
Distribution Game would be expected to be significantly different from 0. This is
exactly what the third research hypothesis seeks to address.
Hypothesis CBG.3 The attained competition penalties are significantly
different from zero (CP0).
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But in the case of the Contract Beer Distribution Game setting, supply
chain overall profits, instead of supply chain overall costs, become of interest.
Because of this, the competition penalties that different interactions attain can be
determined by relation (6.14). According to equation (6.14), the aggregate
channel cost ICc becomes the aggregate channel profit ෠ܲ஼ and the first-best case
minimum cost IC*0 becomes the first-best case maximum profit ைܲ∗෢ . Hence, the
third research hypothesis anticipates a systematic deviation between the first-best
case maximum profit ைܲ∗෢ and the aggregate channel profit ෠ܲ஼ that would be
attained by human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game. The
equivalent expectation is that human interactions could not give rise to ‘globally
efficient’ interactions.
7.2.4 The Bullwhip effect
Prior experimental research on Sterman’s (1989, 1992) original Beer Distribution
Game (e.g. Croson and Donohue, 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007)
verifies the prevalence of the bullwhip effect, even under simplified laboratory
conditions, when all its corresponding operational causes, as recognised by Lee et
al. (1997a; b), are systematically removed. In addition, Su (2008) offers a formal
proof that explains why the existence of at least one non-perfectly rational
decision maker in the Beer Distribution Game constitutes a necessary and
sufficient condition for the occurrence of the bullwhip effect. Building on these
extant results, the introduction of the wholesale price contract as the basis of any
transaction in the Beer Distribution Game could not be considered as a sufficient
condition to abolish the bullwhip effect. So, it is anticipated that the bullwhip
effect will persist in the Contract Beer Distribution Game setting.
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Since the bullwhip effect or else the Forrester effect (Forrester, 1958;
1961) is defined as the tendency of orders to increase in magnitude and variance
as one moves upstream away from the customer to the manufacturer, it can be
quantified by the amplification of demand variance from each level i to the
corresponding upstream supplier’s level i+1, namely via ߪത݅2 < ߪത݅+12 . This is
exactly what the fourth research hypothesis proposes:
Hypothesis CBG.4 The bullwhip effect persists (ఙഥ೔శభ
మ
ఙഥ೔
మ > 1).
The persistence of the bullwhip effect in the Contract Beer Distribution
Game setting signifies that the interaction of human participants is not expected
to be in a position to completely eliminate the operational inefficiencies that are
existent in the Contract Beer Distribution Game. Therefore, human participants
are not anticipated to generate ‘globally efficient’ interactions.
Now that the research hypotheses of this study are formulated, the
approach of this research, as outlined in Chapter 3, is described in greater detail
with respect to the Contract Beer Distribution Game setting. In this way, the
research hypotheses CBG.1 - CBG.4 can be tested.
7.3 The Approach
In order to elicit knowledge on how human subjects make their price and order
quantity decisions and assess the overall performance of all their possible
interactions, the approach that is presented in Figure 3.2 (s. Section 3.2) has been
adapted to the needs of the Contract Beer Distribution Game. In this regard, in
Stage 1 the decision variables of each agent are recognised, namely the price for
the wholesaler and the manufacturer and the order quantity for the retailer, the
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wholesaler and the manufacturer. Following informal pilot sessions, the decision
attributes that correspond to each decision variable are also identified. In Stage 2
volunteers are randomly assigned to play the three different roles in simulation
games and their consecutive decisions over time are recorded. Some participants
are asked to interact over the specially designed board of the game, while some
others are asked to interact via a computer interface with a set of pre-selected
partners’ responses. Whether a participant was asked to play over the board or via
the computer interface, and the exact set of responses or else scenarios that were
provided to him/her have been rigorously selected via a specially developed
methodology that is described in Sub-section 7.3.2. In Stage 3 a combination of
multiple regression models of the first order auto-regressive time-series type and
multiple logistic regression models is fitted to the data that are collected from
each participant. In Stage 4 the ABS model that corresponds to the Contract Beer
Distribution Game is run for all possible combinations of the participants’
decision models. In this way, the respective outcomes can be compared and, thus,
the research hypotheses about simulated manufacturers’ prices (i.e. CBG.1),
order quantities (i.e. CBG.2), attained competition penalties (i.e. CBG.3) and
prevalence of the bullwhip effect (i.e. CBG.4) can be investigated. Each of these
stages is now described in some detail.
7.3.1 Stage 1: The Decision Making Process
The objective of the informal pilot sessions is to identify the decision attributes
that correspond to the two decision variables of this study: that is, the price and
the order quantity decisions. These pilot sessions were conducted via simulation
games, but differed from Stage 2 gaming sessions in two ways. First, the subjects
were provided all information that was relevant to their respective role over the
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course of the entire game; no previous round’s data were hidden from them. Next,
these simulation games were shorter in duration, yet, they were followed by
interviews, during the course of which the subjects were encouraged to discuss
which information they had found of relevance to their required decision task.
They were also asked to explain the underlying reasoning for the decisions that
they had made. In this way, the decision attributes that they had considered as
significant for their respective decision variables were identified.
From these informal sessions evidence is found that most participants
assign significantly higher significance to losses, even of small magnitude, than
to equally sized profits. In other words, most participants seem to be highly loss
averse. Furthermore, since the game starts with an initial inventory of 12 cases
for each participant and, in addition, the backlog penalties cost prices that are
double as high as the inventory holding costs, most participants appear to be
highly averse to backlogged demand. In other words, most participants assign
greater significance to whether their inventory position falls below 0 than to
exactly how much above 0 it actually is. But this aversion of most human
participants to losses and backlogs seems to reproduce Prospect theory’s
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) reference dependence. Building on this loss and
backlog aversion of human participants, net profits that are exactly equal to 0 and
net inventory positions that are exactly equal to 0 can be treated as references.
In addition, in the informal interviews all human participants admitted that
they had based their order quantity decisions on the incoming order quantities or
previous demand realizations. The reason is that they could not predict with
certainty the incoming order quantities or the customer demand, respectively.
Camerer (1995) and Loch and Wu (2007) perceive this tendency of individual
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decision makers to use relevant information that is available as the result of
underlying uncertainty. Last but not least, after the end of the game most
volunteers revealed that they had difficulty in understanding how their current
decisions would affect their profits and the system overall performance in the
next round of the game. In order, thus, to make simpler and faster decisions, they
preferred to use their own previously realised profit, as given to them by the
computer interface. This simplification is viewed as the result of the complexity
that is inherent with the Contract Beer Distribution Game. Camerer (1995) and
Loch and Wu (2007) consider complexity as another behavioural bias that seems
to have a significant effect on individual decision making.
In accordance with the aforementioned behavioural biases and with
Axelrod’s (1997) KISS principle (i.e. Keep It Simple Stupid) all human
participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game (i = MAN, WHL) are
considered to base each period’s price decision ݓ ௜ܲ(ݐ) on the following seven
factors or else decision attributes:
i. the price that was charged by the upstream supplier i+1 in the same
time period t ܹ ௜ܲାଵ(t) [i.e. immediacy and salience]. The reader is
at this point reminded that this decision attribute is not applicable to
the role of the manufacturer (i = SUP),
ii. the previous order quantity ܱ(ݐ− 1) [i.e. immediacy and salience],
iii. the shipment that is in transit to i’s own warehouse ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜+1)
[i.e. reference dependence, immediacy, salience and ambiguity],
iv. the incoming order quantity ܱܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) [i.e. immediacy,
salience and ambiguity],
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v. the incoming order price ܹ ୧ܲ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) [i.e. immediacy, salience
and ambiguity],
vi. the net inventory position ܰܫ ௜(t) [i.e. reference dependence and
complexity],
vii. the realized cumulative profit ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ [i.e. reference dependence
and complexity].
These are the decision attributes that have been used in the subsequent gaming
sessions for all human participants. Therefore, the relation (3.1) that presents the
one-to-one association of the decision variable price ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ) with all
corresponding decision attributes (i.e. ܹ ௜ܲାଵ(t),ܱܳ௜(ݐ− 1), ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜+1),
ܱܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ),ܹ ୧ܲ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ), ܰܫ ௜(t), ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ ) becomes:
The Price’s Decision Function
(7.1)
For the same reasons, all human participants in the Contract Beer
Distribution Game (i = MAN, WHL, RET) are considered to base each period’s
order quantity decision ܱܳ (݅ݐ) on the following eight factors or else decision
attributes:
i. the participant’s own previously charged price ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ− 1) [i.e.
immediacy and salience]. The reader is at this point reminded that
this decision attribute is not applicable to the role of the retailer (i =
RET),
< ܹ ܲ݅ (ݐ) >= ݂ܹ݅ ܲ(ݐ) ቎ܹ ܲ݅+1(ݐ− 1),ܱܳ (݅ݐ− 1),
ܵ݅+1(ݐ− ݅ܮ + 1),ܱܳ −݅1(ݐ− ݈݅−1),ܹ iܲ(ݐ− ݈݅−1), ܰܫ (݅t),෍ ܲ݅ ( )݆ݐ=݆1 ൩
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ii. the player’s own currently charged price ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ) [i.e. immediacy and
salience]. This decision attribute is not applicable to the role of the
retailer (i = RET),
iii. the price that was charged by the upstream supplier i+1 in the same
time period t ܹ ௜ܲାଵ(t) [i.e. immediacy and salience]. This decision
attribute is not applicable to the role of the manufacturer (i = MAN),
iv. the previously placed order quantity ܱܳ௜(ݐ− 1) [i.e. immediacy
and salience],
v. the shipment that is in transit to i’s own warehouse ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜+1)
[i.e. reference dependence, immediacy, salience and ambiguity],
vi. the incoming order quantity ܱܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) for i = MAN, WHL or
customer demand ܦ(ݐ), for i = RET [i.e. immediacy, salience and
ambiguity],
vii. the net inventory position ܰܫ ௜(t) [i.e. reference dependence and
complexity],
viii. the realized cumulative profit ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ [i.e. reference
dependence and complexity].
These are the decision attributes that have been used in the subsequent gaming
sessions for all human participants. Therefore, the relation (3.1) that presents the
one-to-one association of the decision variable order quantity ݋ܳ ௜(ݐ) with all
corresponding decision attributes (i.e. ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ− 1), ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ),ܹ ௜ܲାଵ(t),ܱܳ௜(ݐ−1), ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜+1),ܱܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ),ܹ ୧ܲ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ), ܰܫ ௜(t), ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ ) becomes:
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The Order Quantity’s Decision Function
< ܱܳ௜(ݐ) >= ௜݂ைொ(௧)ൣW(ݐ− 1), ܹ ܲ (݅ݐ),ݓܲ +݅1(t),ܱܳ (݅ݐ− 1),
ܵ݅+1(ݐ− ݅ܮ +1),ܱܳ −݅1(ݐ− ݈݅−1),ܹ iܲ(ݐ− ݈݅−1), ܰܫ (݅t), ∑ ܲ (݅ )݆ݐ=݆1 ൧
(7.2)
The description of the Contract Beer Distribution Game that is provided in
Section 6.3 along with the decision functions (7.1) and (7.2) fully specify the
ABS model of the Contract Beer Distribution Game model, which is described in
greater detail in the sub-section that follows.
Outcome 1: The Agent-Based Simulation Model of the Contract Beer
Distribution Game
According to the exact specification of the Contract Beer Distribution that is
provided in Section 6.3, there are three different types of agents: the
manufacturer-agent, the wholesaler-agent and the retailer-agent. In accordance
with the definition of an agent that is provided in Section 3.2, the bulleted list that
follows briefly summarises how the manufacturer-agent, the wholesaler-agent
and the retailer-agent satisfy all requirements and are, thus, eligible to be
considered as agents:
 Social Ability: the manufacturer-agent, the wholesaler-agent and the
retailer-agent have the social ability to communicate with each other and
their surrounding environment. The wholesale price contract specifies all
terms of trade and any exchange that occurs between them.
 Capability to learn: the manufacturer-agent, the wholesaler-agent and the
retailer-agent use the feedback information that is provided to them to better
understand their partners’ reactions and any changes that occur in their
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environment. In this way, they can modify and, thus, adapt their behaviours
accordingly. The reader should at this point be reminded that the decision
functions of the manufacturer-agent (i.e. relations 7.1 and 7.2), the
wholesaler-agent (i.e. relations 7.1 and 7.2) and the retailer-agent (i.e.
relation 7.2) may remain fixed, but the agents’ exact decisions do vary with
time, depending on the previous period’s results. This dynamic behaviour
encapsulates their capability to learn.
 Autonomy: the manufacturer-agent, the wholesaler-agent and the retailer-
agent have separate and well determined goals to achieve and clearly
defined internal logic rules that govern their actions.
 Heterogeneity: the manufacturer-agent, the wholesaler-agent and the
retailer-agent follow their own intentions and make different decisions.
In this regard, Table 7.1 outlines the basic structure (i.e. attributes and
behavioural characteristics) of the retailer-agent; Table 7.2 does the same for the
wholesaler-agent, while Table 7.3 does so for the manufacturer-agent.
It is evident from Table 7.1 that the different retailer-agents only differ in
the exact values of their corresponding attributes. These are in turn given by the
specific decision models of type (7.2) that have been fitted to the associated
human retailer’s respective decisions. Their exact values along with their detailed
explanations are provided in Sub-section 7.3.3, where the decision models that
have been fitted to all participants’ datasets of recorded decisions are presented.
Nevertheless, the association of the retailer’s (i = RET) decision variable OQ(t)
with any decision attribute, that is the corresponding decision model coefficient,
constitutes exactly what specifies the ABS model attribute (e.g. the association of
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Oܳ (݅ݐ) with ܱܳ௜(ݐ− 1) provides the ABS model attribute ߛ෤ைொ೟షభோா ೞ் , that differs
accross different retailer-agents).
Following the same rationale, Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that the different
wholesaler-agents and manufacturer-agents only differ in the exact values of
their corresponding attributes. These ABS model attributes are in turn given by
the decision models of types (7.1) and (7.2) that have been fitted to the human
participants’ respective decisions. Although their exact values and detailed
explanations are reported in Sub-section 7.3.3, their specification is provided by
the decision model of types (7.1) and (7.2) that associates the participants’
decision variables ݓܲ (݅ݐ) and ݋ܳ (݅ݐ) with all corresponding decision attributes.
The exact behaviour of the retailer-agent is presented in the statechart of
Figure 7.1. The exact behaviour of the wholesaler-agent is illustrated in Figure
7.2 and the exact behaviour of the manufacturer-agent is illustrated in Figure 7.3.
From Figure 7.1 it is evident that the retailer-agent is considered to be in
idle (i.e. awaiting) state while waiting for the wholesaler’s price decision. From
Figure 7.2 it is evident that the wholesaler-agent is in an awaiting state in two
different instances. The first instance is before he/she determines his/her own
price decision (possibly because he/she might wait to receive the price that is
charged by the manufacturer, before making his/her decision). The second
instance is while he/she waits to receive the manufacturer’s price, in response to
which the wholesaler-agent places his/her order.
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Table 7.1: The basic structure of the retailer-agent
The Retailer-Agent
Attributes: Regression Coefficients Behaviours:
 ߛ0ܴܧܶݏ
 ܹߛ
ܹܲ
ܴܧܶݏ
 ߛ෤ܱ
ܳݐ−1
ܴܧܶݏ
 ܱߣ
ܴܳܧܶ(ݐ−1)ܴܧܶݏ
 ߛ෤ܵ
ݐ−ܴܮ +1ܴܧܶݏ
 ܵߣ
ܹ (ݐ−ܴܮ ܧܶ+1)ܴܧܶݏ
 ߛ෤
ܰܫ ݐ
ܴܧܶݏ
 ߣ
ܰܫ (݅ݐ)ܴܧܶݏ
 ߛ෤
ܥܲݐ
ܴܧܶݏ
 ߣܥܲݐ
ܴܧܶݏ
 ߚ0ܴܧܶݏ
 ߚ
ܹ ܹܲ
ܴܧܶݏ
 ߚ෤ܱ
ܳݐ−1
ܴܧܶݏ
 ܱߣ
ܴܳܧܶ(ݐ−1)ܴܧܶݏ
 ߚ෤ܵ
ݐ−ܴܮ ܧܶ+1ܴܧܶݏ
 ܵߣ
ܹ (ݐ−ܴܮ ܧܶ+1)ܴܧܶݏ
 ߚ෤
ܰܫ ݐ
ܴܧܶݏ
 ߣ
ܰܫ ܴܧܶ(ݐ)ܴܧܶݏ
 ߚ෤
ܥܲݐ
ܴܧܶݏ
 ߣܥܲݐ
ܴܧܶݏ
 Receiving a shipment (and incurring
associated acquisition cost)
 (Receiving and) satisfying the
incoming demand
 Earning profits
 (Accepting the price and) placing an
order
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Table 7.2: The basic structure of the wholesaler-agent
The Wholesaler-Agent
Attributes: Regression Coefficients Behaviours:
 ࢇ૙
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢇࢃ ࡼࡹ ࡭࢔
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢇ෥ࡻࡽ࢚ష૚
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࢃ ࡴࡸ(࢚ି ૚)ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢇ෥ࡿ࢚షࡸࢃ ࡴ࢒శ૚
ࢃ ࡴ࢒࢙
 ࣅࡿࡲ(࢚ି ࡸࢃ ࡴ࢒ା૚)ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢇ෥ࡻࡽ࢚ష࢒ࡾ
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࡾࡱࢀ(࢚ି ࢒ࡾࡱࢀ)ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢇࢃ ࡼ࢚ష࢒ࡾࡱࢀ
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢇ෥ࡵࡺ࢚
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࣅࡵࡺࢃ ࡴ࢒(࢚)ࢃ ࡴ࢒࢙
 ࢇ෥࡯ࡼ࢚
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࣅ࡯ࡼ࢚
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢽ૙
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢽࢃ ࡼ࢚ష૚
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢽࢃ ࡼ࢚
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢽࢃ ࡼࡹ ࡭ࡺ
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢽ෥ࡻࡽ࢚ష૚
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽ࢝ (࢚ି ૚)ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢽ෥ࡿ࢚షࡸࢃ ࡴࡸశ૚
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࣅࡿࡹ ࡭ࡺ(࢚ି ࡸࢃ ࡴࡸା૚)ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢽ෥ࡻࡽ࢚ష࢒ࡾ
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࡾࡱࢀ(࢚ି ࢒ࡾࡱࢀ)ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢽ෥ࡵࡺ࢚
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࣅࡵࡺࢃ ࡴࡸ(࢚)ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢽ෥࡯ࡼ࢚
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࣅ࡯ࡼ࢚
ࢃ ࡴࡸ࢙
 ࢼ૙
ࢃ ࢙
 ࢼ૙
ࢃ ࢙ + ࢼ࢝ࡼ࢚ష૚ࢃ ࢙
 ࢼࢃ ࡼ࢚
ࢃ ࢙
 ࢼࢃ ࡼࡲ
ࢃ ࢙
 ࢼ෩ࡻࡽ࢚ష૚
ࢃ ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࢃ (࢚ି ૚)ࢃ ࢙
 ࢼ෩ࡿ࢚షࡸࢃ శ૚
ࢃ ࢙
 ࣅࡿࡲ(࢚ି ࡸࢃ ା૚)ࢃ ࢙
 ࢼ෩ࡻࡽ࢚ష࢒ࡾ
ࢃ ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࡾ(࢚ି ࢒ࡾ)ࢃ ࢙
 ࢼ෩ࡵࡺ࢚
ࢃ ࢙
 ࣅࡵࡺࢃ (࢚)ࢃ ࢙
 ࢼ෩࡯ࡼ࢚
ࢃ ࢙
 ࣅ࡯ࡼ࢚
ࢃ ࢙
 Receiving a shipment (and
completing outstanding financial
transactions)
 (Receiving incoming order and)
filling the incoming order
 Earning profits
 Charging a wholesaler price
 (Accepting the price and) placing an
order
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Table 7.3: The basic structure of the manufacturer-agent
The Manufacturer-Agent
Attributes: Regression Coefficients Behaviours:
 ࢇ૙
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢇ෥࢕ࡽ࢚ష૚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࡲ(࢚ି ૚)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢇ෥ࡻࡽ࢚షࡸࡹ ࡭ࡺష૚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࡹ ࡭ࡺ(࢚ି ࡸࡹ ࡭ࡺି૚)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢇ෥ࡻࡽ࢚ష࢒ࢃ ࡴࡸ
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࢃ ࡴࡸ(࢚ି ࢒ࢃ ࡴࡸ)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢇࢃ ࡼ࢚ష࢒ࢃ ࡴࡸ
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢇ෥ࡵࡺ࢚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡵࡺࡹ ࡭ࡺ(࢚)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢇ෥࡯ࡼ࢚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅ࡯ࡼ࢚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢽ૙
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢽࢃ ࡼ࢚ష૚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢽࢃ ࡼ࢚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙ ∙
 ࢽ෥ࡻࡽ࢚ష૚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࡹ ࡭ࡺ(࢚ି ૚)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢽ෥ࡻࡽ࢚షࡸࡹ ࡭ࡺష૚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࡹ ࡭ࡺ(࢚ି ࡸࢃ ࡴࡸି૚)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙ ,
 ࢽ෥ࡻࡽ࢚ష࢒ࢃ ࡴࡸ
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࢃ ࡴࡸ(࢚ି ࢒ࢃ ࡴࡸ)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢽ෥ࡵࡺ࢚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡵࡺࡹ ࡭ࡺ(࢚)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢽ෥࡯ࡼ࢚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅ࡯ࡼ࢚
ࡲ࢙ ,
 ࢼ૙
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢼࢃ ࡼ࢚ష૚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢼࢃ ࡼ࢚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢼ෩ࡻࡽ࢚ష૚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࡹ ࡭ࡺ(࢚ି ૚)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢼ෩ࡻࡽ࢚షࡸࡹ ࡭ࡺష૚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࡹ ࡭ࡺ(࢚ି ࡸࡹ ࡭ࡺି૚)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢼ෩ࡻࡽ࢚ష࢒ࢃ ࡴࡸ
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡻࡽࢃ ࡴࡸ(࢚ି ࢒ࢃ ࡴࡸ)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢼ෩ࡵࡺ࢚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅࡵࡺࡲ(࢚)ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࢼ෩࡯ࡼ࢚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 ࣅ࡯ࡼ࢚
ࡹ ࡭ࡺ࢙
 Receiving a production lot (and
completing outstanding financial
transactions)
 (Receiving incoming order and filling the
incoming order)
 Producing past production request (and
incurring production cost)
 Earning profits
 Charging a manufacturer price
 Placing a production request
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Figure 7.1: The statechart of the retailer-agent
Chapter 7- The Contract Beer Distribution Game Approach
Figure 7.2: The statechart of the wholesaler-agent
Awaiting
Receive_Shipment
Earn_Profits
Awaiting
Decide_Price
Fill_Orders
Decide_OrderQty
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Figure 7.3: The statechart of the manufacturer-agent
Awaiting
Receive_ProdLot
Earn_Profits
Awaiting
Decide_Price
Fill_Orders
Decide_ProdReq
Produce
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Figure 7.3 also demonstrates that the manufacturer-agent does not need to
wait for his/partners decisions in order to make his/her respective decisions. The
reasons are that the manufacturer-agent incurs a fixed manufacturing cost
(c=0.5m.u.) and does not place production requests in immediate response to the
orders that are placed by the wholesaler. For a detailed explanation the reader is
referred to Steps d) and i) of the Contract Beer Distribution Game in Sub-section
6.2.2, where it is evident that both the wholesaler and the manufacturer must wait
௜݈= 2 (i = 2, 3) time periods to receive a newly placed order from their
respective downstream customer.
The underlying environment of the ABS model of the Contract Beer
Distribution Game symbolizes the market. The environment reflects the customer
demand that is uncertain in nature. The element of combined evolution is of most
relevance to the research hypotheses CBG.3 and CBG.4 that concern whether the
emerging competition penalties would statistically differ from 0 and the bullwhip
effect would prevail. In this way, it can be established whether ‘globally efficient’
interactions can emerge from the interactions of ‘locally poor’ decisions.
‘Globally efficient’ interactions would attain overall competition penalties
that would not differ significantly from 0 and/or where the bullwhip effect would
not prevail. As for ‘locally poor’ decisions, these concern price and order
quantity decisions that would substantially differ from the corresponding
rationally optimising counterparts’ decisions, as specified by research questions
CBG.1 and CBG.2 respectively.
Based on the above specifications, given the problem’s small size and
mostly for reasons of speed of model build, ease of use and familiarity with the
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data presentation, a spreadsheet version of the model (in Excel-VBA) has been
developed (Robinson, 2004; North and Macal, 2007).
7.3.2 Stage 2: The Gaming Sessions
The objective of the second stage is to collect data for each human decision
maker. Table 7.4 summarises the key aspects of all gaming sessions that were
conducted to this end, namely, the sample of subjects, the version of the game
along with the corresponding computer interfaces, the duration and distinct
components of each session, the underlying customer demand, the provision of
financial incentives to participants and the response sets or else scenarios that
were provided to the human subjects in each session.
Table 7.4: Summary of Gaming Sessions
Sample
From a pool of 2009 Warwick Business School students (i.e.
MSc in Management, MSc in Management Science and
Operational Research and MSc in Business Analytics and
Consulting):
 MAN0 to MAN3
 WHL0 to WHL3
 RET0 to RET3
Demographic characteristics of all participants are provided in
Tables 7.5-7.7.
Computer Interface  “Base Session”(i.e. Session No. 1 in Table 7.8) : over the
board
 Remaining sessions (i.e. Sessions No. 2 - No. 10 in Table
7.8): computerized simulation games.
 Screenshots of the computer interfaces that were presented
to participants are attached in Figures 7.4 - 7.6.
Customer Demand  Sterman’s (1989, 1992) step-up function
 Only the human retailers were aware of true customer
demand realizations
 The participants were not aware of demand distribution
Duration of Sessions  2hrs
 10 trial periods that were evenly spread over the total
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number of different supply chain configurations
 N= 90 consecutive rounds for each participant
 The participants were not aware of the exact session’s
duration, so that end-of-game effects could be eliminated
 Debriefing
 Post-game interview (For an illustrative example of what
constituted the basis of the conversation that took place s.
Appendix C.2)
Financial Incentives No financial incentives were offered
Scenarios Following Latin Hypercube Design (42, 3) the experimental
protocol is presented in Table 7.8
The sub-sections that follow explain some of these key aspects in greater
detail. For even more details the interested reader is referred to Appendix C.1 that
provides a detailed account of the gaming sessions.
Sample
Tables 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7 summarize the main demographic characteristics of all
human subjects, by the role that was assigned to each of them.
Table 7.5: The human manufacturers - subjects
Factor level Course Age
MAN0 MSc in Management 24
MAN1 MSc in Management Science and Operational
Research
26
MAN2 MSc in Business Analytics and Consulting 24
MAN3 MSc in Management Science and Operational
Research
23
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Table 7.6: The human wholesalers - subjects
Factor level Course Age
WHL0 MSc in Management 25
WHL1 MSc in Management 26
WHL2 MSc in Business Analytics and Consulting 25
WHL3 MSc in Management Science and Operational
Research
23
The participation requirements set were two-fold: a). all participants had
received formal classroom training in inventory management principles, prior to
the experiment, as part of their curriculum requisite; and b). none of the
participants had played any version of the Beer Distribution Game before. Both
requirements intended to control and, thus, ensure a standard, common level of
knowledge of the game dynamics from all participants. Given recent empirical
studies that confirm the overall analogous performance of well trained students
when compared with experienced supply chain managers (Croson and Donohue,
2006; Bolton et al, 2008), a graduate level course in inventory management
would help the participants to better and faster understand the game underlying
dynamics and, therefore, perform as well as possible. As for prior participation in
the Beer Distribution Game, any pre-conception resulting from this might bias
the participants against exploring the full potential of the extra control (i.e. the
price decision) that is offered to them in the Contract Beer Distribution Game
(that is, in comparison to Sterman’s (1989; 1992) traditional version of the
game).
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Table 7.7: The human retailers - subjects
Factor level Course Age
RET0 MSc in Management 23
RET1 MSc in Management Science and Operational
Research
22
RET2 MSc in Management Science and Operational
Research
24
RET3 MSc in Management Science and Operational
Research
37
Computer Interface
The first three participants who were invited to the laboratory played the
Contract Beer Distribution Game facing each other over the board. All other
participants were asked to record their decisions in computerized simulation
games of the Contract Beer Distribution Game with three serial echelons (Steckel
et al, 2004). They worked with a computer interface that simulated the interacting
partners’ responses. This computer interface has been adapted from the ABS
model of the Contract Beer Distribution Game that has been developed at the end
of Stage 1 (i.e. Outcome 1). An illustrative screen shot of this computer interface,
as shown to the human manufacturers, is illustrated in Figure 7.4; while the
corresponding screenshots of the computer interfaces that were presented to the
human wholesalers and the human retailers are attached in Figures 7.5 and 7.6
respectively.
As is evident from these screenshots, participants are expected to perform
the following sequence of activities: i. initialize the application (“start the
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game”), ii. enter their decisions (namely, order quantities for the human retailers;
prices and order quantities for the human wholesalers and the human
manufacturers) and iii. “proceed” the game until, finally, being advised by the
researcher to “end the game”. When subjects click on “proceed”, the application
records their decisions, informs the corresponding downstream customers about
their selected prices, places their order quantities with their corresponding
upstream suppliers, simulates their partners’ responses and updates accordingly
the game statistics.
After every repetition, participants receive via the computer interface
feedback on their previous decisions, their realized profit (or losses), their current
inventory position and their incoming order. They are also informed about the
price that is currently charged to them by their upstream supplier (that is, if
applicable) and the shipment that is in transit to their warehouse. In case they
wish to obtain any additional history information, they have access to full history
information by clicking on the relevant button of their interface.
Interacting Partners
Written instructions on the required task were distributed to all participants well
in advance of their allocated session so that they could get familiar with the task
and the available software as quickly as possible. The instructions that were
distributed to the subjects who played the role of the retailer are presented in
Appendix C.3, while the instructions that were distributed to the subjects who
played the roles of the wholesaler and the manufacturer are attached in
Appendices C.4 and C.5 respectively.
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Figure 7.4: The computer interface of the simulation game that is faced by the human manufacturers
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Figure 7.5: The computer interface of the simulation game that is faced by the human wholesalers
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Figure 7.6: The computer interface of the simulation game that is faced by the human retailers
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Apart from written instructions, the participants could address questions both
before the start of the session and during its course. Nevertheless, the game could
not be re-started, once it had began.
Apart from written instructions, the participants could address questions both
before the start of the session and during its course. Nevertheless, the game could
not be re-started, once it had began.
Scenarios
Table 7.8 outlines the gaming sessions that were conducted, according to the
Latin Hypercube Experimental Design of k=3 treatment factors (i.e. MAN, WHL,
RET) at s=4 levels each. More details on the exact way that this experimental
protocol derived from the Latin Hypercube Design are provided in Appendix C.6.
The grey shaded row in Table 7.8 (i.e. Session No. 1) that is separated from the
remaining rows with a dashed line represents the “base” session that was required
to let the iteration between gaming sessions and inference of decision making
strategies begin.
To this end, one decision model needed to be deduced for each available
role: one for the manufacturer (MAN0), one for the wholesaler (WHL0) and one
for the retailer (RET0). This is why the subjects who had been randomly assigned
to the subject codes MAN0, WHL0 and RET0 were asked to participate in the study
first. Since there were no pre-deduced decision models for these subjects to
interact with, they were asked to play with each other interactively over the
board. Once the decisions of MAN0, WHL0 and RET0 were recorded, the
appropriate combinations of decision models that would determine their
corresponding decision models ௜݂
ௐ ௉(௧) and ௜݂ைொ(௧) , according to types (7.1) and
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(7.2), were inferred. The exact approach that was used to this end is discussed in
Sub-section 7.3.3.
Table 7.8 also denotes that in the second gaming session (i.e Session No. 2)
the decisions of the participant, who had been assigned the code WHL2, were
recorded. This participant was asked to interact with the fitted decision models of
MAN0 and RET0. The result of this second gaming session was that the decision
models ௜݂
ௐ ௉(௧) and ௜݂ைொ(௧) that corresponded to WHL2 could be inferred.
Subsequently, in the third gaming session (i.e Session No. 3) the decisions of the
participant, who had been assigned the code RET3, were recorded. This
participant was in turn asked to interact with the fitted decision models of MAN0
and WHL2. Following this third session, the decision model ݂ܱ݅ܳ(ݐ) that
corresponded to RET3 was deduced.
In the next, fourth, gaming session (i.e Session No. 4) the decisions of the
participant, who had been assigned the code RET1, were recorded. This
participant was asked to interact with two different scenarios or else supply chain
configurations: namely, the interaction of the MAN0 and WHL2 and the interaction
of MAN0 and WHL0 interaction. The only difference between this gaming session
that comprised of two different supply chain configurations and the previous
gaming sessions that only included one supply chain configuration was that the
sample size of total observations (N=90) was equally split over the two supply
chain configurations that were under study, with 5 trial periods applied at the
beginning of each. At each beginning, the participants were informed that they
would be interacting with a different set of partners and the game was restarted.
The remaining gaming sessions (Sessions No. 5 - 10) proceeded in exactly the
same way.
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Table 7.8: The Experimental Protocol
Participant Supply Chain Configuration
Session
No.
(i.e. Decision Making Strategy
–ies- to be determined)
(i.e. Known Decision Making
Strategies)
1 MAN0, WHL0, RET0 ---
2 WHL2 MAN0, RET0
3 RET3 WHL2, MAN0
4 RET1
MAN0,WHL2
MAN0,WHL0
5 MAN1 WHL2, RET1
6 WHL3
MAN0, RET0
MAN1, RET0
MAN1,RET1
7 WHL1 MAN1,RET0
8 RET2 MAN1, WHL0
9 MAN2
WHL1, RET2
WHL1, RET0
WHL0, RET3
10 MAN3
WHL1, RET2
WHL0, RET1
WHL0, RET3
Table 7.8 indicates how 50% of the gaming session that were performed
consisted of multiple supply chain configurations. In this way, participants were
allocated to multiple supply chain configurations. Furthermore, Table 7.8
demonstrates how 17 different supply chain configurations were possible within,
in total, 10 gaming sessions. This was accomplished by running multiple supply
chain configurations within a single gaming session. In this way, no human
subjects were asked to participate in more than one gaming sessions. Because of
the way that the sampling observations were split over the different supply chain
configurations explored, the session durations were also even.
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Outcome 2: The Datasets of Participants’ recorded Decisions
Similarly to the Newsvendor Problem setting, all participants’ recorded decisions
are collectively gathered with the associated decision attributes in appropriate
datasets.
7.3.3 Stage 3: The Decision Making Strategies
The objective of the third stage is to determine the decision model that
corresponds to each participant, namely specify the relations of type (7.1) that
correspond to the price decisions ݓ ௜ܲೞ(ݐ) of each participant is (i: MAN, WHL)
and the relations of type (7.2) that correspond to the order quantity decisions
݋ܳ ௜ೞ(ݐ) of each participant is (i: MAN, WHL, RET).
Following the same approach that is used in the Newsvendor Problem
setting, the decision models that correspond to the price decisions ݓ ௜ܲೞ(ݐ) get
transformed to the li-1-th order auto-regressive time-series models AR(li-1) of type
(7.3), while the decision models that correspond to the order quantity decisions
݋ܳ ௜ೞ(ݐ) become the li-1 – th order auto-regressive time-series models AR(li-1) of
type (7.4) (Mills, 1990; Box et al, 1994; Hamilton, 1994; Greene, 2002).
Types of Decision Models in the Contract Beer Distribution Game
(7.3)
〈ݓܲ(ݐ)〉
݅ݏ
= 0ܽ݅ݏ + ܽݓܲ +݅1݅ݏ ∙ ݓܲ݅+1(ݐ) + ݋ܽܳ ݐ−1݅ݏ ∙
݋ܳ (݅ݐ− 1) + ܽܵ
ݐ−ܮ +݅1݅ݏ ∙ ܵ݅+1(ݐ− ݅ܮ + 1) + ܽܳߧ ݐ−݈݅−1݅ݏ ∙
݋ܳ −݅1(ݐ− ݈݅−1)+ ܽݓܲݐ−݈݅−1݅ݏ ∙ ݓܲ݅ (ݐ− ݈݅−1)+ ܽܰܫ ݐ݅ݏ ∙
ܰܫ (݅ݐ) + ܽܥܲ݅ݏ ∙ ∑ ܲ݅ ( )݆ݐ=݆1
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〈ܹ ݌(ݐ)〉௜ೞ = ଴ܽ௜ೞ + ௐܽ ௉೔శభ௜ೞ ∙ ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ− 1) + ߚௐ ௉೟௜ೞ ∙ ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ) + ߚௐ ௉೔శభ௜ೞ
∙  ܹ ௜ܲାଵ(ݐ) + ߚைொ೟షభ௜ೞ ∙ ܱܳ௜(ݐ− 1) + ߚௌ೟షಽ೔శభ௜ೞ
∙ ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜+ 1) + ߚைொ೟ష೗೔షభ௜ೞ ∙ ܱܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ)
+ ߚூே೟௜ೞ ∙ ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) + ߚ஼௉೟௜ೞ ∙ ෍ ௜ܲ( )݆௧〈ܱܳ(ݐ)〉௜ೞ = ߚ଴௜ೞ ௐ ௉೟షభ ∙ ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ− 1) + ߚௐ ௉೟௜ೞ ∙ ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ) + ߚௐ ௉೔శభ௜ೞ ∙
ܹ ௜ܲାଵ(ݐ) + ߚைொ೟షభ௜ೞ ∙ ܱܳ௜(ݐ− 1) + ߚௌ೟షಽ೔శభ௜ೞ ∙ ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜+ 1) +
ߚைொ೟ష೗೔షభ
௜ೞ ∙ ܱܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) + ߚூே೟௜ೞ ∙ ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) + ߚ஼௉೟௜ೞ ∙ ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ
(7.4)
In these linear models, the value of each coefficient ௞ܽ
௜ೞ (where k 
ݓ ௜ܲାଵ(t), ݋ܳ ௜(ݐ− 1), ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜+1),
݋ܳ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ),ܹ ୧ܲ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ), ܰܫ ௜(t), ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ ) and ߚ௞௜ೞ (where k  ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ−1), ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ),ܹ ௜ܲାଵ(t),ܱܳ௜(ݐ− 1), ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜+1),ܱܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ),ܹ ୧ܲ(ݐ−
௜݈ି ଵ), ܰܫ ௜(t), ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ reflects the importance that each human participant
assigns to each of the decision attributes that he/she considers for his/her
respective decision 〈ܹ ܲ(ݐ)〉௜ೞand 〈ܱܳ(ݐ)〉௜ೞ. A number of departures from
linearity, normality and hetero-skedasticity for some of the dependent and
independent variables has been identified by the testing procedure that is
presented in Appendix C.7 (Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006; Fox, 2008).
In order to address these departures, appropriate modifications need to be
applied to the simple linear regression models of types (7.3) and (7.4). Appendix
C.8 discusses the main reasons for which the earlier example of a number of
related papers is not followed; these papers (e.g. Bostian et al, 2008; Su, 2008;
Ho et al, 2009; Lurie and Swaminathan, 2009) apply Generalised Linear Models
(GLMs) (Nelder and Wedderburn, 1972) to remedy the aforementioned
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violations. In this study the following two remedies are instead put in force. The
first remedy is that the participants’ order quantity decisions are viewed as two
distinct decisions: (i) whether they wish to place a strictly positive order and,
provided that they do, (ii) exactly to how much would this order quantity amount
to. This remedy addresses the non-normality of the order quantity decisions
〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉௜ೞof most human participants, namely the added mass at the value of zero
that most participants’ order quantity decisions have. The second remedy is that
appropriate transformations are enforced to the values of the decision attributes
that violate normality. In this way, non-linearity and hetero-skedasticity are
additionally accounted for (Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006). The paragraphs
that follow discuss these two remedies in more detail.
In order to model participants’ decision to place a non-zero or zero order,
the logistic regression model of type (7.5) is used. In equation (7.5) any deriving
probability value above the cut-off threshold of 0.5 naturally represents the
placement of a strictly positive order, while any value below 0.5 respectively
implies a refusal to place a non-zero order (Tsokos and DiCrose, 1992; Hosmer
and Lemeshow, 2000; Hair et al, 2006). Moreover, the coefficients of the logistic
regression (γ0, γ1,...,γκ) reflect the importance that each participant assigns to each
of his/her decision attributes for his/her decision to place a non-zero order
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000;Hair et al, 2006).
The main advantage of this model is that the existing violations of
normality, linearity and homo-skedasticity do not pose any concerns about the
applicability of the logistic regression model (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000; Hair
et al, 2006). The reader should at this point also be reassured that since in the
gaming sessions that were conducted at least 10 observations were collected for
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each explanatory variable (s. Sub-section 7.3.2), the risk of over-fitting was to a
great part eliminated (i.e. the minimum sample size requirements of logistic
regression were satisfied: Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000).
The Decision of placing a strictly positive Order in the Contract Beer
Distribution Game
(7.5)
Among the available families of transformations, the Yeo-Johnson (2000)
transformation is applied to the values of the decision attributes that violate
normality or linearity. The main reason is it extends the good properties of the
Box-Cox transformation (Box and Cox, 1964) to the whole real line (Thode,
2002; Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006). Relation (7.6) defines the family of the
Yeo-Johnson trasformations. Relation (7.6) indicates that if the data values of y
are strictly positive, then the Yeo-Johnson transformation is the same as the Box-
Cox power transformation of (y+1). If y is strictly negative, then the Yeo-Johnson
transformation is the same as the Box-Cox power transformation of (-y+1), but
with the power of 2-λ, where λ represents the chosen power value. Therefore, in
case both positive and negative values are existent, different power values of λ
are used for positive and negative values. In order to identify the appropriate
power values ࣅ∗ = 〈ߣଵ∗ , … ,ߣ௷∗ 〉 = 〈ߣ఑∗ 〉 for different participants’ decision
variables and decision attributes, Velilla’s (1993) recommendation is followed.
According to this, among the most usual power values, that is [-3,...,3]
〈 ݋݈݃ ݅ݐ(ܱܳ(ݐ))〉
݅ݏ
= ߛ0݅ݏ + ߛܹ ܲݐ−1݅ݏ ∙ ܹ ܲ (݅ݐ− 1) + ܹߛ ܲݐ݅ݏ ∙ ܹ ܲ (݅ݐ) + ܹߛ ܲ +݅1݅ݏ ∙ ܹ ܲ
߮
݅ݏ
ቄܱߣ ܳ (݅ݐ−1)݅ݏ ,ܱܳ (݅ݐ− 1)ቅ+ ܵߛ ݐ−݅ܮ +1݅ݏ ∙ ߮ ݅ݏቄܵߣ +݅1(ݐ−݅ܮ+1)݅ݏ , ܵ݅+1(ݐ− ݅ܮ + 1)ቅ+
߮
݅ݏ
ቄܱߣ ܳ −݅1(ݐ−݈݅−1)݅ݏ ,ܱܳ −݅1(ݐ− ݈݅−1)ቅ+ ߛܰܫ ݐ݅ݏ ∙ ߮ ݅ݏቄߣܰܫ (݅ݐ)݅ݏ , ܰܫ (݅ݐ)ቅ+ ߛܥܲݐ݅ݏ ∙ ߮ ݅ݏ൛
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(Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006), the set of transformation parameters ߣ఑∗ that
minimise the logarithm of the determinant of the sample covariance matrix of the
transformed data ߮(ࣅ∗,ࢵ) is chosen.
Yeo-Johnson (2000) Transformation
߮(ߣ,ݕ) =
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧
(ݕ+ 1)ఒ − 1
ߣ
, ݂݅ ߣ≠ 0,ݕ≥ 0
݋݈݃ (ݕ+ 1), ݂݅ ߣ= 0,ݕ≥ 0
−ቈ
(−ݕ+ 1)ଶିఒ − 1
2 − ߣ
቉, ݂݅ ߣ≠ 2,ݕ< 0
− ݋݈݃ (−ݕ+ 1), ݂݅ ߣ= 2,ݕ< 0
 (7.6)
The relations (7.7) – (7.9) that follow present the revised types of decision
models that exist in the Contract Beer Distribution Game. In greater detail, the
type (7.7) reflects the participants’ pricing decision models, the type (7.8)
outlines the order placement decision models, while the type (7.9) indicates the
exact order quantity decision models (that is, provided that the participants do
wish to place a strictly positive order). In these decision models the violations of
normality, linearity and homo-skedasticity are addressed via: i. the provision of
participants’ potential desire to place a zero order (i.e. logit model of type (7.5))
and ii. the appropriate Yeo-Johnson (2000) transformations of type (7.6). In the
models (7.7) – (7.9) these transformations are incorporated via the modified
regression coefficients ෤ܽ௜౩, ߛ෤௜౩ and ߚ෨୧౩ respectively. In relation (7.9) it is also
checked whether the binary transformation of the decision attributes (namely λ=
ܫ{ݔ> 0} ≝ ൜0, if ݔ= 01, if ݔ> 0) would increase the explanatory power of the logistic
regression model (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000; Hair et al, 2006; Fox, 2008).
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Revised Types of Decision Models in the Contract Beer Distribution Game
〈ܹ ܲ(ݐ)〉௜ೞ =
଴ܽ
௜ೞ + ௐܽ ௉೔శభ௜ೞ ∙ ܹ ௜ܲାଵ(ݐ) + ෤ܽைொ೟షభ௜ೞ ∙ ߮௜ೞቄߣைொ೔(௧ି ଵ)௜ೞ ,ܱܳ௜(ݐ− 1)ቅ+
෤ܽௌ೟షಽ೔శభ
௜ೞ ∙ ߮௜ೞቄߣௌ೔శభ(௧ି ௅೔ାଵ)௜ೞ , ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜+ 1)ቅ+ ෤ܽைொ೟ష೗೔షభ௜ೞ ∙
߮
݅ݏ
ቄܱߣ ܳ −݅1(ݐ−݈݅−1)݅ݏ ,ܱܳ −݅1(ݐ− ݈݅−1)ቅ+ܹܽ ܲݐ−݈݅−1݅ݏ ∙ ܹ ܲ (݅ݐ− ݈݅−1)+෤ܽܰܫ ݐ݅ݏ ∙
߮
݅ݏ
ቄߣܰܫ (݅ݐ)݅ݏ , ܰܫ (݅ݐ)ቅ+ ෤ܽܥܲݐ݅ݏ ∙ ߮ ݅ݏ൛ߣܥܲݐ݅ݏ , ∑ ܲ (݅ )݆ݐ=݆1 ൟ
(7.7)
(7.8)
〈ܱܳ(ݐ)〉௜ೞ = ߚ଴௜ೞ + ߚௐ ௉೟షభ௜ೞ ∙ ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ− 1) + ߚௐ ௉೟௜ೞ ∙ ܹ ௜ܲ(ݐ) + ߚௐ ௉೔శభ௜ೞ ∙
ܹ ௜ܲାଵ(ݐ) + ߚ෨௢ொ೟షభ௜ೞ ∙ ߮௜ೞቄߣைொ೔(௧ି ଵ)௜ೞ ,ܱܳ௜(ݐ− 1)ቅ+ ߚ෨ௌ೟షಽ೔శభ௜ೞ ∙
߮௜ೞቄߣௌ೔శభ(௧ି ௅೔ାଵ)௜ೞ , ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜+ 1)ቅ+ ߚ෨ைொ೟ష೗೔షభ௜ೞ ∙
߮௜ೞቄߣைொ೔షభ(௧ି ௟೔షభ)௜ೞ ,ܱܳ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ)ቅ+ ߚ෨ூே೟௜ೞ ∙ ߮௜ೞቄߣூே೔(௧)௜ೞ , ܰܫ ௜(ݐ)ቅ+
ߚ෨஼௉೟
௜ೞ ∙ ߮௜ೞቄߣ஼௉೟
௜ೞ , ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ ቅ
(7.9)
Outcome 3: The Participants’ Decision Models
Tables 7.9 – 7.16 present the decision models of types (7.7) – (7.9) that have been
fitted to the decisions of participants is who played the roles of the retailer (i.e.
i=RET), the wholesaler (i.e. i=WHL) and the manufacturer (i.e. i=MAN). In
greater detail, Tables 7.9-7.10 correspond to the decision models of human
retailers(i.e. the decision models of type (7.8) and (7.9), respectively). , Tables
7.11-7.13 correspond to the decision models of the human wholesalers (i.e.
〈 ݋݈݃ ݅ݐ(ܱܳ(ݐ))〉
݅ݏ
= ߛ0݅ݏ + ܹߛ ܲݐ−1݅ݏ ∙ ܹ ܲ݅ (ݐ− 1) + ܹߛ ܲݐ݅ݏ ∙ ܹ ܲ݅ (ݐ) + ܹߛ ܲ +݅1݅ݏ ∙ ܹ ܲ݅+1(ݐ) + ߛ෤݋ܳ
߮
݅ݏ
ቄܱߣ ܳ (݅ݐ−1)݅ݏ ,ܱܳ (݅ݐ− 1)ቅ+ ߛ෤ܵݐ−ܮ +݅1݅ݏ ∙ ߮ ݅ݏቄܵߣ +݅1(ݐ−ܮ +݅1)݅ݏ , ܵ݅+1(ݐ− ݅ܮ + 1)ቅ+ ߛ෤ܱܳݐ−݈݅−1݅ݏ ∙
߮
݅ݏ
ቄܱߣ ܳ −݅1(ݐ−݈݅−1)݅ݏ ,ܱܳ −݅1(ݐ− ݈݅−1)ቅ+ ߛܰܫ ݐ݅ݏ ∙ ߮ ݅ݏቄߣܰܫ (݅ݐ)݅ݏ , ܰܫ (݅ݐ)ቅ+ ߛ෤ܥ ܲݐ݅ݏ ∙ ߮ ݅ݏቄߣܥ ܲݐ݅ݏ , ∑ ܲݐ=݆1
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thedecision models of type (7.7), (7.8) and (7.9), respectively). Tables 7.14-7.16
correspond to the decision models of the human manufacturers (i.e.the decision
models of type (7.7), (7.8) and (7.9), respectively ). The paragraphs that follow
discuss in greater detail the information that these tables in turn provide.
In the tables that correspond to the auto-regressive multiple linear
regression pricing and order quantity decision models of type (7.7) and (7.9)
(namely Tables 7.10, 7.11, 7.13, 7.14, 7.16), column (1) outlines the regression
coefficients ෤ܽs݅and ߚ෨is(with i taking the values of RET, WHL and MAN and s
taking the values 0-3), respectively, that have been fitted to the corresponding
participant’s recorded decisions. These regression coefficients represent the
significance that the participant under study appears to assign to his/her
corresponding decision attributes. A value of 0 indicates that the corresponding
decision attribute has been eliminated from the decision model. Column (2)
presents the transformation parameter ߣ ݅ݏ (with i taking the values of RET, WHL
and MAN and s taking the values 0-3) that is associated with each decision
attribute. Column (3) portrays the t-values of each decision attribute, which
demonstrate how significant the effect of each decision attribute is on the actual
decision. Column (4) presents the associated p-values, which in turn represent the
lowest significance level for which the effect of a decision attribute is statistically
insignificant. The reason that the p-values are reported is that the critical rejection
values depend on the total number of valid observations, where the exact number
of non-zero quantity orders varies across different subjects. This is why the exact
number of non-zero orders is reported separately below each subject’s code. In
general, the decision attributes with p-values that are higher than 5% have not
been kept in the multiple linear regression decision models of types (7.7) and
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(7.9). The last row of Tables 7.10, 7.11, 7.13, 7.14, 7.16 presents the adjusted
coefficient of determination (adj. R2) for each decision model. Since the adj. R2
takes into account sample sizes, it is considered as an accurate measure of overall
model fit (Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006).
The tables that correspond to the logit order placement decision models of
type (7.8) (namely, Tables 7.9, 7.12 and 7.15) provide the following information:
Column (1) reflects the logistic regression coefficients ߛ෤s݅ (with i taking the
values of RET, WHL and MAN and s taking the values 0-3) that have been fitted
to the corresponding participant’s recorded decisions. These coefficients
represent the impact that a unit change in a decision attribute’s value has on the
logarithm of each participant’s order placement decision. Given the difficulty in
interpreting and, thus, understanding the impact of decision attributes on
logarithms, column (2) outlines the corresponding exponentiated values. These
exponentiated values represent the importance that each participant seems to
assign to his/her order placement decision. Column (3) summarizes the
transformation parameter ߣ௜ೞ (with i taking the values of RET, WHL and MAN
and s taking the values 0-3) that corresponds to each decision attribute. Column
(4) portrays the Wald-test statistic value that concerns each decision attribute.
The Wald-test statistic indicates the statistical significance of a decision attribute.
Column (5) presents the associated p-value, which in turn represents the lowest
significance level for which the effect of a decision attribute derives as
statistically insignificant. The reader is at this point informed that decision
attributes with p-values that are higher than 5% have been eliminated from the
logit decision models of type (7.8). The last two rows of Tables 7.9, 7.12 and
7.15 assess the overall logistic model fit via two different indicators: that is, the
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attained Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 measure and the proportional accuracy rate. The
Nagelkerke R2 measure demonstrates the percentage of total variation that is
explained by the logistic model of type (7.8). The reason that the Nagelkerke
pseudo-R2 measure is reported is it is consistent with the linear regression’s
adjusted coefficient of determination adj. R2 in that it indicates a perfect model fit
by taking the value of 1 (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000; Hair et al, 2006; Fox,
2008). The accuracy rate (or else hit ratio) measures the proportion of cases that
have been correctly classified (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000; Hair et al, 2006).
The accuracy rate that is attained is subsequently compared with the
corresponding proportional by chance accuracy criterion. The proportional by
chance accuracy criterion is calculated from the product of proportional accuracy
rate that would be achieved by chance alone (i.e. sum of squares of proportion of
non-zero orders over total orders and proportion of zero orders over total orders)
and 1.25, for reasons of stronger evidence. Attaining an accuracy rate that is
strictly higher than the proportional by chance accuracy rate indicates a
reasonable fit of the logistic model of type (7.8). Overall, the logistic models of
type (7.8) that have been fitted to the decision of the human participants explain
more than 60% of the existent variation (s. Nagelkerke R2) and satisfy the by
chance accuracy criterion. Each of these tables is now discussed in some detail.
Table 7.9 summarises the order placement decision models of type (7.8)
that have been fitted to the human retailers’ RETs recorded decisions. The fact
that the p-values of ݓ ௐܲ (ݐ) are strictly lower than 0.05 indicates that all human
retailers (RET0 - RET3) seem to take into account the price that is currently
charged to them in their respective order placement decisions. In addition, RET0,
RET2 and RET3 significantly consider the previously ordered quantity ߍܳோ(ݐ−
Chapter 7- The Contract Beer Distribution Game Approach
290
1), while RET1, on the contrary, prefers instead to rely on the shipment that is in
transit towards his warehouse ௐܵ (ݐ− ܮோ + 1), which the other three retailers
(RET0, RET2, RET3) largely ignore. This supports that RET0, RET2 and RET3
correctly perceive their previous order quantities as a more reliable indicator of
their outstanding orders than the shipments that are in transit towards their
warehouse. Last but not least, all human retailers (RET0 - RET3) only marginally
consider their current inventory positions ܰܫ ோ(ݐ) and cumulatively realized
profits ∑ ோܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ . This supports that RET0, RET2 and RET3 also correctly
perceive their previous order. The above observations can explain the labels that
have been assigned to the human retailers in Table 7.9. In this regard, RET0, RET2
and RET3 are characterized as ‘price and cost sensitive’, while RET1 is labeled as
‘price sensitive’. More details about the explanation of these labels are provided
in Appendix C.9.
Table 7.10 presents the order quantity decision models of type (7.8) that
have been fitted to the human retailers’ RETs recorded decisions. The fact that the
p-values of ݓܹܲ (ݐ) are strictly lower than 0. 05 indicates that the human retailers
RET1 - RET3) appear to take into account the price that is currently charged to
them. Nevertheless, RET0 - RET3 consider their previous order quantities ݋ܳ ோ(ݐ−1) only marginally and seem to almost ignore the shipments that are in transit
towards their warehouse ܹܵ (ݐ− ܴܮ + 1). RET0 additionally considers the
current inventory position ܰܫ ܴ(ݐ), while RET1 and RET2 significantly consider
the cumulative realized profit ∑ ܴܲ( )݆ݐ=݆1 for their order quantity decisions.
Building on these observations, RET0 is characterized in Table 7.10 as ‘price
conscious’, RET1 as ‘price and profit conscious’, RET2 as ‘price and cost and
profit conscious’ and RET3 as ‘price and cost conscious’.
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Table 7.11 presents the pricing decision models of type (7.7) that have
been fitted to the human wholesalers WHLs. It is evident from Table 7.11 that all
human wholesalers (WHL0 - WHL3) take into account for every new price
decision they make either the price that is currently charged to them ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ) or
(/and) the price that they themselves charged at the time when the incoming order
was placed ݓ ௐܲ ு௅(ݐ− ோ݈). The labels ‘price and past order reactive’ (WHL0),
‘price and present availability reactive’ (WHL1), ‘price and future availability
reactive’ (WHL2) and ‘profit and present availability reactive’ (WHL3) summarise
the most significant decision attributes of each human wholesaler.
Table 7.12 presents the order placement decision models of type (7.8) that
have been fitted to the human wholesalers WHLs. It is evident from Table 7.12
that all human wholesalers (WHL0 - WHL3) consider significantly in their order
placement decisions both the prices that are charged to them ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ) and their
own current prices ݓ ௐܲ ு௅(ݐ). Yet, there is one exception: WHL1, who almost
ignores her own price and relies only on the manufacturer’s current price. Since
wholesalers WHL0 - WHL3 treat prices as a sufficient measure of realized profits,
they tend to ignore their cumulative profits ∑ ௐܲ ு௅( )݆࢚࢐ୀ૚ . But WHL0 - WHL3 do
take into account some indication of inventory availability. In greater detail,
WHL1 considers the present inventory position ܰܫ ௐ ு௅(ݐ), while the other three
wholesalers instead prefer to project this inventory availability in the future (i.e.
WHL0, WHL3 and WHL3). In this regard, WHL3 only accounts for his own
previous order quantity ݋ܳ ௐ ு௅(ݐ− 1), while WHL0 and WHL2 see their future
inventory as the outcome of the combination between their own previous order
quantity ݋ܳ ௐ ு௅(ݐ− 1) and their newly received order quantity ݋ܳ ோா்(ݐ− ோ݈ா்).
The above observations can explain the labels that have been assigned to the
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human wholesalers in Table 7.12. In this regard, WHL0 and WHL2 are
characterized as ‘price and future availability sensitive’, WHL1 is labeled as ‘price
and present availability sensitive’, while WHL3 is viewed as ‘price and part future
availability sensitive’.
Table 7.13 presents the order quantity decision models of type (7.9) that
have been fitted to the recorded decisions of human wholesalers WHLs. Table
7.13 clearly indicates that all human wholesalers (WHL0 - WHL3) account for
some measure of profitability and inventory availability in their order quantity
decisions. WHL0 is the exception, because she completely ignores her inventory
availability. Instead she relies on the price that is charged to her ݓܲܯܣܰ(ݐ) and
her cumulatively realized profit ∑ ܹܲ ܪܮ( )݆ݐ=݆1 . These observations justify the
labels that have been assigned to the human wholesalers WHL0 - WHL3 in Table
7.13, which are the following: WHL0 is characterised as ‘profit conscious’, WHL1
as ‘price and future availability conscious’, WHL2 as ‘price and current
availability conscious’ and WHL3 as ‘price and present and future availability
conscious’.
Table 7.14 presents the pricing decision models of type (7.7) that have
been fitted to the human manufacturers MANs. It is obvious from Table 7.14 that
the manufacturer MAN3 simplifies his pricing task by constantly charging a fixed
price of 3 m.u. throughout the entire gaming session. As for the remaining human
manufacturers (MAN0 - MAN2), in order to determine their new prices, they
significantly rely on the incoming order price ܹ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ− ௐ݈ ு௅) that they
charged ௐ݈ ு௅ periods ago. Nevertheless, only MAN2 manages to successfully
associate this past price with her incoming order quantity ܱܳௐ ு௅(ݐ− ௐ݈ ு௅).
MAN1 associates this incoming order price ܹ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ− ௐ݈ ு௅) with his own
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previous order quantity ܱܳெ ஺ே (ݐ− 1). As for MAN0, he completely ignores all
indicators of inventory availability and/or previous ordering behaviour that is
available. In this regard, as can be seen in Figure 7.14, MAN0 is characterized as
‘incoming price reactive’, MAN1 is labelled as ‘past order and incoming price
reactive’, MAN2 is identified as ‘incoming order and price reactive’ and MAN3 is
considered to enforce a ‘fixed pricing’ scheme.
Table 7.15 presents the order placement decision models of type (7.8) that
have been fitted to the recorded decisions of the human manufacturers MANs.
Table 7.15 demonstrates that MAN0 and MAN2 assign great importance to the
price that they are currently charging ܹ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ). In addition, MAN2 considers
her cumulatively realized profit ∑ ெܲ ஺ே ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ . MAN1 limits his attention to the
present inventory position ܰܫ ெ ஺ே (ݐ). MAN3 appears to compensate for his lack of
consideration of prices by taking into account all indicators of inventory
availability and/or previous ordering behaviour that are available to him. In
respect to this, MAN0 is identified in Table 7.15 as ‘price sensitive’, MAN1 is
considered ‘present availability sensitive’, MAN2 is characterized as ‘price and
profit sensitive’ and MAN3 is labeled as ‘profit and present and future availability
sensitive’.
Table 7.16 presents the order quantity decision models of type (7.9) that
have been fitted to the recorded decisions of human manufacturers MANs. It
becomes evident from Table 7.16 that the human manufacturers MAN0 – MAN3 in
their respective quantity decisions consider at least one indicator of price or profit
and at least one indicator of inventory availability. The only exception is MAN3,
who only considers inventory availability, because he steadily charges the fixed
price of 3 m.u. In this regard, MAN0 accurately associates his previous price
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ܹ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ− 1) with the quantity that he is now requesting and, thus, prioritizes
this price. MAN2 fails to make this connection and, therefore, prioritizes her
current price ܹ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ) instead. But MAN2 ‘s current price ܹ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ) could be
considered as an indicator of her future incoming order quantities. MAN1 assigns
greater significance to his cumulatively realized profit ∑ ெܲ ஺ே ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ . Among the
available inventory-related measures, all human manufacturers MAN0 – MAN3
appear to take into account their respective current inventory position ܰܫ ெ ஺ே (ݐ).
It is very interesting that none of the studied participants perceive the shipment in
transit ܱܳெ ஺ே (ݐ− ܮெ ஺ே − 1) of relevance, most probably because they have
realised the assumed perfect reliability of their production facility. In respect to
this, MAN0 is considered ‘past price and present availability conscious’, MAN1 is
characterized as ‘profit and present and future availability conscious’, MAN2 is
identified as ‘present price and present availability conscious’ and MAN3 is
labeled as ‘present and part future availability conscious’.
Even though Tables 7.9-7.16 report the statistical power of the decision
models that have been inferred (i.e. Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 and accuracy rate for
logistic regression models and adjusted coefficient of determination adj. R2 for
multiple linear regression), it also needs to be ensured that these decision models
realistically reproduce the participants’ decisions, that is, as were observed in the
laboratory. To this end, Sterman’s (1989) suggestion is followed.
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Table 7.9: Human retailers’ order placement decision models
Decision Model:
(7.8)
RET0 RET1
‘price and cost sensitive’ ‘price sensitive’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ߛ෥ܴܧܶ0 OddsChange
%
ߣோா బ் ܹ ఊ(ோா బ்) ݌ఊ(ோಶ೅బ) ߛ෥ܴܧܶ1 OddsChange
%
ߣோா భ் ܹ ఊ(ோா భ்) ݌ఊ(ோಶ೅భ)
ߛ଴
ோா ೞ் 42.094 - - 0 1 -0.404 - - 0.353 0.553
ߛௐ ௉ೈ
ோா ೞ் -0.171 -70.30 1 0.220 0.639 0.182 19.96 1 3.768 0.052
ߛ෤ைொ೟షభ
ோா ೞ் -1.058 -99.94 ܫ{݋ܳ ௧ି ଵ> 0} 0.543 0.461 -0.022 -2.18 1 3.114 0.078
ߛ෤ௌ೟షಽೃశభ
ோா ೞ் 6.591 -79.38 ܫ൛ܵ ௧ି ௅ೃାଵ> 0} 2.338 0.126 -0.055 -5.35 1 5.492 0.019
ߛ෤ூே೟
ோா ೞ் -0.034 9.97 1 0.141 0.708 -0.003 -0.30 1 1.250 0.264
ߛ෤஼௉೟
ோா ೞ் 0.014 3.46 1 3.464 0.063 0.001 0.10 1 16.859 <0.001
Nagelkerke R2 0.864 0.650
Accuracy Rate 0.914
(> 0.51=by chance accuracy criterion)
0.762
(> 0.648=by chance accuracy criterion)
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Table 7.9(Cont.): Human retailers’ order placement decision models
Decision Model:
(7.8)
RET2 RET3
‘price and cost sensitive’ ‘price and cost sensitive’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ߛ෥ܴܧܶ2 OddsChange
%
ߣோா మ் ܹ ௔(ோಶ೅మ) ݌ఊ(ோಶ೅మ) ߛ෥ܴܧܶ3 OddsChange
%
ߣோா య் ܹ ௔(ோா య்) ݌ఊ(ோா య்)
ߛ଴
ோா ೞ் 14.048 - - 10.566 0.001 2.146 - - 2.585 0.108
ߛௐ ௉ೈ
ோா ೞ் -0.655 -48.06 1 6.696 0.010 -0.183 -16.72 1 1.629 0.202
ߛ෤ைொ೟షభ
ோா ೞ் -2.373 -90.68 ܫ{݋ܳ ௧ି ଵ> 0} 5.221 0.022 -1.469 -76.98 ܫ{݋ܳ ௧ି ଵ > 0} 5.881 0.015
ߛ෤ௌ೟షಽೃశభ
ோா ೞ் -0.481 -38.18 ܫ൛ܵ ௧ି ௅ೃାଵ> 0} 0.205 0.651 -0.351 -29.60 ܫ൛ܵ ௧ି ௅ೃାଵ> 0} 0.271 0.602
ߛ෤ூே೟
ோா ೞ் 0.005 0.50 1 0.707 0.4 0 0 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 01, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0  0.602 0.438
ߛ෤஼௉೟
ோா ೞ் 0.001 0.10 1 7.089 0.008 0 0 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܥܲ௧ ≥ 01, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ< 0  1.209 0.271
Nagelkerke R2 0.783 0.631
Accuracy Rate 0.908(> 0.625=by chance accuracy criterion)
0.822
(> 0.818=by chance accuracy criterion)
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Table 7.10: Human retailers’ order quantity decision models
Decision Model:
(7.9)
RET0 RET1
‘price conscious’ ‘price and profit conscious’
N=36 N=51
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ߚ෨ோா బ் ߣோா బ் ݐఉ(ோா బ்) ݌ఉ(ோா బ்) ߚ෨ோா భ் ߣோா భ் ݐఉ(ோா భ்) ݌ఉ(ோா భ்)
ߚ଴
ோா ೞ் 14.166 - 1.256 0.003 57.138 - 3.982 0
ߚௐ ௉ೈ
ோா ೞ் -1.483 1 -1.784 0.102 -6.088 1 -2.213 0.032
ߚ෨ைொ೟షభ
ோா ೞ் 49.258 -4 2.171 0.053 23.988 -3 0.517 0.607
ߚ෨ௌ೟షಽೃశభ
ோா ೞ் 0 -4 -0.233 0.821 9.901 -3 0.239 0.812
ߚ෨ூே೟
ோா ೞ் -0.343 1 -2.168 0.053 14.728 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 0−1, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 1.293 0.202
ߚ෨஼௉೟
ோா ೞ் 0 1 0.393 0.704 23.253 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ ≥ 0−1, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 -2.453 0.018
Adj. R2 0.799 0.730
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Table 7.10(Cont.): Human retailers’ order quantity decision models
Decision Model:
(7.9)
RET2 RET3
‘price and profit conscious’ ‘price and cost conscious’
N=68 N=35
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ߚ෨ோா మ் ߣோா మ் ݐఉ(ோா మ்) ݌ఉ(ோா మ்) ߚ෨ோா య் ߣோா య் ݐఉ(ோா య்) ݌ఉ(ோா య்)
ߚ଴
ோா ೞ் 130.858 - 4.111 <0.001 23.229 - 3.497 0.002
ߚௐ ௉ೈ
ோா ೞ் -6.956 1 -4.658 <0.001 -11.858 1 -4.302 <0.001
ߚ෨ைொ೟షభ
ோா ೞ் 39.146 -3 1.127 0.268 40.017 -3 1.707 0.103
ߚ෨ௌ೟షಽೃశభ
ோா ೞ் 36.845 -3 1.072 0.292 -7.463 -3 -0.286 0.778
ߚ෨ூே೟
ோா ೞ் 61.949 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 00.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 1.513 0.139 -0.001 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 01, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0  -0.931 0.363
ߚ෨஼௉೟
ோா ೞ் 0.365 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ≥ 00.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 2.542 0.016 0 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ ≥ 01, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ< 0  2.656 0.015
Adj. R2 0.722 0.761
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Table 7.11: Human wholesalers’ pricing decision models
Decision Model:
(7.7)
WHL0 WHL1
‘price and past order reactive’ ‘price and present availability reactive’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ߙ෤ௐ ு௅బ ߣௐ ு௅బ ݐఈ(ௐ ு௅బ) ݌ఈ(ௐ ಹಽబ) ߙ෤ௐ ு௅భ ߣௐ ಹಽభ ݐఈ(ௐ ு௅భ) ݌ఈ(ௐ ு௅భ)
଴ܽ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0.472 - 0.733 0.470 3.076 - 3.186 0.002
ௐܽ ௉ಾ ಲಿ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 1.388 1 7.327 <0.001 0.426 1 3.401 0.001
෤ܽைொ೟షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -1.166 -2 -2.153 0.04 0 -3 0.748 0.457
෤ܽௌ೟షಽೈ శభ
ௐ ಹಽೞ -0.254 -2 -0.642 0.526 0 -3 -0.033 0.974
෤ܽைொ೟ష೗ೃ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -0.283 -2 -0.680 0.502 0 -3 0.290 0.773
ௐܽ ௉೟ష೗ೃ
௪ு௅ೞ 0.588 1 9.594 <0.001 0.416 1 6.782 <0.001
෤ܽூே೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0.003 1 0.577 0.569 -0.038 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 01.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 -3.953 <0.001
෤ܽ஼௉೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0.002 1 1.268 0.216 0 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ≥ 01.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 -3.130 0.003
Adj. R2 0.940 0.851
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Table 7.11(Cont.): Human wholesalers’ pricing decision models
Decision Model:
(7.7)
WHL2 WHL3
‘price and future availability reactive’ ‘profit and present availability reactive’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ߙ෤ௐ ு௅మ ߣௐ ு௅మ ݐఈ(ௐ ு௅మ) ݌ఈ(ௐ ு௅మ) ߙ෤ௐ ு௅య ߣௐ ு௅య ݐఈ(ௐ ு௅య) ݌ఈ(ௐ ு௅య)
଴ܽ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0.195 - 0.618 0.538 -19.326 - -1.989 0.050
ௐܽ ௉ಾ ಲಿ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0.05 1 1.080 0.282 0.897 1 6.397 <0.001
෤ܽைொ೟షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -0.615 -2 -1.641 0.103 0 -3 0.431 0.667
෤ܽௌ೟షಽೈ శభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -0.309 -2 -2.032 0.044 35.808 -3 1.864 0.066
෤ܽைொ೟ష೗ೃ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -2.755 -2 6.155 <0.001 0 -3 -1.285 0.202
ௐܽ ௉೟ష೗ೃ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0.853 1 18.51 <0.001 -0.401 1 -2.533 0.013
෤ܽூே೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 ൜−2, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 00.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 -0.943 0.348 -15.337 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 0−1, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 -3.249 0.002
෤ܽ஼௉೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 ൜−2, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ≥ 00.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 -0.510 0.611 -19.747 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ ≥ 0−1, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 -2.22 0.029
Adj. R2 0.879 0.655
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Table 7.12: Human wholesalers’ order placement decision models
Decision Model:
(7.8)
WHL0 WHL1
‘price and future availability sensitive’ ‘price and present availability sensitive’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ߛ෤ௐ ு௅బ
Odds
Change
%
ߣௐ ு௅బ ܹ ߛ(ܹ ܪܮ0) ݌ߛ(ܹ ܪܮ0) ߛ෤ௐ ு௅భ OddsChange
%
ߣௐ ு௅భ ܹ ߛ(ܹ ܪܮ1) ݌ߛ(ܹ ܪܮ1)
ߛ଴
ௐ ு௅ೞ 98.307 - - 0 1 7.421 - - 1.774 0.183
ߛௐ ௉೟షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -8.363 -99.98 1 0.271 0.602 0 0 1 0.105 0.294
ߛௐ ௉೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ -6.898 -99.90 1 5.221 0.022 0 0 1 0.382 0.977
ߛௐ ௉ಷ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0.524 68.93 1 6.696 0.010 -1.241 -71.09 1 2.927 0.087
ߛ෤ைொ೟షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0.488 62.82 ܫ{݋ܳ ௧ି ଵ> 0} 7.089 0.008 0.104 10.96 1 0.694 0.405
ߛ෤ௌ೟షಽೈ శభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -3.32 -96.38 ܫ൛ܵ ௧ି ௅ೈ ାଵ> 0} 0.205 0.651 -0.048 -4.69 1 1.267 0.267
ߛ෤ைொ೟ష೗ೃ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -5.97 -99.74 ܫ൛ܳߧ ௧ି ௟ೃ> 0} 7.089 0.008 0 0 1 0.256 0.953
ߛ෤ூே೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ -0.153 -14.16 1 0.220 0.639 -0.021 -2.08 1 6.397 0.011
ߛ෤஼௉೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ -2.20 -88.92 1 2.338 0.126 0 0 1 1.535 0.215
Nagelkerke R2 0.989 0.631
Accuracy Rate 0.996 (>0.65 =by chance accuracy criterion) 0.849 (> 0.837 =by chance accuracy criterion)
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Table 7.12(Cont.): Human wholesalers’ order placement decision models
Decision Model:
(7.8)
WHL2 WHL3
‘price and future availability sensitive’ ‘price and part future availability sensitive’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ߛ෤ௐ ு௅మ
Odds
Change
%
ߣௐ ு௅మ ܹ (ܹܽ ܪܮ2) ݌ߛ(ܹ ܪܮ2) ߛ෤ௐ ு௅య OddsChange
%
ߣௐ ு௅య ܹ (ܹܽ ܪܮ3) ݌ߛ(ܹ ܪܮ3)
ߛ଴
ௐ ு௅ೞ 6.672 - - 6.017 0.014 4.097 - - 3.021 0.082
ߛௐ ௉೟షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0.11 11.63 1 7.089 0.010 -0.009 -0.90 1 0.013 0.911
ߛௐ ௉೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0.987 168.32 1 5.175 0.023 1.196 230.69 1 6.127 0.013
ߛௐ ௉ಷ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -2.208 -89.01 1 13.708 <0.001 -1.402 -75.39 1 6.553 0.01
ߛ෤ைொ೟షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -1.156 -68.53 ܫ{݋ܳ ௧ି ଵ> 0} 3.104 0.078 -5.789 -99.69 ܫ{݋ܳ ௧ି ଵ > 0} 4.132 0.042
ߛ෤ௌ೟షಽೈ శభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -0.199 -18.05 ܫ൛ܵ ௧ି ௅ೈ ାଵ> 0} 0.121 0.728 0 0 ܫ൛ܵ ௧ି ௅ೈ ାଵ> 0} 0.1 0.752
ߛ෤ைொ೟ష೗ೃ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -1.613 -80.07 ܫ൛ܳߧ ௧ି ௟ೃ> 0} 3.104 0.078 0 0 ܫ൛ܳߧ ௧ି ௟ೃ > 0ൟ 0.027 0.868
ߛ෤ூே೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ -0.007 -0.70 1 0.884 0.347 0 0 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 0−1, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 1.509 0.219
ߛ෤஼௉೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 0 1 0.805 0.369 0 0 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ≥ 0−1, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ< 0 0.456 0.5
Nagelkerke R2 0.682 0.975
Accuracy Rate 0.837(> 0.794 =by chance accuracy criterion) 0.958(> 0.638 =by chance accuracy criterion)
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Table 7.13: Human wholesalers’ order quantity decision models
Decision Model:
(7.9)
WHL0 WHL1
‘profit conscious’ ‘price and future availability conscious’
N=26 N=31
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ߚ෨ௐ ு௅బ ߣௐ ு௅బ ݐఉ(ௐ ு௅బ) ݌ఉ(ௐ ு௅బ) ߚ෨ௐ ு௅భ ߣௐ ு௅భ ݐఉ(ௐ ு௅భ) ݌ఉ(ௐ ு௅భ)
ߚ0ܹ ܪܮݏ 90.269 - 3.2 0.008 37,794.65 - 3.532 0.004
ߚௐ ௉೟షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 1 -1.138 0.307 0.656 1 3.785 0.003
ߚௐ ௉೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 1 0.750 0.487 -0.188 1 -2.114 0.056
ߚௐ ௉ಷ
ௐ ೈ ಹಽ -15.168 1 -2.748 0.019 0 1 0.346 0.736
ߚ෨ைொ೟షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 -2 0.520 0.626 -98.361 -3 -1.233 0.241
ߚ෨ௌ೟షಽೈ శభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 -2 0.293 0.781 -108,286 -3 -3.513 0.004
ߚ෨ைொ೟ష೗ೈ షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 -2 -1.155 0.3 -5,158.84 -3 -1.026 0.325
ߚ෨ூே೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 1 -1.680 0.154 0 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 01.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 -0.792 0.447
ߚ෨஼௉೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ -0.097 1 -2.497 0.055 0 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ≥ 01.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 0.750 0.464
Adj. R2 0.714 0.775
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Table 7.13(Cont.): Human wholesalers’ order quantity decision models
Decision Model:
(7.9)
WHL2 WHL3
‘price and current availability conscious’ ‘price and present and future availabilityconscious’
N=43 N=53
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ߚ෨ௐ ு௅మ ߣௐ ு௅మ ݐఉ(ௐ ு௅మ) ݌ఉ(ௐ ு௅మ) ߚ෨ௐ ு௅య ߣௐ ு௅య ݐఉ(ௐ ு௅య) ݌ఉ(ௐ ு௅య)
ߚ0ܹ ܪܮݏ 27.365 - 2.089 0.047 75.8 - 7.823 <0.001
ߚௐ ௉೟షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 4.805 1 1.327 0.197 0 1 -0.309 0.759
ߚௐ ௉೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ -8.14 1 -2.224 0.036 0.963 1 9.295 <0.001
ߚௐ ௉ಷ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 1 0.274 0.787 -0.953 1 -1.701 0.098
ߚ෨ைொ೟షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ -16.664 -2 -0.739 0.467 53.833 -3 0.979 0.335
ߚ෨ௌ೟షಽೈ శభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 -2 -0.025 0.980 -84.465 -3 -2.717 0.01
ߚ෨ைொ೟ష೗ೈ షభ
ௐ ு௅ೞ 7l.548 -2 3.032 0.006 0 -3 0.096 0.924
ߚ෨ூே೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ -0.053 ൜−2, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 00.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 -1.470 0.155 58.345 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 0−1, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 3.913 <0.001
ߚ෨஼௉೟
ௐ ு௅ೞ 0 ൜−2, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ≥ 00.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 -0.779 0.445 0 ൜−3, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ ≥ 0−1, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 0.461 0.648
Adj. R2 0.641 0.821
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Table 7.14: Human manufacturers’ pricing decision models
Decision Model:
(7.7)
MAN0 MAN1
‘incoming price reactive’ ‘past order and incoming price reactive’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ߙ෤ெ ஺ேబ ߣெ ஺ேబ ݐఈ(ெ ஺ேబ) ݌ఈ(ெ ஺ேబ) ߙ෤ெ ஺ேభ ߣெ ஺ேభ ݐఈ(ெ ஺ேభ) ݌ఈ(ெ ஺ேభ)
଴ܽ
ெ ஺ேೞ 2.313 - 3.396 0.002 22.314 - -1.781 0.079
෤ܽைொ೟షభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0.179 -2 0.207 0.837 0.029 1.5 2.884 0.005
෤ܽைொ೟షಽಷశభ
ெ ஺ேೞ -0.090 -2 -0.109 0.914 0 1.5 -0.05 0.96
෤ܽைொ೟ష೗ೈ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 -2 0.590 0.560 -0.007 1.5 -0.595 0.554
ௐܽ ௉೟ష೗ೈ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0.418 1 2.644 0.013 0.716 1 8.570 <0.001
෤ܽூே೟
ெ ஺ேೞ -0.009 1 -1.508 0.143 -0.002 ൜1.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 0−0.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 -0.307 0.760
෤ܽ஼௉೟
ெ ஺ேೞ 0.002 1 1.433 0.163 -0.011 ൜1.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ ≥ 0−0.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 -1.782 0.079
Adj. R2 0.722 0.785
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Table 7.14(Cont.): Human manufacturers’ pricing decision models
Decision Model:
(7.7)
MAN2 MAN3
‘incoming order and price reactive’ ‘fixed pricing’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ߙ෤ெ ஺ேమ ߣெ ஺ேమ ݐఈ(ெ ஺ேమ) ݌ఈ(ெ ஺ேమ) ߙ෤ெ ஺ேయ ߣெ ஺ேయ ݐఈ(ெ ஺ேయ) ݌ఈ(ெ ஺ேయ)
଴ܽ
ெ ஺ேೞ -2.498 - -1.237 0.218 3 - - -
෤ܽைொ೟షభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 1.5 -1.420 0.158 0 1 - -
෤ܽைொ೟షಽಷశభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 1.5 -0.637 0.525 0 1 - -
෤ܽைொ೟ష೗ೈ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0.001 1.5 3.5 0.001 0 1 - -
ௐܽ ௉೟ష೗ೈ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0.647 1 6.522 <0.001 0 1 - -
෤ܽூே೟
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 ൜1.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 0−0.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 -2.568 0.011 0 1 - -
෤ܽ஼௉೟
ெ ஺ேೞ -1.686 ൜1.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ ≥ 0−0.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 -1.563 0.120 0 1 - -
Adj. R2 0.705 -
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Table 7.15: Human manufacturers’ order placement decision models
Decision Model:
(7.8)
MAN0 MAN1
‘price sensitive’ ‘present availability sensitive’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ߛ෤ெ ஺ேబ
Odds
Change
%
ߣெ ஺ேబ ܹ ߛ(ܯܣܰ0) ݌ߛ(ܯܣܰ0) ߛ෤ெ ஺ேభ OddsChange
%
ߣெ ஺ேభ ܹ ߛ(ܯܣܰ1) ݌ߛ(ܯܣܰ1)
ߛ଴
ெ ஺ேೞ 1.869 - - 0.241 0.623 -1.049 - - 0.793 0.373
ߛௐ ௉೟షభ
ெ ஺ேೞ -1.19 -69.58 1 2.038 0.153 -0.139 -12.98 1 1.313 0.252
ߛௐ ௉೟
ெ ஺ேೞ 1.224 240.08 1 3.603 0.058 0 0 1 1.832 0.176
ߛ෤ைொ೟షభ
ெ ஺ேೞ -2.783 -93.81 ܫ{݋ܳ ௧ି ଵ> 0} 2.774 0.096 1.039 182.64 ܫ{݋ܳ ௧ି ଵ > 0} 2.348 0.125
ߛ෤ைொ೟షಽಷషభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 2.062 686.17 ܫ൛ܵ ௧ି ௅ಷିଵ> 0} 1.035 0.309 0 0 ܫ൛ܵ ௧ି ௅ಷିଵ> 0} 0.779 0.810
ߛ෤ைொ೟ష೗ೢ
ெ ஺ேೞ -0.091 -8.70 ܫ൛ܳߧ ௧ି ௟ೢ> 0} 0.003 0.954 -0.481 -38.18 ܫ൛ܳߧ ௧ି ௟ೢ > 0ൟ 0.415 0.519
ߛ෤ூே೟
ெ ஺ேೞ -0.044 -4.30 1 1.472 0.225 -0.111 -10.51 1 17.477 <0.001
ߛ෤஼௉೟
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 0 1 0.003 0.953 -0.005 -0.50 1 0.861 0.353
Nagelkerke R2 0.776 0.661
Accuracy Rate 0.886 (>0.63 =by chance accuracy criterion) 0.84 (> 0.638 =by chance accuracy criterion)
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Table 7.15(Cont.): Human manufacturers’ order placement decision models
Decision Model:
(7.8)
MAN2 MAN3
‘price and profit sensitive’ ‘profit and present and future availabilitysensitive’
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ߛ෤ெ ஺ேమ
Odds
Change
%
ߣெ ஺ேమ ܹ (ܽܯܣܰ2) ݌ߛ(ܯܣܰ2) ߛ෤ெ ஺ேయ OddsChange
%
ߣெ ஺ேయ ܹ (ܽܯܣܰ3) ݌ߛ(ܯܣܰ3)
ߛ଴
ெ ஺ேೞ -18.531 - - 5.155 0.023 1.005 - - 5.990 0.014
ߛௐ ௉೟షభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 0 1 -0.677 0.5 - - 1 - -
ߛௐ ௉೟
ெ ஺ேೞ 0.342 40.78 1 17.656 <0.001 - - 1 - -
ߛ෤ைொ೟షభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0.007 0.70 1 0.921 0.337 -0.045 -4.40 1 15.078 <0.001
ߛ෤ைொ೟షಽಷషభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 0 1 -0.019 0.985 -0.034 -3.34 1 11.831 0.001
ߛ෤ைொ೟ష೗ೢ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 0 1 0.979 0.329 -0.006 -0.6 1 0.710 0.400
ߛ෤ூே೟
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 0 ൜1.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 0−0.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 0.168 0.867 -0.062 -6.01 1 16.946 <0.001
ߛ෤஼௉೟
ெ ஺ேೞ -7.913 -99.96 ൜1.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ ≥ 0−0.5 ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 3.551 0.06 0.005 0.5 1 11.852 0.001
Nagelkerke R2 0.666 0.726
Accuracy Rate 0.707 (> 0.626 =by chance accuracy criterion) 0.763 (> 0.631 =by chance accuracy criterion)
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Table 7.16: Human manufacturers’ order quantity decision models
Decision Model:
(7.9)
MAN0 MAN1
‘past price and present availability conscious’ ‘profit and present and future availabilityconscious’
N=34 N=24
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ߚ෨ெ ஺ேబ ߣெ ஺ேబ ݐఉ(ெ ஺ேబ) ݌ఉ(ெ ஺ேబ) ߚ෨ெ ஺ேభ ߣெ ஺ேభ ݐఉ(ெ ஺ேభ) ݌ఉ(ெ ஺ேభ)
ߚ0ܯܣܰݏ 122.245 - 7.511 <0.001 4.68 - 2.924 0.007
ߚௐ ௉೟షభ
ெ ஺ேೞ -22.685 1 -6.228 <0.001 0 1 -0.454 0.654
ߚௐ ௉೟
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 1 0.641 0.533 0 1 0.011 0.991
ߚ෨ைொ೟షభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 -2 0.095 0.926 -0.211 1.5 5.010 <0.001
ߚ෨ைொ೟షಽಷషభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 -2 0.175 0.864 -0.086 1.5 -1.533 0.138
ߚ෨ைொ೟ష೗ೈ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 -2 0.087 0.932 0.174 1.5 -1.996 0.057
ߚ෨ூே೟
ெ ஺ேೞ -0.627 1 -4.977 <0.001 -0.306 ൜1.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 0−0.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 -0.927 0.363
ߚ෨஼௉೟
ெ ஺ேೞ 0.054 1 2.193 0.044 -2.382 ൜1.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ ≥ 0−0.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 2.916 0.007
Adj. R2 0.857 0.781
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Table 7.16(Cont.): Human manufacturers’ order quantity decision models
Decision Model:
(7.9)
MAN2 MAN3
‘present price and present availability conscious’ ‘present and part future availability conscious’
N=53 N=32
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ߚ෨ெ ஺ேమ ߣெ ஺ேమ ݐఉ(ெ ஺ேమ) ݌ఉ(ெ ஺ேమ) ߚ෨ெ ஺ேయ ߣெ ஺ேయ ݐఉ(ெ ஺ேయ) ݌ఉ(ெ ஺ேయ)
ߚ0ܯܣܰݏ 16.565 - 1.077 0.286 96.186 - 3.844 <0.001
ߚௐ ௉೟షభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 1 0.097 0.923 0 1 - -
ߚௐ ௉೟
ெ ஺ேೞ 32.516 1 6.037 <0.001 0 1 - -
ߚ෨ைொ೟షభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0.033 1.5 1.813 0.075 -14.774 -2 -3.505 0.001
ߚ෨ைொ೟షಽಾ ಲಿ షభ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 1.5 -0.742 0.461 -53.926 -2 -1.307 0.199
ߚ෨ைொ೟ష೗ೈ ಹಽ
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 1.5 0.314 0.755 -66.249 -2 -1.417 0.165
ߚ෨ூே೟
ெ ஺ேೞ -0.022 ൜1.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 0−0.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 -1.992 0.051 -42.123 ൜−2, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ ≥ 02.5, ݂݅ ܰܫ ௧ < 0 -3.145 0.003
ߚ෨஼௉೟
ெ ஺ேೞ 0 ൜1.5, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ ≥ 0−0.5 ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 0.042 0.967 0 ൜−2, ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ ≥ 02.5 ݂݅ ܥ ௧ܲ < 0 0.160 0.874
Adj. R2 0.749 0.621
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In this regard, the deviation between the total profits that were observed
during the actual experimental session and the profits that would be realised if
each human subject was assumed to be replaced by the corresponding
combination of inferred decision models is explored. In this study if a difference
of profits of a magnitude that is lower than 20%1 takes place, a reliable
correspondence is assumed. Table 7.17 summarises the difference of profits that
are observed.
Building on this, Table 7.17 confirms the reliable correspondence of the
decision models that have fitted to most human participants (according to Tables
7.9-7.16). The reader should at this point be reassured that the slightly higher
than 20% deviation (i.e. 22%, as can be seen from the first row of Table 7.17)
that was observed between the actual “Base Session” that MAN0, WHL0 and RET0
conducted over the board and the corresponding simulation run with the inferred
decision models is attributed to the fact that the same dataset was used to infer
three different decision models. For this reason, this deviation is not considered
to be unreliable.
Nevertheless, there are two exceptions that need to be treated as unreliable:
the decision models that have been fitted to the human manufacturers MAN1 and
MAN3, which generate a 40% and 34.1% difference of profits, respectively. The
explanation of this poor predictive power of the decision models that have been
fitted to the recorded decisions of MAN1 and MAN3 possibly lie at the small
1The fact that 20% is assumed to indicate a reliable correspondence between the total
profits that were observed during the actual experimental session and the profits that
would be realised if each human subject was assumed to be replaced by the
corresponding combination of inferred decision models originates from the insight that
was gained during all actual experimental sessions.
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number of non-zero orders that MAN1 and MAN3 placed. Table 7.16 confirms that
the order quantity decision models of MAN1 and MAN3 have been inferred based
on the smallest number of valid observations. Due to this unreliable
correspondence, the decision models that correspond to human manufacturers
MAN1 and MAN3 (i.e. the grey shaded rows in Table 7.17) are eliminated from
further consideration. Nevertheless, it is viewed as encouraging that although the
decision models that have been fitted to MAN1 were used in the gaming sessions
that WHL3, WHL1 and RET2 participated (i.e. Sessions No. 6-8, according to
Table 7.8), the decision models that have been fitted to WHL3, WHL1 and RET2
do demonstrate a reliable correspondence. For this reason, the decision models
that have been fitted to WHL3, WHL1 and RET2 are kept in the subsequent
analysis.
Table 7.17: Difference of Profits between actual experimental session and inferred
decision models
Participant or Total Profit Total Profit Difference
Session
No.
Corresponding Decision
Models
realised during the
course of actual
experimental
session
realised when
inferred decision
models are in place
of Profits
(%)
1 MAN0, WHL0, RET0 -1,500 m.u. -1,170 m.u. 22
2 WHL2 300 m.u. 360 m.u. 20
3 RET3 -25,000 m.u. -29,500 m.u. 18
4 RET1 -350 m.u. -283 m.u. 19.1
5 MAN1 -20,000 m.u. -12,000 m.u. 40
6 WHL3 -10,000 m.u. -7,400 m.u. 20
7 WHL1 -12,000 m.u. -9,360 m.u. 16
8 RET2 -28,000 m.u. -22,442 m.u. 19.9
9 MAN2 -15,000 m.u. -17,852 m.u. 19
10 MAN3 -22,000 m.u. -29,520 m.u. 34.1
7.3.4 Stage 4: The Agent-Based Simulation Model Runs
The object of the fourth stage is to explore under all possible interactions of
inferred decision making strategies the overall performance of the wholesale
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price contract in the Contract Beer Distribution Game setting. To this end, the
ABS model of the Contract Beer Distribution Game is run for all possible
combinations of decision models. In greater detail, the interacting partners’
respective decision models are treated as the treatment factors of analysis (TF1:
retailer, TF2: wholesaler and TF3: manufacturer), with TF1 appearing at s1=4
levels (RETi, i=0-3); TF2 at s2=4 levels (WHLj, j=0-3) and TF3 at s3=2 levels
(MANk k=0, 2). The reason that the human manufacturers MAN1 and MAN3 are
eliminated from the analysis is that a reliable correspondence of observed and
simulated profits could not be assured. This conclusion is supported by Table
7.17. Since the total number of all possible TF1 – TF2– TF3 combinations (TF1 x
TF2 x TF3 =32) is not prohibitively high, Chapter 8 reports the simulation results
of the resulting asymmetrical, full factorial experimental design (Robinson, 2000;
Toutenburg, 2002; Mukerjee and Wu, 2006).
But in order to draw statistically accurate conclusions and, thus, test the
research hypotheses that are formulated in Section 7.2 and concern the simulated
human participants’ WPi- prices (i.e. CBG.1) and OQi – quantities (i.e. C.B.G. 2),
the emerging competition penalties (i.e. C.B.G. 3) and the degree of prevalence
of the bullwhip effect (i.e. C.B.G. 4), a number of conventions need to be applied
to all ABS model runs. The run strategy that is followed (i.e. warm-up, run length
and number of replications) is summarized in the paragraph that follows.
Figures 7.7 and 7.8 demonstrate how the decision models that have been
fitted to the recorded decisions of human participants require some time to
converge to their steady state mean values (Figures 7.7 and 7.8 present
indicatively the first 500 time periods). The reason is that these decision rules
start from an initial state that is far removed from the steady state mean value. In
order, thus, to ensure that inferences are not made while the “initialization bias”
phenomenon (Pidd, 2004; Robinson, 2004; Law, 2007; Hoad et al, 2009a) is still
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present and, in addition, to obtain accurate estimates of mean performances, the
following run strategy is implemented: i. An estimate of the warm-up length is
established according to the MSER-5 method (White, 1997; White and Spratt,
2000). The warm-up length is found from the longest warm-up (i.e. of the retailer
order quantities) for all the output values to amount to 1,400 time periods. ii. The
model is run for 15,000 time periods, according to Banks et al.’s (2005)
recommendation to run for at least ten times the length of the warm-up period. iii.
In order to obtain accurate estimates of mean performances each simulation run is
replicated for n=50 times, following Hoad et al.’s (2009b) replications algorithm.
Figures 7.7 and 7.8 present the price and order quantity decisions of the
combination of models that correspond to the interaction of RET0, WHL2 and
MAN0. This particular interaction is only selected for illustration purposes, while
similar conclusions can be drawn for all the decision models that have been fitted
to all participants’ decisions.
Figure 7.7: WHL2 and MAN0 price decisions, according to the simulation model
(treatment combination: RET0 - WHL2 - MAN0)
ܹ ܲ (݅ݐ)
c
ܹ ௐܲ ு௅(ݐ)
p
ܹ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ)
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Figure 7.8: RET0, WHL2 and MAN0 order decisions, according to the simulation model
(treatment combination: RET0 - WHL2 - MAN0 )
Outcome 4: The Key Outcomes
The key outcomes that are obtained from the ABS Contract Beer Distribution
Game model (i.e. the simulated human participants’ WPi- prices and OQi –
quantities, the emerging competition penalties and the dominance of the bullwhip
effect) are presented in Chapter 8.
7.4 Verification and Validation
Although verification and validation have been performed in parallel with
developing any version of the ABS Contract Beer Distribution Game model
(North and Macal, 2007; Robinson, 2008), some steps that have been undertaken
to verify and validate the ABS model are summarised in the paragraphs that
follow.
As far as verification is concerned, each model function, routine and
component, in this order and priority, have been tested separately. Only after all
relevant tests have been successful is the entire model tested on the aggregate
ܱܳௐ ு௅(ݐ)ܱܳெ ஺ே (ݐ)
ܱܳோா்(ݐ)
ܱܳ (݅ݐ)
t
t
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level. To this end, source code analysis and ‘unit testing’ have been performed;
according to which as many test cases as possible have been covered (Pidd, 2004;
North and Macal, 2007). Among these test cases, ‘extreme conditions’ and
‘simplifying assumptions’, that enable one to produce results manually, have
played a crucial role (Law, 2007). Indicative examples of such ‘extreme
conditions’ and ‘simplifying assumptions’ are: cases for which no orders are
placed from any of the participating agents or no customer demand occurs or
fixed deterministic orders are always placed. For example, in the case that no
orders are placed from any of the participating agents and the customer demand is
assumed fixed at 4 cases of beer, the retailer’s inventory should steadily decrease
per 4 cases of beer in every time period (i.e. take the values of 8, 4, 0, -4 etc.) and
the wholesaler’s and the manufacturer’s inventory availability should constantly
remain equal to 12. Table 7.18 presents another example, when the manufacturer
is assumed to place fixed orders of size 8, the wholesaler and the retailer are
enforced to place fixed orders of size 4 and the customer demand is assumed to
follow Sterman’s (1989) step-up function. In this case, it can be manually
calculated that all supply chain partners’ corresponding inventory availabilities
derive as shown in Table 7.18.
Table 7.18: Example of ‘simplifying assumptions’ under which the ABS model of the
Contract Beer Distribution Game is ran
Manufacturer’s Orders: [8,8,8,8,8,8,8,8]
Wholesaler’s Orders: [4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4]
Retailer’s Orders: [4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4]
Demands: [4,4,4,4,8,8,8,8]
OUTCOME
Inventory Availability of the Manufacturer:
Inventory Availability of the Wholesaler:
Inventory Availability of the Retailer:
[12,12,12,16,20,24,28,32]
[12,12,12,12,12,12,12,12]
[12,12,12,12,8,4,0,-4]
The results that are produced by the ABS Contract Beer Distribution
Game model coincide with these manual calculations. These ‘extreme conditions’
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should, nevertheless, not be considered as restrictive, but only serve as illustrative
examples. For these scenarios the results that are obtained from the simulation
model have been compared with the results that are derived manually. In this
way, it has been ensured that the ABS Contract Beer Distribution Game model
operates as intended.
An additional technique that has been applied to the objective of
verification is following ‘traces’ (Law, 2007: pg. 249). According to this, just
after a new shipment is received, the contents of each agent’s warehouse is
displayed and enumerated. These contents have been subsequently compared
with the corresponding manual expectations. As for these expectations, they are
built on the inventory balance equations (6.4a) and (6.4b) and the following three
balance equations that concern shipments that are received and orders that are in
backlog. The aforementioned set of five balance equations should be satisfied in
all time periods t.
Balance Equations of Traces
෍ ܦ (ܵ )݆
௧
= [ܰܫ ଵ(ݐ)]ି + ෍ ܦ( )݆
௧
ܱܳ௜(ݐ− ܮ௜− ௜݈) + [ܰܫ ௜ାଵ(ݐ− 1)]ି = [ܰܫ ௜ାଵ(ݐ− 2)]ି + ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ) for i = 1, 2
ܱܳଷ(ݐ− ܮଷ − ଷ݈) = ସܵ(ݐ)
where ∑ ܦ (ܵ )݆௧ reflects the total demand that has been satisfied by the retailer
over t periods and ସܵ(ݐ) represents the total production lot that has been received
by the manufacturer at time period t. This last balance equation ensures that the
manufacturing facility’s perfect reliability is actually implemented by the model
source code.
With respect to validation, both the agents’ distinct behavioural rules and
the overall ABS model behaviour have been validated (North and Macal, 2007).
In order to validate the agents’ decision rules, a reliable correspondence between
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the simulated profits and the actual profits has been ensured. In this way, it has
been validated that the agents’ decisions don’t differ significantly from the
corresponding decisions that the participants were observed to make in the
laboratory (Sterman, 1989). Table 7.17 summarises all relevant results. In order
to validate the overall ABS model behaviour, ‘black box validation’ has been
conducted (Pidd, 2004; Robinson, 2004). To this end, the results that are obtained
from the overall model have been compared with existing, confirmed, results. As
existing, confirmed, results are treated: i. the real world data that were acquired
during the course of the “Base” session (i.e. grey shaded row of Table 7.8) and ii.
the widely accepted results of the Beer Distribution Game. The reliable
correspondence between the simulated profits and the actual profits that were
observed during the “Base” session serves as the first successful ‘black box
validation’ test.
As the second successful ‘black box validation’ test is treated the confirmed
ability of the ABS model of the Contract Beer Distribution Game to reproduce
the full spectrum of possible outcomes from stability to pure chaos that is
reported by North and Macal (2007) in their reproduction of Mosekilde et al.’s
(1991) implementation of the Beer Distribution Game.
i. Stability: After some initial transient period, the system eventually settles down
to a more stable state. It is evident from Figure 7.9 that after period 26, RET2,
WHL0, MAN0 settle down to not placing any new orders with their respective
upstream suppliers. Figure 7.9 presents an example of stability.
ii. Transiency: After some initial unstable behaviour, the system eventually settles
down and indefinitely exhibits only small fluctuations. In Figure 7.10 it can be
identified that after period 16 RET3, WHL3 and MAN2 cease to vary their order
quantity decisions widely.
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Thus, Figure 7.10 presents an indicative example of transiency.
ܱܳ (݅ݐ)
ܱܳ (݅ݐ)
ܱܳௐ ு௅(ݐ)ܱܳெ ஺ே (ݐ)
ܱܳோா்(ݐ)
t
Figure 7.10: Transiency - Order quantity decisions, according to the simulation model of the
treatment combination: RET2 – WHL3 – MAN2
Figure 7.9: Stability - Order quantity decisions, according to the simulation model (treatment
combination: RET3 – WHL1 - MAN0)
ܱܳௐ ு௅(ݐ)ܱܳெ ஺ே (ݐ)
ܱܳோா்(ݐ)
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iii. Periodicity: The system presents recurring cycles of oscillations that could be
easily predicted. In Figure 7.11 WHL3 and MAN0 periodically reproduce orders of
sizes that are of repeating patterns.
iv. Chaos: The system suffers from persistent oscillations of no predictable pattern.
Figure 7.12 shows that the order decisions of RET2, WHL1 and MAN0 constantly
fluctuate and, thus, generate a chaos.
t
ܱܳ (݅ݐ)
ܱܳௐ ு௅(ݐ)ܱܳெ ஺ே (ݐ)
ܱܳோா்(ݐ)
t
Figure 7.12: Chaos - Order quantity decisions, according to the simulation model of the
treatment combination: RET2 – WHL1 – MAN0
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Figure 7.11: Periodicity - Order quantity decisions, according to the simulation model of the
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Since the results of these verification and validation activities are
encouraging, some confidence is gained in the accuracy of the ABS model of the
Contract Beer Distribution Game2.
7.5 Summary
This chapter reminds the reader of the Contract Beer Distribution Game’s
specification, summarises the analytical results that are developed in Chapter 6
and the existing relevant experimental results that are known about the traditional
Beer Distribution Game in Sub-section 2.2.2. It then uses these known results to
build the research hypotheses about human participants’ WPi- prices being
significantly higher than the prices that they are charged (i.e. CBG.1), human
participants’ OQi – quantities being significantly different from the quantities that
they are requested to deliver (i.e. C.B.G. 2), the emerging competition penalties
being significantly different from 0 (i.e. C.B.G. 3) and the degree of prevalence
of the bullwhip effect (i.e. C.B.G. 4).
The chapter subsequently describes in some detail the approach that this
PhD thesis has followed to address the aforementioned research hypotheses. In
greater detail, this research uses ABS models, which have been calibrated via
human experiments. In this way, it builds statistically accurate conclusions about
the effect that different prolonged interactions between dynamic, heterogeneous
and autonomous decisions of human echelon managers can have on the wholesale
price contract’s performance, when applied to the Beer Distribution Game
setting. In this way, it manages to accommodate: i. human intentions that might
2The reader should at this point be reassured that the reason that all possible different
states are produced is that all possible combinations of inferred decision models are
studied. This result that further confirms our main argument here that the system overall
behaviour depends on the interplay between the interacting decision making strategies.
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be different from profit maximisation, ii. human actions that might differ from
their corresponding intentions in heterogeneous ways (i.e. heterogeneous
bounded rationality), iii. human reactions that might depend on their surrounding
environment and changes that occur if any and iv. human decisions that are
independent and autonomous. In this way, it successfully addresses the literature
gaps G.1-G.4 that are identified in Table 2.5 (s. Section 2.4) for the Beer
Distribution Game setting.
Chapter 8 presents the results that are obtained from the ABS Contract
Beer Distribution Game model, so that statistically accurate conclusions about
the research hypotheses CBG.1 – CBG.4 can be drawn.
Chapter 8
The Contract Beer Distribution Game Results
The purpose of this chapter is to draw statistically accurate conclusions about the
effect that different prolonged interactions between dynamic, heterogeneous and
autonomous decisions can have on the wholesale price contract’s performance,
when applied to the Beer Distribution Game setting. To this end, this chapter
presents and discusses the results that are obtained from the ABS model that is
described in Sub-section 7.3.4. In this way, Chapter 8 addresses the research
hypotheses that concern human participants’ WPi- prices being significantly
higher than the prices that they are charged (i.e. CBG.1), OQi – quantities being
significantly different from the quantities that they are requested to deliver (i.e.
C.B.G. 2), the emerging competition penalties being significantly different from
0 (i.e. C.B.G. 3) and the bullwhip effect prevailing (i.e. C.B.G. 4), as formulated
in Section 7.2.
This chapter presents the results that are acquired from the ABS model in
the same order that the research hypotheses have also been formulated. It starts
by discussing the simulated human participants’ decisions about wPi-prices and
oQi-quantities, proceeds to the competition penalties that emerge from all
possible interactions and finishes by discussing the degree to which the bullwhip
effect prevails. In this way, the research hypotheses CBG.1-CBG.4, are in turn,
tested. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion and a reflection on the
managerial implications and the practical significance of the results that are
obtained.
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The steady state mean results of n=50 simulated replications for all 32
possible treatment combinations are presented in the tables of Sections 8.1-8.4. In
greater detail, Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present the simulated human participants’
steady state mean ܹ ܲതതതതത௜ – prices. In the same way Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.7 outline
the simulated participants’ steady state mean ܱܳതതതത௜– order quantities respectively.
Table 8.9 portrays the steady state mean competition penalties that are attained by
all studied interactions and Table 8.10 the percentage of cases for which variance
amplification is exhibited. More details about the data that are presented in these
tables is provided in the sub-sections that follow.
Tables 8.1-8.2, 8.4-8.5, 8.7 and 8.9-8.10 are organised as follows: between
parentheses () in italics font the standard deviation of all different replications’
results is given, while between brackets [] in bold font the half widths of the
corresponding 99% confidence intervals are provided. The reason that all
inferences are based on the low significance level of  = 0.01 is on the side of
caution in rejecting a null hypothesis and, so, reducing the probability of
committing a Type I error. For the reasons that are discussed in Sub-section 7.3.3
the human manufacturers MAN1 and MAN3 have been excluded from the analysis.
8.1 Participants’ ࢃ ࡼതതതതത࢏- prices
The object of this section is to test whether the simulated human participants in
the Contract Beer Distribution Game would make ‘locally good’ price decisions,
namely test the research hypothesis CBG.1. In respect to this, the simulated
participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game are expected to charge WPi-
prices that are significantly higher than the prices that they are charged. In this
regard, Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present the simulated human manufacturers’ and
wholesalers’ ܹ ܲതതതതത௜ – price decisions. In greater detail, Table 8.1 focuses on the
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simulated human manufacturers, while Table 8.2 turns attention to the simulated
human wholesalers. Table 8.3 compares the prices that are charged by the
simulated human manufacturers and the wholesalers. The reason that
manufacturers’ price decisions are first presented and are subsequently followed
by wholesalers’ price decisions is that this is the way that prices are transmitted
along the Beer Distribution Game supply chain.
8.1.1 Manufacturers’ ࢃ ࡼതതതതതࡹ ࡭ࡺ – prices
Table 8.1 portrays the simulated human manufacturers ܹ ܲതതതതതெ ஺ே – price decisions
over n=50 simulated replications for all 32 treatment combinations studied.
Among the decision attributes of models of type (7.7) that have been fitted to
human manufacturers’ price decisions (according to Table 7.14) only the
incoming order quantities ܱܳௐ ு௅(ݐ− ௐ݈ ு௅), the inventory positions ܰܫ ெ ஺ே (ݐ)
and the cumulatively realized profits ∑ ெܲ ஺ே ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ are affected by the variation
of customer demand that exists between different replications. But since the
‘incoming order price reactive’ MAN0 is the only human manufacturer who takes
into account the decision attributes the incoming order quantities ܱܳௐ ு௅(ݐ−
ௐ݈ ு௅), the inventory positions ܰܫ ெ ஺ே (ݐ) and the cumulatively realized profits
∑ ெܲ ஺ே ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ in his respective price decisions according to Table 7.14, non-zero
standard deviations derive for only some of his interactions that are studied. The
remaining interactions of Table 8.1 exhibit standard deviations that are exactly
equal to 0. For this reason, all corresponding half-width 99% confidence intervals
for all ܹ ܲതതതതതெ ஺ே – price decisions reported become equal to 0.
It can be observed from Table 8.1 that the simulated human manufacturers
seem not to vary the prices that they charge depending on the interacting
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wholesaler and retailer. Therefore, the simulated human manufacturers appear to
have their own preferred strategies that are independent of wholesaler-retailer
interaction pairs. There is, nevertheless, one exception (i.e. the grey shaded row
of Table 8.1): the interaction of the ‘incoming price reactive’ manufacturer MAN0
and the ‘price and future availability reactive’ wholesaler WHL2, in which the
interacting simulated human retailer seems to affect MAN0 price decisions. The
reason is that the interaction of WHL2 with MAN0 is the only interaction, in which
both the interacting wholesaler and the interacting manufacturer consider order
quantities in their price decisions (according to Tables 7.11 and 7.14,
respectively).
It is very interesting that the simulated human manufacturers MAN0 and
MAN2 seem to employ two opposite strategies to ensure their profitability. The
simulated ‘incoming price reactive’ MAN0, solely aware of his own previously
charged prices as he is (according to Table 7.14), prefers to attract a demand that
is sufficiently high to maximise his individual profit. In order, thus, to achieve
this high demand, he insists on charging low prices. In this regard, his pricing
strategy could be viewed as ‘demand – driven’. As for the simulated ‘incoming
order and price reactive’ MAN2, she appears to be highly conscious of the
incoming order quantities from the wholesaler (according to Table 7.14) and,
therefore, aware of the high probability of not receiving orders that are strictly
positive. For this reason, she seems to adopt the view that strictly positive
margins can ensure profitability. To this end, MAN2, chooses to charge high
prices. This is why her pricing strategy can be characterised as ‘profit margin -
driven’.
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Table 8.1: Simulated manufacturers’ ࢃ ࡼതതതതതࡹ ࡭ࡺ – price decisions3
R
W - F
RET0 RET1 RET2 RET3
WHL0 –
MAN0
0.5 (0)
[0]
0.5 (0)
[0]
0.5 (0)
[0]
0.5 (0)
[0]
WHL0 –
MAN2
44.59 (0)
[0]
44.58 (0)
[0]
44.58 (0)
[0]
44.58 (0)
[0]
WHL1 –
MAN0
0.5 (0)
[0]
0.5 (0)
[0]
0.5 (0)
[0]
0.5 (0)
[0]
WHL1 –
MAN2
44.59 (0)
[0]
44.58 (0)
[0]
44.57 (0)
[0]
44.58 (0)
[0]
WHL2 –
MAN0
26.94 (1.168)
[0.196]
0.5 (0)
[0]
10 (0)
[0]
9.998 (0.003)
[0]
WHL2 –
MAN2
44.57 (0)
[0]
44.57 (0)
[0]
44.57 (0)
[0]
44.57 (0)
[0]
WHL3 –
MAN0
0.5 (0)
[0]
3.187 (0)
[0]
0.5 (0)
[0]
0.5 (0)
[0]
WHL3 –
MAN2
44.59 (0)
[0]
44.58 (0)
[0]
44.9 (0)
[0]
44.9 (0)
[0]
Since the ‘incoming price reactive’ manufacturer MAN0 constantly charges
prices that are not significantly different from the manufacturing cost (i.e. c =
0.50 m.u.), the research hypothesis CBG.1 needs to be rejected for his treatment
combinations MAN0, WHLi, RETj with i=0, 1, 3 and j=0,...,3.
However, for ¾ of the interactions in which the ‘incoming price reactive’
manufacturer MAN0 interacts with the ‘price and future availability reactive’
3 This table presents the following information about the simulated manufacturers’ prices
over n=50 replications: i. averages in regular font, ii. standard deviations in italics font
(between parentheses), iii. the half widths of the corresponding 99% confidence intervals
in bold font (between brackets).
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wholesaler WHL2 (i.e. the grey shaded row of Table 8.1), MAN0 charges
significantly higher prices than his own incurred manufacturing cost. Therefore,
for these interactions the research hypothesis CBG.1 cannot be rejected (i.e.
ݓܲതതതതெ ஺ே > ܿ at p<0.01 for: MAN0, WHL2, RETi with i=1, 3, 4). Overall the
research hypothesis CBG.1 cannot be rejected for 18.75% of the interactions of
MAN0. However, the research hypothesis CBG.1 needs to be rejected for the
remaining 81.25% of the MAN0 interactions studied. Building on this observation,
MAN0 appears to make ‘locally poor’ price decisions for the majority of the
interactions studied.
Table 8.1 demonstrates that the simulated ‘incoming order and price
reactive’ manufacturer MAN2 charges prices that are significantly higher than the
manufacturing cost, independently of the interacting wholesaler-retailer
interaction pair. The result is that the research hypothesis CBG.1 cannot be
rejected for any of the treatment combinations, in which MAN2 participates (i.e.
ݓܲതതതതெ ஺ே > ܿ at p<0.01 for the following interactions: MAN2, WHLi, RETj with
i=0...3 and j=0,...,3). Therefore, MAN2 appears to constantly make ‘locally good’
price decisions.
8.1.2 Wholesalers’ ࢃ ࡼതതതതതࢃ ࡴࡸ – prices
Table 8.2 presents the simulated human wholesalers’ܹ ܲതതതതതܹ ܪܮ – price decisions
over n=50 simulated replications for all 32 treatment combinations studied.
Among the decision attributes of models of type (7.7) that have been fitted to
human wholesalers’ price decisions (according to Table 7.11) only the shipments
to be received ெܵ ஺ே (ݐ− ܮௐ ு௅ + 1), the incoming order quantities ܱܳோா்(ݐ−
ோ݈ா்) and the current inventory positions ܰܫ ௐ ு௅(ݐ) are affected by the variation
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of customer demand that exists between different replications. Since WHL1,
WHL2 and WHL3 significantly consider these three decision attributes in their
price decisions (according to Table 7.11), non zero standard deviations occur for
some of the interactions in which these simulated human wholesalers come into
play, as can be observed from Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Simulated wholesalers’ ࢃ ࡼതതതതതࢃ ࡴࡸ – price decisions4
R
W - F
RET0 RET1 RET2 RET3
WHL0 –
MAN0
0.5 (0)
[0]
0.5 (0)
[0]
0.5 (0)
[0]
0.5 (0)
[0]
WHL0 –
MAN2
44.59 (0)
[0]
44.58 (0)
[0]
44.58 (0)
[0]
44.58 (0)
[0]
WHL1 –
MAN0
249.0 (0.75)
[0.13]
249.04 (0.96)
[0.16]
249.47 (0.20)
[0.03]
249.35 (0.87)
[0.15]
WHL1 –
MAN2
249.69 (0.80)
[0.13]
249.53 (0.68)
[0.11]
248.93 (0.65)
[0.11]
248.22 (0.88)
[0.15]
WHL2 –
MAN0
19.79 (0.46)
[0.08]
1.59 (0.01)
[0]
4.837 (0.002)
[0]
5.952 (0.007)
[0.001]
WHL2 –
MAN2
25.86 (0)
[0]
17.266 (0)
[0]
17.27 (0)
[0]
17.27 (0)
[0]
WHL3 –
MAN0
10.97 (0)
[0]
3.54 (0)
[0]
10.97 (0)
[0]
5.07 (0.39)
[0.07]
WHL3 –
MAN2
34.13 (0.01)
[0.001]
33.59 (0.01)
[0.001]
52.66 (0)
[0]
52.66 (0)
[0]
4 This table presents the following information about the simulated wholesalers’ prices
over n=50 replications: i. averages in regular font, ii. standard deviations in italics font
(between parentheses), iii. the half widths of the corresponding 99% confidence intervals
in bold font (between brackets).
Chapter 8- The Contract Beer Distribution Game Results
330
But since WHL0 does not significantly consider any of these three decision
attributes in her price decisions (according to Table 7.8), the standard deviations
of all treatment combinations in which she participates are exactly equal to 0 (s.
Table 8.2).
It is also very interesting that all simulated human wholesalers seem to
follow the manufacturers’ example and attempt to ensure their profitability by
adopting two distinct strategies. In greater detail, they might prefer to adopt a
‘demand – driven’ pricing strategy and, hence, charge low prices, in order to
induce demand for the downstream retailer. These low prices may even be lower
than their own incurred prices. Alternatively, they might choose to employ a
‘profit margin - driven’ pricing strategy, in accordance with which they charge
prices that are sufficiently high to ensure strictly positive margins. In order to
identify which of these two pricing strategies the simulated human wholesalers
enforce, the research hypothesis CBG.1 needs to be tested for the simulated
human wholesalers. To this end, the steady state mean prices that are charged by
the simulated human wholesalers need to be compared with the corresponding
mean prices of the simulated human manufacturers. Table 8.3 summarises this
information.
It is evident from Table 8.3 that WHL0 is the only simulated human
wholesaler, who in steady state charges prices that, irrespective of the interacting
manufacturers and retailers, do not differ significantly from her own incurred
prices. This is highlighted by the first two grey shaded rows of Table 8.3. So, the
‘price and past order reactive’ WHL0 is the only human wholesaler who adopts
the ‘demand – driven’ pricing strategy. The other three simulated human
wholesalers, that is WHL1, WHL2 and WHL3, charge in steady state prices that on
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average are significantly higher than the corresponding manufacturer prices.
Thus, they seem to prefer the ‘profit margin - driven’ pricing strategy.
Table 8.3: Comparison of manufacturers ࢃ ࡼതതതതതࡹ ࡭ࡺ and wholesalers’ ࢃ ࡼതതതതതࢃ ࡴࡸ – price
decisions
R
W - F
RET0 RET1 RET2 RET3
ܹ ܲതതതതതெ ஺ே ܹ ܲതതതതതௐ ு௅ ܹ ܲതതതതതெ ஺ே ܹ ܲതതതതതௐ ு௅ ܹ ܲതതതതതெ ஺ே ܹ ܲതതതതതௐ ு௅ ܹ ܲതതതതതெ ஺ே ܹ ܲതതതതതௐ ு௅
WHL0
–
MAN0
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
WHL0
–
MAN2
44.59 44.59 44.58 44.58 44.58 44.58 44.58 44.58
WHL1
–
MAN0
0.5 249.0 0.5 249.04 0.5 249.47 0.5 249.35
WHL1
–
MAN2
44.59 249.69 44.58 249.53 44.57 248.93 44.58 248.22
WHL2
–
MAN0
26.94 19.79 0.5 1.59 10 4.837 9.998 5.952
WHL2
–
MAN2
44.57 25.86 44.57 17.266 44.57 17.27 44.57 17.27
WHL3
–
MAN0
0.5 10.97 3.187 3.54 0.5 10.97 0.5 5.07
WHL3
–
MAN2
44.59 34.13 44.58 33.59 44.9 52.66 44.9 52.66
The underlying reason for this difference might be that the ‘price and past
order reactive’WHL0 is the only wholesaler who relies on her past order quantities
to determine her new prices (s. Table 7.8). Focusing, thus, on selling the
shipments that she expects to receive from the manufacturer (i.e. her own past
order quantities ܱܳ௧ି ଵ), she appears to view low prices as inducing demand. This
is where the ‘demand – driven’ pricing strategy might stem from. On the other
hand, the ‘price and present availability reactive’ WHL1, the ‘price and future
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availability reactive’ WHL2 and the ‘profit and present availability reactive’
WHL3 prefer to consider in their price decisions their present or future inventory
availabilities instead of their previous order quantities. For this reason, they seem
to be highly conscious of inventory costs. Therefore, they might enforce a ‘profit
margin – driven’ pricing strategy, in order to compensate for these costs, from
which they cannot be protected.
Based on the above observations from Table 8.3, it naturally follows that
the research hypothesis CBG.1 that concerns human wholesalers’ prices being
significantly higher than the corresponding manufacturer prices needs to be
rejected for WHL0, but cannot be rejected for WHL1, WHL2 and WHL3 (i.e.
ݓܲതതതതܹ ܪܮ > ݓܲതതതതܯܣܰ at p<0.01). Hence, WHL0 appears to make ‘locally poor’ price
decisions, while WHL1, WHL2 and WHL3 appear to make ‘locally good’ price
decisions. The only exception for the ‘profit and present availability reactive’
wholesaler WHL3 is the interaction with the ‘incoming order and price reactive’
manufacturer MAN2, in which WHL3 charges on average prices that are
significantly lower than the prices that he is himself charged by MAN2. This
exception is highlighted by the last grey shaded row of Table 8.3.
The explanation that neither WHL1 nor WHL2 charge so low prices when
interacting with MAN2 most possibly lies at the fact that both the the ‘price and
present availability reactive’ WHL1 and the ‘price and future availability reactive’
WHL2 almost ignore their profits in their price decisions. Furthermore, the most
probable reason that WHL3 charges so low prices when he interacts with the
‘incoming order and price reactive’ manufacturer MAN2 and not the ‘incoming
price reactive’ manufacturer MAN0 is because MAN0’s prices are indifferent to
the order quantities that WHL3 places.
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In view of these two opposite pricing strategies that the simulated human
wholesalers adopt, that is, the ‘demand – driven’ or the ‘profit margin – driven’
and the corresponding resulting prices (namely, prices that may be either “too-
high” or “too-low”), it becomes very interesting to explore the emerging
competition penalties that these generate respectively. This question is discussed
in Section 8.3.
8.2 Participants’ ࡻࡽതതതതത࢏- quantities
The purpose of this section is to test whether the simulated human participants in
the Contract Beer Distribution Game would make ‘locally poor’ order quantity
decisions, namely test the research hypothesis CBG.2. In respect to this, the
simulated participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game are expected to
order oQi- quantities that are significantly different from the quantities that they
are requested to deliver. In this regard, Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.7 present the
simulated human participants’ ܱܳതതതത௜ – order quantity decisions. Table 8.4 focuses
on the simulated human retailers, Table 8.5 turns attention to the simulated
human wholesalers, while Table 8.7 concentrates on the simulated human
manufacturers. Table 8.6 summarises the steady state mean order quantities of
human retailers and wholesalers, so that comparisons can be more easily made.
Table 8.8 does so for the simulated human wholesalers and manufacturers.
8.2.1 Retailers’ ࡻࡽതതതതࡾࡱࢀ – order quantities
Table 8.4 portrays the simulated human retailers ܱܳതതതതோா் – order quantity
decisions over n=50 simulated replications for all 32 treatment combinations
studied.
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There is in Table 8.4 a high number of occurrences of non-zero, yet low
standard deviations. The simulated human retailers may come in direct contact
with stochastic customer demand, which is the only place where variation across
different replications exists. As discussed in Section 6.2, where the Contract Beer
Distribution Game is formally specified, customer demand is assumed to follow
the truncated at zero normal distribution with μ=5 and σ = 2. But these demand
realizations are not included in the order quantity decision models of type (7.9)
that have been fitted to the simulated human retailers’ true decisions (according
to Table 7.10). This is the reason why the standard deviations that are observed in
Table 8.4 remain low.
As for why there is a high number of non-zero standard deviations, the
answer seems to be the combined effect of demand and supply uncertainty that is
applicable to all the simulated human retailers. Demand variation affects
retailers’ respective inventory positions ܰܫ ோ(ݐ) and cumulatively realized profits
∑ ோܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ , which are taken into account by all the simulated human retailers in
their order quantity decisions (according to Table 7.10). Supply uncertainty is due
to the unpredictable pattern of shipments that the retailers receive from their
respective upstream wholesalers ௐܵ ு௅(ݐ− ܮோா் + 1). Although not all the
simulated human retailers directly consider shipments in their order quantity
decisions, the shipments that are in transit to their warehouse ௐܵ ு௅(ݐ− ܮோா் +1) affect both their inventory position ܰܫ ோ(ݐ) and their cumulatively realized
profits ∑ ோܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ , which are significant determinants of most human retailers’
order quantity decisions (according to Table 7.10).
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Table 8.4: Simulated retailers’ ࡻࡽࡾࡱࢀ – quantity decisions5
R
W - F
RET0 RET1 RET2 RET3
WHL0 –
MAN0
4.99 (0.01)
[0.002]
2.33 (0.01)
[0.001]
2.27 (0.01)
[0.001]
30.04 (0.07)
[0.012]
WHL0 –
MAN2
5.01 (0.011)
[0.002]
2.34 (0.008)
[0.001]
2.34 (0.009)
[0.002]
2.34 (0.01)
[0.001]
WHL1 –
MAN0
0 (0)
[0]
2.94 (0.04)
[0.006]
2.95 (0.02)
[0.003]
2.96 (0.01)
[0.002]
WHL1 –
MAN2
2.93 (0.05)
[0.008]
2.81 (0.041)
[0.007]
2.88 (0.012)
[0.002]
2.79 (0.009)
[0.002]
WHL2 –
MAN0
200.01 (0)
[0]
2.32 (0.007)
[0.001]
2.27 (0.009)
[0.002]
1.22 (0.02)
[0.004]
WHL2 –
MAN2
200.01 (0)
[0]
3.42 (0.02)
[0.002]
3.42 (0.02)
[0.002]
3.42 (0.01)
[0.002]
WHL3 –
MAN0
5 (0.01)
[0.002]
2.34 (0.008)
[0.001]
2.05 (0.009)
[0.002]
50 (0.004)
[0.001]
WHL3 –
MAN2
5 (0.01)
[0.002]
2.34 (0.01)
[0.001]
3.33 (0.01)
[0.002]
3.34 (0.01)
[0.002]
Still, there is also a number of interactions in Table 8.4 that exhibit standard
deviations that are exactly equal to 0, turning the corresponding half-width 99%
confidence intervals for all ܱܳതതതതோா் – order quantity decisions also to zero. These
exceptions consist of the interactions in which the simulated ‘price conscious’
RET0 interacts with the ‘price and current availability conscious’ wholesaler
WHL2. The reason is that in these particular interactions RET0 orders in steady
5 This table presents the following information about the simulated retailers’ order
quantities over n=50 replications: i. averages in regular font, ii. standard deviations in
italics font (between parentheses), iii. the half widths of the corresponding 99%
confidence intervals in bold font (between brackets).
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state quantities that are on average so exceptionally high that they are completely
irrelevant to the occurring supply and demand uncertainty.
In order to test the research hypothesis CBG.2 and, thus, assess whether the
simulated human retailers make ‘locally poor’ decisions, their steady state mean
݋ܳതതതതܴ ܧܶ – order quantities need to be compared to the mean customer demand (i.e.
μ=5).
It is evident from Table 8.4 that only the ‘price conscious’ retailer RET0
manages to closely follow true customer demand for a number of interactions.
Hence, the research hypothesis CBG.2 needs to be rejected for these particular
interactions (i.e. ܱܳതതതത௜= ߤ). RET0 proves to make ‘locally good’ decisions in these
particular interactions.
Nevertheless, the ‘price conscious’ retailer RET0 is found to order
quantities that are significantly higher than the mean customer demand or else
‘over-order’ in a number of different interactions. These interactions are also
discussed when the occurring zero standard deviations are observed. In these
particular interactions that RET0 ‘over-orders’, he seems to be driven by his
strong preference to ‘minimise backlogs’. It is very interesting that RET0 is found
to ‘over-order’ when asked to interact with the ‘price and future availability
reactive’ wholesaler WHL2. A possible explanation might be that WHL2 is the
lowest charging wholesaler, one who sometimes charges prices that are even
lower than the prices that he is himself charged and, therefore, leaves a wide
profit margin for RET0 to exploit (Sub-section 8.1.2). For another set of
interactions, though, the ‘price conscious’ retailer RET0 proves to order quantities
that are significantly lower than the mean customer demand or else ‘under-order’.
In these particular interactions RET0 seems to prioritize ‘minimisation of
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inventories’ and, thus, ‘under-orders’. Interestingly, RET0 appears to ‘under-
order’ when asked to interact with the ‘price and present availability reactive’
WHL1, who is found to charge the highest prices. Conscious of prices as he is, he
prefers to suffer from backlog penalties rather than being charged excessively
high prices. The research hypothesis CBG.2 cannot be rejected for these
interactions of RET0 with WHL1 and WHL2 that he either ‘under-orders’ or ‘over-
orders’. (i.e. ܱܳതതതത௜≠ ߤ at p<0.01). These particular interactions are highlighted via
the grey shaded cells of Table 8.4. A last note on RET0 ordering strategy that is
worthy of further attention is that, ‘price conscious’ as he is, he exhibits a wide
range of ordering strategies, varying from ‘under-ordering’ to ‘over-ordering’,
depending on the price that he is himself charged. It is a surprise that his ordering
decisions seem to be driven from the wholesaler prices and not the actual
customer demand.
The fact that RET0 is the only simulated human retailer who exclusively
relies on the price that the wholesaler charges to him for his order decision
constitutes a potential explanation for RET0’s potential to make both ‘locally
good’ and ‘locally poor’ decisions. The other three simulated human retailers
additionally resort to this end to either their cumulatively realized profit (i.e
RET1 and RET2) or their inventory holding and backlog cost (i.e RET2 and RET3).
Concerned about profits and costs as the ‘price and profit conscious’ retailer
RET1, the ‘price and cost and profit conscious’ retailer RET2 and the ‘price and
cost conscious’ retailer RET3 are, they place orders of sizes that are significantly
lower than the mean of true customer demand (s. Table 8.4). Therefore, in all
their interactions RET1, RET2 and RET3 ‘under-order’, that is, order quantities that
are significantly lower than the arising customer demand. This ‘under-ordering’
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behaviour seems to be created by their strong preference to ‘minimise
inventories’. Since RET1, RET2 and RET3 order significantly different quantities
than the mean customer demand, the research hypothesis CBG.2 cannot be
rejected for all the interactions of RET1, RET2 and RET3 (i.e. ܱܳതതതത௜≠ ߤ at p<0.01).
These particular interactions are highlighted via the grey shaded cells of Table
8.4. Hence, RET1, RET2 and RET3 make persistently ‘locally poor’ decisions.
In respect to this, it seems fair to say that it may be the ‘price conscious’
retailer’s RET0 simplified ordering strategy that enables him to order, on average,
as much as his received customer demand entails. This is the first indication that
establishes that prices can serve to control order quantities and, thus, inventories.
It would be very interesting to explore whether something similar also holds for
the wholesaler and the retailer.
8.2.2 Wholesalers’ ࢕ࡽതതതതࢃ ࡴࡸ – order quantities
Table 8.5 presents the simulated human wholesalers’ ܱܳതതതതௐ ு௅ – order quantity
decisions over n=50 simulated replications for all 32 treatment combinations
studied. There is in Table 8.5 a high number of occurrences of non-zero standard
deviations. This originates from the combined effect of demand and supply
uncertainty, from which all simulated human wholesalers suffer. Nevertheless,
there are certain exceptions that exhibit standard deviations that are exactly equal
to 0, turning the corresponding half-width 99% confidence intervals for all
݋ܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ – order quantity decisions also equal to 0.
Chapter 8- The Contract Beer Distribution Game Results
339
Table 8.5: Simulated wholesalers’ ࡻࡽࢃ ࡴࡸ – quantity decisions6
R
W - F
RET0 RET1 RET2 RET3
WHL0 –
MAN0
5 (0.02)
[0.004]
2.33 (0.01)
[0.002]
2.28 (0.01)
[0.001]
30.04 (0.08)
[0.01]
WHL0 –
MAN2
5 (0.02)
[0.003]
2.38 (0.01)
[0.001]
2.34 (0.01)
[0.001]
2.38 (0.01)
[0.001]
WHL1 –
MAN0
5.14 (0.08)
[0.01]
1.21 (0.03)
[0.005]
1.20 (0.02)
[0.003]
1.20 (0.02)
[0.003]
WHL1 –
MAN2
4.97 (0.02)
[0.03]
1.41 (0.05)
[0.01]
1.5 (0.01)
[0.001]
1.39 (0.01)
[0.001]
WHL2 –
MAN0
0.04 (0.04)
[0.007]
4.31 (0.01)
[0.001]
3.251
(0.01)
2.23 (0.02)
[0.004]
WHL2 –
MAN2
23 (0)
[0]
18.74 (0)
[0]
18.74 (0)
[0]
20.86 (0.004)
[0.001]
WHL3 –
MAN0
9.88 (0)
[0]
8.57 (0)
[0]
9.88 (0.002)
[0]
77.52 (10.28)
[1.73]
WHL3 –
MAN2
5.01 (0.02)
[0.003]
2.34 (0.02)
[0.003]
124.01 (0)
[0]
124.01 (0)
[0]
These exceptions entail some of the interactions in which the simulated
‘price and present availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL2 and the ‘price and
present and future availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL3 come into play. One
potential explanation could be that WHL2 and WHL3 assign a great importance to
their current inventory availabilities ܰܫ ௧ for their order quantity decisions
(according toTable 7.13), which is not uncertain in nature.
6 This table presents the following information about the simulated wholesalers’ order
quantities over n=50 replications: i. averages in regular font, ii. standard deviations in
italics font (between parentheses), iii. the half widths of the corresponding 99%
confidence intervals in bold font (between brackets).
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In order to test the research hypothesis CBG.2 and, thus, assess whether
the simulated human wholesalers make ‘locally poor’ decisions, their steady state
mean ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ – order quantities need to be compared to the steady state mean
ܱܳതതതതܴ ܧܶ – order quantities of simulated human retailers. In order to facilitate this
comparison, Table 8.6 summarises the steady state mean order quantities of
human retailers’ ܱܳതതതതܴ ܧܶ and human wholesalers ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ.
Table 8.6: Comparison of retailers’ ࢕ࡽതതതതࡾࡱࢀ and wholesalers’ ࢕ࡽതതതതࢃ ࡴࡸ – order decisions
R
W - F
RET0 RET1 RET2 RET3
ܱܳതതതതܴ ܧܶ ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ ܱܳതതതതܴ ܧܶ ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ ܱܳതതതതܴ ܧܶ ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ ܱܳതതതതܴ ܧܶ ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ
WHL0
–
MAN0
4.99 5 2.33 2.33 2.27 2.28 30.04 30.04
WHL0
–
MAN2
5.01 5 2.34 2.38 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.38
WHL1
–
MAN0
0 5.14 2.94 1.21 2.95 1.20 2.96 1.20
WHL1
–
MAN2
2.93 4.97 2.81 1.41 2.88 1.5 2.79 1.39
WHL2
–
MAN0
200.01 0.04 2.32 4.31 2.27 3.251 1.22 2.23
WHL2
–
MAN2
200.01 23.002 3.42 18.741 3.42 18.741 3.42 20.863
WHL3
–
MAN0
5 9.88 2.34 8.57 2.05 9.88 50 77.52
WHL3
–
MAN2
5 5.01 2.34 2.34 3.33 124.01 3.34 124.01
It is evident from Table 8.6 that the ‘profit conscious’ wholesaler WHL0
orders as much as she is requested to deliver, irrespectively of the interacting
retailer and manufacturer. For this reason, the research hypothesis CBG.2 needs
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to be rejected for all the interactions in which WHL0 participates (i.e. ܱܳതതതതௐ ு௅బ =
ܱܳതതതതோா்). Therefore, WHL0 proves to make ‘locally good’ decisions across all
interactions studied. This is also the case for a sub-set of the interactions in which
the ‘price and current availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL3 participates;
namely, RET0, WHL3, MAN2 (i.e. ܱܳതതതതௐ ு௅య ≠ ܱܳതതതതோா బ்) and RET1, WHL3, MAN2
interaction(i.e. ܱܳതതതതௐ ு௅య ≠ ܱܳതതതതோா భ்). For these particular interactions the research
hypothesis CBG.2 also needs to be rejected.
But in all remaining interactions the ‘price and present and future
availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL3 consistently ‘over-orders’ or else orders
quantities that are significantly higher than the mean incoming order quantity.
This ‘over-ordering’ behaviour of WHL3 may be interpreted as an indicator of an
attempt to ‘minimise backlogs’. Therefore, the research hypothesis CBG.2 cannot
be rejected for these interactions (i.e. ܱܳതതതതௐ ு௅య ≠ ܱܳതതതതோா் at p<0.01). These
particular interactions are highlighted via the grey shaded cells in the last row of
Table 8.6. In these interactions WHL3 appears to make ‘locally poor’ decisions.
As far as the ‘price and future availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL1 and
the ‘price and current availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL2 are concerned,
both WHL1 and WHL2 systematically place orders of sizes that are significantly
different from the incoming order quantities. For this reason, the research
hypothesis CBG.2 cannot be rejected for these particular interactions (i.e.
ܱܳതതതതௐ ு௅ೕ ≠ ܱܳ
തതതത
ோா்೔ with j=1, 2 and i=0,.., 3 at p<0.01). These interactions are
highlighted via the grey shaded cells of Table 8.6. Therefore, WHL1 and WHL2
make ‘locally poor’ decisions, irrespectively of their interacting partners’
responses.
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In greater detail, the ‘price and future availability conscious’ wholesaler
WHL1 ‘over-orders’ when she interacts with the ‘price conscious’ retailer RET0
and ‘under-orders’ when she interacts with any of the ‘price and profit conscious’
retailer RET1 or the ‘price and cost and profit conscious’ retailer RET2 or the
‘price and cost conscious’ retailer RET3. As for the the ‘price and current
availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL2, he follows exactly the complementary
approach: namely he ‘under-orders’ when he interacts with the ‘price conscious’
retailer RET0 and ‘over-orders’ when he interacts with either the ‘price and profit
conscious’ retailer RET1 or the ‘price and cost and profit conscious’ retailer RET2
or the ‘price and cost conscious’ retailer RET3. The reason that both WHL1 and
WHL2 adopt different policies when facing the ‘price conscious’ retailer RET0
with respect to the remaining human retailers RETj with j=1,..3 might be that
RET0 is the only human retailer who exhibits a range of ordering strategies that
varies from ‘under-ordering’ to ‘over-ordering’.
Last but not least, the reader should at this point be reminded that in Sub-
section 8.2.1 it is shown that the ‘price conscious’ retailer RET0 steadily ‘under-
orders’ when in interaction with the ‘price and future availability conscious’
wholesaler WHL1 and ‘over-orders’ when in interaction with the ‘price and
current availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL2. In Sub-section 8.2.1 it is also
demonstrated that the ‘price and profit conscious’ RET1, the ‘price and cost and
profit conscious’ RET2 and the ‘price and cost conscious’ RET3 ‘over-order’
when in interaction with the ‘price and future availability conscious’ wholesaler
WHL1 and ‘under-order’ when in interaction with the ‘price and current
availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL2. In this regard, the ‘price and future
availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL1 and the price and current availability
conscious’ wholesaler WHL2 seem to adopt the completely opposite ordering
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strategies with their interacting partners. For this reason, it can be claimed that
WHL1and WHL2 attempt to correct the erroneous ordering policies of their
interacting retailers. Whether they do manage to accomplish this, though,
depends strongly on the interaction with their corresponding upstream supplier.
But since the ‘profit conscious’ wholesaler WHL0 is the only simulated
human wholesaler who constantly makes ‘locally good’ decisions, it becomes
very interesting to explore what the underlying reasons for the ‘locally good’
order quantity decisions might be. Her almost complete ignorance of inventory
related measures in her order quantity decisions, combined with her initial pre-
conception on placing strictly positive orders, seem to explain her ‘locally good’
ordering policy. The ignorance on the part of WHL0 of inventory related measures
originates from the simplified ordering strategy that WHL0 appears to implement.
According to this, WHL0 almost exclusively relies on her realised profit for her
exact ordering decisions. The initial pre-conception of placing strictly positive
orders that WHL0 has, is indicated by the fact that she places the highest number
of non-zero orders. This is the result of the highest intercept in WHL0’s order
placement decision model of type (7.8) according to Table 7.12. It is very
interesting that even though ‘price consciousness’ is an effective strategy for the
human retailers, ‘ profit consciousness’ proves to be the equivalent effective
strategy for the human wholesalers. It remains to be explored what an equivalent
effective strategy for the human manufacturers would be.
8.2.3 Manufacturers’ ࡻࡽതതതതതࡹ ࡭ࡺ – order quantities
Table 8.7 presents the simulated human manufacturers’ ܱܳതതതതெ ஺ே – order quantity
decisions over n=50 simulated replications for all 32 treatment combinations
studied. The reader is at this point reminded that because of the perfectly reliable
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manufacturing facility that all simulated human manufacturers are assumed to
have in place, they face uncertainty from only the demand side. The results are
the low standard deviations that can be observed from Table 8.7.
Table 8.7: Simulated manufacturers’ ࡻࡽࡹ ࡭ࡺ – quantity decisions7
R
W - F
RET0 RET1 RET2 RET3
WHL0 –
MAN0
5 (0.025)
[0.004]
2.33 (0.01)
[0.002]
2.28 (0.01)
[0.001]
30.05 (0.08)
[0.01]
WHL0 –
MAN2
5 (0.02)
[0.003]
2.28 (0.01)
[0.002]
2.29 (0.01)
[0.002]
2.28 (0.01)
[0.002]
WHL1 –
MAN0
5.14 (0.08)
[0.01]
1.21 (0.03)
[0.01]
1.19 (0.02)
[0.003]
1.19 (0.02)
[0.003]
WHL1 –
MAN2
4.97 (0.02)
[0.003]
1.34 (0.02)
[0.003]
1.37 (0.01)
[0.001]
1.34 (0.01)
[0.001]
WHL2 –
MAN0
0.04 (0.04)
[0.01]
2.31 (0.01)
[0.001]
2.26 (0.01)
[0.002]
1.22 (0.02)
[0.004]
WHL2 –
MAN2
5.03 (0.04)
[0.01]
2.34 (0.04)
[0.002]
1.37 (0.01)
[0.001]
1.64 (0.02)
[0.001]
WHL3 –
MAN0
9.88 (0)
[0]
8.57 (0)
[0]
9.88 (0.001)
[0]
50 (0)
[0]
WHL3 –
MAN2
5 (0.01)
[0.001]
2.29 (0.04)
[0.08]
2.5 (0.003)
[0.01]
1.35 (0.004)
[0.0]
In order to test the research hypothesis CBG.2 and, thus, assess whether
the simulated human manufacturers make ‘locally poor’ decisions, their steady
state mean ܱܳതതതതܯܣܰ – order quantities need to be compared to the steady state
7 This table presents the following information about the simulated manufacturers’ order
quantities over n=50 replications: i. averages in regular font, ii. standard deviations in
italics font (between parentheses), iii. the half widths of the corresponding 99%
confidence intervals in bold font (between brackets).
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mean ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ – order quantities of the simulated wholesalers. In order to
facilitate, thus, this comparison, Table 8.8 summarises the steady state mean
order quantities of human wholesalers ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ and human manufacturers.
It can be concluded from Table 8.8 that both the ‘past price and present
availability conscious’ MAN0 and the ‘present price and present availability
conscious’MAN2 in most interactions in which they participate (i.e. the non-
shaded cells of Table 8.8), order in steady state quantities that on average closely
follow the corresponding wholesalers’ orders. For this reason, the research
hypothesis CBG.2 needs to be rejected for these particular interactions
(ܱܳതതതതெ ஺ே = ܱܳതതതതௐ ு௅). Therefore, both MAN0 and MAN2 seem to make ‘locally
good’ decisions for the majority of the interactions studied. There are, however, a
number of exceptions. These are the interactions for which the ‘present price and
present availability conscious’MAN2 ‘under-orders’, namely places orders of
sizes that are significantly lower than her incoming order quantities. Table 8.8
highlights these exceptions by shading the corresponding cells in grey colour. For
these interactions the research hypothesis CBG.2 cannot be rejected (i.e.
ܱܳതതതതܯܣܰ ≠ ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ at p<0.05). Therefore, MAN2 proves to make ‘locally poor’
decisions for these particular interactions. As for the ‘past price and present
availability conscious’MAN0, he seems to be making ‘locally poor’ order
decisions for only one of the interactions studied (i.e. the interaction with WHL3
and RET3), most probably because he considers past prices instead of present
prices in his order decisions.
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Table 8.8: Comparison of wholesalers’ ࡻࡽതതതതതࢃ ࡴࡸ and manufacturers’ ࡻࡽതതതതതࡹ ࡭ࡺ – order
decisions
R
W - F
RET0 RET1 RET2 RET3
ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ ܱܳതതതതܯܣܰ ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ ܱܳതതതതܯܣܰ ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ ܱܳതതതതܯܣܰ ܱܳതതതതܹ ܪܮ ܱܳതതതതܯܣܰ
WHL0
–
MAN0
5 5 2.33 2.33 2.28 2.28 30.04 30.05
WHL0
–
MAN2
5 5 2.38 2.28 2.34 2.29 2.38 2.28
WHL1
–
MAN0
5.14 5.14 1.21 1.21 1.20 1.19 1.20 1.19
WHL1
–
MAN2
4.97 4.97 1.41 1.34 1.5 1.37 1.39 1.34
WHL2
–
MAN0
0.04 0.04 2.31 2.31 2.25 2.26 1.23 1.22
WHL2
–
MAN2
23.002 5.03 18.74 2.34 18.74 1.37 20.86 1.64
WHL3
–
MAN0
9.88 9.88 8.57 8.57 9.88 9.88 77.52 50
WHL3
–
MAN2
5.01 5 2.34 2.29 124.01 2.5 124.01 1.35
It is very interesting that in these interactions in which the ‘present price
and present availability conscious’MAN2 makes ‘locally poor’ order decisions,
she orders almost as if she realized the excessively high order quantities that the
wholesaler places. In response to these erroneous orders, MAN2 attempts to
correct them. Whether MAN2 actually manages to correct these excessive orders
or, in contrast, reduce them too much in size is another issue though. It is very
interesting to explore why MAN2 can realise the erroneous ordering behaviour of
the ‘price and present availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL2 and the ‘price and
present and future availability conscious’ wholesaler WHL3 and not the ‘profit
conscious’ wholesaler WHL0, for example. A potential explanation might be that
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the orders that are placed by WHL2 and WHL3 exhibit lower variances. For this
reason, MAN2 might be better willing to leave wholesalers’ orders unsatisfied
when interacting with WHL2 and WHL3. But it does remain an open issue why
MAN2 in these instances orders so low quantities and, thus, leaves such a great
portion of the wholesalers’ orders unsatisfied.
Since both MAN0 and MAN2 seem to make ‘locally good’ decisions for the
majority of the interactions studied, no special effective ordering strategy can be
identified for the simulated human manufacturers. Attention is now turned to the
competition penalties and the degree of prevalence of the bullwhip effect that
emerge from all possible combinations between the different pricing and ordering
strategies that are employed by the different simulated human participants in the
Contract Beer Distribution Game.
8.3 Emergent Competition Penalties
The objective of this section is to test whether the emerging competition penalties
statistically differ from 0, namely test the research hypothesis CBG. 3. In this
regard, Table 8.9 presents the mean competition penalties (ܥܲതതതത) that are achieved
by all 32 treatment combinations studied over n=50 replications. As already
discussed in Sub-Section 7.2.3, the competition penalties that different
interactions attain are calculated according to relation (6.14). In relation (6.14),
the aggregate channel profit ෠ܲ஼ is equal to the sum of the individual profits that
the interacting partners separately attain according to the ABS model of the
Contract Beer Distribution Game. The first-best case maximum profit ைܲ∗෢ results
from the ABS model, when all interacting decision makers are enforced to follow
the decision rules (6.10a) and (6.10b). Based on this, it has a mean of 143,617
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m.u., a standard deviation of 1,838 m.u.; hence, the resulting half-width of the
99%confidence interval is: ±309 m.u.
Table 8.9: The emergent steady state competition penalties8
R
W - F
RET0 RET1 RET2 RET3
WHL0 –
MAN0
19.98 (0.22)
[0.04]
108.97 (9.86)
[1.66]
104.29 (8.29)
[1.39]
351.53 (28.77)
[4.84]
WHL0 –
MAN2
53.9 (0.71)
[0.12]
114.32 (9.77)
[1.64]
113.93 (9.58)
[1.61]
114.34 (9.68)
[1.63]
WHL1 –
MAN0
40.05 (91.4)
[15.37]
159.16 (6.57)
[1.11]
159.63 (10.43)
[1.75]
159.32 (13.97)
[2.35]
WHL1 –
MAN2
216.47 (36.29)
[6.10]
147.95 (79.02)
[13.29]
162.24 (13.38)
[2.25]
144.46 (13.35)
[2.24]
WHL2 –
MAN0
556.98 (851.96)
[143.28]
110 (9.81)
[1.65]
110.24 (8.95)
[1.51]
764 (25.69)
[4.32]
WHL2 –
MAN2
582.61 (727.8)
[122.4]
198.31 (15.57)
[2.62]
200.79 (16.77)
[2.82]
197.54 (16.36)
[2.75]
WHL3 –
MAN0
726.78 (12.78)
[2.15]
213.86 (23.34)
[3.93]
243.29 (27.07)
[4.55]
1,470.7 (1217.16)
[204.70]
WHL3 –
MAN2
54.18 (0.76)
[0.13]
113.642 (9.43)
[1.59]
3,746.776(471.63)
[79.32]
3,740.76 (473.68)
[79.66]
It is evident from Table 8.9 that the competition penalties that are attained
by all treatment combinations studied differ significantly from 0. For this reason,
the research hypothesis CBG.3 cannot be rejected for any of the interactions
studied (CP0 at p<0.01). Thus, no ‘globally efficient’ interactions seem to
8 This table presents the following information about the competition penalties that are
attained by all the simulated interactions over n=50 replications: i. averages in regular
font, ii. standard deviations in italics font (between parentheses), iii. the half widths of the
corresponding 99% confidence intervals in bold font (between brackets).
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emerge. Nevertheless, there are certain interactions that attain competition
penalties of significantly lower magnitude than the remaining interactions. These
interactions are highlighted in grey shaded colour in Table 8.9 and are thereafter
characterised as ‘globally better performing’.
It is very interesting that in most of these ‘globally better performing’
interactions, the ‘price conscious’ retailer RET0, the ‘profit conscious’ WHL0 and
the ‘price and past order reactive’ wholesaler WHL1 come into play. Both RET0
and WHL0 make ‘locally good’ quantity decisions, while WHL1 makes ‘locally
good’ price decisions. For this reason, the emergence of ‘globally better
performing’ interactions from their combinations does not come as a surprise.
Therefore, there seems to be some evidence that ‘locally good’ decisions induce
‘globally better performances’. Still, it should be noted that neither a ‘demand –
driven’ nor a ‘profit margin – driven’ pricing behavior seem to be enhancing the
competition penalties that are attained overall.
The case of one interaction is now taken as an example. To this end, the
case of the interaction of MAN0 with WHL0 and RET0 is taken for illustration
purposes. The main reason is that this is the interaction that, among the treatment
combinations studied, attains the lowest competition penalty. As already
discussed, this does not come as a surprise, as in this particular interaction all
partners are proven to make ‘locally good’ price and quantity decisions. In
greater detail, the ‘incoming order price reactive’MAN0 and the ‘price and past
order reactive’ wholesaler WHL0 charge prices that do not differ significantly
from the incurred manufacturing cost, while the ‘past price and present
availability conscious’ manufacturer MAN0, the ‘profit conscious’ wholesaler
WHL0, and the ‘price conscious’ retailer RET0 place orders of quantities that do
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not differ statistically from the mean customer demand. Therefore, all interacting
partners seem to follow the team optimising decision rules that are given by
relations (6.10a) and (6.10b) of Sub-section 6.4.1. According to theory, thus, the
first-best case maximum profit should be attained. Following this, the competition
penalty that is attained should amount to 0. The first cell of Table 8.9 shows that
the competition penalty that is attained by the interaction of MAN0 with WHL0 and
RET0 may be relatively low (i.e. the lowest among all interactions studied), but it
remains significantly higher than 0. This is surprising and remains an open
question that deserves further exploration.
A potential answer lies in the exact timing of order decisions. Namely,
MAN0, WHL0, and RET0 may in the long run order approximately as much as they
are requested to deliver, but they may fail to do so in every time period studied.
For illustration purposes Figure 8.1 demonstrates the order decisions that the
simulated MAN0, WHL0, and RET0 make when they interact in the ABS model of
the Contract Beer Distribution Game between the 5,500th and 6,000th period (in
simulation time). The reason that the average order quantities over n=50
replications within the time interval of 5,500 and 6,000 periods is presented is it
is representative of what happens during any simulation run (i.e. the warm-up is
eliminated and the run remains restricted within the limits of the run length
studied).
It is evident from Figure 8.1 that MAN0, WHL0, and RET0 may on average
order quantities that are not significantly different from μ = 5, but their decisions
that correspond to the different periods do significantly differ from μ = 5. For this
reason, the simulated decisions of MAN0, WHL0 and RET0 cannot instantaneously
reproduce the team optimising rules that are specified by relations (6.10a) and
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(6.10b). The result is widely fluctuating inventory levels. . This amplification of
inventories and backlogs is due to the fact that some of the retailer’s potential
backlog might be caused by the wholesaler’s backlog, which might in turn be
created by the manufacturer’s backlog. The result is backlogs that are possibly
calculated more than once in the Contract Beer Distribution Game supply chain.
This divergence of the order decisions that are inferred from the decision
models of type (7.9) from the team optimising decision rules may be the
explanation of the non-zero competition penalty that is attained by the interaction
of MAN0 with WHL0 and RET0. Therefore, it may not simply suffice to ensure
that decision makers’ quantities coincide with the requested quantities on
average. It additionally becomes important to force this coincidence on a one-to-
one time period basis, that is for every time period of the simulation run, as is
specified by the team optimising decision rules (6.10a) and (6.10b).
Figure 8.2 illustrates in the form of stacked column charts the allocation of
losses for each supply chain configuration. In this figure, each column reflects a
different interaction. In greater detail, R represents the total revenues that are
attained by a given interaction; SC the total acquisition costs that are incurred; BP
the total backlog penalties that are incurred; IC the total inventory holding costs
0
5
10
15
20
5,801 5,821 5,841 5,861 5,881 5,901 5,921 5,941 5,961 5,981 6,001
Quantity Decisions
Order_Qty_Man
Order_Qty_WS
Order_Qty_Ret
Figure 8.1: The decisions of the simulated MAN0, WHL0 and RET0 between 5,500 and
6,000 time periods (average of ABS model results over n=50 replications)
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that are incurred. The reason that these stacked column charts are presented is
that since this is the first study that applies the wholesale price contract in the
Beer Distribution Game setting, there are no previous published results on
obtained supply chain profits and competition penalties that could be compared
with the results that are reported in Table 8.9. In respect to this, the supply chain
costs that are incurred are instead of the supply chain profits that are earned
illustrated in Figure 8.2.
In the calculation of total supply chain costs, in accordance with the equation
(6.2a), the following are cancelled out: i. the revenues that are received by the
manufacturers and the acquisition costs that are incurred by the wholesalers and
ii. the revenues that are received by the wholesalers and the acquisition costs that
are incurred by the retailers. Therefore, Figure 8.2 only shows the revenues that
are received by the retailers and the shipments costs that are incurred by the
manufacturers (i.e. production costs). It is evident from Figure 8.2 that all
interactions studied suffer from huge losses, which are caused by high inventory
holding and backlog costs. The latter is in line with the existing experimental
research on the traditional Beer Distribution Game’s set-up (e.g. Kaminsky and
Simchi-Levi, 1998; Steckel et al, 2004; Nienhaus et al, 2006). The reader should
at this point be reassured that there are two reasons that explain why inventory
holding and backlog costs are not cancelled out. The first reason is that the cost
that all supply chain partners need to incur for backlogging (i.e. not immediately
satisfying) customer demand for one period costs ܾ݅ =1 m.u., which is double
the cost of keeping inventory in one’s warehouse (i.e. ℎ݅=0.50 m.u). The second
reason is that the supply and demand uncertainties that all supply chain partners
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need to incur affect their net inventory availabilities in such a way that average
positive inventories are not necessarily exactly equal to average backlogs.
8.4 Emergence of the Bullwhip effect
The objective of this section is to test whether the bullwhip effect persists in the
Contract Beer Distribution Game, namely test the research hypothesis CBG.4.
The research hypothesis CBG.4 specifies that the bullwhip effect persists if and
only if the variance of orders increases as one moves away from the retailer. In
order, thus, to test the research hypothesis CBG.4, one would need to test whether
the variance of orders increases from the retailer to the wholesaler and from the
wholesaler to the manufacturer.
To this end is coded as a failure. (A failure includes both the cases of
equalities and decreas, every increase of orders observed is coded as a success,
while any non-increase observed es of order sizes.) In addition, each time period
studied is treated as a separate case. So, the total number of cases (NoC) is equal
to the total number of time periods studied (i.e total run length – warm-up period
= 15,000-1,400 = 13,600) multiplied by 2 (i.e. one for the retailer-wholesaler pair
and one for the wholesaler-retailer pair). Thus: NoC=13,600 x 2 = 27,200. The
sample proportion is the number of successes divided by the total number of
cases NoC. The average between n = 50 replications is then estimated. Following
the earlier example of a number of previous behavioural studies that investigate
the dominance of the bullwhip effect in the Beer Distribution Game setting (e.g.
Croson and Donohue, 2003; 2005; 2006; Croson et al, 2007), the corresponding
non-parametric sign test (Siegel, 1956) is applied. In respect to this, the research
hypothesis CBG.4 implies that the sample proportion of success would be
significantly higher than 0.5 (i.e. pො> 0.5).
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Figure 8.2: Simulation Results – Allocation of Costs for all treatment combinations studied
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In this regard, Table 8.10 presents the mean success rates or else the mean
percentages of successes over n=50 for all 32 treatment combinations studied.
It is evident from Table 8.10 that the degree to which the bullwhip effect
remains is heterogeneous and varies between two extremes, that is, strong
prevalence and production smoothing. Strong prevalence occurs in the case that
the success rate of bullwhip existence is significantly higher than 0.5, while
production smoothing occurs in the case that the bullwhip effect is eliminated, or
else that the success rate of bullwhip existence remains significantly lower than
0.5.
Table 8.10: The emergent success rates of the bullwhip effect
R
W - F
RET0 RET1 RET2 RET3
WHL0 –
MAN0
44.44% 72% 98% 64.54%
WHL0 –
MAN2
68% 48% 18% 54%
WHL1 –
MAN0
58% 32% 28% 32%
WHL1 –
MAN2
68% 54% 26% 46%
WHL2 –
MAN0
76.67% 54.44% 58% 56%
WHL2 –
MAN2
12% 23% 44% 32%
WHL3 –
MAN0
100% 58% 53% 52%
WHL3 –
MAN2
68% 26% 24% 33%
Since the success rates that are attained by 62.50% of the studied
interactions are significantly higher than 50% (i.e. the non-shaded cells of Table
8.10), the research hypothesis CBG.4 cannot be rejected for these particular
interactions (݌Ƹ> 50% at p<0.05). These interactions are highlighted in Table
8.10 via grey shaded cells. This conclusion implies that for a significant
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percentage of the interactions studied, the bullwhip effect persists (i.e. strong
prevalence), which is in line with the existing experimental research on
Sterman’s (1989, 1992) traditional Beer Distribution Game set-up (e.g. Croson
and Donohue, 2003; 2005; 2006; Croson et al, 2007).
Nevertheless, there is another 37.5% of the interactions studied, for which
the observed success rate remains significantly lower than 0.5. The research
hypothesis CBG.4 needs to be rejected for these particular interactions. These
interactions are highlighted in Table 8.10 via the non - shaded cells. But the
elimination of the bullwhip effect (i.e. production smoothing) can be perceived as
an indication that a ‘globally better performing’ interaction is attained (s.
discussion in Sub-section 6.4.3). Therefore, it can be argued that these
interactions emerge as ‘globally near-efficient’. For this reason, the wholesale
price contract, as applied in the Contract Beer Distribution Game setting seems
to have the potential to at least partially address the bullwhip effect. This result is
very important, because it gives evidence that the introduction of the wholesale
price contract in the Beer Distribution Game setting may not attain the first-best
case maximum profit, but it can seriously reduce the bullwhip effect in the case of
some interacting participants. Since there is no prior experimental research that
confirms the elimination of the bullwhip effect, this is considered as a valuable
addition to the existing literature.
At this point the reader should be reminded of Su’s (2008) earlier
theoretical work that is reviewed in Sub-section 2.2.2 and warned about the main
differences with this study. Su offers the formal proof that the existence of at
least one non-perfectly rational decision maker constitutes the necessary and
sufficient condition for occurrence of the bullwhip effect in the Beer Distribution
Chapter 8- The Contract Beer Distribution Game Results
357
Game setting. The following three differences with Su’s study justify the
innovative result of this study that the bullwhip effect may be at least mitigated.
First, all human participants are required in the Contract Beer Distribution Game
to make an extra decision task in comparison with Su’s decision makers, that is,
choose the prices that they wish to charge to their respective customers. Second,
participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game are instructed to maximise
the aggregate channel profit to their best knowledge and ability. Su’s decision
makers are assumed to intend to minimise their individual cost. Last but not least,
the decisions of simulated human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution
Game are inferred from decision models that have been calibrated via actual
laboratory evidence. The decisions of Su’s decision makers are driven by the
same quantal choice analytical formulae. Following these differences, there
seems to be some evidence that the inclusion of prices serves to eliminate the
bullwhip effect. Whether the wholesale price contract actually manages to
eliminate the bullwhip effect, though, depends on the interplay between the
different policies of the interacting partners. At this point it should be highlighted
that this study’s reported result that the degree of prevalence of the bullwhip
effect is strongly heterogeneous is in line with Cachon et al.’s (2007) earlier
finding that associates this degree to the industry’s seasonality. The main
difference of this study with Cachon et al.’s is that it is based on a combination of
laboratory and simulation experiments, while Cachon et al. resort to industry
level census data.
A final point that is worthy of further attention is that in the ‘globally near-
efficient’ interactions, that is, the interactions in which the bullwhip effect does
not prevail (in a statistical sense), not only the simulated human participants who
make ‘locally good’ price and/or order decisions can participate. But in ‘globally
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near-efficient’ interactions all simulated human decision makers (i.e MANi, WHLi
and RETi with i = 0,...,3) can potentially participate. This innovative and counter-
intuitive insight originates from the ABS model results that are reported in Table
8.10. Whether ‘global near-efficiency’ actually emerges in a specific interaction
depends on the interplay between the interacting partners’ policies and is
independent from the interacting partners’ decisions that may be ‘locally poor’.
That is exactly why it becomes important to help distinct echelon managers to
understand the underlying supply chain dynamics and, thus, train them to make
decisions that act against the bullwhip effect, so that ‘global near-efficiency’ can
be attained. The simulation experiments of this study demonstrate that the
consideration of prices, combined with the concentration on aggregate supply
chain profits (instead of individual costs) suffice to reduce to a great extent the
occurrence of the bullwhip effect. The reader should at this point be reminded that
in this study, unlike Cachon et al. (2007), as control mechanisms are treated the
wholesale prices that the interacting supply chain partners charge to each other,
and not the price that the retailers sell to end consumers (that mostly operate as
promotions and discounts, which amplify the bullwhip effect, as Lee et al.
(1997a) recognise).
8.5 Concluding Discussion
This chapter presents the results that are obtained from the ABS model that is
described in Sub-section 7.3.4 and, therefore, addresses the research hypotheses
CBG.1 – CBG.4 that concern human participants’ WPi- prices, OQi – quantities,
the emerging competition penalties and the prevalence of the bullwhip effect, as
formulated in Sub-section 7.2. In this way, Chapter 8 reports on the first study
that explores the effect that different prolonged interactions between dynamic,
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heterogeneous and autonomous decisions can have on the wholesale price
contract’s performance, in the case that the wholesale price contract is enforced
to the Beer Distribution Game setting.
The simulated human wholesalers and manufacturers are found to make
price decisions that vary between ‘under-charging’ and ‘over-charging’. In
greater detail, there are simulated human participants in the Contract Beer
Distribution Game who are found to charge ‘locally good’ prices. Yet, there is
another number of simulated human participants who make ‘locally poor’ price
decisions, namely charge prices that are significantly different from the prices
that their rationally optimising counterparts would charge. The underlying
reasoning is that there are two distinct pricing strategies that different participants
prefer to adopt to ensure profitability. In the case that they take into account their
inventory availabilities in their new price decisions, they tend to ‘over-charge’,
thus enforce a ‘profit margin – driven’ pricing strategy. In the opposite case, that
is when they focus instead on their previous order quantities, they are inclined to
‘under-charge’, hence, implement a ‘demand – driven’ pricing strategy.
In a similar manner, the simulated human participants are found to make
order decisions that vary between ‘under-ordering’ and ‘over-ordering’. There are
simulated human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game who are
proven to make ‘locally good’ order quantity decisions. There is also another
number of simulated human participants whose order quantities differ
significantly from the quantities that their rationally optimising counterparts
would order. In greater detail, the simulated human participants that prioritize
‘minimisation of inventories’ tend to ‘under-order’, while the simulated human
participants that are driven by ‘minimisation of backlogs’ tend to ‘over-order’.
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The results that are obtained from the ABS model of the Contract Beer
Distribution Game also reveal that there is a systematic pattern of ordering
strategies: a simulated human participant seems to make ‘locally good’ order
quantity decisions, provided that he/she takes into account either the prices that
are charged to him/her or (/and) the prices that he/she charges. This is the first
benefit that the wholesale price contract can bring to the Beer Distribution Game
setting.
Although the combinations of ‘locally good’ price and quantity decisions
fail to attain the first-best case maximum profit, they may generate ‘global near-
efficiency’ on the aggregate level. In other words, relatively low competition
penalties may emerge from these combinations. The exact competition penalties
that are attained by the different interactions strongly depend on the interplay
between the interacting partners’ priorities and cognitive abilities. The fact that
‘global near- efficiency’ is possible when prices are taken into account is
considered as the second important offering of the wholesale price contract,
when applied to the Beer Distribution Game setting.
All simulated human decision makers have the potential to eliminate the
bullwhip effect, in spite of their possibly ‘locally poor’ decisions. The exact
degree to which the bullwhip effect persists depends on the interplay between the
interacting partners’ policies. Since there is no prior experimental research that
reports the elimination of the bullwhip effect, this is attributed to the application
of the wholesale price contract to the Beer Distribution Game setting. This is
considered to be the third major advantage of price inclusion in the Beer
Distribution Game setting.
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In summary, this study identifies three distinct benefits that the
introduction of prices can bring to the Beer Distribution Game: first, the
wholesale price contract can lead to ‘locally good’ order quantity decisions; next,
even ‘locally poor’ prices can potentially generate ‘global near efficiency’; and,
last, prices can serve as an effective control mechanism to mitigate the bullwhip
effect.
In addition, this study introduces some innovative ideas that are useful for
practitioners. In this regard, the managerial implication of this research is that it
can help supply chain managers understand that instead of solely investing in
implementing and administering complex, yet efficient, contract types, they could
resort to the simple wholesale price contract, which seems to have the potential
to address at least some of the operational inefficiencies that are inherent with
supply chains. To this end, they could consider effective management training
that focuses on ‘global near efficiency’. The reason is that in spite of a partner’ s
‘locally poor’ individual decisions, ‘global near efficiencies’ can be achieved and,
so, it is important to train decision makers to focus on overall aggregate channel
performances instead of their own individual profits, in order to reach these
decisions that would give rise to ‘global near efficient’ interactions. This is
exactly where the simulation games developed in this study could help as training
tools along the lines of ‘business flight simulators’ (Sterman, 1992; 2000; van der
Zee and Slomp, 2009). The ABS model could also serve as a ‘routine decision
support’ tool in that it can reduce the complexity that is faced by distinct echelon
managers and thus, support the required thinking and analysis (Pidd, 2010).
Nevertheless, this study is not deprived from limitations. One potential
limitation is that most human participants were asked to play against a computer
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interface that approximated the decisions of appropriately assigned supply chain
configurations. Although this approach is followed to address the usual
limitations of experimental approaches (Camerer, 1995; Croson, 2002; Duffy,
2006) and, in addition, eliminate potential biases stemming from social
preferences and reputational effects (Loch and Wu, 2008; Katok and Wu, 2009),
some of these decisions, as deduced from the decision models that have been
fitted to the laboratory data, are unresponsive and inflexible. Human participants
might have reacted in different ways, when facing similar conditions. For this
reason, asking individuals to play interactively against each other, as is usually
done in participatory simulation (North and Macal, 2007), could add some useful
insights to the analysis and potentially reduce some of the approach’s inherent
bias.
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Chapter 9
Discussion: Bringing it all Together
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. The first objective is to summarise the
effect that different prolonged interactions between dynamic, heterogeneous and
autonomous decisions can have on the wholesale price contract’s performance,
that is, when applied to the Newsvendor Problem and the Beer Distribution Game
setting. The second objective is to discuss, explain and justify the similarities and
the differences that are observed between these two settings. The main focus is
on the insights and the managerial implications that can be inferred from this PhD
thesis.
The chapter starts by summarising the main conclusions that can be drawn
from the Newsvendor Problem (Section 9.1), proceeds to outlining the most
important results of the Beer Distribution Game (Section 9.2). Following this, the
differences between the two settings are identified and explained (Section 9.3).
Finally (i.e. in Section 9.4) a discussion on the common themes that seem to
emerge from these two settings is provided.
9.1 Conclusions from the Newsvendor Problem
When the wholesale price contract is assumed to be in force in the simple
Newsvendor Problem setting the manufacturer specifies the wholesale price. In
response to this, the retailer must choose an order quantity. The manufacturer is
assumed to instantaneously deliver to the retailer any quantity requested, while
customer demand is also assumed to occur instantaneously.
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The relevant standard normative theory is reviewed in Sub-section
2.1.1.According to this, the manufacturer is perfectly rational in his/her price
decisions and aims to maximise his/her own individual profit. The same also
holds for the retailer; namely, he/she places, in response to this price, an order
that maximises his/her individual profit. Theory predicts that their resultant
interaction is inefficient, or else that that the efficiency score that is attained by
the overall channel is strictly less than 1 (i.e. the aggregate profit that is realised
is significantly lower than the first-best case maximum profit). This phenomenon
where neither partner takes into account the effect of his/her decisions on the
aggregate channel profit is known as the double marginalization problem.
This study explores systematically how different human decisions may be
from the above theoretical predictions and what the effect of prolonged
interactions between dynamic, heterogeneous and autonomous decisions on the
wholesale price contract’s overall performance is. Since this study is the first that
supplements laboratory investigations with ABS experiments, it is the first that
simultaneously addresses the requirements of multiple interactions, prolonged
interaction lengths and multiple replications. In this way, it infers statistically
accurate conclusions that concern: i. human intentions that might be different
from profit maximisation (i.e. address the literature gap G.1 of Table 2.5), ii.
human actions that might differ from their corresponding intentions in
heterogeneous ways (i.e. heterogeneous boundedly rational actions, according to
the literature gap G.2 of Table 2.5), iii. human reactions that might depend on
their surrounding environments and any occurring changes to it (i.e. address the
literature gap G.3 of Table 2.5), iv. human decisions that might be independent
and autonomous (i.e. address the literature gap G.4 of Table 2.5).
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The results that are obtained from these combinations of laboratory and
ABS experiments demonstrate systematic deviations from the predictions of the
standard normative models in three different aspects, namely, the steady state
mean prices that are charged by the simulated manufacturers, the steady state
mean quantities that are ordered by the simulated retailers and the steady state
mean efficiency scores that are attained by the interactions studied. Each of these
aspects is now described in some detail.
First, the simulated human manufacturers are shown to make strictly
‘locally poor’ price decisions, namely charge prices that are significantly
different from their rationally optimising counterparts’. In greater detail, they are
found to employ two distinct pricing strategies: they either attempt to ensure
profitability by attracting retailers’ demand or by securing strictly positive profit
margins. In the first case they wish to attract customer demand by charging low
prices (i.e. employ the ‘demand – driven’ pricing strategy: s. Section 5.1) and for
this reason tend to ‘under-charge’. In the second case they desire to increase their
profit margins (i.e. employ the ‘profit margin – driven’ pricing strategy: s.
Section 5.1) and for this reason tend to ‘over-charge’.
Second, although a number of simulated human retailers are found to make
‘locally good’ order quantity decisions, namely order quantities that would not
statistically differ from their respective rationally optimising counterparts’, a
significant number of them are observed to only make ‘locally poor’ order
quantity decisions. In stark contrast to the predictions of the standard normative
theory, some simulated human retailers are even observed to order quantities that
do not differ significantly from the quantity that the integrated newsvendor would
order. As discussed in Sub-section 2.1.1 the integrated newsvendor is entrusted
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with the task of ordering quantities, when centralised operation is assumed to
take place, namely when maximisation of the team overall profit is sought for.
This centralised operation is the only instance when the first-best case maximum
profit is achieved in the analytical version of the Newsvendor Problem setting.
Overall the simulated human retailers of this study exhibit different preferences
that can vary between ‘minimisation of left - overs’ and ‘maximisation of
sales’(s. Section 5.2). In the case that ‘minimisation of left - overs’ is a priority,
the simulated human retailers tend to ‘under-order’, while in the case that
‘maximisation of sales’ is a priority; the simulated human retailers tend to ‘over-
order’.
Last, the efficiency scores that are attained by the combined interactions of
the simulated human manufacturers and retailers of this study vary to a great
extent. That is, the efficiency scores emerge from the interplay between
participants’ differing preferences and cognitive limitations and, therefore, are
not solely driven by the individual performances of the partners’ distinct decision
making strategies. The experiments provide evidence that for a significant
number of interactions ‘near efficiency’ is attained, in spite of the interacting
partners’ ‘locally poor’ decisions. In addition, it cannot be rejected that there are
interactions that may attain efficiency scores that are not significantly lower than
1.
In greater detail, there seems to be some evidence that the interests of the
simulated human retailers who comply with their individual interpretations of the
pull-to-centre effect are better aligned with the first-best case maximum profit. In
terms of conditions that derive as favourable for ‘near’ and/or ‘global efficiency’
the participation of at least one ‘demand – driven’ or ‘sales maximising’ decision
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maker has the potential to generate a ‘nearly efficient’ interaction. Indeed, the
participation of only ‘demand – driven’ and ‘sales maximising’ decision makers
in an interaction may generate a higher convergence of aggregate profits to the
first-best case maximum profit. Among these decision making strategies, the
‘better performing’ are the ones that exhibit a high responsiveness to the
interacting partners’ decisions, that is, order quantities in the case of
manufacturers and incurred wholesale prices in the case of retailers. As for
conditions that are unfavourable for ‘near’ and/or ‘global efficiency’, the
existence of a ‘left - overs minimising’ decision maker in an interaction tends to
lower significantly the emerging efficiency scores.
Following the above results from the laboratory and simulation
experiments a number of useful suggestions can be prescribed to supply chain
managers. In order to make price and quantity decision that are better aligned
with the team overall profit maximisation, distinct echelon managers ought to
deviate from their isolated views of individual profits and keep the aggregate
channel profit in mind. However, since they may not have access to perfect
symmetric information to this end, they may instead resort to the relevant
information that is available to them; namely, determine prices by prioritizing the
previously received order quantities and select order quantities by prioritizing the
currently charged wholesale prices. In addition, considering the previous order
quantities and wholesale prices may protect them from unnecessarily sacrificing
their individual profits.
9.2 Conclusions from the Contract Beer Distribution Game
This study is the first that enforces the wholesale price contract in the Beer
Distribution Game setting. In the case that this contract becomes the basis of any
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interaction between adjacent echelon managers, each echelon manager (apart
from the retailer) specifies the price that he/she wishes to charge to his/her
downstream customer. Once he/she has received the price that is currently
charged by the upstream supplier (apart from the manufacturer, who faces a fixed
production cost), he/she decides whether he/she desires to place an order with the
upstream supplier or not. If he/she places an order, he/she also determines the
exact order quantity. Orders require a total information lead-time of (li=) 2 time
periods to be processed and there is also a transportation lead-time of (Li=) 2 time
periods for a shipment to be delivered to a partner’s site. The total manufacturing
time that is required for a requested lot to be produced is (M3=) 3 time periods.
Customer demand arises at the retailer’s site and is assumed to occur
instantaneously. All participants are assumed to incur inventory holding and
backlog costs.
The standard normative models that correspond to the above specification
of the Contract Beer Distribution Game are developed in Section 6.4. According
to these, in the case where all distinct echelon managers are assumed to be
perfectly rational and exclusively intending to maximise the team overall profit
(i.e. centralised operation), they follow order-up-to level inventory policies.
Namely, once they reach their optimal inventory target levels, they place orders
that follow exactly their incoming order quantities. The result of the interaction of
these order-up-to level policies is that in steady state the first-best case maximum
profit is achieved and there is no bullwhip effect. The reason is that since
incoming orders get reproduced from echelon to echelon in steady state, the order
sizes do not get amplified between adjacent supply chain partners.
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In the case where all distinct echelon managers have as their only intention
to maximise their individual profits (i.e. de-centralised operation), they charge
prices that are strictly higher than the prices that they are charged and follow the
same type of order-up-to level inventory policies. Their exact optimal inventory
target levels may in this case be different from the decisions that that they would
make under centralised operation. But in steady state they are assumed to have
already reached these optimal inventory target levels and, therefore, are
subsequently required to simply order as much are they are requested to deliver.
Hence, they follow exactly the same decision rules as they would follow under
the hypothetical scenario of centralised operation. That is exactly why they do
achieve in steady state the first-best case maximum profit and also avoid the
bullwhip effect completely. As their combined interaction generates the first-best
case maximum profit, the competition penalty that is attained is exactly equal to
0.
Since this study is the first that supplements laboratory investigations with
ABS experiments, it is the first that simultaneously addresses the requirements of
multiple interactions, prolonged interaction lengths and multiple replications,
which would not have been possible with laboratory experiments alone. The
results that are obtained from the combination of laboratory and ABS
experiments display persistent divergences from the predictions of standard
normative theory in four different aspects: the steady state mean prices that the
simulated human participants charge; the steady state mean quantities that the
simulated human participants order; the steady state mean competition penalties
that are attained by the aggregate channel and the degree of prevalence of the
bullwhip effect. Each of these aspects is now described in some detail.
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First, although there are a number of simulated human participants who
charge strictly higher prices than the prices that they are charged (i.e. make
‘locally good’ price decisions), there are many simulated human participants who
make ‘locally poor’ price decisions, that is, either charge prices that do not differ
significantly from the prices that they are charged or are significantly lower than
the prices that they are charged. In greater detail, there are two distinct pricing
strategies that the simulated echelon managers seem to employ. In the case where
they take into account their inventory availabilities in their price decisions, they
tend to be highly conscious of incurred inventory holding and backlog costs and
wish to get compensated for these losses. In order, thus, to ensure strictly positive
profit margins, they appear to charge prices that are strictly higher than their own
prices; namely, they ‘over-charge’. In this regard, they make ‘locally good’ price
decisions. For the reasons already explained, this pricing strategy is characterised
as ‘profit margin – driven’ (s. Section 8.1). On the contrary, in the case where
they prefer to instead base their price decisions on the incoming order quantities,
they appear more highly concerned about incoming demand. In order thus, to
attract demand from their respective downstream customer, they implement a
‘demand – driven’ pricing strategy (s. Section 8.1) and, hence, ‘under-charge’,
that is, charge prices that may not differ significantly from their own prices or
may even be significantly lower than their own prices. Thus, they appear to make
‘locally poor’ price decisions.
Second, even though there are a number of simulated human participants in
the game who on average order quantities that do not differ significantly from the
mean incoming order quantities (i.e. make ‘locally good’ order quantity
decisions), there are also a significant number of echelon managers who are
found to make systematically ‘locally poor’ order decisions, that is order
Chapter 9- Discussion: Bringing it all Together
371
significantly more (i.e. ‘over-order’) or less (i.e. ‘under-order’) than their
rationally optimising counterparts would. More specifically, ‘over-ordering’
tends to prevail for those simulated human participants who are driven by
‘minimisation of backlogs’, while ‘under-ordering’ tends to dominate for those
simulated human participants who prioritize ‘minimisation of inventories’ (s.
Section 8.2). It is very interesting that there also seems to be a systematic pattern
of ordering strategies across different simulated echelon managers. A high
accountability with respect to the prices that they charge, the prices that they are
charged, or the profit that they have realised cumulatively during the simulation
run seems to increase their likelihood of making ‘locally good’ order quantity
decisions.
Third, the interactions of simulated human participants who make ‘locally
good’ price and order quantity decisions fail to attain the first-best case maximum
profit. The result is that the emerging competition penalties are strictly higher
than 0, in spite of the interacting partners’ ‘locally good’ decisions. This comes in
stark contrast to the analytical predictions of the standard normative models of
Section 6.4. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are a significant number of
interactions between ‘locally good’ price and order decisions that generate
‘global near efficiencies’ on the aggregate channel level (s. Section 8.3). In the
cases that ‘global near efficiencies’ are achieved, relatively low competition
penalties are observed. As for the exact competition penalties that are attained by
each interaction studied they strongly depend on the interplay between the
interacting partners’ priorities and cognitive abilities.
Last, the degree of prevalence of the bullwhip effect in all simulated human
interactions is strongly heterogeneous and varies between two extremes, that is,
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strong prevalence and production smoothing. Strong prevalence occurs in the
case that the bullwhip effect persists, while production smoothing occurs in the
case that the bullwhip effect is mitigated. Moreover, there is evidence that all
simulated echelon managers have the potential to eliminate the bullwhip effect in
spite of their ‘locally poor’ decisions. In opposition to the standard normative
models’ predictions, not only the simulated human participants who make
‘locally good’ order decisions, but also the simulated human decision makers
who make ‘locally poor’ order decisions can potentially participate in interactions
in which the bullwhip effect is eliminated. In greater detail, it is the interplay
between the interacting partners’ policies and not the interacting partners’
separate decisions that determine the exact degree to which the bullwhip effect
persists.
Following the above deviations of the results of the combined laboratory
and simulation experiments from the predictions of the standard normative
models, a number of conditions are shown to be favourable in decreasing the
emerging competition penalties. Since the inventory holding and backlog costs
that are incurred by all interacting supply chain partners are in great part
responsible for the aggregate channel profits, the distinct echelon managers’
ordering strategies play a more significant role in the emerging competition
penalties than their corresponding pricing strategies. In respect to this, a high
degree of consciousness of prices and profits brings the simulated echelon
managers’ order decisions closer to the corresponding decisions of their
rationally optimising counterparts’ and, hence, significantly reduces the emerging
competition penalties.
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However, no similar favourable conditions for addressing the bullwhip
effect emerge from the combined laboratory and simulation experiments. The
reason is that all simulated echelon managers are shown to be in a position to
eliminate the bullwhip effect, depending on the interplay with their interacting
adjacent partners. Therefore, it becomes important to help distinct echelon
managers to understand the underlying supply chain dynamics and, thus, train
them to make decisions that act against the bullwhip effect.
Building on these findings, a number of useful suggestions can be
prescribed to supply chain managers. The purpose of these prescriptions is to
provoke price and quantity decision that are better aligned with the decisions that
would generate the first-best case maximum profit and that, in addition, resist to
the amplification of the variance that is often inherent with adjacent partners’
orders (i.e. bullwhip effect). To this end, distinct echelon managers ought to
consider prices and aggregate profits instead of individual costs in their
respective order decisions. The reason is that they tend to place orders that are
consistent with their incoming order quantities, provided that the prices that are
charged to them are not excessively high. Hence, a ‘demand – driven’ pricing
strategy favours both ‘global near efficiencies’ and elimination of the bullwhip
effect. This conclusion is very interesting, because a similar conclusion has as yet
not be drawn for Sterman’s (1989) standard Beer Distribution Game, given that
prices do not come into play in it and, thus, cannot affect order quantity decisions
in any way.
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9.3 Main Differences between the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer
Distribution Game
The conclusions from the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer
Distribution Game settings that are provided in Sections 9.1 and 9.2, respectively,
reveal a number of structural differences between the two settings. The numbered
list that follows summarises these concisely:
i. While in the Newsvendor Problem each participant is entrusted with exactly
one decision task (i.e. the manufacturer needs to specify the wholesale price
and the retailer the order quantity), in the Contract Beer Distribution Game
each participant is required to make two distinct decisions (i.e. the price to be
charged to the downstream customer and the order quantity to be placed with
the upstream supplier). The only exception is the retailer, who does not need
to select a price, because the retailer is assumed to sell at a fixed selling price
that is set by competition, as is the case for any commodity product.
ii. Since in the Newsvendor Problem the product lasts for only one selling
season, there is no inventory. The situation in the Contract Beer Distribution
Game setting is completely different. Since there is no limit to a product’s
life, inventory is kept at each echelon. The result is that the associated
inventory holding costs are systematically accounted for.
iii. In the Newsvendor Problem a demand from a period that is left unsatisfied
cannot be satisfied in any subsequent period and, so, all unsatisfied demand is
lost. In contrast, in the Contract Beer Distribution Game any arising demand
needs to be satisfied. Therefore, when demand cannot be satisfied from
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inventory, it is backlogged and the corresponding backlog penalties are
incurred.
iv. In the Newsvendor Problem orders get immediately processed, while in the
Contract Beer Distribution Game there is a fixed information lead-time that
is equal to 2 time periods for all orders to get transmitted and processed.
v. In the Newsvendor Problem shipments get prepared and delivered
immediately. In the Contract Beer Distribution Game there are fixed, non-
zero production and transportation lead-times that are equal to 3 and 2 time
periods, respectively.
vi. Both partners in the Newsvendor Problem deal with demand uncertainty
only. However, all partners in the Contract Beer Distribution Game face
uncertainty from both the supply and demand sides. The only exception is the
manufacturer of the Contract Beer Distribution Game, who is assumed to
have a perfectly reliable manufacturing facility in place. All other
participants in the game face, in addition to demand stochasticity, supply
uncertainty. For example, the exact portion of the requested quantity that the
retailer receives (Mi=) 3 time periods after placing the order depends on the
wholesaler’s inventory availability. The latter in turn depends on the
manufacturer’s inventory level. But the inventory levels of the wholesaler
and manufacturer remain completely outside of the retailer’s own control.
This is where supply uncertainty stems from.
The above structural differences are responsible for the following main
difference that exists between the two settings’ analytical results. The relevant
theories predict that the wholesale price contract may be inefficient when applied
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to the Newsvendor Problem, but it is efficient in the Contract Beer Distribution
Game. The reason that the double marginalization problem persists in the
Newsvendor Problem and, therefore, global efficiency cannot be attained therein
is that the decision making policies of partners are substantially different under
centralised and de-centralised modes of operation.
Nevertheless, the situation is different in the Contract Beer Distribution
Game setting. The first-best case maximum profit can be attained in steady state
when the wholesale price contract is in force, under both scenarios of centralised
operation and de-centralised operation. Since in this setting inventories and
backlogs are accounted for and determine to a great part the overall profit that is
attained, the distinct echelon managers can maximise their individual profits by
minimising the inventory holding and backlog costs. To this end, they need to
follow the same type order-up-to level inventory policies that would maximise
the team overall profit. So, once they have reached their corresponding optimal
target inventory levels (i.e. in steady state), the decision rules that they need to
follow become exactly the same as the decision rules that maximise the team
overall profit.
It is very interesting that this analytical prediction is built on the
simplifying assumption that echelon managers concentrate on only a subset of the
components that generate their individual profits, namely those that remain
within their own control. In this regard, supply uncertainty is left outside of their
individual profit maximising objectives. This simplification brings the Contract
Beer Distribution Game setting closer to the specification of the Newsvendor
Problem. Nevertheless, this convergence is still not sufficient to force the
analytical predictions of the two settings’ standard normative models to coincide.
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The reason is that this simplification affects only the exact optimal inventory
targets of the distinct echelon managers of the Contract Beer Distribution Game,
but leaves the type of the order-up-to level inventory policies that are required
completely unaffected. In respect to this, ordering as much as requested to deliver
leads to attaining the first-best case maximum profit.
Furthermore, there are differences in the results that are obtained from the
combined laboratory and ABS experiments in the Newsvendor Problem and the
Contract Beer Distribution Game. These differences concern three distinct
dimensions: the prices and the order quantities of the simulated human
participants and the divergences that occur between emerging aggregate channel
profits and the first-best case maximum profit.
In respect to the prices that the simulated human manufacturers of the
Newsvendor Problem charge, all of them make ‘locally poor’ price decisions.
Although some of them charge prices that are significantly lower than the
corresponding price that the rationally optimising manufacturer would charge, all
of them prove unwilling to charge the manufacturing cost, which is the only cost
component that the integrated newsvendor would incur and would generate a
zero profit margin. As for the simulated human participants in the Contract Beer
Distribution Game, a significant number of them charge prices that are not
significantly higher than their own incurred prices and, thus, prove willing to
tolerate non strictly positive profit margins. This comes as a direct consequence
of the setting’s inherent complexity: Since all echelon managers in the Contract
Beer Distribution Game need to pay for inventory holding costs, they tend to try
and avoid accumulating inventories by selling at low prices.
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Attention is now turned to the second important difference that is observed
from the experimental results of the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer
Distribution Game. Although most simulated human retailers of the Newsvendor
Problem make ‘locally poor’ order decisions (that is, order quantities that are
significantly different from the quantities that would maximise the team overall
profit), there are a significant number of simulated human participants in the
Contract Beer Distribution Game that make ‘locally good’ order decisions
(namely, order quantities that do not differ significantly from the quantities that
would maximise both their respective individual profits and the team overall
profit). Among the simulated human retailers of the Newsvendor Problem, those
that prefer to ‘minimise left - overs’ tend to ‘under-order’, while those that
prioritize ‘maximisation of sales’ instead tend to ‘over-order. As for the
simulated human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game, those that
strongly prefer to ‘minimise inventories’ tend to ‘under-order’, while those that
favour ‘minimisation of backlogs’ instead tend to ‘over-order’. Nonetheless, it
should at this point be highlighted that the different individual preferences that
drive ‘locally poor’ order decisions in the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract
Beer Distribution Game settings most probably originate from the structural
differences between the two settings and, more specifically, from the lack of
inventories and backlogs in the Newsvendor Problem setting. This is why the
underlying causes of ‘under-ordering’ behaviours in both the Newsvendor
Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution Game settings (i.e. ‘minimisation of
left – overs’ and ‘minimisation of inventories’, respectively), as well as the
corresponding causes of ‘over-ordering’ behaviours in the Newsvendor Problem
and the Contract Beer Distribution Game (i.e. ‘maximisation of sales’ and
‘minimisation of backlogs’, respectively) seem to be equivalent.
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The third and last difference between the experimental results that are
acquired from the two settings is that in the Newsvendor Problem the first-best
case maximum profit is attained, while in the Contract Beer Distribution Game it
is not. The experimental evidence of the Newsvendor Problem demonstrates that
it is possible that the efficiency score of an interaction may not be significantly
lower than 1. The exact efficiency score that is attained in an interaction greatly
varies and, in greater detail, depends on the interplay between the simulated
human participants’ priorities and cognitive abilities. However, the corresponding
evidence of the Contract Beer Distribution Game indicates that, irrespectively of
the interplay between varying pricing and ordering strategies, the competition
penalties that are attained by all interactions are significantly higher than 0. This
major difference becomes even more interesting since in the Contract Beer
Distribution Game there are a number of interactions in which all simulated
supply chain partners are observed to make ‘locally good’ price and order
quantity decisions, which does not happen in the case of the Newsvendor
Problem. The underlying reason that explains why compliance with the team
optimising decision rules in the Contract Beer Distribution Game cannot
guarantee the first-best case maximum profit is the following: some of the
simulated human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game may in
steady state order on average as much as they are requested to deliver, but may
place these order quantities in time periods that lag from incoming order
quantities so significantly that huge inventory and / or backlog costs are
generated. Therefore, it may not simply suffice to ensure that decision makers’
quantities coincide on average with the requested quantities. It additionally
becomes important to force this coincidence on a one-to-one time period basis,
namely, ensure that the optimal decision rules (6.10a) and (6.10b) (that
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incorporate the required order processing time delays) are complied with for
every time period of the simulation run. The reader should, nevertheless, be
reassured that in spite of the laboratory evidence that has been collected in this
PhD study, it cannot be rejected that there might exist a combination that attains a
competition penalty that may not differ significantly from 0.
In summary, the wholesale price contract proves to operate in distinct
ways in the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution Game
settings. These differences pose a concern about the scalability of most existing
studies that apply the wholesale price contract (as well as any other supply chain
contract) exclusively to the Newsvendor Problem setting. Since the principles
that govern the operation of the Beer Distribution Game supply chain, and, thus,
of any serial multi echelon supply chain, are fundamentally different, analytical
and experimental studies of the wholesale price contract (and all supply chain
contracts) should be extended to more complicated and realistic settings than the
Newsvendor Problem. The setting of the Contract Beer Distribution Game
presents the first possible extension in this regard.
Yet, in spite of the structural differences that exist between the
Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution Game the combined
laboratory and ABS experiments of this PhD thesis also reveal a number of
common themes. These similarities, as identified in Section 9.4, set the ground
for the thesis of this PhD thesis.
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9.4 Common Themes between the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract
Beer Distribution Game
It is very interesting that there are systematic divergences between theory and the
experiments for both the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer
Distribution Game. The majority of the simulated human participants in both the
Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution Game make price and
order quantity decisions that are significantly different from the analytical
predictions of the corresponding standard normative models. In addition, there
are a significant number of interactions that generate overall performances that
also differ significantly from the associated theoretical predictions. In other
words, there are interactions in the Newsvendor Problem that generate efficiency
scores that may not be significantly lower than 1 and interactions in the Contract
Beer Distribution Game that lead to competition penalties that may be
significantly higher than 0. Given the true price and order decisions of simulated
human participants and the true emerging global efficiencies of simulated
interactions in both the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution
Game settings, which are systematically different from their corresponding
theoretical predictions, the standard normative models cannot be used as accurate
predictors of reality.
It is also very interesting that the simulated human participants in both the
Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution Game employ similar
pricing strategies to ensure their profitability. In greater detail, the simulated
echelon managers in both settings turn to either ‘demand - driven’ or ‘profit
margin – driven’ pricing schemes or some adequate combination of them.
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Given the equivalence of the ordering strategies in the Newsvendor
Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution Game (that is, ‘minimisation of left
– overs’ and ‘minimisation of inventories’ and ‘maximisation of sales’ and
‘minimisation of backlogs’, respectively), the third commonality between the two
settings concerns the underlying causes of simulated human participants’ ‘under-
ordering’ and ‘over-ordering’ behaviours. In greater detail, in both settings the
simulated human participants’ strong preference to ‘minimise inventories’ (or
‘minimise left – overs’) tends to generate orders that are too low (i.e. ‘under-
ordering’), while the simulated human participants’ inclination towards
‘minimisation of backlogs’ (or ‘maximisation of sales’) mostly produces orders
that are too high (i.e. ‘over-ordering’).
A third common pattern that emerges from the combination of laboratory
and ABS experiments is the effect of price consciousness on overall supply chain
performances in the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution
Game. In greater detail, the consideration of prices appears to improve both the
efficiency scores that the different interactions attain in the Newsvendor Problem
and the degree that the bullwhip effect prevails in the Contract Beer Distribution
Game. Following this, a general prescription that could be suggested to all real
echelon managers in both the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer
Distribution Game is that, in order to reduce operational inefficiencies, they need
to considerably take into account in their order quantity decisions both the prices
that they charge and the prices that they are charged. They also ought to deviate
from their isolated views of individual profit and keep the aggregate channel
profit in mind, when making their respective decisions. This attitude will increase
the aggregate channel profit and, so, bring it closer to the first-best case maximum
profit and, also, reduce the bullwhip effect.
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The last common insight that emerges from the laboratory and ABS
experiments of the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution
Game is that the wholesale price contract can emerge as ‘globally efficient’,
depending on the interplay between the interacting partners’ cognitive limitations
and preferences. Namely, it can generate the first-best case maximum profit in the
Newsvendor Problem and also eliminate the bullwhip effect in the Contract Beer
Distribution Game. That is exactly why supply chain managers should be advised
to consider the simple wholesale price contract, instead of solely investing in
implementing and administering complex, yet efficient, contract types. Not only
is it simpler, cheaper and easier to administer, but it can also in practice
overcome the main operational inefficiencies that are inherent with multi-echelon
serial supply chains, that is the double marginalization problem and the bullwhip
effect. This is a very valuable insight, because it may explain the wide popularity
of the wholesale price contract that is observed in practice, beyond just its
simplicity (e.g. publishing and movie rental industries: Cachon and Lariviere,
2001; Narayan and Raman, 2004; Cachon and Lariviere, 2005). This insight can
also improve the current practice that favours dogmatically the supply chain
contracts that are theoretically proven as coordinating. One such example is the
buyback contract with a full rebate that seems to prevail in the pharmaceutical
industry, irrespectively of the interacting echelon managers’ individual
preferences (Katok and Wu, 2009).
Chapter 10 concludes with how the above established common themes of
this PhD thesis can be used to infer some general lessons about multi echelon
serial supply chains of general type and, hence, serves to answer the main
question that motivated this study.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the conclusions that can be drawn
from the combined laboratory and ABS experiments that this PhD thesis has
conducted in the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution Game
settings.
In this regard, the chapter starts in Section 10.1 by extracting the general
lessons that can be gained about multi-echelon serial supply chain of general type
that can be inferred from the common themes that emerge from the Newsvendor
Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution Game settings. Building on these
general lessons, Section 10.2 proceeds to reflect on whether the objectives of this
study have been satisfied; Section 10.3 then summarises the main contribution of
this PhD thesis to knowledge and Section 10.4 recognises its main limitations.
Finally, Section 10.5 proposes possible directions for future research.
10.1 Insights on general type serial multi-echelon supply chains
Building on the common themes that emerge from the Newsvendor Problem and
the Contract Beer Distribution Game, some general lessons about serial multi-
echelon supply chain settings are gained. The reason is that the Newsvendor
Problem constitutes the fundamental building block of any supply chain
configuration, while the Beer Distribution Game mimics the material,
information and financial flows of any general type, serial multi-echelon supply
chain. This is the reason why, once the two settings are combined, they provide
learning and insight that can be used in other serial multi-echelon supply chain
settings as well.
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The first learning that can be obtained from this PhD thesis puts forward
the limited predictive power of the standard normative models that correspond to
general type, multi –echelon serial supply chain systems, when the wholesale
price contract is assumed to be in force. Since there are systematic divergences
between the results that are obtained from the combined laboratory and ABS
experiments and the corresponding theoretical predictions, these standard
normative models can only to a very a limited degree be used as accurate
predictors of real interactions in supply chain systems. In greater detail, human
echelon managers make price and order decisions that are significantly different
from the corresponding decisions of their perfectly rationally optimising
counterparts. There are three underlying reasons that explain this persistence.
First, real echelon managers do not exclusively intend to maximise their
respective individual profits; they might also be interested in the entire supply
chain’s aggregate profit. In addition, their actions are not necessarily consistent
with their intentions and their respective degrees of consistency also vary, that is,
they are heterogeneously boundedly rational. Last, they react to changes that go
on in their surrounding environment and rely to this end on the information that is
locally available to them. Since the standard normative models fail to accurately
predict the price and order decisions of human echelon managers, their
corresponding predictions of the wholesale price contract’s efficiency also have
limited utility for real interactions.
The second learning that can be obtained from this PhD thesis concerns the
effectiveness of the distinct pricing strategies that the different simulated
participants in the Newsvendor Problem and the Contract Beer Distribution
Game adopt. The combined laboratory and ABS experiments demonstrate that
whether the simulated echelon managers employ a ‘demand – driven’ or a ‘profit
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margin – driven’ or some mixture of both may not have a significant effect on the
aggregate profit that is attained overall. A potential explanations lies at the fact
that the aggregate profit that is attained by all echelon managers combined is not
affected in any way by the intermediate prices that adjacent supply chain partners
charge to each other. Nevertheless, the inclusion of prices does introduce other
important benefits; namely, prices serve as an effective control mechanism to
induce ‘locally good’ order quantity decisions, generate ‘global near efficiencies’
and mitigate the bullwhip effect. In greater detail, there is significant evidence
that among all pricing schemes that can be adopted, the ‘demand – driven’
pricing strategy, which leads to charging low prices, is the most effective in
favouring ‘global near efficiencies’ and eliminating the bullwhip effect.
The third learning that can be obtained from this PhD thesis about multi –
echelon serial supply chains concerns the overall performance of the entire
supply chain, as expressed in the form of efficiency scores and / or competition
penalties, and the degree of prevalence of the bullwhip effect. In this regard, the
overall supply chain performance seems to be affected by two important factors.
First, the willingness of an echelon manager to sacrifice some of his / her
individual profit to the benefit of the aggregate channel profit and, hence, let
his/her order quantities converge to the team overall profit maximising order
quantities appears to have a positive effect on the supply chain’s overall
performance. Second, the significance that an echelon manager assigns to the
prices that he / she charges and the prices that he / she is charged also seems to
influence the overall performance of the entire supply chain. In greater detail, the
simulated human participants’ strong preference to ‘minimise inventories’ tends
to generate orders that are significantly lower than the team overall profit
maximising order quantities (i.e. ‘under-ordering’), while the simulated human
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participants’ inclination to ‘minimise backlogs’ mostly produces orders that are
significantly higher than the team overall profit maximising order quantities (i.e.
‘over-ordering’). On the contrary, in the case that an echelon manager is willing
to sacrifice some of his/her own individual pre-supposition team overall profit
and, thus, adopt some combination of ‘inventories minimising’ and ‘backlogs
minimising’ ordering strategy, he/she lets his/her order quantities converge to the
team overall profit maximising order quantities. This is why the more willing a
simulated human participant is to compromise his/her potentially strong
preference to some adequate mixture, the better the overall performance of the
supply chain. The improvement of the overall supply chain performance is
assessed in respect to how close the aggregate channel profit becomes to the first-
best case maximum profit and to how persistent the bullwhip effect remains.
Based on this, the general prescription that could be suggested to all real echelon
managers is that, in order to reduce operational inefficiencies, they need to take
into account both the prices that they charge and the prices that they are charged
in their order quantity decisions and, also, keep the aggregate channel profit in
mind (and not solely their individual profit, as is usually the case), when making
their respective decisions.
The fourth and last learning that derives from this PhD thesis is that the
wholesale price contract can emerge as globally efficient, depending on the
interplay between the interacting partners’ cognitive limitations and preferences.
Namely, it can generate the first-best case maximum profit and also eliminate the
bullwhip effect. The result is that the wholesale price contract can in practice
overcome all the operational inefficiencies that are inherent with multi-echelon
serial supply chains, that is, the double marginalization problem and the bullwhip
effect. In addition, it is simpler, cheaper and easier to administer than the
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complicated transfer payment schemes that the analytical literature proposes as
efficient. For this reason, in stark contrast to the recommendations of the existing
analytical literature, this study advises supply chain managers to adopt this
simple contract, depending on the interacting partners’ preferred strategies.
Section 10.2 builds on these insights to test whether the objectives of this
PhD thesis have been achieved.
10.2 Reflection on Objectives
The paragraphs that follow remind the reader of the main objectives of this PhD
thesis, as stated in Section 1.4 and discuss the degree to which they have been
achieved. The section also reflects on exactly how each stated objective has been
accomplished. It concludes with a brief note on whether the underlying
motivation of this PhD thesis has been fulfilled.
1. To develop a methodology that revisits the over-simplifying assumptions of
the existing theory-driven, standard normative models in a way that
accurately predicts the decisions of human supply chain decision makers.
This PhD thesis develops and applies a novel approach that revisits the over-
simplifying assumptions of the existing analytical models about decision makers’
common intentions, actions, reactions and decisions. This approach is novel in
that it complements the laboratory experiments, that have as yet been exclusively
conducted in the studies of the field, with Agent Based Simulation experiments.
The corresponding ABS models have been calibrated via the results from the
laboratory experiments, which were run with human subjects. In this way, the
requirements of multiple interactions, prolonged interaction lengths and multiple
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replications, which would not have been possible if only experiments with human
subjects were run, could be simultaneously addressed.
2. To assess how different the decisions of supply chain managers are to the
corresponding predictions of the standard normative models, when the
wholesale price contract is assumed to be in force.
The combined laboratory and ABS experiments of this PhD thesis demonstrate
that in the case where the wholesale price contract is enforced, human echelon
managers are found to make price and order decisions that deviate systematically
from the rationally optimising decisions. The rationally optimising decisions
reflect the price and order decisions that the standard normative models predict
the perfectly rationally optimising counterparts to make. In greater detail, the
simulated human manufacturers in the Newsvendor Problem are shown to
employ two distinct pricing strategies: either the ‘demand – driven’ or the ‘profit
margin – driven’ pricing strategies that both produce price decisions that are
significantly different from the predictions of the corresponding standard
normative models. The simulated human retailers in the Newsvendor Problem
exhibit preferences that vary between the two extremes of ‘minimisation of left -
overs’ and ‘maximisation of sales’. In stark contrast to the predictions of the
standard normative theory, these extremes allow the simulated human retailers to
order quantities that do not differ significantly from the quantity that the
integrated newsvendor would order. As discussed in Sub-section 2.1.1 in the case
that the integrated newsvendor makes order quantity decisions is the only
instance when the first-best case maximum profit is achieved in the analytical
version of the Newsvendor Problem setting. In the Contract Beer Distribution
Game setting all simulated human echelon managers employ either a ‘demand-
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driven’ or a ‘profit margin-driven’ pricing scheme or some adequate combination
of these. The result is that most simulated human participants charge prices that
are significantly lower than the prices that they are charged. Although the
simulated human echelon managers order with a preference to either ‘minimise
inventories’ or ‘minimise backlogs’, a significant number of them order
significantly more (i.e. ‘over-order’) or less (i.e. ‘under-order’) than their
rationally optimising counterparts would. Therefore, it can be justifiably argued
that the standard normative models that correspond to the wholesale price
contract do not represent accurately the interactions that can occur between
human decision makers in multi-echelon serial supply chain systems.
3. To investigate the true efficiency of the wholesale price contract, when
human supply chain managers interact with each other.
Since the standard normative models fail to accurately predict the price and order
decisions of human echelon managers, their corresponding predictions of the
wholesale price contract’s efficiency also retain a limited predictive power.
Furthermore, the true efficiency of the wholesale price contract varies and is
dependent to a great part on the interplay between the interacting partners’
cognitive limitations and preferences. In greater detail, the exact efficiency (i.e.
efficiency score or competition penalty and / or degree of existence of the
bullwhip effect, whichever is applicable) that the wholesale price contract attains
is determined by the interplay between the differing pricing and ordering
strategies that the interacting supply chain partners prefer to employ. There are a
number of interactions in which the wholesale price contract can attain the first-
best case maximum profit and also eliminate the bullwhip effect. Therefore, there
are interactions for which the wholesale price contract emerges as ‘globally
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efficient’. Nevertheless, there are also a significant number of interactions in
which the wholesale price contract achieves very poor overall performances.
Since the exact ‘global efficiency’ of the wholesale price contract depends on the
interplay between the interacting partners’ strategies, there cannot be any
accurate theoretical predictions of the contract’s expected efficiency. Yet, it is
very interesting that given a pricing and ordering strategy that is adopted by a
supply chain partner, the strategies that would turn the contract ‘globally
efficient’ are possible to be investigated. This is a valuable addition to the
existing experimental research, because it implies that echelon managers should
explore the emerging ‘global efficiency’ of their interactions before implementing
a pricing and ordering strategy. For this reason, they should neither be pre-biased
against the wholesale price contract nor inclined towards the complicated
transfer payment schemes, because of their respective theory - driven analytical
results. The reason is that the theoretical predictions of efficiency retain limited
predictive power not only for the wholesale price contract, but also for all other
supply chain contracts. Still, the practical results of other contracts in serial
multi-echelon supply chains remains to be explored.
4. To consider the impact that different pricing strategies have on the wholesale
price contract’s efficiency.
The combined laboratory and ABS experiments of this PhD thesis demonstrate
that the importance that the different echelon managers assign to the prices that
are charged by them and to them play a rather significant role on the realised
aggregate profits. In greater detail, the higher the significance that an echelon
manager assigns to the prices that he/she charges and the prices that he/she is
charged, the closer the aggregate channel profit becomes to the first-best case
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maximum profit and the less the bullwhip effect prevails. Therefore, consideration
of prices determines to a great part the global efficiency that the wholesale price
contract attains. In addition, there is significant evidence that a pricing scheme
that is concerned more about attracting demand (i.e. ‘demand – driven’) rather
than ensuring strictly positive profit margins (i.e. ‘profit margin – driven’) and is,
thus, inclined towards charging lower prices serves a dual purpose; namely,
favours ‘global near efficiencies’ and mitigates the bullwhip effect.
The summary of the above lessons that are gained from this PhD thesis
answers the main question that stimulated this study (s. Section 1.4), namely:
“Could the wholesale price contract in practice generate the first-best case
maximum performance of a supply chain setting and if so, under which specific
conditions?”.
The main answer that this PhD thesis provides to the aforementioned
questions is that supply chain managers are not necessarily advised against the
wholesale price contract, because it is a potentially globally efficient alternative
to efficient, yet complex, contract types. The underlying reason is that the
wholesale price contract has the potential to overcome the main operational
inefficiencies that are inherent with multi-echelon serial supply chains, namely
the double marginalisation problem (i.e. the wholesale price contract can lead to
the first-best case maximum profit) and the bullwhip effect. This comes in stark
contrast to the existing analytical results that are built on the common simplifying
assumptions of the standard normative models. Some conditions are shown to be
favourable, in order to reduce the operational inefficiencies. In greater detail,
individual echelon managers are advised to adopt ‘demand – driven’ pricing
strategies and, in respect to this, charge relatively low prices. They also need to
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considerably take into account both the prices that they charge and the prices that
they are charged in their respective decisions. In addition, they ought to deviate
from their isolated views of individual profits and keep the aggregate channel
profit in mind, when making these decisions.
Section 10.3 summarises the main contributions of this PhD thesis.
10.3 Contributions of the thesis
There are three main contributions of this PhD thesis to existing knowledge.
The first contribution of this PhD thesis is that in order to accurately
answer the principal research question that motivated this study, namely whether
the wholesale price contract can in practice attain global efficiency and the
underlying conditions that seem to favour this, this PhD thesis differs from
existing behavioural research in that it does not exclusively rely on laboratory
investigations with human subjects to draw statistically accurate conclusions. It
instead develops and applies an original approach that combines laboratory
investigations with ABS experiments. The results that are reported in this PhD
thesis originate from experiments with ABS models. These models have been
calibrated via evidence that is gained from laboratory experiments with human
subjects. In greater detail, the approach that this PhD thesis proposes is adapted
from Robinson et al.’s (2005) Knowledge Based Improvement methodology and
consists of five distinct stages. The first stage concerns recognizing the decision
tasks and the factors that influence these decisions on the part of each supply
chain role. In the second stage gaming sessions with human subjects are
performed so that their respective decisions over time can be recorded. In the
third stage the exact mixture of decision models that corresponds to each
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participant’s pricing and ordering decisions is determined. In the fourth stage all
possible interactions of participants’ decision making strategies are simulated via
the ABS model, into which all inferred decision models are input. In the fifth
stage conclusions are drawn, based on the simulation results.
Hence, this combination of laboratory – based experiments with human
subjects with ABS experiments offers the following benefits. It allows each
participant to interact with different response sets, that is, partners with varying
intentions, over prolonged periods of time and for a number of different
replications. In this way, the following possibilities are accommodated: i. human
echelon managers may not exclusively intend to optimise their respective
individual objectives, but they may also be interested in the aggregate supply
chain performance, for example, ii. human echelon managers may not be
perfectly rational and, thus undertake actions that are not consistent with their
intentions, iii. human echelon managers may react to the changes that go on
around them and iv. human echelon managers may make completely independent
and autonomous decisions. That is why this novel approach addresses the
existing literature gaps about human intentions, actions, reactions and decisions
that are identified in Table 2.5 (s. Section 2.4).
The second original contribution of this PhD thesis to existing knowledge
is that it introduces the Contract Beer Distribution Game, namely it extends the
Beer Distribution Game in a way that ensures that the basis of any interaction
between adjacent supply chain partners is the wholesale price contract. It
additionally adds to the existing analytical literature, which only explores the
effect of complicated transfer payments schemes in multi-echelon serial supply
chains. It specifically extends the existing analytical literature by developing the
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standard normative models that correspond to the Contract Beer Distribution
Game. These models serve to predict the price and order quantity decisions that
perfectly rational participants in the Contract Beer Distribution Game would
make under both scenarios of centralised and de-centralised modes of operation.
These price and order quantity decisions differ from the true decisions of human
echelon managers in the following aspects: i. they assume that the decision
makers exhibit an exclusive interest in maximising the overall supply chain
profit, under centralised operation (i.e. team optimal solution) and their
individual aggregate profit, under de-centralised operation, ii. they assume that
all decision makers are perfectly rational and, hence, there is no effect of
individual, behavioural biases and iii. they assume that all decision makers are
completely indifferent to any environmental changes that may occur.
The third and last contribution of this PhD thesis is its counter-intuitive
and interesting result that the exact ‘global efficiency’ that the wholesale price
contract attains in any given interaction is determined by the interplay between
the differing pricing and ordering strategies that the interacting supply chain
partners adopt. It is also possible that the wholesale price contract attains ‘global
efficiency’, in spite of the interacting partners’ ‘locally poor’ price and order
quantity decisions. In this regard, since the efficiency that the wholesale price
contract attains greatly varies (i.e. there may be a significant number of
interactions that achieve ‘global efficiency’, but there are also a significant
number of interactions that achieve very poor overall channel performances),
there cannot be any accurate theoretical prediction of the contract’s expected
efficiency. This comes in stark contrast to the existing analytical and empirical
literature, which aims at accurately predicting the contract’s expected
performance (e.g. Lariviere and Porteus, 2001; Cachon, 2003; Keser and
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Paleologo, 2004; Kremer, 2008; Katok and Wu, 2009). Moreover, the fact that
this PhD thesis recognises price consideration as a favourable condition to
increase the contract’s efficiency is considered as another valuable addition to the
existing knowledge, because it serves as a practical advice that can be given to
real echelon managers.
10.4 Limitations of the research
This PhD thesis is not without limitations. The first potential limitation of this
study concerns the gaming sessions that have been conducted. In respect to these,
human participants were asked to play against either computer pre-automated
scenarios (i.e. Newsvendor Problem: s. Section 4.3) or a computer interface that
approximated the decisions of appropriately assigned supply chain configurations
(i.e. Contract Beer Distribution Game: s. Section 7.3). This approach has been
followed to address the usual limitations of experimental approaches (Camerer,
1995; Croson, 2002; Duffy, 2006) and, in addition, eliminate potential biases
stemming from social preferences and reputational effects (Loch and Wu, 2008;
Katok and Wu, 2009). Nevertheless, there remains the risk that the computer pre-
automated response sets that were presented to the participants in the Newsvendor
Problem might not have covered all cases that are possible. Moreover, some of
these decisions, as deduced from the decision models that have been fitted to the
laboratory data of the Contract Beer Distribution Game, are simplistic and may
suffer from extrapolation. Human participants might have reacted in completely
different ways, possibly more realistic, when facing similar conditions. For this
reason, asking individuals to play interactively against each other, as is usually
done in participatory simulation (North and Macal, 2007), could add some useful
insights to the analysis and potentially reduce some of the approach’s inherent
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bias. It would require in retrospect subjects to interact over prolonged session
durations and participate in the study for multiple times. But repeated visits to the
laboratory are challenging to ask from students who volunteer and are not offered
any financial incentives to participate in the study.
An additional limitation of this study is that no evidence is collected for an
interaction that attains the first-best case maximum profit or else coordinates the
Contract Beer Distribution Game supply chain, as has been anticipated. This is
due to the small number of human participants in the Contract Beer Distribution
Game. Although the first possible solution to this limitation is to conduct an
increased number of laboratory investigations with human subjects, it would also
suffice to identify appropriate combinations of decision coefficients; by
appropriate one would imply such decision coefficients that would generate a
competition penalty that does not differ significantly from 0. The reader should at
this point be made aware that the reason that the sample sizes are so small is
because there was no available budget to induce increased interest for the part of
students to participate in the study. The time that was available to this end was
also limited, which was further complicated by the tight and heavy course load of
MSc students at Warwick Business School. A well related problem that also
justifies the small samples sizes is that no financial incentives were offered to the
participants in the gaming sessions. But provision for specially designed financial
incentives that would directly reflect the participants’ financial performances in
the game might have generated better aligned price and order decisions.
Another limitation of this study is that it limits attention to the emerging
performance of the interactions, under the assumption that all the simulated
echelon managers have reached their corresponding steady state mean decisions.
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Nevertheless, it should at this point be admitted to the reader that different
insights would possibly be drawn, if the decisions of the simulated echelon
managers under the ‘transient period’ were instead investigated. But in this case
the theoretical predictions of the standard normative models presented in Section
6.4 would not provide an accurate basis for comparison and, thus, formulation of
hypotheses.
Last but not least, another limitation of this study is that it was not tested
whether the steady state mean order quantities of simulated human participants
coincided with the team optimising decision rules on a one-to-one time period
basis, that is, for each and every time period of the simulation run. That is exactly
why it remains worthwhile to explore whether a continuous compliance of
partners’ decisions with rationally team optimising decision rules (i.e. in all
decision periods) would generate the first-best case maximum profit, as is
theoretically expected. Section 10.5 proposes in greater detail some additional
possible directions for future research.
10.5 Future Research
As already discussed, a first idea for future research is to test whether continuous
compliance of partners’ decisions with rationally team optimising decision rules
(i.e. in all decision periods) would generate the first-best case maximum profit. It
would also be very interesting to systematically compare the overall performance
that is achieved when no provision for price inclusion is made and when
provision for price inclusion is specifically made. In this regard, the same human
subjects would first be asked to only make order decisions, while subsequently
they would be asked to specifically determine prices, in addition to placing
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orders. In this way, a fairer comparison could be made and, therefore,
conclusions that could be generalised would be drawn.
Furthermore, future research in the area may examine the robustness of the
results obtained in this study in different settings. Some indicative ideas include,
but are not limited to: non-serial supply chains; supply chains, where competition
between sites at the same echelon level comes into play; supply chains, where
multiple products co-exist; supply chains with varying selling prices to end
consumers; and supply chains with seasonal customer demand. In addition,
empirical work is undoubtedly required to identify more fully the range of
situations over which the experimental results obtained from the ABS model of
this study hold. This is where application of the approach that is developed in this
PhD thesis to real supply chain cases would be valuable.
Finally, it would be interesting to apply a similar approach and explore the
effect of interactions between varying individual preferences and cognitive
abilities on the overall performance of different contractual forms, such as, for
example, the buyback contract (Pasternack, 1985; Lau et al, 2007), the quantity
discount contract (Moorthy, 1987; Kolay et al, 2004), the quantity-flexibility
contract (Tsay, 1999), the sales rebate contract (Taylor, 2002; Arcelus et al,
2007; Burer et al, 2008), the revenue sharing contract (Cachon and Lariviere,
2005), the complicated transfer payment schemes of Lee and Whang (1999), the
responsibility tokens of Porteus (2000), the simple linear transfer payment
schemes of Cachon and Zipkin (1999) and their generalizations as suggested by
Cachon (2003). In this way, it can be tested more thoroughly whether real
echelon managers’ decisions systematically deviate from the corresponding
predictions of the standard normative models. To this end, the mechanics of the
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Contract Beer Distribution Game could be easily adapted to the needs of the
above contractual arrangements.
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Appendix A
The Newsvendor Problem
A.1 Manufacturer’s Instructions
In today’s study you will participate in a game acting like the
manufacturer of a two-stage supply chain that produces and sells
perishable widgets over multiple rounds.
The Game Scenario
There are two members in the supply chain you participate to: you (the
Manufacturer) and the Retailer, who is automated. You are responsible for
producing and delivering to the retailer the widgets that he/she orders from
you. You have no capacity constraints and can produce as many widgets
as the retailer orders. Each widget that you produce costs c=50 monetary
units. You start by proposing a wholesale price w to the retailer and he
then responds by placing a specific order quantity. The retailer sells each
widget to end consumers for p=250 monetary units.
The Rules of the Game for every round
i. You specify the wholesale price w,
ii. The retailer is informed about w,
iii. Based on the wholesale price w, the retailer decides on the number of
units q that he/she orders from you,
iv. You instantaneously produce and deliver to the retailer, before the
beginning of the selling season,
v. Customer demand appears at the retailer’s site, sales are recorded and
profits are calculated.
Profit calculation
Your profit depends on the wholesale price that you are charging your
retailer w, as well as the order quantity q that he/she asked you to deliver.
More specifically, it is given by the following formula:
Date Participant Name Code
XXX XXX MANxxx
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Your task
Your task is to determine the wholesale price that you want to charge your
retailer for every widget he/she orders from you. Your purpose is to
maximize the overall supply chain profit for the entire session. You will be
asked to do so repeatedly until your facilitator informs you of the end of
the game.
Feedback information
In each time period, the computer will remind you of past observations.
Your Computer Screen
The Control Panel
1. Click on START GAME to start the game.
2. After you have entered your decision for each round
of the game, click on PROCEED.
3. In case you wish to view a summary of all previous
periods’ results, click on VIEW SUMMARY.
4. When your facilitator informs you to finish the game
click on END GAME.
Your decision
You need to enter your decision for
every round of the game in the
yellow cell.
Previous Round’s
Outcome
You are given all
information about the
previous period’s
outcome in the blue
cells.
A.2 Retailer’s Instructions
In today’s study you will participate in a game acting like the retailer of a
two-stage supply chain that produces and sells perishable widgets over
multiple rounds.
The Game Scenario
There are two members in the supply chain you participate to: the
Manufacturer, who is automated and you (the Retailer). You are
responsible for making the widgets available to end consumers. You sell
each widget at p=250 monetary units. The manufacturer faces no capacity
constraints and, for this reason, you can safely assume that you will
receive as many widgets as you order. The manufacturer may charge you
a different price in every round.
The Rules of the Game for every round
i. The manufacturer specifies the wholesale price w,
ii. You are informed about w,
iii. Based on this price w, you decide on the number of units q that you
want to order from the manufacturer, if any,
iv. The manufacturer instantaneously produces and delivers your
requested quantity,
v. Customer demand appears at your site, sales are recorded and profits
are calculated.
Customer demand
Each period’s demand is random and completely independent of the
demand of any earlier round.
Date Participant Name Code
XXX XXX RETxxx
Appendix A.2: Retailer’s Instructions
420
Profit calculation
Your profit depends on the wholesale price the manufacturer is charging
you (w), the order quantity that you asked him/her to deliver (q) and the
actual demand d that appears.
You also have to incur a cost of lost opportunity g=1, in case there is some
demand you can not satisfy, because you did not order a sufficient
quantity. Your profit is determined by the following formula:
)0,max(),min( tttttr qdgqwdqpP 
Your task
Your task is to determine the order quantity that you want to place to your
manufacturer. Your purpose is to maximize the overall supply chain profit
for the entire session. You will be asked to do so repeatedly until your
facilitator informs you of the end of the game.
Feedback information
In each time period, the computer will remind you of past observations.
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Your Computer Screen
The Control Panel
1. Click on START GAME to start the game.
2. After you have entered your decision for
each round of the game, click on
PROCEED.
3. In case you wish to view a summary of all
previous periods’ results, click on VIEW
SUMMARY.
4. When your facilitator informs you to finish
the game click on END GAME.
Your decision
You need to enter your decision for
every round of the game in the
yellow cell.
Previous Round’s Outcome
You are given all information
about the previous period’s
outcome in the blue cells.
A.3 Dataset of RET1 Recorded Decisions
w(t) q(t-1) d(t-1) Pr(t-1)
1 60 140 183 27,257
2 146 140 156 26,584
3 102 140 98 4,060
4 189 120 0 -12,240
5 187 70 212 4,128
6 178 70 5 -11,840
7 125 70 227 4,883
8 192 70 114 8,706
9 223 60 231 3,309
10 60 50 271 1,129
11 116 200 145 24,250
12 188 100 11 -8,850
13 157 40 134 2,386
14 104 100 165 9,235
15 167 120 89 9,770
16 100 70 216 5,664
17 198 120 158 17,962
18 227 50 248 2,402
19 91 0 181 -181
20 226 140 85 8,510
21 146 20 40 460
22 230 100 177 10,323
23 53 20 155 265
24 68 200 39 -850
25 194 200 94 9,900
26 58 70 97 3,893
27 119 200 98 12,900
28 221 130 304 16,856
29 122 30 93 807
30 79 140 61 -1,830
31 166 160 122 17,860
32 124 120 185 10,015
33 109 140 167 17,613
34 87 150 69 900
35 155 160 28 -6,920
36 132 70 245 6,475
37 97 100 203 11,697
38 118 140 96 10,420
39 215 120 167 15,793
40 163 50 126 1,674
41 68 80 152 6,888
42 175 200 249 36,351
43 200 80 0 -14,000
44 148 50 250 2,300
45 127 100 177 10,123
46 140 150 143 16,700
47 133 90 110 9,880
48 123 120 91 6,790
49 60 130 84 5,010
50 226 200 16 -8,000
A.4 Testing the Assumptions of Multiple Linear Regression
The paragraphs that follow discuss the elaborate tests that were conducted to
substantiate that all dependent and independent variables of relations (4.5) and
(4.6) satisfied the linearity, normality, and homo-skedasticity requirements of
multiple linear regression (Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006; Fox, 2008). The
corresponding scatterplot matrices were only used as a first indicator to this end.
Figure A.4.1 illustratively presents the scatterplot matrix of RETj=RET3’s (or
simply j=3) decision variable 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య் and the corresponding decision
attributes. This particular example is only presented for illustration purposes,
while exactly the same testing procedure was also applied to all human
manufacturers’ MANi and all other human retailers’ RETj datasets of decisions.
Figure A.4.1: Scatterplot Matrix of RET3 dependent and independent variables
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a) Linearity: The rows of the above scatterplot matrix indicated a linear
relationship between RET3 ‘s dependent variable 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య் and all
independent variables. Although this scatterplot matrix appeared
encouraging, the strictly linear relationship between 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య் and all
independent variables was further confirmed via a visual inspection of all the
relevant partial regression plots. Figure A.4.2 indicatively presents the partial
regression plot of RET3‘s order quantity 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య் with w(t). The red line
going through the centre of the points slopes down, based on that the
regression coefficient of w(t) is negative (-0.952, acc. to Table 4.6). The
absence of any clear curvi-linear pattern of residuals in this plot established
the lack of any non-linear association between 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య் and w(t). The same
procedure was repeated for all remaining independent variables (i.e. q(t-1);
d(t-1); ோܲ(ݐ− 1)) and, in this way, it was confirmed that only linear
relationships existed between any pair of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோయand any independent
variable.
Figure A.4.2: Partial Regression Plot of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య்with w(t)
w(t)
q(
t)
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b) Normality: Figure A.4.3 presents the normal histogram of the residuals of
〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ܴܧ 3ܶ. Since this normal histogram was not very clearly formed,
the corresponding normal probability plot was additionally visually
inspected.
Figure A.4.3: Normal Histogram of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ܴܧܶ3
Figure A.4.4 graphically plots 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య் against the corresponding “expected”
quantiles from standard normal distribution; these standard normal distribution’s
“expected” quantiles are represented on the line of the graph. Therefore, Figure
A.4.4 illustrates the quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య், which serves to
identify any systematic deviation of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య் from the the line of the standard
normal distribution (Thode, 2002).
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Figure A.4.4: Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య்
Table A.4.1: One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య்
Characteristics of 〈ࢗ(࢚)〉ࡾࡱࢀ૜ dataset
Normal Parameters
Mean 150.9
Std. Deviation 54.93
Most Extreme
Differences
Absolute 0.084
Positive 0.071
Negative -0.084
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 0.591
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .877
From Figure A.4.4 it is evident that no systematic divergences of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య் from
the standard normal distribution occur, as can be further supported by the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the results of which are presented in Table A.4.1. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test aims at comparing the largest absolute difference
between any empirical observation of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య் and the normal distribution
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(Massey, 1951; Thode, 2002). Since the two-tailed significance of the test
statistic is relatively large (0.877), it is highly unlikely that 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య் originated
from a non-normal distribution. The same conclusion about 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య்normality
could also be drawn from the Anderson – Darling test, which is more powerful,
because it places a higher weight on the tails of the distribution (Robinson, 2007).
Its results are presented in Figure A.4.5.
Figure A.4.5: The Darling - Anderson Test for Normality of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య்
From Figure A.4.5 can be concluded that 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య் follows the normal
distribution (p<0.13). Exactly the same procedure was repeated to confirm that
R3’s decision attributes, i.e. w(t), q(t-1), d(t-1) and ோܲ(ݐ− 1) also satisfied the
normality requirement of multiple regression analysis.
c) Homo-skedasticity: Figure A.4.6 illustrates the plot of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య்studentized
residuals against the predicted dependent values. This plot’s graphical
comparison with the null plot, illustrated in red colour, demonstrates that the
dispersion of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య்variances is almost equal. For this reason, it was
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safely assumed that the homo-skedasticity requirement was satisfied for
〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ோா య். In the same way it was also confirmed that all independent
variables of RET3’s decision model (4.8), namely w(t), q(t-1), d(t-1) and
ோܲ(ݐ− 1), also satisfied the homo-skedasticity requirement.
Figure A.4.6: Residual plot of 〈ݍ(ݐ)〉ܴ3
After it was established that all human manufacturers’ MANi and retailers’
RETj decision variables and decision attributes satisfied the linearity, normality,
and homo-skedasticity requirements of multiple linear regression (Weisberg,
2005; Hair et al, 2006; Fox, 2008), it was also ensured that their respective
decision making strategies could by portrayed by the simple linear models of the
form (4.5) and (4.6).
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Appendix B
The Contract Beer Distribution Game
B.1 Retailer’s Instructions
In today’s study you will participate in the “Beer game”: a role playing
simulation designed to investigate management decision making
behaviours. There is no beer in the beer game and the game does not
promote drinking. Indeed, you will be working with your partners to help
the team to which you have been assigned to make the maximum total,
system-wide profits possible. You will participate in the game as the
Retailer.
The Game Scenario
There are three members in each supply chain configuration: a
Manufacturer, a Wholesaler and a Retailer. You will be the retailer; namely
you will be responsible for serving end consumers. You are supplied the
cases of beer that you order by the wholesaler, who is, in turn, supplied by
the manufacturer.
Each round of the game represents a week. Any week’s demand is
completely independent of the demand of any earlier week. You are the
only team member who can actually see and really knows the exact
customer demand. For this reason, you are kindly asked not to share this
information with any of the other members of your team.
Every week you have to decide: how many cases of beer you want to order.
You pay £0.50 for every case of beer that you keep in your inventory for
one week. You also have to pay £1 for every case of beer demanded by
your customers, but which you are not able to provide. You receive £3 for
every case of beer that you sell to your customers.
What you will need:
1. Your Section of the Game Board
Production
Delay
Production
Delay
Raw
Materials
Shipping DelayShipping DelayShipping DelayShipping Delay
MANUFACTURER
Current Inventory
WHOLESALER
Current Inventory
RETAILER
Current Inventory
Orders Sold to
Customers
Production
Requests
4
Used
Order
Cards
Backorders Backorders
THE BEER GAME
Orders Placed
Wholesal
er Price
Retailer
Order Qty
Wholes
aler
Price
Retailer
Order
Qty
Manufact
urer Price
Wholesal
er Order
Qty
Order
Cards
Orders PlacedIncoming Orders Incoming Orders
Manufact
urer Price
Wholesal
er Order
Qty
Wholesal
er Price
Retailer
Order
Qty
Manufact
urer Price
Wholesal
er Order
Qty
Backlogg
ed
Demand
Backorders
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Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
WHOLESALER
Current Inventory
Backorders
Wholesal
er Price
Retailer
Order
Manufa
cturer
Wholes
aler
Orders PlacedIncoming Orders
Wholes
aler
Retailer
Order
Manufa
cturer
Wholes
aler
Incoming Orders
Shipping DelayShipping Delay
RETAILER
Current Inventory
Orders Sold to
CustomersUsed Order
Cards
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer Order
Qty
Orders Placed
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer Order
Qty
Order Cards
Incoming Orders
Backlogged Demand
Retailer Order
Qty
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer
Order Qty
Step 1a
2. Your Records sheet
The Steps of the Game (these steps have to be repeated in every week)
Step 1: RECEIVE SHIPMENT
Step 1a: Receive inventory and associated order slip
from the first SHIPPING DELAY into your CURRENT
INVENTORY.
Step 1b: Find from the associated order slip: i. the
WHOLESALER PRICE at the left hand side column
and ii. the RETAILER ORDER QUANTITY received
at the right hand side column.
Step 1c: Write in this week’s row and column (3) of your
records sheet your Delivery Cost, calculated as follows:
Delivery Cost = RETAILER ORDER QUANTITY x
WHOLESALER PRICE
For example for the 1st week you write in the first cell of
column (3): 4 x £2= £8, as you can see from the slip at the
side.
In case you received more than one order slips with the shipments add all
corresponding Delivery Costs, where each is calculated according to the above
formula.
Step 1d: Destroy the incoming order slips associated with the cases of beer you
just received.
Step 2: ADVANCE SHIPPING DELAYS
Advance the contents of the second SHIPPING
DELAY one position to the left.
Step 3: FILL BACKLOG, if any, depending
on your available inventory.
 If you don’t have any BACKORDER slips, then wait for your partners to
complete Step 3, so that you can proceed at the same time with them to
Step 4.
 For as long as you have BACKORDER slip(s) and available inventory
left, perform the following sequence of steps:
Step 2
£2 4
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Shipping DelayShipping Delay
RETAILER
Current Inventory
Orders Sold to
CustomersUsed Order
Cards
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer Order
Qty
Orders Placed
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer Order
Qty
Order Cards
Incoming Orders
Backlogged Demand
Retailer Order
Qty
Step 3a
Step 3a: Fill as much of your first BACKORDER slip’s quantity as you
can.
 If your available inventory
entails more cases of beer than your
first BACKORDER slip, then move as
many cases of beer as written in this
BACKORDER slip out of your
warehouse.
 If your available inventory entails less cases
of beer than your first BACKORDER slip, then
move as many cases of beer as you have left in your inventory out of your
warehouse.
Step 3b: Correct your first BACKORDER slip, if required.
 If you delivered to your customers all the cases of beer written in the first
BACKORDER slip, then proceed directly to Step 3c, by keeping the
BACKORDER slip in your hands.
 If you delivered to your customers only a part of the quantity written in the first
BACKORDER slip, then correct this backorder slip by: i. crossing out with
your pen the BACKLOGGED DEMAND and ii. writing with your pen the
exact quantity that you just delivered to your customers. At the side of the
previous page you can see an example of a corrected backorder slip, where only
1 out of 4 backlogged cases of beer were delivered. Keep the BACKORDER
slip in your hands.
Step 3c: Receive corresponding REVENUES from your customers.
 Add in this week’s row and column (4) of your records sheet your
corresponding Revenues, calculated as follows:
Revenues = BACKLOGGED DEMAND x £3
You will find the backlogged demand at the BACKORDER
SLIP you have in your hands.
For the example of the non-corrected backorder slip given at the left
you write in the appropriate cell of column (4):+
4 x £3= £12.
For the example of the corrected backorder slip given at the right,
where you only satisfied 1 out of 4 backlogged cases of beer, you write
in the appropriate cell of column (4): + 1 x £3= £3.
Step 3d: Create a new BACKORDER slip.
 If you have in your hands a non-corrected BACKORDER slip, then you
should go back to Step 3a, for as long as you have remaining BACKORDER
Retailer
Order Qty
Retailer
Order Qty
Retailer
Order Qty
Backorder
Slips
4
Back-
logged
Demand
4
1
Back-
logged
Demand
4 1
Back-
logged
Demand
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Shipping DelayShipping Delay
RETAILER
Current Inventory
Orders Sold to
CustomersUsed Order
Cards
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer Order
Qty
Orders Placed
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer Order
Qty
Order Cards
Incoming Orders
Backlogged Demand
Retailer Order
Qty
Order Cards
4 1
slip(s) and available inventory left. You don’t need the BACKORDER slip
anymore.
 If you have in your hands a corrected BACKORDER
slip, then you should complete an empty BACKORDER slip
with the quantity that you did not have sufficient inventory
to ship and place it as the first of your BACKORDER
slip(s).You don’t need the previous BACKORDER slip
anymore. For the example given above, the new BACKORDER
slip should look like as is shown at the left. After placing the new
BACKORDER slip at the top of all BACKORDER slip(s), you
should wait for your partners to complete Step 3, so that you can
proceed at the same time with them to Step 4.
 When you run out of available inventory or you have satisfied all your
BACKORDER slip(s), then you should wait for your partners to complete
Step 3, so that you can proceed at the same time with them to Step 4.
Step 4: FILL CUSTOMER DEMAND, depending on your available
inventory
Step 4a: Lift ORDER card and keep it in your
hands.
Step 4b: Fill as much of the ORDER quantity as
you can.
 If your available inventory entails more cases of
beer than the ORDER quantity, then move as many cases
of beer as written in this ORDER card out of your
warehouse.
 If your available inventory entails less cases of beer than the ORDER quantity
(or is zero), then move as many cases of beer as you have left in your
inventory out of your warehouse.
Step 4c: Correct the ORDER card, if required.
 If you delivered to your customers all the cases of beer written in the ORDER
card, then proceed directly to Step 4d.
 If you delivered to your customers only a part of the quantity
written in the ORDER card, then correct this ORDER card by:
i. crossing out with your pen the ORDER QUANTITY and ii.
writing with your pen the exact quantity that you just delivered
to your customers. At the side you can see an example of a
corrected ORDER card, where only 1 out of 4 demanded cases of beer were
delivered.
Retailer
Order Qty
Step 4b
Back-
logged
Demand
3
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Order Cards
4 Order Cards
4 1
 If you did not have any inventory left and, thus, did not send anything to your
wholesaler, then place your ORDER card as the last of your
BACKORDER SLIP(s), if any. Then you should wait for your partners to
complete Step 4, so that you can proceed at the same time with them to Step 5.
Step 4d: Receive corresponding REVENUES from your customers.
 Add in this week’s row and column (4) of your records sheet your
corresponding Revenues, calculated as follows:
Revenues = ORDER QUANTITY x £3
You will find the order quantity at the ORDER
card you have in your hands.
For the example of the non-corrected order card
given at the left you write in the appropriate cell of
column (4): + 4 x £3= £12.
For the example of the corrected order card given at the right, where
you only satisfied 1 out of 4 demanded cases of beer, you write in the appropriate cell of
column (4): + 1 x £3= £3.
Step 4e: Create a new BACKORDER slip.
 If you have in your hands a non-corrected ORDER card, then you should
wait for your partners to complete Step 4, so that you can proceed at the
same time with them to Step 5.
 If you have in your hands a corrected ORDER card, then you should
complete an empty BACKORDER slip with the quantity that
you did not have sufficient inventory to ship and place it as the
last of your BACKORDER slip(s). For the example given
above, the new BACKORDER slip should look like as is shown
at the left.
 You don’t need the previous ORDER card anymore.
Step 5: COMPLETE RECORDS SHEET WITH
INVENTORY OR BACKLOG, if any
 If you have any inventory left, then:
Step 5a: Record your inventory.
Count the number of cases of beer you have left in your inventory and write this
number in this week’s row and column (1) of your records sheet.
For example for 1st week you write in the first cell of column (1) 12.
 If you have any backorder slips in front of you, then:
Retailer
Order Qty
3
Back-
logged
Demand
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Shipping DelayShipping Delay
RETAILER
Current Inventory
Orders Sold to
CustomersUsed Order
Cards
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer Order
Qty
Orders Placed
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer Order
Qty
Order Cards
Incoming Orders
Backlogged Demand
Retailer Order
Qty
Step 5b: Record your backlogged quantity.
Add the quantities included at the right hand side columns of all backorder slips
you have and write this number in this week’s row and column (2) of your records
sheet.
 Please make sure that you either follow Step 5a or Step 5b!
Step 6: Calculate Profits
Step 6a: Calculate this week’s total Revenuest
Add all revenues that you have received from your customers (as written in this
week’s row and column (4) of your records sheet) and write the result in the same
cell.
Step 6b: Calculate this week’s profit Profitt .
Calculate this week’s profit Profitt, according to the following formula, where all elements
(t) can be found in this week’s row of your records sheet. In greater detail:
Revenuest in column (4), Production Costt in (3), Backlogt in (2) and Inventoryt in (1).
Profitt = Revenuest – Acquisition costt – Backlogt - Inventoryt / 2
Step 6c: Calculate the cumulative profit Cumulative Profitt .
Add to Profitt the value that can be found in the previous row of column (5) of
your records sheet, namely Cumulative Profitt-1, according to the following
formula:
Cumulative Profitt = Profitt + Cumulative Profitt-1
Step 6c: Record your cumulative profit.
Write the new cumulative profit in this week’s row and column (5) of your
records sheet.
Step 7: ADVANCE INCOMING ORDERS
Advance order slips from the ORDERS PLACED
position to the INCOMING ORDERS position for your
wholesaler to be able to see in the next round of the
game.
Step 8: DO NOTHING
Step 7
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Shipping DelayShipping Delay
RETAILER
Current Inventory
Orders Sold to
CustomersUsed Order
Cards
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer Order
Qty
Orders Placed
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer Order
Qty
Order Cards
Incoming Orders
Backlogged Demand
Retailer Order
Qty
Step 9d
Step 9: PLACE ORDERS
Step 9a: Receive the order slip that your wholesaler is passing on to
you.
Step 9b: Decide your order quantity.
Decide how many cases of beer you want to order. Write this number in this
week’s row and column (6) of your records sheet.
Step 9c: Complete the order slip with this order
quantity.
Complete the right hand side column of the order slip
that you just received from your wholesaler with the
value you just wrote in column (6) of your records sheet.
Step 9d: Place your order.
Place the above order slip at the appropriate position of
your board, as illustrated at the side.
After you have completed Steps 1-9, you should repeat them for the next
week, until your facilitator informs you of the last round of the game.
At the end of the game you will be asked to add your end-of-game
cumulative profit with all your partners’, in order to calculate the total
game profit.
GOOD LUCK!!
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GAME RECORDS (BY WEEK)
POSITION: MANUFACTURER TEAM:
_________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Week Inventory Backlog Production
Cost
Revenues Cumulative
Profit
Manufacturer
Price
Production
Requests
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Appendix B.1: Retailer’s Instructions
438
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Week Inventory Backlog Production
Cost
Revenues Cumulative
Profit
Manufacturer
Price
Production
Requests
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
In every week (t) Profit is given by:
Profitt = Revenuest – Production Costt – Backlogt - Inventoryt / 2
or
Profitt = (4) – (3) – (2) – (1) /2
The corresponding cumulative profit derives as:
Cumulative Profitt = Profitt + Cumulative Profitt-1.
B.2 Wholesaler’s Instructions
In today’s study you will participate in the “Beer game”: a role playing
simulation designed to investigate management decision making
behaviours. There is no beer in the beer game and the game does not
promote drinking. Indeed, you will be working with your partners to help
the team to which you have been assigned to make the maximum total,
system-wide profits possible. You will participate in the game as the
Wholesaler.
The Game Scenario
There are three members in each supply chain configuration: a
Manufacturer, a Wholesaler and a Retailer. You will be the wholesaler;
namely you will be responsible for supplying the retailer. Your customer,
the retailer, in turn, serves end consumers. You are supplied the cases of
beer that you order by the manufacturer.
Each round of the game represents a week. Every week you have to decide:
i. how much you want to charge your retailer for every case of beer that
you deliver to him and ii. how many cases of beer you want to order.
You pay £0.50 for every case of beer that you keep in your inventory for
one week. You also have to pay £1 for every case of beer requested by
your retailer, but which you are not able to supply.
What you will need:
1. Your Section of the Game Board
Production
Delay
Production
Delay
Raw
Materials
Shipping DelayShipping DelayShipping DelayShipping Delay
MANUFACTURER
Current Inventory
WHOLESALER
Current Inventory
RETAILER
Current Inventory
Orders Sold to
Customers
Production
Requests
4
Used
Order
Cards
Backorders Backorders
THE BEER GAME
Orders Placed
Wholesal
er Price
Retailer
Order Qty
Wholes
aler
Price
Retailer
Order
Qty
Manufact
urer Price
Wholesal
er Order
Qty
Order
Cards
Orders PlacedIncoming Orders Incoming Orders
Manufact
urer Price
Wholesal
er Order
Qty
Wholesal
er Price
Retailer
Order
Qty
Manufact
urer Price
Wholesal
er Order
Qty
Backlogg
ed
Demand
Backorders
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Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
WHOLESALER
Current Inventory
Backorders
Wholesal
er Price
Retailer
Order
Manufa
cturer
Wholes
aler
Orders PlacedIncoming Orders
Wholes
aler
Retailer
Order
Manufa
cturer
Wholes
aler
Incoming Orders
Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
WHOLESALER
Current Inventory
Backorders
Wholesal
er Price
Retailer
Order
Manufa
cturer
Wholes
aler
Orders PlacedIncoming Orders
Wholes
aler
Retailer
Order
Manufa
cturer
Wholes
aler
Incoming Orders
Step 2
Step 1a
2. Your Records sheet
The Steps of the Game (these steps have to be repeated in every week)
Step 1: RECEIVE SHIPMENT
Step 1a: Receive inventory and associated order
slip from the first SHIPPING DELAY into your
CURRENT INVENTORY.
Step 1b: Find from the associated order slip: i. the
MANUFACTURER PRICE at the left hand side
column and ii. the WHOLESALER ORDER
QUANTITY received at the right hand side column.
Step 1c: Write in this week’s row and column (3) of your records sheet your
Delivery Cost, calculated as follows:
Delivery Cost = WHOLESALER ORDER
QUANTITY x MANUFACTURER PRICE
For example for the 1st week you write in the first
cell of column (3): 4 x £1.5= £6, as you can see
from the slip at the side.
In case you received more than one order slips
with the shipments add all corresponding Delivery Costs, where each is
calculated according to the above formula.
Step 1d: Destroy the incoming order slips associated with the cases of beer that
you just received.
Step 1e: Write in this week’s row and column (4)
of your records sheet the revenues you received
from your retailer, as dictated by him.
For example for the 1st week you listen to your retailer
saying £8 and you write in the first cell of column (4) £8.
Step 2: ADVANCE SHIPPING DELAYS
Advance the contents of the second SHIPPING
DELAY one position to the left.
Manufactu
rer Price
Wholesaler
Order Qty
£1.5 4
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Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
WHOLESALER
Current Inventory
Backorders
Wholesal
er Price
Retailer
Order
Manufa
cturer
Wholes
aler
Orders PlacedIncoming Orders
Wholes
aler
Retailer
Order
Manufa
cturer
Wholes
aler
Incoming Orders
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer
Order Qty
Step 3a
Step 3: FILL BACKLOG, if any, depending on your available
inventory.
 If you don’t have any BACKORDER slips, then wait for your partners to
complete Step 3, so that you can proceed at the same time with them to Step 4.
 For as long as you have BACKORDER
slip(s) and available inventory left, perform the
following sequence of steps:
Step 3a: Fill as much of your first
BACKORDER slip’s quantity as you can.
 If your available inventory entails more
cases of beer than your first BACKORDER slip, then
move as many cases of beer as written in this BACKORDER slip to the first
SHIPPING DELAY to your left.
 If your available inventory entails less cases of beer than your first
BACKORDER slip, then move as many cases of beer as you have left in your
inventory to the first SHIPPING DELAY to your left.
Step 3b: Attach the appropriate BACKORDER slip to the cases of beer
you just shipped to your retailer.
 If you shipped to your retailer all the cases of beer written in the first
BACKORDER slip, then attach this BACKORDER slip to the cases of beer
you just shipped.
 If you shipped to your retailer only a part of
the quantity written in the first BACKORDER slip,
then correct the backorder slip by: i. crossing out
with your pen its right hand side column
(RETAILER ORDER QUANTITY) and ii. writing
with your pen the exact quantity that you just shipped
to your retailer. Attach this backorder slip to the cases of beer you just shipped.
At the side you can see an example of a corrected backorder slip, where only 1
out of 4 backlogged cases of beer were shipped to the retailer.
Step 3c: Create a new BACKORDER slip.
 If you attached a non-corrected BACKORDER slip to your last shipment,
then you should go back to Step 3a, for as long as you have remaining
BACKORDER slip(s) and available inventory left.
 If you attached a corrected BACKORDER slip to your last shipment, then
complete an empty BACKORDER slip with the quantity that you did not
have sufficient inventory to ship and place it as the first of your
Backorder
Slips
4£2 1
Appendix B.2: Wholesaler’s Instructions
442
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer
Order Qty
Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
Shipping
Delay
WHOLESALER
Current Inventory
Backorders
Wholesal
er Price
Retailer
Order
Manufa
cturer
Wholes
aler
Orders PlacedIncoming Orders
Wholes
aler
Retailer
Order
Manufa
cturer
Wholes
aler
Incoming Orders
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer
Order Qty
BACKORDER slip(s). For the example given
above, the new BACKORDER slip should look
as is shown at the side. After placing the new
BACKORDER slip at the top of all
BACKORDER slip(s), you should wait for
your partners to complete Step 3, so that you
can proceed at the same time with them to Step 4.
 When you run out of available inventory or you have satisfied all your
BACKORDER slip(s), then you should wait for your partners to complete
Step 3, so that you can proceed at the same time with them to Step 4.
Step 4: FILL INCOMING ORDERS, depending on your available
inventory
Step 4a: Lift incoming order.
Step 4b: Fill as much of the INCOMING ORDER quantity as you can.
 If your available inventory entails more cases of beer than your INCOMING
ORDER, then move as many cases of beer as written in this INCOMING
ORDER to the first SHIPPING DELAY to your left.
 If your available inventory entails less cases
of beer than your INCOMING ORDER (or is zero),
then move as many cases of beer as you have left in
your inventory to the first SHIPPING DELAY to
your left.
Step 4c: Attach the appropriate slip to the
cases of beer you just shipped to your
retailer.
 If you shipped to your retailer all the
cases of beer written in the INCOMING ORDER, then attach this INCOMING
ORDER slip to the cases of beer you just shipped.
 If you shipped to your retailer only a part of the quantity written in the
INCOMING ORDER, then correct this slip by: i.
crossing out with your pen its right hand side
column (RETAILER ORDER QUANTITY) and ii.
writing with your pen the exact quantity that you
just shipped to your retailer. Attach this backorder
slip to the cases of beer you just shipped. At the side
you can see an example of a corrected INCOMING ORDER slip, where only 1
out of 4 ordered cases of beer were shipped to the retailer.
Incoming Order
Quantity
Step 4b
4£2
3£2
4£2
1
Appendix B.2: Wholesaler’s Instructions
443
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer
Order Qty
 If you did not have any inventory left and, thus, did not send anything to your
retailer, then place your INCOMING ORDER slip as the last of your
BACKORDER SLIP(s), if any. Then you should wait for your partners to
complete Step 4, so that you can proceed at the same time with them to Step 5.
Step 4d: Create a new BACKORDER slip.
 If you attached a non-corrected INCOMING ORDER slip to your last
shipment, then you should wait for your partners to complete Step 4, so that
you can proceed at the same time with them to Step 5.
 If you attached a corrected INCOMING ORDER slip to your last shipment,
then complete an empty BACKORDER slip
with the quantity that you did not have
sufficient inventory to ship and place it as the
last of your BACKORDER slip(s). For the
example given above, the new BACKORDER
slip should look like as is shown at the side.
Step 5: COMPLETE RECORDS SHEET WITH INVENTORY OR
BACKLOG, if any
 If you have any inventory left, then:
Step 5a: Record your inventory.
Count the number of cases of beer you have left in your inventory and write this
number in this week’s row and column (1) of your records sheet.
For example for 1st week you write in the first cell of column (1) 12.
 If you have any backorder slips in front of you, then:
Step 5b: Record your backlogged quantity.
Add the quantities included at the right hand side columns of all backorder slips
you have and write this number in this week’s row and column (2) of your records
sheet.
 Please make sure that you either follow Step 5a or Step 5b!
Step 6: Calculate Profits
Step 6a: Calculate this week’s profit Profitt .
Profitt = Revenuest – Acquisition costt – Backlogt - Inventoryt / 2
Calculate this week’s profit Profitt, according to the above formula, where all
elements (t) can be found in this week’s row of your records sheet. In greater
detail:
Revenuest in column (4), Production Costt in (3), Backlogt in (2) and Inventoryt in
(1).
3£2
Appendix B.2: Wholesaler’s Instructions
444
Wholesaler
Price
Retailer
Order Qty
Step 7
Step 6b: Calculate the cumulative profit Cumulative Profitt .
Add to Profitt the value that can be found in the previous row of column (5) of
your records sheet, namely Cumulative Profitt-1, according to the following
formula:
Cumulative Profitt = Profitt + Cumulative Profitt-1
Step 6c: Record your cumulative profit.
Write the new cumulative profit in this week’s row and column (5) of your
records sheet.
Step 7: ADVANCE INCOMING ORDERS
Advance order slips from the ORDERS PLACED
position to the INCOMING ORDERS position for
your manufacturer to be able to see in the next
round of the game.
Step 8: DECIDE ON YOUR
WHOLESALER PRICE
Step 8a: Decide your wholesaler price.
Decide how much you want to charge your retailer
for every case of beer that you deliver to him. Write this number in this week’s
row and column (6) of your records sheet.
Step 8b: Create a new order slip.
Choose a new (i.e. empty) order slip and complete its
left hand side column with the price you just wrote
in column (6) of your records sheet.
Step 8c: Pass this order slip on to your retailer.
Step 9: PLACE ORDERS
Step 9a: Receive the order slip that your manufacturer is passing on to
you.
Step 9b: Decide your order quantity.
Decide how many cases of beer you want to order. Write this number in this
week’s row and column (7) of your records sheet.
Shipping
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Shipping
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Shipping
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Backorders
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Step 9d
Step 9d
Step 9c: Complete the order slip with this order quantity.
Complete the right hand side column of the order slip that you just received from
your manufacturer with the value you just wrote in column (7) of your records
sheet.
Step 9d: Place your order.
Place the above order slip at the appropriate position
of your board, as illustrated at the side.
After you have completed Steps 1-9, you should repeat them for the next week,
until your facilitator informs you of the last round of the game.
At the end of the game you will be asked to add your end-of-game cumulative
profit with all your partners’, in order to calculate the total game profit.
Good Luck!!
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GAME RECORDS (BY WEEK)
POSITION: WHOLESALER TEAM:
_________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Week Inventory Backlog Delivery
Cost
Revenues Cumulative
Profit
Wholesaler
Price
Order
Quantity
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Week Inventory Backlog Delivery
Cost
Revenues Cumulative
Profit
Wholesaler
Price
Order
Quantity
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
In every week (t) Profit is given by:
Profitt = Revenuest – Delivery Costt – Backlogt - Inventoryt / 2
or
Profitt = (4) – (3) – (2) – (1) /2
The corresponding cumulative profit derives as:
Cumulative Profitt = Profitt + Cumulative Profitt-1.
B.3 Manufacturer’s Instructions
In today’s study you will participate in the “Beer game”: a role playing
simulation designed to investigate management decision making
behaviours. Indeed, you will be working with your partners to help the
team to which you have been assigned to make the maximum total, system-
wide profits possible. You will participate in the game as the Manufacturer.
The Game Scenario
There are three members in each supply chain configuration: a
Manufacturer, a Wholesaler and a Retailer. You will be the manufacturer;
namely you will be responsible for producing and supplying to the
wholesaler the cases of beer that he/she orders. Your customer, the
wholesaler, is responsible for supplying the retailer. The retailer, in turn,
serves end consumers. You, as the manufacturer, face no capacity
constraints and you can assume that you are able to produce as much as
you order.
Each round of the game represents a week. Every week you have to decide:
i. how much you want to charge your wholesaler for every case of beer that
you deliver to him and ii. how many cases of beer you want to order.
For every case of beer that you produce you pay £0.50. You also pay £0.50
for every case of beer that you keep in your inventory for one week. Last,
you pay £1 for every case of beer requested by your wholesaler, but which
you are not able to supply.
What you will need:
1. Your Section of the Game Board
Production
Delay
Production
Delay
Raw
Materials
Shipping DelayShipping DelayShipping DelayShipping Delay
MANUFACTURER
Current Inventory
WHOLESALER
Current Inventory
RETAILER
Current Inventory
Orders Sold to
Customers
Production
Requests
4
Used
Order
Cards
Backorders Backorders
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Production Delay
Production Delay
Raw
Materials
Shipping Delay
MANUFACTURER
Current Inventory
Production Requests
4
Backorders
Manufacturer Price
Wholesaler Order
Qty
Manufacturer Price Wholesaler Order
Qty
Incoming Orders
Production Delay
Production Delay
Raw
Materials
Shipping Delay
MANUFACTURER
Current Inventory
Production Requests
4
Backorders
Manufacturer Price
Wholesaler Order
Qty
Manufacturer Price Wholesaler Order
Qty
Incoming Orders
2. Your Records sheet
The Steps of the Game (these steps have to be repeated in every week)
Step 1: RECEIVE PRODUCED QUANTITY
Step 1a: Receive inventory from the PRODUCTION
DELAY that is the closest to your warehouse into your
CURRENT INVENTORY.
Step 1b: Write in this week’s row and column (3) of
your records sheet your Production Cost, calculated as
follows:
Production Cost = quantity received x manufacturing
cost
For example for the 1st week you write in the first cell of column
(3): 4 x £0.5= £2.
Step 1c: Write in this week’s row and column (4) of your records sheet the
revenues you received from your wholesaler, as dictated by him/her.
For example for the 1st week you listen to your wholesaler saying £6
and you write in the first cell of column (4) £6.
Step 2: ADVANCE PRODUCTION DELAYS
Advance the contents of your top PRODUCTION
DELAY one position down.
Step 3: FILL BACKLOG, if any, depending on your
available inventory.
 If you don’t have any BACKORDER slips, then
wait for your partners to complete
Step 3, so that you can proceed at the same time with
them to Step 4.
 For as long as you have BACKORDER slip(s)
and available inventory left, perform the following
sequence of steps:
Step 3a: Fill as much of your first BACKORDER
slip’s quantity as you can.
Production Delay
Production Delay
Raw
Materials
Shipping Delay
MANUFACTURER
Current Inventory
Production Requests
4
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Manufacturer Price
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Qty
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Qty
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Backorder
Slips
Step 1a
Step 2
Step 3a
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 If your available inventory entails more cases of beer than your first
BACKORDER slip, then move as many cases of beer as written in this
BACKORDER slip to the first SHIPPING DELAY to your left.
 If your available inventory entails less cases of beer than your first
BACKORDER slip, then move as many cases of beer as you have left in
your inventory to the first SHIPPING DELAY to your left.
Step 3b: Attach the appropriate BACKORDER slip to the cases of beer
you just shipped to your wholesaler.
 If you shipped to your wholesaler all the cases of beer written in the first
BACKORDER slip, then attach this BACKORDER slip to the cases of
beer you just shipped.
 If you shipped to your wholesaler only a part of the quantity written in
the first BACKORDER slip, then correct the backorder slip by: i.
crossing out with your pen its right hand side
column (WHOLESALER ORDER
QUANTITY) and ii. writing with your pen the
exact quantity that you just shipped to your
wholesaler. Attach this backorder slip to the
cases of beer you just shipped. At the side you
can see an example of a corrected backorder slip, where only 1 out of 4
backlogged cases of beer were shipped to the wholesaler.
Step 3c: Create a new BACKORDER slip.
 If you attached a non-corrected BACKORDER slip to your last
shipment, then you should go back to Step 3a, for as long as you have
remaining BACKORDER slip(s) and available inventory left.
 If you attached a corrected BACKORDER slip to your last shipment,
then complete an empty BACKORDER slip
with the quantity that you did not have
sufficient inventory to ship and place it as the
first of your BACKORDER slip(s). For the
example given above, the new BACKORDER
slip should look like as is shown at the side.
After placing the new BACKORDER slip at the top of all
BACKORDER slip(s), you should wait for your partners to complete
Step 3, so that you can proceed at the same time with them to Step 4.
 When you run out of available inventory or you have satisfied all your
BACKORDER slip(s), then you should wait for your partners to
Manufactu
rer Price
Wholesaler
Order Qty
Manufactu
rer Price
Wholesaler
Order Qty
4
£1.5
3£1.5
1
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complete Step 3, so that you can proceed at the same time with them to
Step 4.
Step 4: FILL INCOMING ORDERS, depending on your available
inventory
Step 4a: Lift incoming order.
Step 4b: Fill as much of the INCOMING ORDER
quantity as you can.
 If your available inventory entails more cases of
beer than your INCOMING ORDER, then move as
many cases of beer as written in this INCOMING
ORDER to the first SHIPPING DELAY to your left.
 If your available inventory entails less cases of
beer than your INCOMING ORDER (or is zero), then
move as many cases of beer as you have left in your
inventory to the first SHIPPING DELAY to your left.
Step 4c: Attach the appropriate slip to the cases of
beer you just shipped to your wholesaler.
 If you shipped to your wholesaler all the cases of beer written in the
INCOMING ORDER, then attach this INCOMING ORDER slip to the
cases of beer you just shipped.
 If you shipped to your wholesaler only a part of the quantity written in
the INCOMING ORDER, then correct this slip by: i. crossing out with
your pen its right hand side column
(WHOLESALER ORDER QUANTITY) and
ii. writing with your pen the exact quantity that
you just shipped to your wholesaler. Attach
this backorder slip to the cases of beer you just
shipped. At the side you can see an example of
a corrected INCOMING ORDER slip, where only 1 out of 4 ordered
cases of beer were shipped to the wholesaler.
 If you did not have any inventory left and, for this reason, did not send
anything to your wholesaler, then place your INCOMING ORDER slip
as the last of your BACKORDER SLIP(s), if any. Then, you should wait
for your partners to complete Step 4, so that you can proceed at the same
time with them to Step 5.
Production Delay
Production Delay
Raw
Materials
Shipping Delay
MANUFACTURER
Current Inventory
Production Requests
4
Backorders
Manufacturer Price
Wholesaler Order
Qty
Manufacturer Price Wholesaler Order
Qty
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Wholesaler
Order Qty
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Step 4b
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Step 4d: Create a new BACKORDER slip.
 If you attached a non-corrected INCOMING ORDER slip to your last
shipment, then you should wait for your partners to complete Step 4,
so that you can proceed at the same time with them to Step 5.
 If you attached a corrected
INCOMING ORDER slip to your last
shipment, then complete an empty
BACKORDER slip with the quantity that
you did not have sufficient inventory to ship
and place it at the section of your board BACKORDER slip(s). For the
example given above, the new BACKORDER slip should look like as is
shown at the side.
Step 5: COMPLETE RECORDS SHEET WITH INVENTORY OR
BACKLOG, if any
 If you have any inventory left, then:
Step 5a: Record your inventory.
Count the number of cases of beer you have left in your inventory and
write this number in this week’s row and column (1) of your records sheet.
For example for the 1st week you write in the first cell of column (1) 12.
 If you have any backorder slips in front of you, then:
Step 5b: Record your backlogged quantity.
Add the quantities included at the right hand side columns of all backorder
slips you have and write this number in this week’s row and column (2) of
your records sheet.
 Please make sure that you either follow Step 5a or Step 5b!
Step 6: Calculate Profits
Step 6a: Calculate this week’s profit Profitt .
Calculate this week’s profit Profitt, according to the following formula, where all
elements (t) can be found in this week’s row of your records sheet. In greater
detail:
Revenuest in column (4), Production Costt in (3), Backlogt in (2) and Inventoryt in
(1).
Profitt = Revenuest – Production Costt – Backlogt - Inventoryt / 2
Manufactu
rer Price
Wholesaler
Order Qty
3£1.5
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Step 6b: Calculate the cumulative profit Cumulative Profitt .
Add to Profitt the value that can be found in the previous row of column (5) of
your records sheet, namely Cumulative Profitt-1 (acc. to the following formula).
Cumulative Profitt = Profitt + Cumulative Profitt-1
Step 6c: Record your cumulative profit.
Write the new cumulative profit in this week’s row and column (5) of your
records sheet.
Step 7: BREW
Introduce production requests from last week into the
first PRODUCTION DELAY square.
Step 8: DECIDE ON YOUR MANUFACTURER PRICE
Step 8a: Decide your manufacturer price.
Decide how much you want to charge your wholesaler for every case of
beer that you deliver. Write this number in this week’s row and column (6)
of your records sheet.
Step 8b: Create a new order slip.
Choose a new (i.e. empty) order slip and
complete its left hand side column with the price
you just wrote in column (6) of your records
sheet.
Step 8c: Pass this order slip on to your
wholesaler.
Production Delay
Production Delay
Raw
Materials
Shipping Delay
MANUFACTURER
Current Inventory
Production Requests
4
Backorders
Manufacturer Price
Wholesaler Order
Qty
Manufacturer Price Wholesaler Order
Qty
Incoming Orders
Manufactu
rer Price
Wholesaler
Order Qty
Step 7
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Step 9: PLACE PRODUCTION REQUESTS
Step 9a: Decide your order quantity.
Decide how many cases of beer you want to order. Write this number in
this week’s row and column (7) of your records sheet.
Step 9b: Create a new PRODUCTION REQUESTS slip.
Choose a new (i.e. empty) PRODUCTION REQUESTS slip and complete
it with the value you just wrote in column (7) of your records sheet.
Step 9c: Place your production requests.
Place the above PRODUCTION REQUESTS slip at
the appropriate position of your board, as illustrated at
the side.
After you have completed Steps 1-9, you should repeat them for the next week,
until your facilitator informs you of the last round of the game.
At the end of the game you will be asked to add your end-of-game cumulative
profit with all your partners’, in order to calculate the total game profit.
Good Luck!!
Production Delay
Production Delay
Raw
Materials
Shipping Delay
MANUFACTURER
Current Inventory
Production Requests
4
Backorders
Manufacturer Price
Wholesaler Order
Qty
Manufacturer Price Wholesaler Order
Qty
Incoming Orders
Step 9c
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GAME RECORDS (BY WEEK)
POSITION: RETAILER TEAM:
_________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Week Inventory Backlog Delivery
Cost
Revenues Cumulative
Profit
Order
Quantity
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Week Inventory Backlog Delivery
Cost
Revenues Cumulative
Profit
Order
Quantity
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
In every week (t) Profit is given by:
Profitt = Revenuest – Delivery Costt – Backlogt - Inventoryt / 2
or
Profitt = (4) – (3) – (2) – (1) /2
The corresponding cumulative profit derives as:
Cumulative Profitt = Profitt + Cumulative Profitt-1.
Appendix B.3: Manufacturer’s Instructions
457
TOTAL GAME PROFIT
TEAM: _______________
POSITION
CUMULATIVE
PROFIT
Retailer
Wholesaler
Manufacturer
TOTAL PROFIT: _________________
B.4 The team optimal solution of the Contract Beer Distribution Game
It follows from relation (6.9) that the prices ݓ ௜ܲ(ݐ) that echelon managers charge
to their respective customers do not have any impact at all on the aggregate
supply chain profits. From (6.9) it also becomes evident that total supply chain
profits ஼ܲ(ݐ) are maximized when all echelon managers take up ordering policies
that simultaneously: i. maximize the retailer’s revenues ܴ1(ݐ); ii. minimize the
manufacturer’s production cost ܵܥܰ(ݐ); and iii. minimize the aggregate inventory
costs ܫܥ஼(ݐ) = ∑ ܫܥ௜(ݐ)ே௜ୀଵ . The objective of minimizing total inventory costs is
studied first, while later on it is demonstrated that the policies that minimize total
inventory costs ܫܥ஼(ݐ) also comply with the dual objective of minimizing the
factory’s production cost ܵܥܰ(ݐ) and maximizing the retailer’s revenues ܴଵ(ݐ).
To this end, it is first explained why the Contract Beer Distribution
Game’s total inventory cost model is equivalent to Chen’s (1999) team model.
According to (6.5) the total supply chain inventory holding and backorder cost is
given by:
ܫܥ஼(ݐ) = ෍ [ℎ௜∙ [ܰܫ ௜(ݐ)]ା + ௜ܾ∙ [ܰܫ ௜(ݐ)]ି]ே
௜ୀଵ
= ෍ [ℎ௜∙ ܣ+ ௜ܾ∙ ܤ]ே
௜ୀଵ
(B.4.1)
In order to establish the connections with Chen’s (1999) existing multi-echelon
inventory model and, thus, be able to make the required comparisons, the
following additional definitions are required:
For any two periods ݐଵ and ݐଶ with ݐଵ < ݐଶ the interval ൣݐଵ,ݐଶ൧signifies
periods ݐଵ, ..., ݐଶ; while (ݐଵ,ݐଶ] ݐଵ + 1, ..., ݐଶ; and [ݐଵ,ݐଶ) ݐଵ, ..., ݐଶ + 1. For
example, ܦ(ݐଵ,ݐଶ] denotes the total customer demand between periods ݐଵ + 1 and
ݐଶ.
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Any echelon’s i installation stock ܵܫ ௜(ݐ) consists of its net inventory and its
outstanding orders, namely orders processed by the upstream supplier, shipments
in transit from the upstream supplier and orders backlogged at the upstream
supplier. Its evolution over time is completely independent of shipments received
and is, therefore, given by:
ܵܫ ௜(ݐଶ) = ܵܫ ௜(ݐଵ) + ݋ܳ ௜(ݐଵ,ݐଶ] − ݋ܳ ௜(ݐଵ − ௜݈ି ଵ,ݐଶ − ௜݈ି ଵ] for 1 < ݅≤ ܰ (B.4.2a)
ܵܫ ଵ(ݐଶ) = ܵܫ ଵ(ݐଵ) + ݋ܳ ଵ(ݐଵ,ݐଶ] − ܦ[ݐଵ,ݐଶ) (B.4.2b)
Any echelon’s i effective echelon inventory position ܲܫ ௜(ݐ) consists of its
effective installation stock at the beginning of period t (namely the part of its
installation stock that excludes the shipments that do not get to i after the total
required lead-time ܯ௜; that is the upstream supplier’s backlog at the time of
receipt of i’s order −ܰܫ ௜ାଵ(ݐ+ ௜݈), if any) and the installation stocks at all
downstream sites in an appropriately time-shifted manner that accommodates the
relevant information delays:
ܲܫ ௜(ݐ) ≝ ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) + ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜,ݐ+ ௜݈] + ܵܫ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) + ⋯+ ܵܫ ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ − ⋯ − ଵ݈) (B.4.3)
Any echelon’s i echelon inventory level ܫܮ௜(ݐ) consists of its on-hand inventory
plus the installation stock of all its successor stages, again in the appropriate
time-shifted way:
ܫܮ௜(ݐ) ≝ ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) + ܵܫ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) + ⋯ + ܵܫ ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ − ⋯ − ଵ݈) (B.4.4)
Since in the Contract Beer Distribution Game only quantities that are
physically kept in a site’s warehouse incur inventory holding charges (and not the
quantities that are backlogged, as in Chen’s model) only positive inventories are
included in expression A of (B.4.1). In addition, each site is only charged for its
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own warehouse’s inventories (and not the quantities in transit to or backlogged
from its downstream customers); while, in addition, no echelon incremental
holding costs apply. For these three reasons, Chen’s (1999) ܫܮ௜(ݐ) requirement in
expression A of (B.4.1) (as given by (B.4.4)) gets simplified in our case to ܰܫ ௜(ݐ)
(given by (6.4)). The same also holds for Chen’s ܫܮଵ(ݐ) expression in B of
(B.4.1) that gets simplified to ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) in our case. At this point it needs to be
clarified that it is because all sites i incur linear backlog penalties ௜ܾ that they are
all included in B (and not only the retailer, as in Chen’s case).
Now that it has been demonstrated why Chen’s formulation of total
inventory holding and backorder costs and (B.4.1) are equivalent, it is also
determined whether Chen’s optimality conditions hold in the case of the Contract
Beer Distribution Game. Chen (1999) relies on three optimality conditions to
apply Chen and Zheng’s (1994) procedure to identify and simplify Clark and
Scarf ‘s (1960) and Federgruen and Zipkin’s (1984) optimum ordering policies.
Although there is no reason for these optimality conditions not to hold in the
Contract Beer Distribution Game’s case, the formal proof is outlined in the
paragraphs that follow.
The definition of installation stocks ܵܫ ௜(ݐ), as given in (B.4.2) is first
considered. If echelon i places an order to its upstream supplier i+1 at time period
t, then this order will be received by i+1 at t+li. Two different cases can be
distinguished. First, the case that i+1 has at time period t+li sufficient inventory to
fully satisfy i’s newly received order (namely ܰܫ ௜ାଵ(ݐ+ ௜݈) ≥ ݋ܳ ௜(ݐ)). In this
case, i’s outstanding orders at time period t become simply the shipments that i
receives from i+1 between the time of delivery of the last shipment (this
shipment was still in transit to i at t), i.e. t-Li, and the time that this new order will
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be received by supplier i+1, i.e. t+li. Therefore: ܵܫ ௜(ݐ) = ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) + ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ−
ܮ௜,ݐ+ ௜݈]. Second, the case that i+1 does not have sufficient inventory at time t+li
to fully satisfy i’s newly received order (namely ܰܫ ௜ାଵ(ݐ+ ௜݈) < ݋ܳ ௜(ݐ)). In this
case, i’s outstanding orders at time period t include, except for the shipments that
i receives from i+1 in the appropriate time interval, i+1’s backlog at that time,
namely −ܰܫ ௜ାଵ(ݐ+ ௜݈). Therefore: ܵܫ ௜(ݐ) = ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) + ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜,ݐ+ ௜݈] −
ܰܫ ௜ାଵ(ݐ+ ௜݈). Combining the two above cases:
ܵܫ ௜(ݐ) = ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) + ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜,ݐ+ ௜݈] − min {0, ܰܫ ௜ାଵ(ݐ+ ௜݈)}
which in turn leads to:
ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) + ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜,ݐ+ ௜݈] ≤ ܵܫ ௜(ݐ) + ܰܫ ௜ାଵ(ݐ+ ௜݈) for i=1,...,N
By adding the quantities ܵܫ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) + ⋯ + ܵܫ ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ − ⋯ − ଵ݈) in both
sides of the above equation, according to (B.4.3) and (B.4.4), the following
relation is obtained:
ܲܫ ௜(ݐ) ≤ ܫܮ௜ାଵ(ݐ+ ௜݈) for i=1,...,N (B.4.5)
(B.4.5) represents Chen’s (1999) first optimality condition.
Attention is now turned to the definition of echelon inventory level ܫܮ௜(ݐ),
as given by (B.4.4). By shifting the echelon inventory level ܫܮ௜(ݐ) by i’s total
lead-time ܯ௜(B.4.4) becomes:
ܫܮ௜(ݐ+ ܯ௜) = ܰܫ ௜(ݐ+ ܯ௜) + ܵܫ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ+ ܯ௜− ௜݈ି ଵ) + ⋯+ ܵܫ ଵ(ݐ+ ܯ௜− ௜݈ି ଵ − ⋯ − ଵ݈) (B.4.6)
By incorporating the inventory balance equations (6.4) and installation stock
balance equations (B.4.2), (B.4.6) becomes:
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ܫܮ௜(ݐ+ ܯ௜) = ܰܫ ௜(ݐ) + ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜,ݐ+ ௜݈]
− ݋ܳ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ,ݐ+ ܯ௜− ௜݈ି ଵ]+ܵܫ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ)+ ݋ܳ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ,ݐ+ ܯ௜− ௜݈ି ଵ]
− ݋ܳ ௜ି ଶ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ − ௜݈ି ଶ,ݐ+ ܯ௜− ௜݈ି ଵ − ௜݈ି ଶ] + ⋯+ ܵܫ ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ − ⋯ − ଵ݈)+ ݋ܳ ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ − … − ଵ݈,ݐ+ ܯ௜− ௜݈ି ଵ − ⋯ − ଵ݈] − ܦ[ݐ
− ௜݈ି ଵ − ⋯ − ଵ݈,ݐ+ ܯ௜− ௜݈ି ଵ − ⋯ − ଵ݈)
According to (B.4.3) the above gets transformed to:
ܫܮ௜(ݐ+ ܯ௜) = ܲܫ ௜(ݐ) − ܦ[ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ − ⋯ − ଵ݈,ݐ+ ܯ௜− ௜݈ି ଵ − ⋯ − ଵ݈) (B.4.7)
(B.4.7) reflects Chen’s (1999) second optimality condition.
Chen’s third optimality concerns echelon inventory levels taken at the
beginning of period ݐ+ ܯ௜, namely before customer demand arises. If exactly the
same procedure as above is followed with time periods shifted before occurrence
of customer demand, it can also be proven that Chen’s third optimality holds.
This straightforward proof is here omitted for reasons of brevity.
This completes the proof that all Chen’s optimality conditions hold in the
Contract Beer Distribution Game case.
In summary, it has so far been proven that the two formulations of total
inventory and backorder costs, that is the one provided by Chen (1999) and (6.10)
are equivalent. In addition, it has been formally proven that all Chen’s optimality
conditions hold in the Contract Beer Distribution Game model. For these
reasons, Chen’s approach to estimate the team optimal solution could also be
adapted in the case of the Contract Beer Distribution Game. The following
functions are first recursively defined for each site i=1,…,N:
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ܩ௜(ݕ) ≝ ܧ{ℎ௜(ݕ−ܦ[ݐ− ℒ ,݅ݐ− ℒ݅+ܯ ]݅)+ ܾ݅ (ݕ−ܦ[ݐ− ℒ ,݅ݐ− ℒ݅+ܯ ]݅)−} (B.4.8)
Clearly, ܩ௜(ݕ) is convex and has a finite minimum point, which is denoted by ௜ܻ.
Therefore, the optimal policy that achieves the lower bound on the long-run
average value of total inventory and backlog costs according to (6.10) is one
where each echelon manager orders to keep his/her installation stock at the
constant level ܼ݅∗, i=1,…,N, where ܼ݅∗ = ܻ .݅ Hence, the precise decision rule that
each echelon manager i needs to follow to attain this minimum total cost is easy
to implement: as soon as local installation stock reaches the optimal target level
௜ܼ
∗, echelon i needs to place an order of size equal to the last received order.
In summary, it has so far been proven that if all echelon managers i placed
orders to maintain their respective optimal target levels ௜ܼ∗, namely according to
(6.10), then the minimum total inventory holding and backlog cost ܫܥை(ݐ) =min {ܫܥை(ݐ)} would be attained. From (6.1b) it can be recognised that if this
policy is followed by the manufacturer, then the manufacturer’s objective to
minimize the production cost for the period ܵܥே (ݐ) would not be contradicted.
According to (6.9), the only thing that still needs to be proven that if the retailer
follows the optimal ordering policy that is given by relation (6.10), then his/her
maximum revenues ܴଵ∗(ݐ) would be attained.
To this end, three distinct cases can be can identified: a). In case the
retailer does not hold any inventory at all at time period t, namely ܰܫ 1(ݐ− 1) +
2ܵ(ݐ− ܮ1) ≤ 0, the retailer receives zero revenues: ܴ1(ݐ) = 0; b). In case the
retailer holds positive inventory, but strictly less than period’s t demand, namely0 < ܰܫ 1(ݐ− 1) + 2ܵ(ݐ− ܮ1) < ܦ(ݐ), then the retailer receives revenues
ܴ1(ݐ) = ݌ ∙ ܰܫ 1(ݐ− 1) + 2ܵ(ݐ− ܮ1), according to (6.2b); c). In case the retailer
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holds inventory that is higher in quantity than period’s t demand, namely
ܰܫ 1(ݐ− 1) + 2ܵ(ݐ− ܮ1) ≥ ܦ(ݐ), the retailer receives revenues ܴ1(ݐ) = ݌ ∙
ܦ(ݐ), according to (6.2b). By comparing these three cases, it is recognised that in
the first two cases the retailer has lost the opportunity to satisfy some, or any, of
the customer demand, which has in turn caused him/her some loss of potential
revenues. For this reason, in order to earn maximum revenues ܴ1∗(ݐ), the retailer
needs to keep sufficient inventory in his/her warehouse to suit the third case.
Nevertheless, keeping too much inventory in the retailer’s warehouse would
unnecessarily increase his/her own inventory holding costs and, thus, the entire
supply chain’s inventory costs. This comes into conflict with the first stated
objective. On the contrary, constantly maintaining the optimal target level 1ܵ∗ ,
according to Chen (1999), would ensure that the retailer holds sufficient
inventory to minimize the retailer’s own backlogs, which means satisfy customer
demand as much as possible. But this also maximizes the retailer’s revenues
ܴ1(ݐ), without compromising minimisation of total inventory and backlog costs.
This proof explains why in case all echelon managers i=1,...,N behaved as
a perfectly rational team and placed orders to their upstream suppliers of size
݋ܳ ௜(ݐ) that maintained their respective optimal target levels ௜ܼ∗, then the first-best
case maximum profit ைܲ∗(ݐ), as given by (6.9), would be attained.
B.5 The individual optimal solution of the Contract Beer Distribution Game
It is assumed that each upstream supplier i+1 is perfectly reliable; namely, each
supplier i+1 always has ample stock to ship all the quantity that was requested
ܯ௜= ௜݈+ ܮ௜ periods ago, that is ݋ܳ ௜(ݐ− ܯ௜). Under this hypothetical scenario,
the inventory of each echelon i increases by the exact order quantities that
echelon manager i placed ܯ௜ time periods before, that is irrespectively of the
shipments that were actually received from the upstream supplier i+1. In addition,
the inventory of echelon i decreases by the quantities that are requested by the
downstream customer i-1. Following this, each echelon manager i always incurs
the shipment (or production) cost that corresponds to his/her own ordered
quantities ܯ௜ time periods ago, namely ܵܥ௜(ݐ) = ݓ ௜ܲାଵ(ݐ− ܯ௜) ∙ ݋ܳ ௜(ݐ− ܯ௜).
First, the problem that the retailer (i=1) is facing is considered. The retailer
needs to determine the order quantity ݍଵ ∶= ݋ܳ ଵ(ݐ) that will maximize his/her
expected net profit, which is: ෠ܲଵ = ܧ{ܴଵ(ݐ) − ܵܥଵ(ݐ) -ܫܥଵ(ݐ)}. Since the
retailer’s revenues depend on his/her inventory availability and customer
demand, it is easily derived that ܴଵ(ݐ) = ݌ ∙ ݉ ݅݊ {ܰܫ ଵ(ݐ),ܦ(ݐ)}, while the
retailer’s inventory holding and backorder cost is, according to relation (6.5):
ܫܥ௜(ݐ) = ℎଵ ∙ [ܰܫ ଵ(ݐ)]ା + ଵܾ ∙ [ܰܫ ଵ(ݐ)]ି . Therefore:
It follows that the retailer’s expected net profit can be calculated from (6.19):
෡ܲ1 = ܧ൛݌ ∙ ݉ ݅݊ {ܰܫ 1(ݐ),ܦ(ݐ)} − ݓ2 ∙ ݍ1(ݐ− ܯ 1) − ℎ1 ∙ [ܰܫ 1(ݐ)]+ − 1ܾ
∙ [ܰܫ 1(ݐ)]−}
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(B.5.1)
The perfectly rational retailer always obeys dominance, namely chooses
the strategy that generates the highest profit and eliminates all other possible
options that would produce lower expected profits. In order, thus, to maximize
the expected value of his/her own profit ଵܲ෢ , among all available policies, the
retailer is assumed to prefer a base stock policy (Chen, 1999; Cachon and
Netessine, 2004; Su, 2008). Hence, the retailer’s problem gets simplified to
identifying the order-up-to level ݖଵ∗ that would maximize his/her respective
individual profit, as is given by (6.19), namely:
(B.5.2)
It is easy to verify that (B.5.2) is concave and, hence, one can easily
determine the best ݖଵ∗ from the first order newsvendor-type condition
ௗ௉భ෢ (௭భ)
ௗ௭భ
= 0:
݌ ∙ ܨ(ݖଵ∗) + (ℎଵ + ଵܾ) ∙ ܨெభାଵ(ݖଵ∗) = ଵܾ + ݌ (B.5.3)
where ݂ reflects the cumulative distribution function of customer demand and
݂ெ భ represents the cumulative distribution function of the customer demand that
has occurred over the last M1 periods.
Next, the problem that an echelon manager i>1 is facing is considered.
Echelon manager i needs to determine the prices ݓ௜= ݓ ௜ܲ(ݐ) and order
quantities ݍ௜= ݋ܳ ௜(ݐ) that would maximize his/her respective profits ෠ܲ௜=
ܧ{ܴ௜(ݐ) − ܵܥ௜(ݐ) -ܫܥ௜(ݐ)}, where his/her respective revenues are given by
෡ܲ1(ݍ1) = ݌ ∙ ∫ ݑ (݂ݑ)݀ݑ+ ݌ ∙ ∫ ݍ1 (݂ݑ)݀ݑ− ݓ2 ∙ ݍ1(ݐ− ܯ 1) − ℎ1 ∙∞ݍ1ݍ10
∫ (ݍ1 − ݑ) ݂ܯ 1+1(ݑ)݀ݑݍ10 − 1ܾ ∙ ∫ (ݑ− ݍ1) ݂ܯ 1+1(ݑ)݀ݑ∞ݍ1
෡ܲ1(ݖ1) = ݌ ∙ ∫ ݑ (݂ݑ)݀ݑ+ ݌ ∙ ∫ ݖ1 (݂ݑ)݀ݑ− ݓ2 ∙ ݍ1(ݐ− ܯ 1) − ℎ1 ∙∞ݖ1ݖ10
∫ (ݖ1 − ݑ) ݂ܯ 1+1(ݑ)݀ݑݖ10 − 1ܾ ∙ ∫ (ݑ− ݖ1) ݂ܯ 1+1(ݑ)݀ݑ∞ݖ1
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ܴ௜(ݐ) = ܵܥ௜ି ଵ(ݐ) = ݓ ௜ܲ(ݐ− ܯ ௜ି ଵ) ∙ ݋ܳ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ܯ ௜ି ଵ), acquisition costs by
ܵܥ௜(ݐ) = ݓ ௜ܲାଵ(ݐ− ܯ௜) ∙ ݋ܳ ௜(ݐ− ܯ௜) and inventory holding costs by ܫܥ௜(ݐ) =
ℎଵ ∙ [ܰܫ ଵ(ݐ)]ା + ଵܾ ∙ [ܰܫ ଵ(ݐ)]ି . It is evident that i'’s decisions in time period t
affect his/her net profit in time period t+Mi. But under study here is the expected
value of net profit ෡ܲ (݅ݐ+ ܯ௜), so it would not make any difference if its
projection after Mi periods is used instead:
A perfectly rational echelon manager always obeys dominance, namely
chooses the strategy that generates the highest profit and eliminates all other
possible options that would produce lower expected profits. In order, thus, to
maximize this expected value పܲ෡(ݓ௜,ݍ௜), echelon manager i is assumed to prefer a
base stock policy, like the retailer (Chen, 1999; Cachon and Netessine, 2004; Su,
2008). Hence, echelon manager’s i problem gets simplified to identifying the
prices ݓ௜∗ and order-up-to level ݖ௜∗ that would maximize his/her respective
individual profit, as is given by (B.5.4):
(B.5.4)
where ௜݂ reflects the probability density function of the demand that partner i
faces (from the incoming from i-1 order) and ௜݂
ெ ೔ the probability density function
of the demand that partner i faces over the last Mi periods.
Application of the Leibnitz’s rule about differentiation under the integral
sign (Flanders, 1973) for the derivatives of first order provides (B.5.5a) and
(B.5.5b):
෠ܲ݅(ݓ ,݅ ݅ݍ ) = ݓ݅∙ ∫ ݑ ݂݅(ݑ)dݑ+ ݓ݅∙ ∫ ݅ݍ ݂݅(ݑ)dݑ− ݓ +݅1 ∙ ݅ݍ − ℎ݅∙∞ݍ݅ݍ݅0
∫ (݅ݖ − ݑ) ݂݅ܯ ݅(ݑ)dݑݍ݅0 − ܾ݅ ∙ ∫ (ݑ− ݅ݍ ) ݂݅ܯ ݅(ݑ)dݑ∞ݍ݅ for 1 < ݅≤ ܰ
෠ܲ݅(ݓ ,݅ ݅ݍ ) = ݓ݅∙ ∫ ݑ ݂݅(ݑ)dݑ+ ݓ݅∙ ∫ ݅ݏ ݂݅(ݑ)dݑ− ݓ +݅1 ∙ ݅ݍ − ℎ݅∙∞݅ݖ݅ݖ0
∫ (݅ݖ − ݑ) ݂݅ܯ ݅(ݑ)dݑ݅ݖ0 − ܾ݅ ∙ ∫ (ݑ− ݅ݖ ) ݂݅ܯ ݅(ݑ)dݑ∞݅ݖ for 1 < ݅≤ ܰ
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߲௉෠೔(ݓ ,݅݅ݖ )
߲ݓ݅
= 0  ∫ ݑ ௜݂(ݑ)݀ݑ௦೔଴ +∫ ݖ௜݂ ௜(ݑ)݀ݑஶ௭೔ = 0 for 1 < ݅≤ ܰ (B.5.5a)
߲௉෠೔(ݓ ,݅݅ݖ )
߲݅ݖ
= 0  ݓ௜∙ ܨ௜(ݖ௜∗) + (ℎ௜+ ௜ܾ) ∙ ܨ௜ெ ೔(ݖ௜∗) = ௜ܾ+ ݓ௜ for
1 < ݅≤ ܰ
(B5.5b)
where ܨ௜ reflects the cumulative distribution function of the demand that echelon
manager i faces (incoming from i-1) and ܨ௜
ெ ೔ the cumulative distribution function
of the demand that echelon manager i faces over the last Mi periods.
In order to establish whether the expected net profit of echelon manager is
concave and, thus, there is a unique maximum, the second order derivative of
(B.5.4) needs to be calculated, according to Leibnitz’s rule. To this end,
following the rule of differentiation under the integral sign (Flanders, 1973) the
derivative of (6.23) is used:
2߲௉෠೔(ݓ ,݅݅ݖ)
߲ݓ݅
మ = ܨ (݅݅ݖ∗) > 0, which is strictly higher than
1 for i>1. Thus, there is a price ݓ௜ that would maximize i's expected value of net
profit.
Equations (B.5.5a) and (B.5.5b) combined offer the set of conditions that
every echelon manager’s price ݓ݅ and quantity ݅ݍ decisions (for i>1) should
satisfy, in order to maximize his/her respective expected value of net profit.
Appendix C
The Contract Beer Distribution Game –
The experiments
C.1 Details about the Gaming Sessions
Sample
Volunteers were recruited from a pool of 2009 Warwick Business School
students (MSc in Management, MSc in Management Science and Operational
Research and MSc in Business Analytics and Consulting). There were in total 12
volunteers who registered their interest to participate in the study. Based on this
level of interest, four were asked to play the role of the manufacturer (i.e. SMAN =
4), denoted as MAN0 to MAN3, four the role of the wholesaler (i.e. SWHL = 4),
denoted as WHL0 to WHL3, and four the role of the retailer (i.e. SRET = 4), denoted
as RET0 to RET3. The participants were randomly assigned to each of the 12
totally available subject codes.
Computer Interface
The first three participants who were invited to the laboratory played the
Contract Beer Distribution Game facing each other over the board. All other
participants were asked to record their decisions in computerized simulation
games of the Contract Beer Distribution Game with three serial echelons (Steckel
et al, 2004). They worked with a computer interface that simulated the interacting
partners’ responses. This computer interface has been adapted from the ABS
model of the Contract Beer Distribution Game that has been developed at the end
of Stage 1 (i.e. Outcome 1).
Written instructions on the required task were distributed to all participants
well in advance of their allocated session so that they could get familiar with the
task and the available software as quickly as possible. The instructions informed
them that the product under study was beer and that it faced stochastic customer
demand.
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In greater detail, although they were made aware that each round’s demand
was independent of any previous round’s, they were not informed about the exact
type of distribution that customer demand followed. The main reason was to
remain consistent with Sterman’s (1989, 1992) original Beer Distribution Game’s
set-up. The participants were also instructed to make decisions that, to their best
knowledge, would make the entire aggregate channel as highly profitable as
possible. But in order to reflect real supply chain interactions as accurately as
possible, participants were not provided information about the aggregate channel
profit that was realised at the end of each round.
The instructions that were distributed to the subjects who played the role of
the retailer are presented in Appendix C.2, while the instructions that were
distributed to the subjects who played the role of the wholesaler and
manufacturer are attached in Appendix C.3 and C.4 respectively. Apart from
written instructions, the participants could address questions both before the start
of the session and during its course. The game could not be re-started, once it had
began.
Customer Demand
The retailers were presented with a customer demand that followed the step-up
function of Sterman’s (1989, 1992) original Beer Distribution Game: namely, it
amounted to 4 cases of beer for the first 4 periods, subsequently (i.e. at time
period 5) it increased to 8 cases of beer and thereafter remained fixed at 8 cases
of beer (Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 1998; Kimbrough et al, 2002; Hieber and
Hartel, 2003; Nienhaus et al, 2006; Steckel et al, 2004). The main reason that the
human retailers were not presented with the customer demand that is discussed in
Chapter 6 (i.e. normal distribution truncated at zero with μ=5 and σ = 2) is to
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simplify all participants’ decision task as much as possible and protect them from
the complications that might be inherent with continuous demand distributions
(Bearden and Rapoport, 2005). The reader should, nevertheless, be reminded at
this point that the ABS model of the Contract Beer Distribution Game that has
been used to infer all conclusions is built on the assumption of the truncated at
zero normal distribution, because this more closely reflects reality, especially in
cases where limited information about the distribution of customer demand is
available (Gallego and Moon, 1993; Son and Sheu, 2008; Ho et al, 2009). The
last point noteworthy of further attention is that only the participants who were
asked to act as the retailer were presented with information about true customer
demand. The reasons that the participants who played all other roles did not have
access to this information were two-fold: first, customer demand did not have any
impact on their respective profits, according to the corresponding relations of
type (6.6); second, this choice was consistent with Sterman’s (1989, 1992)
original Beer Distribution Game set-up.
Duration of Sessions
The total duration of each session was restricted to 2 hours, so that the subjects
would maintain their level of interest and concentration over the course of the
game. In order to give participants some time to get used to their new roles, the
first 10 rounds were used as trial periods. The participants were informed in
advance about the fact that these rounds were only meant for their practice and
would not count towards the final outcome (i.e. ‘dry-run’ periods: Friedman and
Sunder, 1994, pg. 78). In total, each game ran for N=90 consecutive rounds for
each participant (that is, including the trial periods), but the participants were not
aware of the exact session’s duration, so that end-of-game effects could be
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eliminated (Croson and Donohue, 2003; Steckel et al, 2004; Croson and
Donohue, 2005; 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006; Croson et al, 2007). In order to
comply with the minimum sample size requirements and ensure sufficient
statistical power, more than 10 samples for each decision attribute were collected
(Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006), namely 7x10 for price decisions and 8x10 for
order quantity decisions, as given by relations (7.1) and (7.2) respectively. Each
gaming session was followed by debriefing and a post-game interview. This
interview was of open form; its main aim was to strongly encourage participants
to express in words their feelings and thoughts over the course of the game, as
well as explain their underlying mental decision making process. Appendix C.5
provides an illustrative example of what constituted the basis of the conversation
that took place. The list of questions that is therein presented is by no means
exhaustive, but only serves for illustrative purposes.
Financial Incentives
The participants were not offered any financial incentives because there was no
budget available to this end. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether providing
financial incentives would have a significant impact on the inferred decision
making strategies (Smith and Walker, 1993; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Croson,
2002).
Interacting Partners
The previous laboratory investigations of the Beer Distribution Game, as
reviewed in Sub-section 2.2.2, force subjects to play interactively either with each
other (Croson and Donohue, 2003; Steckel et al, 2004; Croson and Donohue,
2005; Croson and Donohue, 2006; Nienhaus et al, 2006; Wu and Katok, 2006;
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Croson et al, 2007) or with automated responses that simulate all the other roles
(Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi, 1998; Hieber and Hartel, 2003). Nevertheless, the
common drawback of these approaches is that participants are asked to interact
with exactly one set of pre-allocated partners whose responses could be either
pre-determined (i.e. interact with a predetermined sequence of decisions) or
specified live, that is during the course of the game (i.e. interact with a person or
a predetermined model). But people might adopt completely different strategies,
when they are given different stimuli. Following this, the main idea is to extend
as much as possible the range of responses that are presented to each human
subject, so that their adopted strategies would depend as little as possible on their
pre-allocated partners. In order to overcome this same problem, in the case of the
Newsvendor Problem setting all participants were presented with exactly the
same series of scenarios that entailed all possible partners’ responses, with
exactly the same order (s. Sub-section 4.3.2). The reason that this approach could
not be applied in the case of the Contract Beer Distribution Game setting is that
the setting is a lot more complicated and, so, the full range of all possible human
reactions could not be predicted with certainty.
That is why an alternative approach is used for the Contract Beer
Distribution Game. In order to improve the accuracy of subjects’ deduced
decision making strategies, each subject needs to be assigned to more than one
interaction (or else treatment factor combinations or else ‘supply chain
configurations’). However, participants could not be asked to visit the laboratory
more than once and also could not be asked to participate in sessions that would
exceed the limit of 2 hours. Otherwise, their levels of interest and concentration
might decline (Camerer, 1995; Duffy, 2006). The result is that a dual objective
has to be satisfied: participants need to be allocated to multiple supply chain
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configurations, yet within a single and limited in duration session. This is
accomplished by asking participants to interact with the ABS version of the
Contract Beer Distribution Game, where the two remaining roles’ responses are
simulated according to their respective fitted decision models ௜݂
௪௉(௧) and ௜݂௢ொ(௧).
In this way, all human participants could be assigned to any number of
interactions between the decision models ௜݂
௪௉(௧) and ௜݂௢ொ(௧)that had already been
inferred, and to interact with any number of such models that had previously been
inferred.
Following this, the remaining questions are two-fold: first, which were the
specific supply chain configurations to which each human subject was assigned
and second, which was the order by which the different participants were invited
to the laboratory. Answers to both of these questions were provided by the
experimental design named ‘Latin Hypercube Design’ (McKay et al, 1979).
Table C.1.1 outlines the gaming sessions that were conducted, according to the
Latin Hypercube Experimental Design of k=3 treatment factors (i.e. MAN, WHL,
RET) at s=4 levels each. More details on the exact way that this experimental
protocol derived from the above Latin Hypercube Design (42, 3) are provided in
Appendix C.6.
The grey shaded row in Table C.1.1 (i.e. Session No. 1) that is separated
from the remaining rows with a dashed line represents the “base” session that was
required to let the iteration between gaming sessions and inference of decision
making strategies begin. To this end, one decision model needed to be deduced
for each available role: one for the manufacturer (MAN0), one for the wholesaler
(WHL0) and one for the retailer (RET0). This is why the subjects who had been
randomly assigned to the subject codes MAN0, WHL0 and RET0 were asked to
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participate in the study first. Since there were no pre-deduced decision models for
these subjects to interact with, they were asked to play with each other
interactively over the board. Once the decisions of MAN0, WHL0 and RET0 were
recorded, the adequate combinations of decision models that would determine
their corresponding ௜݂
௪௉(௧) and ௜݂௢ொ(௧) , according to types (7.1) and (7.2), were
inferred. The exact approach that was used to this end is discussed in some detail
in Sub-section 7.3.3.
Table C.1.1: The Experimental Protocol
Participant Supply Chain Configuration
Session
No.
(i.e. Decision Making Strategy
–ies- to be determined)
(i.e. Known Decision Making
Strategies)
1 MAN0, WHL0, RET0 ---
2 WHL2 MAN0, RET0
3 RET3 WHL2, MAN0
4 RET1
MAN0,WHL2
MAN0,WHL0
5 MAN1 WHL2, RET1
6 WHL3
MAN0, RET0
MAN1, RET0
MAN1,RET1
7 WHL1 MAN1,RET0
8 RET2 MAN1, WHL0
9 MAN2
WHL1, RET2
WHL1, RET0
WHL0, RET3
10 MAN3
WHL1, RET2
WHL0, RET1
WHL0, RET3
The participants who had been assigned to all the other subject codes were
asked to interact with the computer interfaces that have been described in an
earlier paragraph of this sub-section. Table C.1.1 also denotes that in the second
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gaming session (i.e Session No. 2) the decisions of the participant, who had been
assigned the code WHL2, were recorded. This participant was asked to interact
with the fitted decision models of MAN0 and RET0. The result of this second
gaming session was that the decision models ௜݂
௪௉(௧) and ௜݂௢ொ(௧) that corresponded
to WHL2 could be inferred. Subsequently, in the third gaming session (i.e Session
No. 3) the decisions of the participant, who had been assigned the code RET3,
were recorded. This participant was in turn asked to interact with the the fitted
decision models of MAN0 and WHL2. Following this third session, the decision
model ௜݂
௢ொ(௧) that corresponded to RET3 was deduced.
In the next, fourth, gaming session (i.e Session No. 4) the decisions of the
participant, who had been assigned the code RET1, were recorded. This
participant was asked to interact with two different supply chain configurations:
namely, the MAN0 and WHL2 interaction and the MAN0 and WHL0 interaction. The
only difference between this gaming session that comprised of two different
supply chain configurations and the previous gaming sessions that only included
one supply chain configuration was that the sample size of total observations
(N=90) was equally split over the two supply chain configurations that were
under study, with 5 trial periods applied at the beginning of each. At each
beginning, the participants were informed that they would be interacting with a
different set of partners and the game was restarted. The remaining gaming
sessions (Sessions No. 5 - 10) proceeded in exactly the same way.
Table C.1.1 indicates how 50% of the gaming session that were performed
consisted of multiple supply chain configurations. Since the experimental
protocol that was followed derived from the Latin Hypercube Experimental
Design, it satisfied the first objective that was set: namely, allocate participants to
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multiple supply chain configurations. Furthermore, Table C.1.1 demonstrates
how 17 different supply chain configurations were possible within, in total, 10
gaming sessions. This was accomplished by running multiple supply chain
configurations within a single gaming session. In this way, no human subjects
were asked to participate in more than one gaming sessions. Because of the way
that the sampling observations were split over the different supply chain
configurations that were explored in each gaming session, the session durations
were also even. The result was that the second objective that was required from
the experimental protocol was also successfully addressed.
C.2 Debriefing and End-of-Game interview
We would like to take this opportunity to warmly thank you for having taken the time to
participate in the “Beer Game”. Without your help this research would not have been
possible.
Now that the game has ended it is time for you to think about your feelings at the course
of the game:
- How did you feel (i.e. calm, collected, in control or perhaps frazzled, frustrated or at
the mercy of events)?
- What did you think about your automated partners (did you think they showed great
skill, they had your best interests at heart, or they fouled up)?
- Was there any special factor that caused any great difficulties to your decision
making?
- Was there any factor that you considered highly significant to your decisions?
- Did you find any shortcut that was of any help to your decision making process?
- Did you feel that you could effectively use your prices to control the incoming order
quantities that you received from your customer?
- Was there any additional piece of information that you found missing from the game
set-up?
A general observation that has been made from the “Beer Game” is that irrespectively of
your aforementioned feelings, performance of teams is always poor: Even though people
from diverse backgrounds may play, similar patterns always occur. What is even more
important, no way has yet been established to teach and help participants to learn to do
better. The ultimate reason is that it is the structure of our management processes that
creates their decision making behaviour.
If any of the above learning outcomes are of particular interest to you or you have any
ideas about ways to improve the “Beer Game" supply chain, plz. do not hesitate to contact
us. We are looking forward to hearing from you and discussing the above issues in greater
detail.
Sincerely thanking you again,
On behalf of the research team:
Stavrianna Dimitriou
Doctoral Researcher
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Research Supervisors:
Prof. Stewart Robinson
Professor of Operational Research
Associate Dean for Specialist Masters Programmes
Author of the book: “Simulation - The Practice of Model Development and Use”
by John Wiley and Sons (2003)
Dr. Kathy Kotiadis
Assistant Professor of Operational Research
C.3 Retailer’s Instructions
In today’s study you will participate in the “Beer game”: a role playing
simulation designed to investigate management decision making
behaviours. There is no beer in the beer game and the game does not
promote drinking. Indeed, you will be working with your partners to help
the team to which you have been assigned to make the maximum total,
system-wide profits possible. You will participate in the game as the
Retailer.
The Game Scenario
There are three members in each supply chain configuration: a
Manufacturer, a Wholesaler and a Retailer. You will be the retailer; namely
you will be responsible for serving end consumers. You are supplied the
cases of beer that you order by the wholesaler, who is, in turn, supplied by
the manufacturer.
Each round of the game represents a week. Any week’s demand is
completely independent of the demand of any earlier week. Every week
you have to decide: how many cases of beer you want to order.
You pay £0.50 for every case of beer that you keep in your inventory for
one week. You also have to pay £1 for every case of beer demanded by
your customers, but which you are not able to provide (Backlog cost). You
receive £6.5 for every case of beer that you sell to your customers (This is
your selling price).
Your Computer Screen
Your decision
You need to enter your decision for
every round of the game in the
yellow cell.
The Control Panel
1. Click on START GAME to start the
game.
2. After you have entered your
decisions for each round of the game,
click on PROCEED.
3. In case you wish to view a summary
of all previous periods’ results, click
on VIEW SUMMARY.
4. To finish the game click on END
GAME.
Previous Round’s Outcome
You are given the information from the
previous period’s outcome in the blue
cells.
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Instructions of the Game
Step 1: Click on START GAME
For every round of the game (until your facilitator informs you of the
end of the game) repeat the following sequence of steps:
Step 2: Observe any of the information that is given to you in the blue
coloured cells that you feel is relevant to the decisions you have to make:
Cumulative Profit: The total profit you have realised until this round of the
game (in £’s). It includes: i. the earnings you just received from your
customer, ii. the cost you have to pay to your wholesaler for the shipment
you just received, iii. your weekly inventory cost and iv. your weekly
backlog cost. All weekly profits are aggregated to give the cumulative
profit.
Wholesaler Price: The price that your wholesaler is currently charging you
for every case of beer that he/she delivers to you.
Previous Period’s Order Quantity: The order quantity that you placed in
last period to your wholesaler.
Incoming Beer from Wholesaler – This is the shipment that you now
received from your wholesaler. He/she had shipped this quantity two weeks
earlier.
Wholesaler Price: The price that you had agreed to pay your wholesaler for
every case of beer that was delivered to you.
Quantity In Transit: The quantity of incoming beer (in cases of beer) that is
currently in transit to your warehouse.
On-Hand Current Inventory: The number of cases of beer that you
currently have available in your warehouse.
Backlog: The number of cases of beer requested by your customer but you
did not have sufficient inventory left to deliver.
Beer Sent to Retailer - This is the shipment that you just sent to your
customer. He/She will be able to receive this shipment two weeks later.
Quantity: The number of cases of beer that you have now shipped to your
customer.
Demand– This is the demand that you are now facing.
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Quantity: The number of cases of beer that you now have to ship to your
customer.
Step 3: Decide your order quantity (yellow coloured cell). Press ENTER.
Step 4: Click on PROCEED.
Step 5: Repeat the above sequence of steps for the next round of the game.
If, at any point during the game, you wish to view a summary of the
results acquired, then you should click on VIEW SUMMARY.
When your facilitator informs you of the end of the game, then you
should make your decisions for the last round of the game and click on
END GAME.
Your facilitator will be constantly with you to guide you and assist you in
any questions you might have. Plz. do not hesitate to ask any clarification
you might feel you need!
Good Luck!!
C.4 Wholesaler’s Instructions
In today’s study you will participate in the “Beer game”: a role playing
simulation designed to investigate management decision making
behaviours. There is no beer in the beer game and the game does not
promote drinking. Indeed, you will be working with your partners to help
the team to which you have been assigned to make the maximum total,
system-wide profits possible. You will participate in the game as the
Wholesaler.
The Game Scenario
There are three members in each supply chain configuration: a
Manufacturer, a Wholesaler and a Retailer. You will be the wholesaler;
namely you will be responsible for supplying the retailer. Your customer,
the retailer, in turn, serves end consumers. You are supplied the cases of
beer that you order by the manufacturer.
Each round of the game represents a week. Every week you have to decide:
i. how much you want to charge your retailer for every case of beer that
you deliver to him and ii. how many cases of beer you want to order.
You pay £0.50 for every case of beer that you keep in your inventory for
one week. You also have to pay £1 for every case of beer requested by
your retailer, but which you are not able to supply.
Your Computer Screen
The Control Panel
1. Click on START GAME to start the
game.
2. After you have entered your
decisions for each round of the game,
click on PROCEED.
3. In case you wish to view a summary
of all previous periods’ results, click
on VIEW SUMMARY.
4. To finish the game click on END
GAME.
Previous Round’s Outcome
You are given the information
from the previous period’s
outcome in the blue cells.
Your decisions
You need to enter your decisions for every round of the
game in the yellow cells.
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Instructions of the Game
Step 1: Click on START GAME
For every round of the game (until your facilitator informs you of the
end of the game) repeat the following sequence of steps:
Step 2: Observe any of the information that is given to you in the blue
coloured cells that you feel is relevant to the decisions you have to make:
Cumulative Profit: The total profit you have realised until this round of the
game (in £’s). It includes: i. the earnings you just received from your
retailer, ii. the cost you have to pay to your manufacturer for the shipment
you just received, iii. your weekly inventory cost and iv. your weekly
backlog cost. All weekly profits are aggregated to give the cumulative
profit.
Manufacturer Price: The price that your manufacturer is currently charging
you for every case of beer that he/she delivers to you.
Previous Period’s Price: The price that you decided in last period to charge
your retailer.
Previous Period’s Order Quantity: The order quantity that you placed in
last period to your manufacturer.
Incoming Beer from Manufacturer – This is the shipment that you now
received from your manufacturer. He/She had shipped this quantity two
weeks earlier.
Manufacturer Price: The price that you had agreed to pay your
manufacturer for every case of beer that was delivered to you.
Quantity In Transit: The quantity of incoming beer (in cases of beer) that is
currently in transit to your warehouse.
On-Hand Current Inventory: The number of cases of beer that you
currently have available in your warehouse.
Backlog: The number of cases of beer requested by your retailer but you
did not have sufficient inventory left to deliver.
Beer Sent to Retailer - This is the shipment that you now sent to your
retailer. He/she will be able to receive this shipment two weeks later.
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Wholesaler Price: The price you had agreed with your retailer to be paid
for every case of beer that you would deliver to him.
Retailer Order Quantity: The number of cases of beer that you have now
shipped to your retailer.
Incoming Order from Retailer – This is the order that you now received
from your retailer. He/She had placed this order one week earlier.
Wholesaler Price: The price you had agreed with your retailer to be paid
for every case of beer that you would deliver to him.
Retailer Order Quantity: The number of cases of beer that you now have to
ship to the retailer.
Step 3: Decide your wholesaler price (first yellow coloured cell). Press
ENTER.
Step 4: Decide your order quantity (second yellow coloured cell). Press
ENTER.
Step 5: Click on PROCEED.
Step 6: Repeat the above sequence of steps for the next round of the game.
If, at any point during the game, you wish to view a summary of the
results acquired, then you should click on VIEW SUMMARY.
When your facilitator informs you of the end of the game, then you
should make your decisions for the last round of the game and click on
END GAME.
Your facilitator will be constantly with you to guide you and assist you in
any questions you might have. Plz. do not hesitate to ask any clarification
you might feel you need!
Good Luck!!
C.5 Manufacturer’s Instructions
In today’s study you will participate in the “Beer game”: a role playing
simulation designed to investigate management decision making
behaviours. There is no beer in the beer game and the game does not
promote drinking. Indeed, you will be working with your partners to help
the team to which you have been assigned to make the maximum total,
system-wide profits possible. You will participate in the game as the
Manufacturer.
The Game Scenario
There are three members in each supply chain configuration: a
Manufacturer, a Wholesaler and a Retailer. You will be the manufacturer;
namely you will be responsible for producing and supplying to the
wholesaler the cases of beer that he/she orders. Your customer, the
wholesaler, is responsible for supplying the retailer. You, as the
manufacturer, face no capacity constraints and you can assume that you are
able to produce as much as you order.
Each round of the game represents a week. Every week you have to decide:
i. how much you want to charge your wholesaler for every case of beer that
you deliver to him and ii. how many cases of beer you want to order.
For every case of beer that you produce you pay £0.50 (fixed production
cost). You also pay £0.50 for every case of beer that you keep in your
inventory for one week. Last, you pay £1 for every case of beer requested
by your wholesaler, but which you are not able to supply (demand in
backlog).
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Your Computer Screen
Instructions of the Game
Step 1: Click on START GAME
For every round of the game (until your facilitator informs you of the
end of the game) repeat the following sequence of steps:
Step 2: Observe any of the information that is given to you in the blue
coloured cells that you feel is relevant to the decisions you have to make:
Cumulative Profit: The total profit you have realised until this round of the
game (in £’s). It includes: i. the earnings you just received from your
wholesaler, ii. the cost you have to incur for producing your requested
cases of beer, iii. your weekly inventory cost and iv. your weekly backlog
cost. All weekly profits are aggregated to give the cumulative profit.
Previous Round’s Outcome
You are given the information from
the previous period’s outcome in the
blue cells.
The Control Panel
1. Click on START GAME to start
the game.
2. After you have entered your
decisions for each round of the
game, click on PROCEED.
3. In case you wish to view a
summary of all previous periods’
results, click on VIEW
SUMMARY.
4. To finish the game click on END
GAME.
Your decisions
You need to enter your decisions for
every round of the game in the
yellow cells.
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Fixed Production Cost: The fixed production cost you have to incur for
every case of beer that you produce.
Previous Period’s Price: The price that you decided in last period to charge
your wholesaler.
Previous Period’s Production Request: The production request that you
placed in last period.
Incoming Beer from Production – This is the batch that you now received
from production. You had placed a production request for this particular
order three weeks ago.
Quantity In Transit: The quantity of incoming beer (in cases of beer) that is
currently in transit to your warehouse.
On-Hand Current Inventory: The number of cases of beer that you
currently have available in your warehouse.
Backlog: The number of cases of beer requested by your wholesaler but
you did not have sufficient inventory left to deliver.
Beer Sent to Retailer - This is the shipment that you now sent to your
wholesaler. He/she will be able to receive this shipment two weeks later.
Wholesaler Price: The price you had agreed with your retailer to be paid
for every case of beer that you would deliver to him.
Retailer Order Quantity: The number of cases of beer that you have now
shipped to your retailer.
Incoming Order from Wholesaler – This is the order that you now received
from your wholesaler. He/she had placed this order one week earlier.
Manufacturer Price: The price you had agreed with your wholesaler to be
paid for every case of beer that you would deliver to him.
Wholesaler Order Quantity: The number of cases of beer that you now
have to ship to the wholesaler.
Step 3: Decide your manufacturer price (first yellow coloured cell). Press
ENTER.
Step 4: Decide your production request (second yellow coloured cell).
Press ENTER.
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Step 5: Click on PROCEED.
Step 6: Repeat the above sequence of steps for the next round of the game.
If, at any point during the game, you wish to view a summary of the
results acquired, then you should click on VIEW SUMMARY.
When your facilitator informs you of the end of the game, then you
should make your decisions for the last round of the game and click on
END GAME.
Your facilitator will be constantly with you to guide you and assist you in
any questions you might have. Plz. do not hesitate to ask any clarification
you might feel you need!
Good Luck!
C.6 Details about the Experimental Protocol
The Latin Hypercube Design (LHD) was specifically developed by McKay et al.
(1979) to sample responses not osnly on the edges of the hypercube of the area
created by all possible combinations of input factors, but also in its interior. It is a
type of stratified sampling, where each level of an input factor appears exactly
once and each possible factor level combination has an equal probability of
occurrence (Mason et al, 2003; Fang et al, 2006; Kleijnen, 2008).We explain our
reasoning for choosing LHD to base the experimental protocol in the paragraphs
that follow.
Since we were interested in assigning subjects to multiple configurations,
we sought for an experimental design that would sample on the widest range of
possible factor levels (i.e. space filling property: Santner et al, 2003; Kleijnen et
al, 2005). Hence, among all evaluation criteria of experimental designs suggested
by Kleijnen et al. (2005) space filling revealed as the most important for our
purposes. From the variety of designs that was applicable to our needs, as
proposed by Sanchez and Lucas (2002), Kleijnen et al. (2005) and Sanchez
(2005a), LHD was specifically designed to address space filling. Hence, it
derived as the best suited, mostly for the three following reasons: a). it forced
minimal assumptions on response surfaces; b). it enabled efficient sampling over
a wide range of possible input factor levels and c). it ignored interaction and
quadratic terms (of the factor levels) that were outside of the interests of our
study.
We now describe the steps that we had to follow to construct the Latin
Hypercube Sample for k treatment factors at s levels each (Santner et al, 2003;
Fang et al, 2006; Kleijnen, 2008).
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Step 1: Take k independent permutations of integers 1,...,s ߨ௝(1), … ,ߨ௝(ݏ) for
j=1,..., k.
Step 2.1: Take k independent permutations of integers 1,..., s ߨ௝(1), … ,ߨ௝(ݏ) for
j=1,..., k.
Step 2.2: Pair these k independent permutations with the previous k permutations
to create s pairs of factor levels.
Step 3.1: Take k independent permutations of integers 1,..., s ߨ௝(1), … ,ߨ௝(ݏ) for
j=1,..., k.
Step 3.2: Combine these k independent permutations with the previous s pairs of
factor levels to create s2 triplets of factor levels.
This algorithm clearly explains why it dictated the need for s2=16 design
points or supply chain configurations for k factors at s levels each. This is why it
is denoted as LHD(s2, k).
By using the spreadsheet of Sanchez (2005b), based on Cioppa and Lucas’
(2007) recommendations, we composed the list of 16 design points (D.P.)
presented in Table C.6.1 that follows. At this point we would like to remind the
reader that the following 16 supply chain configurations were conducted in
addition to and following the initial BASE configuration (MAN0, WHL0, RET0), in
which all participants were asked to play the game over the board. This is why
this BASE session is illustrated within a row, separated with a dashed line from
the remaining rows of Table C.6.1. The design points (D.P.) that are listed in
Table C.6.1 satisfied all the above specifications of LHD(s2, k).
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Table C.6.1: The Design Points of the Experimental Design LHD(s2, k)
D.P. MAN WHL RET
0 MANo WHL0 RETo
1 MANo WHL 2 RETo
2 MANo WHL 2 RET3
3 MANo WHL 2 RET1
4 MANo WHL 0 RET1
5 MAN1 WHL 2 RET1
6 MANo WHL 3 RETo
7 MAN1 WHL 3 RETo
8 MAN1 WHL 3 RET1
9 MAN 1 WHL 1 RETo
10 MAN 1 WHL 0 RET2
11 MAN 2 WHL 1 RET2
12 MAN 2 WHL 1 RETo
13 MAN 2 WHL 0 RET3
14 MAN 3 WHL 1 RET2
15 MAN 3 WHL 0 RET1
16 MAN 3 WHL 0 RET3
Each supply chain configuration was conducted in the exact order that
Table C.6.1 presents. Each new participant was each time asked to make decisions
on behalf of the only unknown factor level. For example, following the BASE
session and after the decision making strategies of MAN0, WHL0 and RET0 had been
deduced, WHL2 came to the laboratory to play the role of the wholesaler. The
participant who had been randomly assigned the role of WHL2 was asked to
interact with the supply chain configuration MAN0, RET0, because these were the
only manufacturer and retailer decision making strategies that had been
determined so far. The design point 2 of our experimental design forced the
supply chain configuration MAN0, WHL2, RET3. From the above combination of
factor levels the only unknown corresponded to the role of the retailer (RET3). For
this reason, the participant who was randomly assigned the role of RET3 was
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asked to interact with the supply chain configuration MAN0, WHL2. We proceeded
in exactly the same way. Table C.6.2 outlines the gaming sessions that were
conducted, along with the corresponding supply chain configurations.
Table C.6.2: The Experimental Protocol
Supply Chain Configuration Participant
Session No.
D.P.
(s. Table C.5.1)
(i.e. Known Decision
Making Strategies)
(i.e. Decision Making
Strategy –ies- to be
determined)
1 0 --- MAN0, WHL0, RET0
2 1 MANo, RETo WHL 2
3 2 MANo, WHL2 RET 3
4
3 MANo, WHL2
RET 1
4 MANo, WHL0
5 5 WHL2, RET1 MAN 1
6
6 MANo, RET0
WHL 37 MAN1, RET0
8 MAN1, RET1
7 9 MAN1, RET0 WHL 1
8 10 MAN1,WHL0 RET 2
9
11 WHL1, RET2
MAN 212 WHL1, RET0
13 WHL0, RET3
10
14 WHL1, RET2
MAN 215 WHL0, RET1
16 WHL0, RET3
It is clear from Table C.6.2 that by conducting 10 gaming sessions and,
therefore, asking each subject to participate only once, we managed to sample 17
different supply chain configurations. Nevertheless, according to the experimental
protocol applied, not all participants needed to participate in multiple supply chain
configurations; approximately only 50% did: namely, the ones who participated to
sessions 4, 6, 9 and 10. There was no other difference between these sessions and
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the remaining 5 sessions (2, 3, 5, 7 and 8) apart from the fact that the overall
duration of the game (in rounds or time periods) was split over the total number of
supply chain configurations, so that the total duration of the session (in actual
minutes) would not be significantly different across different configurations. The
reason for this specification was that all subjects would remain equally
concentrated and interested over the course of the session. In this regard, the total
duration of all sessions was kept to about 2 hours, including debriefing and brief
interview with each participant at the end. Participants were kindly asked not to
share any of this information with other students that would subsequently
participate in the study.
In summary, by iterating between: (i) recording participants’ decisions; (ii)
deducing decision models; and (iii) using the decision models for subsequent
gaming sessions, this approach has three main advantages over the usual,
sequential approaches:
 it eliminates the risk of deducing decision making strategies that are overly
sensitive to specific role allocation and supply chain configurations;
 it reduces the time requirements of each experimental session, because
decision making delays from different players do not accumulate (i.e. each
subject played the Contract Beer Distribution Game on his/her own pace
without any effect on other players’ decisions);
 it enables gradually building of and, therefore, assuring the validity of the
inferred decision models. The exact approach that was followed to validate
the inferred decision models and assure that they closely followed the
decisions that were truly observed during the course of the simulation game
is described in Sub-section 7.3.3 that discusses the inferred decision models.
C.7 Testing the Assumptions of Multiple Linear Regression
The paragraphs that follow discuss the elaborate tests that were conducted to test
whether all dependent and independent variables of relations (7.5) and (7.6)
satisfied the linearity, normality, and homo-skedasticity requirements of multiple
linear regression (Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006; Fox, 2008). The
corresponding scatterplot matrices were only used as a first indicator to this end.
Figure C.7.1 illustratively presents the scatterplot matrix of is = MAN0 dependent
(i.e. decision variable) and independent (i.e. decision attributes) variables,
following relations (7.5) and (7.6) above, as recorded in the Gaming Session No.
1 of Table 7.8. This particular example is only presented for illustration purposes,
while exactly the same testing procedure was also applied to all remaining
subjects’ datasets of decisions. But since the scatterplot matrix of Figure C.7.1 is
unclear and, therefore, hard to be distinguished, for clarity reasons the
scatterplots of the dependent variable 〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ with the independent
variables < ݓ ௜ܲ(ݐ− 1) >ெ ஺ேబ and < ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ >ெ ஺ேబ are also attached in
Figures C.7.2 and C.7.3 that follow. In the paragraphs that follow the scatterplot
matrix of Figure C.7.1 and the separate sceatteplots of Figures C.7.2 and C.7.3
are discussed.
a) Linearity: The 1st column of Figure’s C.7.1 scatterplot matrix reveals the
existence of a potentially non-linear relationship between any change in the
decision variable price 〈ݓܲ(ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబand the decision attributes: previous
order quantity ݋ܳ ௜(ݐ− 1); shipment in transit ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ− ܮ௜+ 1); incoming
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order quantity ݋ܳ ௜ି ଵ(ݐ− ௜݈ି ଵ) and cumulative profit ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆୲୨ୀଵ .
Figure C.7.1: Scatterplot Matrix of MAN0 dependent and independent variables
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< ݓ ௜ܲ(ݐ− 1) >ெ ஺ேబ
Figure C.7.2: Scatterplot of 〈࢕ࡽ(࢚)〉ࡹ ࡭ࡺ૙with < ݓ ࢏ܲ(࢚− ૚) >ࡹ ࡭ࡺ૙
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The second column of Figure’s C.7.1 scatterplot matrix demonstrates a
non-strictly linear relationship between the decision variable quantity
〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ and the decision attributes: previous order ݋ܳ ௜(ݐ− 1) and
cumulative profit ∑ ୧ܲ( )݆୲୨ୀଵ . Figure C.7.2 more clearly establishes that there was
a linear relationship between 〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ and < ݓ ୧ܲ(ݐ− 1) >ெ ஺ேబ, while the
relationship between 〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ and ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆୲୨ୀଵ might indeed not be linear,
according to Figure C.7.3. In order to additionally confirm that all other
relationships between dependent and independent variables were strictly linear,
partial regression plots were additionally resorted to. Figure C.7.4 indicatively
presents the partial regression plot of 〈ݓܲ(ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబwith ∑ ୧ܲ( )݆୲୨ୀଵ . The red line
going through the centre of the points slopes up, based on that the regression
coefficient of ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆୲୨ୀଵ is positive. Since in Figure C.7.4 no clear curvi-linear
pattern of residuals could be observed, testimony for a non-linear relationship
〈 ݋ܳ
(ݐ)〉 ெ஺ே
బ
< ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ >ெ ஺ேబ
Figure C.7.3: Scatterplot of 〈࢕ࡽ(࢚)〉ࡹ ࡭ࡺ૙with < ∑ ࡼ࢏(࢐)࢚࢐=૚ >ࡹ ࡭ࡺ૙
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between 〈ݓܲ(ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ and ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆୲୨ୀଵ could not be further supported. Exactly the
same procedure was repeated for all remaining pairs of dependent and
independent variables; in this way the existence of non-linear relationships
between the charged price 〈ݓܲ(ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ and the shipment in transit ௜ܵାଵ(ݐ−
ܮ௜+ 1) was established.
b) Normality: Normality was visually inspected via normal histograms and
normal probability plots. Figure C.7.5 indicatively presents the normal
histogram of the residuals of 〈ݓܲ(ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ. Since this normal histogram
appeared ill formed, the normal probability plots were additionally required.
Figure C.7.6 indicatively presents the quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot of MAN0 ‘s
quantity decisions 〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ that plots the quantiles from 〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ data
set statistics against “expected” quantiles from standard normal distribution
(Thode, 2002). The systematic deviations of the data from linearity indicates that
Figure C.7.4: Partial Regression Plot of 〈࢝ࡼ(࢚)〉ࡹ ࡭ࡺ૙with < ∑ ࡼ࢏(࢐)࢚࢐=૚ >ࡹ ࡭ࡺ૙
< ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ >ெ ஺ேబ
〈 ݓ
ܲ
(ݐ)〉 ெ஺ே
బ
< ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ >ெ ஺ேబ
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Figure C.7.5: Normal Histogram of 〈࢝ࡼ(࢚)〉ࡹ ࡭ࡺ૙
MAN0 ‘s quantity decisions were not normally distributed. This was further
supported by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test result, which compares the
〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబdataset with the normal distribution (with mean: 13.543; standard
deviation: 23.700), as presented in Table C.6.1. According to the largest absolute
difference between the empirical observation of 〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబand the theoretical
value of the tested normal distribution (0.284), the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
statistic was calculated equal to 1.679, which exceeded the 5% significance level
critical value of 0.895 (Thode, 2002), which indicated departure from normality
(p>0.07).
The same conclusion could also be drawn from the Darling-Anderson test,
which is generally considered as more reliable, due to its higher power, as it
places more weight on the tails of the distribution (Robinson, 2007). Its results
are presented in Figure C.7.7 that follows.
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Figure C.7.6: Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot of 〈࢕ࡽ(࢚)〉ࡹ ࡭ࡺ૙
Table C.7.1: One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for 〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ܯܣܰ0
Characteristics of 〈࢕ࡽ(࢚)〉ࡹ ࡭ࡺ૙ dataset
Normal Parameters
Mean 13.543
Std. Deviation 23.700
Most Extreme
Differences
Absolute 0.284
Positive 0.250
Negative -0.284
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.679
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .007
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Figure C.7.7: The Darling-Anderson Test for Normality of 〈࢕ࡽ(࢚)〉ࡹ ࡭ࡺ૙
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Figure C.7.7 additionally justifies why the hypothesis that
〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబfollowed the normal distribution was rejected (at the 0.5%
significance level). A further indication of non-normality could also be provided
by Figure’s C.7.1 scatterplot matrix, according to which a high concentration of
〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ values at zero is evident. In greater detail, the distribution of
〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ decisions took strictly non-negative values: namely, it was
continuous on the positive integers, but exhibited an added mass at the value of
zero. Therefore, it seemed to follow, instead of the normal distribution, a type of
mixed compound Poisson distribution (Poisson sum of gamma distributions),
which belonged to the exponential family of distributions (Fox, 2008). But this
distribution with the added mass at the value of zero more closely resembled to
the actual mental decision making process that participants described in the post-
game interviews that they went through in order to make their respective order
quantity decisions: namely, they first decided whether they wished to place an
order; and second, they determined their preferred exact order quantity, that is
provided they wished to place a non-zero order. Similar conclusions could be
drawn for all participants’ order quantity decisions 〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉௜ೞ.
c) Homo-skedasticity: Figure C.7.8 illustrates the plot of
〈ݓܲ(ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబstudentized residuals against the predicted dependent values.
This plot’s graphical comparison with the null plot, illustrated in red colour,
demonstrates that the dispersion of 〈ݓܲ(ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబvariances is unequal. The
lack of a sufficient number of unique spread/level pairs to conduct the
Levene test (Levene, 1960) is another strong indication of the hetero-
skedasticity that was inherent in the data set of 〈ݓܲ(ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ, which,
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nevertheless, did not come as a surprise, given the previously identified non-
normality of at least one of the independent variables. The same procedure
was also followed for all independent variables of MAN0’s ெ݂ ஺ேబ
௢ொ(௧)decision
model of type (7.6), namely ݓܲ (݅ݐ− 1), ݓܲ (݅ݐ),ݓܲ +݅1(t), ݋ܳ (݅ݐ− 1),
ܵ݅+1(ݐ− ݅ܮ+1),݋ܳ −݅1(ݐ− ݈݅−1),ݓ iܲ(ݐ− ݈݅−1), ܰܫ (݅t), ∑ ܲ (݅ )݆ݐ=݆1 and
heteroskedasticity was additionally established for a number of these
variables.
In summary, by following the testing procedure that has been in some
detail described in the preceding paragraphs, departures from linearity, normality
and homo-skedasticity have been confirmed for some of the dependent and
independent variables. For this reason, the simple linear regression models of
types (7.3) and (7.4) could not be considered as adequate to portray participants’
price and order quantity decisions, respectively (Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al,
Figure C.7.8: Residual Plot of 〈࢝ࡼ(࢚)〉ࡹ ࡭ࡺ૙
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2006; Fox, 2008). Appropriate modifications of them needed to be instead
applied.
To this end, the following two remedies are put in force. The first remedy
is that the participants’ order quantity decisions are viewed as two distinct
decisions: (i) whether they wish to place a strictly positive order and, provided
that they do, (ii) exactly to how much would this order quantity amount to. This
remedy addresses the non-normality of the order quantity decisions 〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉௜ೞof
most human participants, namely the added mass at the value of zero that most
participants’ order quantity decisions have. The second remedy is that appropriate
transformations are enforced to the values of the decision attributes that violate
normality. In this way, non-linearity and hetero-skedasticity are additionally
accounted for (Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006).
For illustration purposes the transformations that have been applied to
is=MAN0 decision attributes are subsequently presented. The improvements in
normality, linearity and homo-skedasticity that are offered by these
transformations over the untransformed decision models of is=MAN0 according to
relations (7.3) and (7.4) are subsequently discussed.
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߮ெ ஺ேబቄߣ௢ொయ(௧ି ଵ)ெ ஺ேబ , ݋ܳ ଷ(ݐ− 1)ቅ= [݋ܳ ଷ(ݐ− 1) + 1]ିଶ − 1(−2)
߮ெ ஺ேబቄߣ௢ொయ(௧ି ௅యାଵ)ெ ஺ேబ , ݋ܳ ଷ(ݐ− ܮଷ + 1)ቅ
= [݋ܳ ଷ(ݐ− ܮଷ + 1) + 1]ିଶ − 1(−2)
߮ெ ஺ேబቄߣ௢ொమ(௧ି ௟మ)ிయ , ݋ܳ ଶ(ݐ− ଶ݈)ቅ= [݋ܳ ଶ(ݐ− ଶ݈) + 1]ିଶ − 1(−2)
߮ெ ஺ேయ ቄߣூேయ(௧)ெ ஺ேబ , ܰܫ ଷ(ݐ)ቅ
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−ቈ
(−ܰܫ ଷ(ݐ) + 1)ି଴.ହ − 1(−0.5) ቉, ݂݅ ܰܫ ଷ(ݐ) < 0
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௝ୀଵ
 ≥ 0 
−൥
൫− ∑ ଷܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ + 1൯ି଴.ହ − 1
(−0.5)
൩, ݂݅ ෍ ଷܲ( )݆௧
௝ୀଵ
< 0
Figure C.7.9 presents the scatterplot of MAN0 dependent and independent
variables, after the aforementioned Yeo-Johnson (2000) have been applied. For
reasons of greater clarity, Figure C.7.10 presents the scatterplot of
〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబwith the transformation of < ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ >ெ ஺ேబ.
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Figure C.7.9: Scatterplot Matrix of MAN0 dependent and independent variables
In this regard, the visual comparison of Figure C.7.10 with Figure C.7.3
can clearly demonstrate how the above Yeo-Johnson (2000) transformations
offered satisfying remedies to the linearity, normality and homo-skedasticity
requirements of multiple linear regression.
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Figure C.7.10: Scatterplot of 〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉ெ ஺ேబ with transformed dataset of< ∑ ௜ܲ( )݆୲୨ୀଵ >ெ ஺ேబ
C.8 Details about Generalised Linear Models
Generalized Linear Models (GLMs), originally formulated by Nelder and
Wedderburn (1972) to synthesize and extend linear, logistic and Poisson
regression under a single framework, consist of three components (McCulloch et
al, 2008; Fox, 2008):
 The conditional distribution of the dependent variable, given the values of the
independent variables,
 The linear predictor of all independent variables’ pre-specified
transformations and
 The link function that transforms the expectation of the dependent variable to
the linear predictor.
Hence, transforming the simple linear regression models of type (7.3) and
(7.4) to the corresponding GLMs would involve three distinct steps: First, we
would have to choose the appropriate distribution of the dependent variables (i.e.
some sort of mixed compound Poisson distribution, which with appropriate
algebraic manipulation would be transformed to the common linear-exponential
form of the exponential family of distributions); based on this, we would select
the appropriate link function for different participants’ decision making strategies
(i.e. according to their recorded decisions the log, invese, inverse square, square
root etc. might for example derive as appropriate) and last, we would determine
the exact set of independent variables that should be included in the model (i.e.
we would choose from the list of decision attributes specified in relations (7.3)
and (7.4) the corresponding sub-set of the ones that are statistically significant.
The first step would serve to address the normality and homoskedasticity
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violations of our participants’ decision making models, while the second would
address the linearity violation.
The appropriate modifications that have been developed to adapt GLMs to
the correlation requirements of time-series data (e.g. Kedem and Fokianos, 2002)
turn GLMs particularly attractive for our research purposes. In addition, GLMs
have already been extensively applied in previous experimental research that is
relevant to our study (but is not solely restricted to the behavioural dimension of
the Beer Distribution Game). For example, Lurie and Swaminathan (2009)
directly applied GLMs to their experimentally collected data for the Newsvendor
Problem, while a number of other papers (i.e. Bostian et al, 2008; Su, 2008; Ho et
al, 2009) concentrated on the behavioural models that they proposed to predict
human order quantity decisions in a variety of different settings (i.e. the
Newsvendor problem, the Beer Distribution Game and the Newsvendor problem
with competing retailers) and only resorted to experimentally collected data to
support the validity of these behavioural models.
Yet, we identified three main limitations with the application of GLMs to
determine participants’ is decision making strategies for price 〈ݓܲ(ݐ)〉௜ೞ and
quantity 〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉௜ೞ). First, in GLMs the equivalent to regression coefficients ௞ܽ௜ೞ
and ߚ௞
௜ೞ of relations (7.5) and (7.6) are included in the linear predictor, which is in
turn mirrored to the expectation of the dependent variable via the link function.
Hence, the associations and inter-connections of decision attributes and decision
variables become very complicated and, thus, hard to interpret. It is for this
reason that GLMs could not be easily used to draw insights on the importance
weights that different participants assigned to their decision attributes for each
decision they made. But the ultimate purpose of our study is to systematically
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explore the effect of different decision makers’ individual preferences, priorities
and cognitive limitations on overall supply chain performance, which pre-
assumes deep understanding and classification of participants’ overall adopted
decision making strategies. This is the second reason why we decided to seek for
an alternative way to model participants’ respective decision making strategies.
Third, the post-game interviews we had with participants revealed a more
detailed picture of the mental decision making process that most subjects
undertook to complete their required decision tasks: As already discussed, most
subjects first decided whether they wished to place an order; and second, they
specified their preferred order quantity, that is provided they wished to place an
order. GLMs failed to approximate these distinct decision making steps of
participants.
For the above three reasons we sought for an alternative way to model
participants’ is decision making strategies for price 〈ݓܲ(ݐ)〉௜ೞ and quantity
〈݋ܳ (ݐ)〉௜ೞ); one that would more naturally follow the mental decision making
steps of participants and simultaneously address the violations that disqualified us
from using the linear relations in (7.5) and (7.6) (i.e. linearity, normality and
homoskedasticity).
C.9 Details about Participants’Decision Models
We can clearly see from Table 7.8 that all human retailers (RET0 - RET3) took
considerably into account the currently charged price ݓ ௐܲ (ݐ) for their decision to
place a non-zero order or not. RET0, RET2, RET3 also significantly considered the
previously ordered quantity ݋ܳ ோ(ݐ− 1). RET1 preferred to instead rely on the
shipment in transit towards his warehouse ௐܵ ு௅(ݐ− ܮோா் + 1), which the other
three retailers (RET0, RET2, RET3) almost ignored. This supports that RET0, RET2
and RET3 correctly perceived their previous order quantities as a more reliable
indicator of their outstanding orders than the shipments in transit. Last but not
least, all human retailers (RET0 - RET3) only marginally considered their current
inventory positions ܰܫ ோா்(ݐ) and cumulatively realized profits ∑ ோܲா்( )݆௧௝ୀଵ in
their decisions to place an order or not. Overall, the logistic regression models that
were fitted to human retailers’ decisions to place an order with their upstream
wholesaler explained more than 60% of the total variation existent in their
recorded decisions (according to Nagelkerke R2) and satisfied the by chance
accuracy criterion.
Based on the above observations, we can characterise RET0, RET2 and
RET3 as ‘price and cost sensitive’, since they significantly considered for their
decisions both the price charged to them and their previous order placement
decision, which is an indicator of inventory holding and backlog costs. RET1
derived as more highly ‘price sensitive’, because she only let the currently
charged price to play a significant role in her decision to place an order.
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We can clearly see from Table 7.9 that all human retailers (RET0 - RET3)
significantly considered the currently charged price ݓ ௐܲ (ݐ) for their exact order
quantity decision. On the contrary, RET0 - RET3 marginally considered their
previous order quantities ݋ܳ ோ(ݐ− 1). RET0 - RET3 almost ignored the shipments
in transit from the wholesaler ௐܵ (ݐ− ܮோ + 1).
This ignorance provided further evidence in support of retailers RET0,
RET2, RET3 accurate perception of outstanding orders. As far as current inventory
position ܰܫ ோ(ݐ) is concerned, RET0 considered it significant, while RET1 and
RET3 only marginally considered it. Finally, as for the cumulative realized profit
∑ ோܲ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ , RET0 and RET3 ignored it, while RET1 and RET2 significantly
considered it for their order quantity decisions.
Overall, the regression models that we fitted to each human retailer’s order
quantity decisions are statistically significant at the 10% significance level and
explain more than 70% of the total variation that existed in their recorded
decisions (adj.R2). At this point we find worthwhile to explain that since our
ultimate objective was to attain the highest adjusted coefficients of determination
adj.R2, we kept in the fitted regression models some of the decision attributes that
derived as statistically in-significant, yet of considerable magnitude (e.g. RET2’s
current inventory position ܰܫ ோா்(ݐ)).
In summary, we can characterize RET0 as ‘price conscious’ because he only
let the currently charged wholesaler price to affect to a significant degree his exact
order quantity decision: he considerably took into account neither his current
inventory position nor his realized profit. As for RET1, she revealed as ‘price and
profit conscious’, as she reserved considerable attention to both the currently
charged price and her realized profit. As for RET3, he exhibited exactly the
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complementary strategy, since he was significantly influenced by both the
currently charged price and his current inventory position. It was for this reason
that we labelled RET3 as ‘price and cost conscious’. Finally, RET2 revealed as
‘price and cost and profit conscious’, because the wholesale price, his current
inventory position and his realized profit all factors combined, determined to a
significant degree his quantity decision.
We now try to shed some more light on all our human retailers’ decision
making strategies: RET0 initially considered both the price currently charged to
him by his wholesaler and his previous order placement decision as to whether he
preferred to place a non-zero order or not (i.e. ‘price and cost sensitive’); while
once he had decided to place an order, he exclusively considered price as to how
much did he wish to order (i.e. ‘price conscious’). RET1 appeared overly sensitive
to profit, as price can be considered as an additional indicator of profit-to-be
realized: not only did she exclusively consider the wholesaler price in her decision
to place an order or not (i.e. ‘price sensitive’), but she also let only this price and
her cumulatively realized profit majorly affect her exact order quantity (i.e ‘price
and profit conscious’). RET2 adapted a more thoroughly balanced strategy by
considering both price and cost in his initial order placement decision (i.e.
‘combined price and cost sensitive’) and bearing in mind all three categories of
factors combined in his exact quantity decision, namely price, cost and profit (i.e.
‘price and cost and profit conscious’). RET3’s rationale was somewhat similar, as
profit would simply originate from the combination of the newly charged price
and the total costs incurred. It was most probably for this reason that RET3 took
into account price and cost in his initial order placement decision (i.e. ‘combined
price and cost sensitive’), as well as his subsequent exact order quantity decision
(i.e. ‘price and cost conscious’).
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It is evident from Table 7.9 that all human wholesalers (WHL0 - WHL3)
took considerably into account relevant prices for every new price decision they
made; namely, they accounted for the price currently charged to them ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ)
and/or their own charged price that is attached to their incoming orders
ݓ ௐܲ ு௅(ݐ− ோ݈ா்). WHL0 - WHL3 also chose to take into consideration among the
information that was available to them some indication of how much inventory /
backlog they had: WHL0 chose her previous order quantity ݋ܳ ௐ ு௅(ݐ− 1) ; WHL2
the shipment in transit to his warehouse ெܵ ஺ே (ݐ− ܮௐ ு௅ + 1) and his incoming
order quantity ݋ܳ ோா்(ݐ− ோ݈ா்), in increasing order of importance. WHL1
preferred instead to assign significant priority directly to her inventory availability
ܰܫ ௐ ு௅(ݐ); while WHL3 strived for an almost equivalent consideration of the
shipment in transit to his warehouse ெܵ ஺ே (ݐ− ܮௐ ு௅ + 1), his available inventory
ܰܫ ௐ ு௅(ݐ) and his cumulative realized profit ∑ ௐܲ ு௅( )݆௧௝ୀଵ . Overall the regression
models that we fitted to each human wholesaler’s pricing decisions are
statistically significant at the 10% significance level and explain more than 65%
of the total variation that exists in their recorded decisions (adj.R2).
In summary, all wholesalers WHL0 - WHL3 appeared to manipulate their
prices in a way that would mostly benefit their own respective profits. For WHL3
profits were a significant factor; as for total incurred costs, WHL3 perceived them
as majorly determined by his current inventory position and the shipment to be
received. Therefore, WHL3’s pricing strategy derived almost as a reaction to
profits and inventories, enabling us to characterize him as ‘profit and current
availability reactive’. As for the remaining three wholesalers, WHL0 – WHL2
perceived profits as majorly determined by prices and costs by the aforementioned
indications of inventory availability.
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Hence, in what concerns pricing decisions, WHL2 could be easily
characterized as ‘price and future availability reactive’; WHL1 as ‘price and
present availability reactive’ and WHL0 as ‘price and past order reactive’. This
WHL0’s strategy can be justified by her assumption that her previous order
quantity will soon be delivered by her upstream wholesaler. The latter, however,
might not happen, in case a stock-out at the wholesaler’s site occurs. This WHL0’s
pre-supposition demonstrates her limited apprehension of the complicated
phenomenon taking place, which, nevertheless, might at least partially be
explained by the relatively limited duration of her gaming session. The other three
wholesalers’ pricing strategies support their effective use of prices as a
mechanism that can control new order quantities, based on their own inventory
availabilities.
We can clearly see from Table 7.10 that all human wholesalers (WHL0 -
WHL3) significantly considered both the prices charged to them by their upstream
manufacturers ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ) and their own current prices ݓ ௐܲ ு௅(ݐ) in order to
decide to place a non-zero order; the only exception was WHL1 who almost
ignored her own price and significantly relied only on the manufacturer’s current
price. Since wholesalers WHL0 - WHL3 treated prices as a sufficient measure of
realized profits, they almost ignored their cumulative profits ∑ ௐܲ ு௅( )݆࢚࢐ୀ૚ in
their order placement decisions. In addition, wholesalers WHL0 - WHL3 took
considerably into account some indication of inventory availability: WHL1 its
simplest form, which is the present inventory position ܰܫ ௐ ு௅(ݐ); while the other
three wholesalers its future situation. In this regard, WHL3 only accounted for his
own previous order quantity ݋ܳ ௐ ு௅(ݐ− 1), in opposition to WHL0 and WHL2,
who correctly realized that their future inventory would be given by their own
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previous order quantity ݋ܳ ௐ ு௅(ݐ− 1), combined with their newly received from
the retailer order quantity ݋ܳ ோா்(ݐ− ோ݈ா்). WHL3’s possible underlying
reasoning might be that he would prefer to avoid placing a new order, whenever
he had placed a new order in the preceding period.
In summary, in what concerns order placement decisions, we can
characterize WHL0 and WHL2 as ‘price and future availability sensitive’, WHL1 as
‘price and present availability sensitive’ and WHL3 as ‘price and part future
availability sensitive’. Overall, all human wholesalers’ fitted logistic regression
models explained more than 60% of the total variation inherent in their respective
datasets (according to Nagelkerke R2) and satisfied the by chance accuracy
criterion.
Table 7.10 clearly indicates that all human wholesalers (WHL0 - WHL3) also
accounted for some measure of profitability and inventory availability in their
exact order quantity decisions. WHL0 was the exception: she completely ignored
her inventory availability and resorted to a more degree to the price charged to her
by her upstream supplier ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ) and to a lesser degree to her cumulatively
realized profit ∑ ௐܲ ு௅( )݆௧௝ୀଵ . The other three wholesalers WHL1 – WHL3 relied to
the same objective to some measure of price (i.e. previous own price ݓ ௐܲ ு௅(ݐ−1 for WHL1; current own price ݓܹܲ ܪܮݐfor WHL2; a combination of present
prices for WHL3: own ݓ ௐܲ ு௅(ݐ) and manufacturer’s ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ)) and some of
inventory availability (i.e. shipment in transit from manufacturer ெܵ ஺ே (ݐ−
ܹܮ ܪܮ+1 for WHL1; incoming from retailer order quantity ݋ܳ ܴܧܶݐ−݈ܴ ܧܶ for
WHL2; a combination of shipment in transit from manufacturer ெܵ ஺ே (ݐ−
ܹܮ ܪܮ+1 and current inventory position ܰܫ ܹ ܪܮݐfor WHL3.
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For this reason, in respect to order quantity decisions, we could characterize
WHL1 as ‘price and future availability conscious’, where future availability was
mostly regarded as soon to be received shipments. We could also characterize
WHL2 as ‘price and current availability conscious’, where current availability was
mostly assessed via the just received order quantity. WHL3 derived as ‘price and
present and future availability conscious’: he directly associated his current
availability with his current inventory position; while he regarded future
availability in terms of shipments in transit towards his warehouse. As for WHL0,
she followed a completely different order quantity strategy: since the price
charged by her supplier can be treated as an additional indicator of her own profit-
to-be realized, she resulted as mostly ‘profit conscious’. Overall, the wholesalers’
quantity decision models are statistically significant at the 10% significance level
and explain more than 60% of the recorded dataset’s total variation (adj.R2).
Combining the wholesalers’ order placement and quantity decisions, it is
very interesting to observe that all human wholesalers exhibited complementary
strategies in these two distinct decisions, as if they tried to incorporate as much of
the available information as possible. Namely, although WHL0 considered her
future availability in her order placement decision (i.e. ‘price and future
availability sensitive’), once she had decided to place an order, she was only
concerned about her profitability (i.e. ‘profit conscious’). WHL1 considered
current availability in her order placement decision (i.e. ‘price and present
availability sensitive’), yet future availability in her exact quantity decision (i.e.
‘price and future availability conscious’). WHL2 adopted the completely opposite
strategy: he accounted for his future availability in his order placement decision
(i.e. ‘price and future availability sensitive’), but for his current availability in his
exact quantity decision (i.e. ‘price and present availability conscious’). WHL3
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prioritized, in addition to price, past orders in his order placement decision (i.e.
‘price and part future availability sensitive’) and present and future availability in
his exact quantity decision (i.e. ‘price and present and future availability
conscious’).
We can clearly observe from Table 7.12 that our participant MAN3
simplified his pricing task by constantly charging a fixed price of 3 m.u.
throughout the entire gaming session. As for the remaining human manufacturers
(MAN0 - MAN2), in order to determine their new prices, they significantly relied on
the incoming order price ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ− ௐ݈ ு௅) they charged ௐ݈ ு௅ periods ago.
Nevertheless, it was only MAN2 who managed to successfully associate this past
price with her incoming order quantity ݋ܳ ௐ ு௅(ݐ− ௐ݈ ு௅); F1 associated it with
his own previous order quantity ݋ܳ ெ ஺ே (ݐ− 1); while MAN0 completely ignored
all indicators of inventory availability and/or previous ordering behavior that was
available to him (i.e. previous order quantity ݋ܳ ெ ஺ே (ݐ− 1), shipment in transit
݋ܳ ெ ஺ே (ݐ− ܮௐ ு௅ − 1), incoming order quantity ݋ܳ ௐ ு௅(ݐ− ௐ݈ ு௅), inventory
position ܰܫ ெ ஺ே (ݐ)). In addition to incoming order price ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ− ௐ݈ ு௅) and
previous order quantity ݋ܳ ெ ஺ே (ݐ− 1) in decreasing order of importance, MAN1
marginally considered his cumulatively realized profit ∑ ெܲ ஺ே ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ . Overall, the
pricing models that were fitted to human manufacturers MAN0 - MAN2 are
statistically significant at the 10% significance level and explain more than 70%
of the total variation existent in their respective original datasets (adj.R2).
In summary, MAN0’s pricing strategy mostly depended on the price
attached to his incoming order, turning him, thus, to ‘incoming order price
reactive’. MAN1 paid significant attention to his past order quantity and incoming
order price. For this reason, we could characterize him as ‘past order and
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incoming price reactive’. Following the same rationale, MAN2 was viewed as
‘incoming order and price reactive’; while, finally MAN3, as already recognized,
adapted a ‘fixed pricing’ strategy.
Table 7.13 presents our human manufacturers’ respective order placement
decisions. The price-relevant decision attributes (i.e. ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ− 1), ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ))
were not applicable to MAN3’s case, because he set prices to the fixed value of 3
m.u.. All other manufacturers MAN0 - MAN2 considered their previous price
ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ− 1) unimportant on whether they should now place a new order or not;
MAN0 and MAN2, on the contrary, assigned great importance to their currently
decided price ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ) for their new order placement decision. In addition,
MAN2 considered her cumulatively realized profit ∑ ெܲ ஺ே ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ , but she, like
MAN0, completely ignored all indicators of inventory availability and/or previous
ordering behavior that was available to her. The latter were, in contrast,
considered of utmost importance to MAN3, who appeared to endeavour to
compensate for his lack of consideration of prices by taking into account all other
decision attribute (i.e. previous order ݋ܳ ெ ஺ே (ݐ− 1); shipment in
transit ݋ܳ ெ ஺ே (ݐ− ܮௐ ு௅ − 1); inventory position ܰܫ ெ ஺ே (ݐ)). Among inventory
availability measures, MAN1 limited his attention to present inventory position.
Based on the above observations, we characterized MAN0 as ‘price
sensitive’, MAN1 as ‘present availability sensitive’, MAN2 as ‘price and profit
sensitive’ and, finally, MAN3 as ‘profit and present and future availability
sensitive’. In summary, all logistic regression models that we fitted to human
manufacturers’ order placement decisions explained more than 65% of the total
variation and complied with the by chance accuracy criterion.
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Table 7.14 outlines the decision models that we deduced that our
participants followed to determine the exact quantities of their production
requests, that is provided they desired to place a new production request. It
becomes evident from Table 7.14 that all human manufacturers MAN0 – MAN3
considered at least one indicator of price or profit and at least one of inventory
availability in their respective quantity decisions. The only exception was MAN3
who systematically ignored all measures of price and profit. MAN0 accurately
associated his previous price ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ− 1) with the quantity that he is now
requesting and, thus, prioritized it, while MAN2 failed to make this connection
and, hence, prioritized her current price ݓ ெܲ ஺ே (ݐ) instead. Nevertheless, current
price could successfully be considered as an indicator of MAN2 ‘s future incoming
order quantities and, therefore, MAN2 ‘s higher preference of it could reveal as a
successful strategy. MAN1 considered his cumulatively realized profit
∑ ெܲ ஺ே ( )݆௧௝ୀଵ as more significant and, therefore, resorted to it to make a quantity
decision. Among the available inventory-related measures, all human
manufacturers MAN0 – MAN3 assigned high significance to their respective current
inventory position ܰܫ ெ ஺ே (ݐ), F0 and MAN3 to their corresponding previous order
quantities ݋ܳ ெ ஺ே (ݐ− 1) and MAN1 to the just received order’s quantity
݋ܳ ௐ ு௅(ݐ− ௐ݈ ு௅). It is very interesting that none of our participants perceived the
shipment in transit oQ୑ ୅୒(t − L୑ ୅୒ − 1) of relevance to their quantity
decisions, most probably because they had accurately perceived the assumed
perfect reliability of their production facility.
The above observations guided us to characterize MAN0 ‘s quantity strategy
as ‘past price and present availability conscious’, MAN1 ‘s as ‘profit and present
and future availability conscious’, MAN2 ‘s as ‘present price and present
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availability conscious’; MAN3 ‘s as ‘present and part future availability
conscious’. Overall, the regression models that we fitted to our manufacturers’
quantity decisions are significant at the 10% significance level and explained
more than the 60% observed variation (adj. R2).
Last but not least, we find it very interesting to highlight that only MAN0
appeared to adapt a strategy similar to wholesalers’ tactic to incorporate as much
of the available information as possible. In this regard, MAN0 overall considered
past and present prices and present inventory availability while determining new
production requests. As for the remaining three manufacturers MAN1 – MAN3,
they systematically preferred one of the available decision attributes over all
others: MAN2 price, while MAN1 and MAN3 present inventory availability.

